Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1991

The political thought of Carl F.H. Henry
David L. Weeks
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Weeks, David L., "The political thought of Carl F.H. Henry" (1991). Dissertations. 3031.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3031

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1991 David L. Weeks

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF CARL F. H. HENRY

by
David L. Weeks

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May
1991

Copyright by David L. Weeks, 1991
All Rights Reserved

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is important to acknowledge those who have assisted me on this project. The

members of my committee, James Wiser, Thomas Engeman, Ronald Nash, and Raymond
Tatalovich, are true scholars and gentlemen. I appreciated their gentle prodding, personal
encouragement, and unending patience. I was continually impressed with their sharp
intellects, wise counsel, and thoughtful, reflective responses to my work. Their
gentlemanly demeanor and their commitment to careful scholarship have been an inspiration
tome.
Christopher Flannery provided me with much needed editorial assistance. Moreover,
his keen and thoughtful insights clarified and sharpened my thinking on numerous
occasions. William Mounce solved a myriad of word processing problems and helped
shape the original proposal. Thomas Schreiner read various portions of the text and
offered very helpful comments. The library staff of Azusa Pacific University diligently
sought and retrieved numerous out-of-town and out-of-print sources. The administration
of Azusa Pacific University contributed much needed financial and moral support.
Most of all, I want to acknowledge three people who have stood behind me
throughout my academic career. My parents, Bob and Dorothy Weeks, have provided me
with unending support and encouragement. Their faith in me and their prayers have been a
constant source of moral support. My wife, Debbie, reassured, comforted, sustained, and
supported me throughout the writing of this disseration. Her love, devotion and
longsuffering are beyond measure. As an expression of my sincere appreciation and
affection, this dissertation is dedicated to her.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................

m

Ghapter

I.

INlRODUCTION.................................................................

1

11.

MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING............................................

18

III.

JUDEO-CHRISTIAN THEISM.................................................

58

IV.

TWENTIETH CENTURY CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT........ 121

V.

THE POLITICS OF REGENERATION ........................................ 161

VI.

JUSTICE IN THE TEMPORAL KINGDOM.................................. 193

VII.

PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

VIII.

CONCLUSION.................................................................... 272

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................... 319
VITA .............................................................................................. 349

iv

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, humanity has been plagued with social and political problems.
Political philosophers have fashioned many different solutions in their attempts to attain
justice, bring about peace and maintain public order. The most important efforts in this
regard seem to emerge in times of greatest crisis. I Each crisis returns humanity's attention
to very basic questions. Are there moral, social and political principles which are
universally true and which provide solutions to political problems? If so, how may
mankind learn about them?
Carl F. H. Henry, a leading evangelical statesman, believes that western civilization
is confronted with such a crisis, nihilism. The crisis has profound ramifications for all
areas of life. The solution to the crisis, he claims, will become apparent only when we
"reinvestigate the cohesive intellectual alternative that Judeo-Christian theism offers. "2
The world of politics, in particular, is of special concern to Henry. He bemoans the
fact that conservative Christians abandoned the political enterprise in the first half of the
twentieth century. This error must be rectified. Renewed interest and involvement in
politics is vital. This revival must be preceded by a reinvestigation into basic political
questions. How should an evangelical Christian approach the world of politics? What

1 See James Wiser, Political Theory: A Thematic Inquiry (Chicago, IL: Nelson
Hall, 1986), xi.
2 Carl F. H. Henry, "Twenty Fantasies of a Secular Society," in Christian
Countermoyes in a Decadent Culture (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986), 39.
1

2

guidelines for social and political activism have been made available to humanity via divine
revelation? What do evangelicals have to contribute to the quest for a just political order?
Carl F. H. Henry's stature in the evangelical community is unparalleled.3 Henry is
widely accepted as the elder statesman and preeminent theologian of the evangelical
movement.4 As Kenneth Kantzer, the current editor of Christianity Ioday, wrote of
Henry: "Among evangelicals--left, right or center--Carl F. H. Henry stands without peer
as the honored dean of evangelical theologians ...5
A full understanding of Henry's solution to the crisis of nihilism requires an

3 Bob Patterson, a professor of religion at Baylor University, past president of the
American Academy of Religion and editor for the Journal of Church and State, has written
the only published book-length monograph on Henry. The book was written as a part of
an eighteen volume series edited by Patterson. Speaking of Henry, Patterson wrote: "As
editor of this series ... I had to select an (or the) outstanding American evangelical
theologian about whom to write a book. The choice was simplicity itself--Carl F. H.
Henry, of course. Carl Henry is the prime interpreter of evangelical theology, one of its
leading theoreticians, and now in his 70s the unofficial spokesman for the entire tradition."
Carl F. H. Henry (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983), 9. In addition to the volume on
Henry, the series, entitled "Makers of the Modern Theological Mind," devotes book length
studies to theologians such as Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Rudolf Bultmann, Woltbart
Pannenberg, Emil Brunner, Soren Kierkegaard, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Hans
Kung, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.
4 Several scholars have identified Henry as the most important evangelical
theologian in recent years. For example, Gabriel Fackre, a prominent non-evangelical
theologian, wrote: "If the twentieth century 'evangelical renaissance' in North America has
produced a Michelangelo, that exemplar is surely Carl Henry. Premier theologian, key
figure in its formative institutions, chief public interpreter of its ways and critic of its
wanderings, this renaissance man has left his mark on an epoch .... As evangelical
presence is now widely felt through American society and its churches, its intellectual
leaders are getting a hearing. In this company Henry has no peer." "Carl F. H. Henry," in
A Handbook of Christian Theolo~ians, enl. ed., eds. Martin E. Marty and Dean G.
Peerman (Nashville, TN: Abington, 1984), 583. A. James Reichley, a political scientist,
calls Henry the"leading evangelical theologian of his generation." Reli~on in American
Public Life (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1985), 253. Henry has received
similar recognition in popular circles. Evangelist Billy Graham said of Henry that he is
"intellectually the most eminent of conservative theologians." "Mr. Inside," Newsweek,
15 January 1968, 71. Time magazine described him as the "leading theologian of the
nation's growing evangelical flank." "Theology for the Tent Meeting," Time, 14 February
1977, 82.

5 Kenneth S. Kantzer, Christianity Ioday, 20 May 1983, 72.
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investigation of his philosophical presuppositions. Thus, the starting point for this study
will be Henry's description of the ontological and epistemological foundation for JudeoChristian theism. What are Henry's arguments concerning the supernatural, divine
revelation, and human reason?
After describing Henry's philosophical principles, this study will proceed to its
central concern, namely, to demonstrate how Henry views the nature and direction of
Christian political involvement. He insists that "social concern is an indispensable
ingredient of the evangelistic message. "6 He says:
The evangelical community has a mandate to challenge social injustice wherever it is
found, and to call and strive for social justice--as part of what it means to love God
with one's whole being and one's neighbor as one's self. The Christian is to work
for just government and for just laws.7
Prior to the more substantive portion of this dissertation, the remaining sections of
this chapter will review the importance of this study, explain the research approach, and
provide an outline of the dissertation.
TIIE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STUDY

This study is important for several reasons. First, evangelical Christians are playing
an increasingly important role in contemporary politics. 8 After several decades of political
6 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Purpose of God," in The New Face of Evani:elicalism:
An International Symposium on the Lausanne Covenant. ed. C. Rene Padilla (Downers
Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1976), 23.
7 Carl F. H. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6 vols. (Waco, TX: Word
Books, 1976-82), 4:553.
8 My understanding of contemporary evangelicalism is based upon the following
historical and theological literature: David F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge, eds., Ihk
Eyan~licals: What They Believe. Wbo They Are. Wbere They Are Chan~m~ (Nashville,
TN: Abingdon Press, 1975); Mark Ellingsen, The Evam~elical Moyement: Growth.
Impact. Controversy. Dialo~ (Minneapolis, MN: Augsberg Publishing House, 1988);
Ronald Nash, Evan~elicals In America: Who They Are. What They Believe (Nashville,
TN: Abingdon Press, 1987) and The New Evan~licalism (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Press, 1963); James Hunter, The Comin~ Generation of Evan~elicals (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1986); Richard Quebedeaux, "Conservative and Charismatic
Developments of the Later Twentieth Century," in Encyclopedia of the American Relii:IDus
Experience: Studies of Traditions and Moyements, eds. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
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and social passivity, a resurgence of evangelical activism has occurred in the second half of
the twentieth century.9 Scholars agree that throughout the I800s, evangelical Christians
were one of the most active social and political forces in America 10 With the arrival of the
twentieth century, evangelicals were put on the defensive by a variety of theological and
philosophical challenges. Liberal Protestantism, Darwinian evolution, and Freudian
psychology, among others, all challenged evangelicalism. I I These challenges contributed
Williams (New York, NY: Charles Scribners Sons, I988), 2:963-976; and, Leonard I.
Sweet, ed., The Evan~lical Traciition in America (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
I984).
9 Surveys of recent evangelical political involvement can be found in Robert Booth
Fowler, A New Engagement: Evangelical Political Thought. I966-I976 (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., I982); Samuel S. Hill and Dennis E. Owen, The
New Reli~ous Political Right in America (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, I982); and, Richard
Quebedeaux, The Worldly Evangelicals (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, I980).
For a review of various evangelical political perspectives, see Augustus Cerillo, Jr., and
Murray W. Dempster, Salt and Light: Evangelical Political Thought in Modem America
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, I989), or Darrell Koop, "Currents in
Contemporary American Evangelical Political Thought," (M. A. thesis, College of William
and Mary, I977).
Richard V. Pierard has published several interesting bibliographic articles on the
religious right. See "Bibliography on the New Christian Right," TSF Bulletin 5
(November-December I98I): I-4; "The New Religious Right: A Formidable Force in
American Politics," Choice I 9 (March I 982): 863-879; "The Christian Right,"
Foundations 25 (April-June I982): 2I2-2I7; and, "Evangelicals and the New Political
Conservatism," Evanu;lical Studies Bulletin 5 (May I984): 7-9.
10 Social involvement among nineteenth century American evangelicals is
documented in Timothy Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform in Mid-Nineteenth Centuty
America (New York, NY: Abingdon, I957). See also Leonard Sweet, "NineteenthCentury Evangelicalism," in Encyclopedia of the American Reli~ous Experience, 2:875900. Evangelicals were also active in Great Britain. For example, see Thomas S.
Engeman, "Religion and Political Reform: Wesleyan Methodism in Nineteenth-Century
Britain," Journal of Church and State 24 (I982): 32I-333.
I I Liberal Protestantism was "a somewhat diverse movement in Protestant theology
which arose in the second half of the nineteenth century. Negatively, it is characteriz.ed by
a rather critical attitude to naive biblicism (e.g. to a simplistic affirmation of statements in
the Bible) and to traditional dogmatic formulations of the Christian faith. Positively, it is
concerned to present the spirit of the Christian gospel in contemporary terms and to assert
the importance of the individual's religious experience." "Liberals hold in common a
suspicion of natural or speculative theology; consider dogma an illegitimate mixture of
religion and metaphysics, therefore secondary or dispensable; cherish human freedom and
reason; endorse the application of critical scholarship to the Bible and ecclesiastical
tradition; and emphasize the practical side of religion, especially the ethical imperatives of
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to society's "progressive abandonment of supernaturalism." In response to this intellectual
onslaught, a "siege mentality" resulted and conservative Christians increasingly became
isolated socially and intellectually.12 The label "fundamentalist" was attached to those who
failed to engage in intellectual debate with their modem opponents and who separated
themselves from society at large.13
During this period, Christian social thought became dominated by a liberal social
gospel which "repudiated an individuated conception of moral and social ills in favor of an
interpretation of such phenomena as resulting from social, political, and economic realities
over which the individual had little or no control." 14 Evangelicals were not concerned with
the Hebrew prophets and of Jesus. A classic expression of Liberalism is found in Adolf
von Hamack's (1851-1930) popular What Is Christianity? (1900)." Prominent individuals
included Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918) and Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834). See William McGuire King, "Liberalism," in Encyclopedia
of the American Religious Experience, 2: 1129-1148; "Liberal Protestantism," The Fact on
File Dictiomuy of Religion, ed. John R. Hinnells (New York, NY: Fact File Inc., 1984)
and "Liberal Protestantism," The Dictionazy of Bible and Religion, gen. ed. William H.
Gentz (Nashville, 1N: Abington, 1986).
12 James Davison Hunter, American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the
Ouandruy of Modernity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 28-30.
Marquette sociologist, David 0. Moberg, discusses the transformation of evangelicalism
from a politically and socially active community to the passive pietistic community of tum
of the century fundamentalism in The Great Reversal: Evangelism Versus Social Concern
(Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1972). There were exceptions. For example, in
theological circles, J. Gresham Machen debated and fought against proponents of
theological liberalism. In social circles, organizations such as the Salvation Army
undertook significant humanitarian programs. An interesting account of evangelical social
involvement during this period can be found in Norris Magnuson, Salvation in the Slums:
Evangelical Social Work. 1865-1920 (Grand Rapids, Ml: Baker Book House, 1990).
13 Excellent historical treatments of fundamentalism can be found in Ernest R.
Sandeen, The Roots of Fundamentalism. British and American Millenarianism: 1800-1930
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970); George Marsden, Fundamentalism and
American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth Centwy Evangelicalism. 1870-1925 (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980); and, Douglas Frank, Less Than Conguemrs:
How Evangelicals Entered the Twentieth Centwy (Grand Rapids, Ml: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1986). In addition, one might consult the following article-length
treatments: George M. Marsden, "Fundamentalism," in Encyclopedia of the American
Religious Experience. 2:947-962; and, Nancy T. Ammerman, "North American Protestant
Fundamentalism," in volume one of Fundamentalism Observed (forthcoming).
14 Hunter, American Evao~licalism: Conservative Religion and the Ouandaiy of
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"the endorsement of social concern but [with] the emphasis on social concern to the
exclusion of the spiritual dimensions of faith." 15 Thus, to counteract the liberal emphasis,
they began to ignore social concerns and focus upon evangelism and personal piety.16
After World War II, a distinct movement emerged from the fundamentalist ranks.17
Calling themselves evangelicals, often labeled n~vangelicals, this movement argued that
fundamentalism had gone awry:
... it had a wrong attitude (a suspicion of all who did not hold every doctrine and
practice that fundamentalists did), a wrong strategy (a separatism that aimed at a
totally pure church on the local and denominational levels), and wrong results (it had
not turned the tide of liberalism anywhere nor had it penetrated with its theology into
the social problems of the day).18
Carl Henry's book, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, played an
important role in this movement by reminding conservative Christians of their social
responsibilities.19
Modernity, 28-30.
15 Ibid.
16 In addition, one must acknowledge the rise of a premillennial eschatology in
fundamentalist theological circles which maintained "a sustained pessimism towards the
period owing to their view that the trials of the age are evidences of humankind's total
depravity and of the approaching Second Coming of Christ and the end of time. Thus,
their greatest preoccupation became the salvation of souls." Ibid. A good discussion of
premillennialism during this era can be found in Timothy P. Weber, Llyin~ in the Shadow
of the Second Cowin~: American Premillennialism. 1875-1925 (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1979).
17 For a contemporary attempt by a political scientist to differentiate fundamentalists
from evangelicals, see Corwin Smidt, "Evangelicals Within Contemporary American
Politics: Differentiating Between Fundamentalist and Non-Fundamentalist Evangelicals,"
Western Political Ouanerly 41 (1988): 601-620. Smidt's unpublished article is also
useful, "Evangelicals Versus Fundamentalists: An Analysis of the Political Characteristics
and Importance of Two Major Religious Movements ... " (Presented at the Midwest
Political Science Association Meeting in Chicago, April 1983).
18 R. V. Pierard, "Evangelicalism," in the EvaniCliCal Dictionaiy of Theolo~. ed.
Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 381.
19 Carl F. H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fun<lamentalism (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1947). After being out of print for
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This resurgence of activism has received significant attention since it has been
accompanied by tremendous numerical growth. For example, George Gallop named 1976
as the year of the evangelical when his polls determined that there were as many as 50
million adult evangelicals in the United States.20 This numerical strength illustrates the
potential of evangelicalism as a potent social and political force in modern society. Jeremy

Rifkin argues: "There is no other single cultural force in American life today that has as
much potential as the evangelical community to influence the future direction of this
country."21 Several empirical studies have documented and described this phenomenon
but little is known about the intellectual basis of modern evangelicalism.22 Serious thought
many years, this book is now available as part of a 45 volume facsimile series. See Joel
Carpenter, ed., Two Reformers of Fundamentalism: Harold John Ocken~a and Carl F. H.
~. Fundamentalism in American Religion, 1880-1950, vol. 45 (New York, NY:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988).
20 Quebedeaux, The Worldly Evanielicals, 3-4. While evangelicalism is often
thought of as a movement in the United States, evidence suggests otherwise. Richard
Rodriguez says: "After four Catholic centuries, a new brand of Christianity is catching fire
in Latin America. Latin America ... is turning Protestant. And not just Protestant, but
evangelical." He goes on to say: "At the beginning of the century there were fewer than
200,000 Protestants in all of Latin America Today, one in eight Latin Americans is
Protestant; there are more than 50 million Protestants in Latin America. The rate of
conversion (by one estimate, 400 per hour) leads demographers to predict Latin America
will be evangelical before the end of the 21st century." Los An~eles Times, 13 August
1989, part v, p. 1.
21 Jeremy Rifkin with Ted Howard, The Emeriin~ Order: God in the Aiw of
Scarcity (New York, NY: G. Putnam's Sons, 1979), xi.
22 Many empirical studies have been published in the last decade by both political
scientists and sociologists. Some examples include Robert C. Liebman and Robert
Wunthrow, eds., The New Christian Ri~ht: Mobilization and Le~itimation (New York,
NY: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983); Anson Shupe and William A. Stacey, limn
A~ain Politics and the Moral Majority: What Social Surveys Really Show (New York,
NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1982); Steve Bruce, The Rise and Fall of the New Christian
Ri~t: Conservative Protestant Politics in America. 1978-1988 (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1988); James Hunter, American Evan~licalism: Conservative Reli~on
and the Ouandary of Modernity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983);
Ted Jelen, ed., Reli~ion and Political Behavior in the United States (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1989); Corwin Smidt, ed., Contemporazy Eyan~lical Political
Involvement: An Analysis and Assessment (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1989); Stephen D. Johnson and Joseph B. Tamney, eds., The Political Role of Reli~on in
the United States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); and, David Bromley and Anson
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should be devoted to what the evangelicals can contribute to political discourse. In this
regard, the work of Carl Henry merits close study. He is often identified as the central
figure in the resurgence of evangelical theology and political involvement 23 According to
Patterson:
His influence in theology, personal and social ethics, evangelism and soci~political
involvement is unparalleled among evangelicals, and his writings give promise of
continuing contributions to American thought and life. 24
Second, for many years conservative Christians have been labeled anti-intellectual.25
In an attempt to escape this label, evangelicals have separated themselves from their

fundamentalist counterparts and have sought to achieve a degree of theoretical and
intellectual respectability. Henry is one of the central figures in this regard. Patterson
describes him as "the prime mover in helping evangelical theology in America reassert its
self-respect. "26 Henry sets out to "show that orthodox Christianity is able to answer the
fundamental questions of life as adequately as, if not more adequately than, any other view
would ... 27 He issues a "plea for a vital presentation of redemptive Christianity which does
Shupe, New Christian Politics (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984).
23 University of Wisconsin political scientist, Robert Booth Fowler, calls Henry the
"pioneer within evangelicalism for a new gospel of social concern." A New Engagement,
77. A Lutheran theologian, Mark Ellingsen, says Henry was the "modem trail-blazer in
revitalizing social ethical concern among Evangelicals." The Evangelical Movement:
Growth. Impact Controversy. Dialog, 277. David Moberg concurs: "The first prominent
spokesman calling for a revival of interest in social issues was Carl F. H. Henry." The
Great Reversal: Evangelism Versus Social Concern, 160.
24 Patterson, Carl Herny, 169. Although widely considered a conservative,
Henry's pioneering efforts spawned political involvement among both the religious right
and the evangelical left as represented by Jim Wallis, John Alexander, and Sojourners
magazine. See chapters five and six in Fowler, A New Enga~meot, 77-139.
25 See Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).
26 Patterson, Carl Henry, 9-10.
27 Ibid., 59.
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not obscure its philosophical implications, its social imperatives ... and its revelational
11

base. 28 In part, this study will describe and evaluate Henry's contribution to the
evangelical attempt to shed its anti-intellectual label.
The third reason for this study is the lack of a major substantive work on Carl
Henry's political thought. Several major studies have been written on Henry but none has
concentrated on the nature, direction and philosophical foundation of Henry's political
thought.29 Given the significant influence that Henry has had on the evangelical

28 Quoted in Henry's autobiography, Confessions of a Theolo~ian: An
<Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), 117. Original source was "The Vigor of
the New Evangelicalism," in three parts Christian Life and Times 3 (January, March, April,
1949).
Autobio~hy

29 See the following lengthy studies on Henry. Bob Patterson, Carl F. H. Henry
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983); Miroslav M. Kis, "Revelation and Ethics: Dependence,
Interdependence, Independence? A Comparative Study of Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl F.
H. Henry," (Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Religious Studies, McGill University,
Montreal, 1983 ); Richard Allan Purdy, "Carl Henry and Contemporary Apologetics: An
Assessment of the Rational Apologetic Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of
the Current Impasse Between Refonned and Evangelical Apologetics," (Ph.D. dissertation,
New York University, 1980); Thomas Reginald McNeal, "A Critical Analysis of the
Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F. H. Henry," (Ph.D. dissertation, Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 1986); Randall E. Anderson, "The Symbolic Processing of
Continuity and Change Using the Case of Carl F. H. Henry," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1983); Larry Dean Sharp, "Carl Henry: Neo-Evangelical Theologian,"
(D. Min. thesis, Vanderbilt University Divinity School, 1972); Richard H. Warneck, "The
Theology of Carl F. H. Henry," (S.T.M. thesis, Concordia Seminary, 1968); Murray
Wayne Dempster, "The Role of Scripture in the Social Ethical Writings of Carl F. H.
Henry," (M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1968); and, D. P. Haney, "Carl
F. H. Henry: A Critical Appraisal of Fundamentalism," (M.A. thesis, Earlham College,
1965).
Henry is discussed in several more general studies such as Gerald Stephen Mathisen,
"Evangelical Social Concern: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Legitimization," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Purdue University, 1982); Allen Dale Verhey, "The Use of Scripture in Moral
Discourse: A Case Study of Walter Rauschenbusch," (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
1975); and, Daryl A. Porter, "Christianity Today: Its History and Development," (Th.M.
thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1978).
Several short works on Henry have been completed. A good brief theological review
of Henry can be found in Gabriel Fackre, "Carl F. H. Henry," 583-606. A biographical
sketch is in Russell Chandler, The Overcomers (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1978), 26-39. Henry's role in the reemergence of evangelicals in the world of politics is
addressed in Fowler, A New En~a~ment, 77-93. Also see Bob Patterson, "Carl F. H.
Henry: Apologist of Evangelical Orthodoxy," The Journal of Ministers Personal Librazy,
1, no. 4 (1979), and 2, no. 1 (1980).
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movement, it is important that a full length study of Henry's political thought and its
philosophical foundation be done.
TIIE RESEARCH APPROACH
This study is not apologetical. It will demonstrate the basis for and direction of
Henry's call for evangelical political activism. It will be both a descriptive study and a
critical evaluation. The central question will be: "What is Carl F. H. Henry's
understanding of the nature, direction, and philosophical foundation of Christian political
activism?"
In terms of methodology, the political and philosophical writings of Henry will be

scrutinized carefully and Henry's response to the research question will be described and
analyzed. A very prolific scholar, Henry has written or edited over forty books and several
hundred articles.
Among his philosophical writings, his six volume magnum opus entitled, QQd..
Revelation and Authority, will be most important. 30 In these volumes, Henry focuses on
ontological and epistemological questions and modem attempts to discount biblical
revelation. He has identified the "modem crisis of truth" as the theme for this work. 31 He
insists that humanity is capable of "cognitive" knowledge of God via divine revelation and
he proposes to challenge "encroaching naturalism with its besetting inability to identify

30 The first four volumes focus on epistemology, primarily the question of divine
revelation, and the last two volumes are metaphysical discussions on the nature of God.
Speaking of this project, fellow evangelical Ronald Nash wrote: "Henry's exciting and
creative work will undoubtedly be regarded as the definitive statement of the evangelical
theological consensus for years to come." Christianity Today, 22 February 1980, 38.
Kenneth Briggs, the religious news editor of the New York Times, described these
v<;>lumes as "the most important work of evangelical theology in recent times." New York
Tunes Book Review 3 April 1977, sec. 7, 32. Prominent theologian, J. I. Packer, calls it a
"magnificent achievement," and says it is "quite simply, the best, fullest and most masterly
apologetic account of the evangelical view of scripture that you can find anywhere." ~.
December 1984, 28.
31 Henry, Confessions of a Theolo~ian: An AutobioiWWhy, 312.
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fixed truth and values."32
The view of revelation adopted by Henry is perhaps the most important theological
distinction of contemporary evangelicalism. Most evangelicals insist on "the
indispensability and legitimacy of a belief in cognitive or propositional revelation. n 33
While much of contemporary Protestant theology has "questioned God's ability to
communicate truth to man" and doubted "man's ability to attain knowledge about God," the
evangelicals have held to an older traditional view of revelation. 34 John Hick describes
this traditional understanding of revelation as follows:
In the propositional view, that which is revealed is a body of religious truths
capable of being expressed in propositions. Because a knowledge of these truths is
necessary for man's salvation, God has supernaturally made them known. 35

A more common conception of revelation among twentieth century theologians, and a view
rejected by Henry, is the perspective which:
maintains that revelation consists not in the promulgation of divinely guaranteed
truths but in the performance of self-revealing divine acts within human history.
The locus of revelation is not propositions but events, and its content is not a body
of truths about God but "the living God" revealing himself in his actions toward
man.36

32 Ibid., 356.
33 Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man: The Crisis of Revealed
Truth in Contemporar.y Theolo~ (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1982), 9.
34 Ibid.
35 John Hick, "Revelation," in the Encyclo.pedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards
(New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company and The Free Press, 1967), 5:189.
36 Ibid., 5:190. A helpful discussion of different understandings of revelation can

be found in Avery Dulles, S.J., Mociels of Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1983). Dulles presents five models of revelation. 1. Revelation as Doctrine:
"Revelation is divinely authoritative doctrine inerrantly proposed as God's word by the
Bible or by official church teaching." 2. Revelation as History: "Revelation is the
manifestation of God's saving power by his great deeds in history." 3. Revelation as
Inner Experience: "Revelation is the self-manifestation of God by his intimate presence in
the depths of the human spirit." 4. Revelation as Dialectical Presence: "Revelation is
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Knowledge of "truth" or "propositions" is denied on the basis of "particular theories about
the nature of human knowledge ... [or] ... view[s] of the nature of God ... [or] ...
because of theories about the nature of human language ... 37 Scripture is not divine
revelation itself but is a witness of divine revelation.
As a preeminent exponent of modern evangelicalism, Henry finds the contemporary
conception of revelation untenable. He defends the traditional conception of revelation as
propositional truth as well as those orthodox doctrines based upon it He believes a return
to the traditional understanding of the Christian faith, as represented by modern
evangelicalism, is the solution to the woes of modernity.
Among his political writings, one should start with his call for evangelical social
action in The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism. 38 The character of
Christian political involvement has been a recurrent theme in many articles as well as in
books such as Aswcts of Christian Social Ethics, A PJea for Evanwical Demonstration.

The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, Christian Countemloyes in a Decadent Culture,
and Twili~t of a Great Civilization. 39
God's address to those whom he encounters with his word in Scripture and Christian
proclamation." 5. Revelation as New Awareness: "Revelation is a breakthrough to a
higher level of consciousness as humanity is drawn to a fuller participation in the divine
creativity." (115) Henry is a representative of the first model. Dulles' critique of model
one will be addressed in chapter eight Other useful sources include J. Baillie, The Idea of
Revelation in Recent Thoueht (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1956); H. D.
MacDonald, Theories of Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979); and,
David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theoloey (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress
Press, 1975).
37 Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man, 9.
38 This book is often referred to as the manifesto of the evangelical movement. See
Carpenter's introduction to Two Reformers of Fundamentalism. Donald Bloesch calls this
book the "harbinger of an awakened evangelical social consciousness." The Future of
Evan~elical Christianity: A Call for Unity Amid Diversity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
& Co., Inc, 1983), 30. Robert K. Johnston calls it the "key document in evangelicalism's
emerging social conscience." Evaneelicals at an Impasse (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press,
1979), 78.
39 Asucts of Christian Social Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
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The critical evaluation of Henry's political contributions will include questions
regarding the proper role of government, the nature of political rule, the goals of and
justification for political involvement as well as an analysis of his practical political
prescriptions.
Regarding Henry's understanding of the role of government, one must ask: What are
the goals of political life? Do biblical principles require a minimalist state? Is benevolence,
as argued by Henry, outside the realm of legitimate governmental activity? Should a
government attempt to legislate morality? Does the state have any spiritual functions? For
example, would Henry approve of St. Augustine's call for civil authorities to punish the
heretical Donatists? Concerning the form of government, does the existence of divine
commands for political behavior lend itself more to authoritarianism than to democracy?
Questions regarding the nature of political rule need to be addressed. Does political
rule require a morality different from that expected of individuals? For example, does
public morality permit the use of violence or the telling of a "noble lie" that would be
unacceptable for an individual? Is a Christian faith a prerequisite to true statesmanship?
On the topic of Henry's call for Christian political involvement, one can ask: Why
should Christians engage in political thinking and action? Can men deliberately affect the
course of history through political action? Why is revolution unacceptable for Henry?
When, if ever, is civil disobedience permissible? In addition, two questions raised by
fellow evangelical Lewis Smedes merit attention. Is Henry's reliance on personal
regeneration as the evangelical strategy in social ethics inadequate? Does Henry's stress on
the individual tend to diminish the social part of human nature and thus undermine political

Publishing Co., 1964; reprint, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980); A Plea for
Demonstration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1971 ); The Christian
Mindset in a Secular Society (Portland OR: Multnomah Press, 1984); Christian
Counteonoyes in a Decadent Culture (Portland OR: Multnomah Press, 1986); and,
Twili~ht of a Great Civilization (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1988).
Evan~elical
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community?40
His specific political prescriptions need to be evaluated also. For example, does his
analysis provide sufficient biblical exegesis? Do his political prescriptions logically follow
from his philosophic presuppositions or are they merely a reflection of the conservative
predisposition of the evangelical community as argued by Murray Dempster?41 How can a
believer convince a non-believer to accept the viability and superiority of political
prescriptions based upon a divine revelation that the non-believer rejects? Another question
to be addressed was raised by Gabriel Fackre: Does Henry adequately deal with the
biblical teachings on war and peace, solidarity with the poor and liberation?42
These questions provide a framework for a critical evaluation of Henry's work.
Thus this study will provide a descriptive and critical evaluation of one of evangelicalism's
most prolific and authoritative proponents.

OUILINE
Following the introductory material in this chapter, the second and third chapters of
this study will survey Henry's description of the ontological and epistemological
presuppositions of modem naturalism, classical Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian
theism. While Henry admires the philosophical efforts of classical Greek philosophy-especially the work of Plato and Aristotle--he views their work as inadequate. What,
according to Henry, were their strengths and what were their fatal flaws?
Henry is very interested in the dominant philosophical alternative available today.

40 See Lewis Smedes, "The Evangelicals and the Social Question," The Reformed
Journal 16 (February 1966): 9-13; and, "Where Do We Differ," The Reformed Journal 16
(May-June 1966): 8-10.
41 Dempster, "The Role of Scripture in the Social Ethical Writings of Carl F. H.
Henry." This charge is repeated in regard to other conservative Christian leaders by John
~land Berg, "An Ethical Analysis of Selected Leaders and Issues of the New Religious
Right," (Ph.D. dissertation, Baylor University, 1985), 135-179.
42 Fackre, "Carl F. H. Henry," 606.
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While acknowledging differences among modem thinkers, Henry insists that modernity is
guided by a philosophical orientation that he labels "naturalism...43 This view,
explicitly repudiates the reality of the supernatural, rejects all transcendent revelation
and divine commandments, excludes objective purpose and providence from
history and the cosmos, and forfeits ~ divine plan of salvation or special destiny
that sets man apart from the animals.
When humanity attempts to live according to these presuppositions, Henry insists, "he
drains his own life of meaning and worth and progressively empties his existence of
everything that makes human life desirable...45 He believes "the basic modem
assumptions are trickling their philosophic course to pessimism," and it is now time to
remind humanity that biblical theism offers a philosophically sound and practically useful
alternative. 46
Chapter three is a summary of Henry's effort to articulate a Judeo-Christian view of
life and the world Of particular importance--for Henry as well for the purposes of this
study--will be a review of the roles of reason and revelation. In simple terms, Henry views
reason as "a divinely fashioned instrument for recognizing truth."47 Henry's view of

43 "Not that modem speculation (is) a one-colored cloak. Between rationalists like
Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza, and the empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume,
stands an immovable obstruction. Kantian criticism and Hegelian idealism have their
weighty differences and both together are far removed from Comtean positivism.... Yet
they all ... may be catalogued in federation [when] they declare ... for the ultimate reality
of nature.... Even where Kantian and Hegelian thinkers link man to a world of
supemature or insist that nature is not so ultimate as the Absolute ... [it is a] man-made
realm of supemature and a man-projected Absolute or [they] so merged the realms of nature
and supemature that the one was lost in the other ... " Carl F. H. Henry, Remakin~ the
Modem Mind (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1946), 22-23.
44 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Undoing of the Modem Mind," in Evan~elical Roots, ed.
Kenneth Kantzer (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1978), 109.
45 Henry, God Revelation and Authority, 1: 140.
46 Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 247.
47 Patterson, Carl Heru:y, 65.
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revelation as propositional in nature also merits close attention. He defines a proposition as
"a verbal statement that is either true or false; it is a rational declaration capable of being
either believed, doubted or denied. "48 Henry asserts that the "Judeo-Christian religion
centers supremely in the living God self-disclosed in his Word, and this biblically attested
11

Word is communicated intelligibly in meaningful sentences. 49 To ignore
the revelation of God as the final ground and source of truth and the good
accommodates and accelerates the contemporary drift to nihilism.... To avert a
nihilistic loss of enduring truth and good, only the recovery of revelation will
suffice.50
After describing the philosophical foundation of Henry's work, the remaining
chapters will focus on Henry's political thought. Chapters four and five describe Henry's
reaction to twentieth century Christian political engagement and reviews the corrective
measures that he prescribes. Calling for a return to evangelical social activism, Henry
bemoans the fact that "one often hears that nonevangelical theology seems to speak ...
directly to the dilemmas of the age [while] evangelical theology ... all too often fails to
project engagingly upon present-day perplexities."51 How have twentieth century nonevangelical Protestant Christians responded? Where have they gone awry? Why is it
essential for evangelical Christians to respond to a call to activism? What is the basis for
this call and what are the practical ramifications of that call?
The sixth chapter addresses several significant questions. What is justice? What do
we know about it? How do we obtain it? Is justice conventional in the sense of being mere
law-abidingness or is it a higher principle to which the state must aspire? What type of

48 Henry, God Revelation and Authority, 3:456.
49 Ibid., 1:27.
50 Ibid., 1:29.
51 Ibid., 1:9-10.
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justice is the temporal kingdom capable of maintaining? What are the proper roles for the
state and the church? What are their responsibilities, duties and limitations? What
responsibilities fall upon the individual and how should one conduct oneself in the often
rough and tumble world of practical politics?
Chapter seven will review Henry's attempt to apply his political thought to practical
political issues. Henry adamantly asserts: "The Bible may not deal with many particular
problems of modem life but it exhibits the only framework in which they may be
pennanently unravelled."52 What principles are available to humanity in Scripture that
provide guidelines to the world of practical politics? How does he apply them to the issues
of today? Contemporary debates over abortion, capital punishment, war and peace,
poverty-relief programs, economic systems and civil rights will be covered.
The concluding chapter will summarize the study and critically evaluate the work of
Henry. In the 1940s, Henry set out to, among other things, "clarify the philosophical
implications of biblical theism" and to "develop a valid social ethic. 11 53 A careful
theoretical analysis will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of his work. What are
the problems, if any, with his analysis? What can we learn from him? What are the
implications for further study for evangelicals? What, indeed, has he contributed to the
quest for a just political order? These questions will be addressed in the closing chapter.

52 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Ominous Drift from Christian Ideals," United
Evan~lical Action. 1February1953, 18.
53 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Vigor of the New Evangelicalism," Christian Life and
~ 3 (March 1948): 35-38, and 3 (April 1948): 32-35, 65-69.
.

CHAPI'ER1WO

MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING

Carl Henry's interest in the history of philosophy is not merely historical. Rather, he
is concerned with man's search for meaning. He looks at the ancient, medieval and
modem philosophers, not as historical curiosities, but as thinkers pursuing seriously the
meaning of the world and of life. Henry believes their search enlightens our understanding
of important philosophical questions and their inadequacies contribute to the argument that
Christianity provides the only sound and logically consistent solution to the problems
perplexing humanity.
Henry identifies three distinct philosophical epochs.1 He says that "each epoch is
distinguished from the others by a diverse way of discerning facts and of assessing their
importance. Peculiar to each is a genius, a certain homogeneity of outlook, which requires
a distinction between them. "2 This chapter will summarize Henry's discussion of ancient
Greek philosophy, medieval Judeo-Christian theism and modem naturalism.

1 "The reason for this tripartite division of history is intellectual or philosophical.
Every culture is seen to have its own motivating impulse and sense of values, raises its
own special questions and provides its own distinctive answers. Each culture relates itself
to reality by its own peculiar methodology--be it reason or revelation or empirical
observation or tentative hypotheses or subjective decision or whatever else." Henry, .000..
Revelation and Authority, 1:31.
2 Carl F. H. Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
~erdmans Publishing Co., 1951 ), 11. As a Christian apologist, Henry is interested in the
m~uence of philosophy on Christianity and with the influence of Christianity on
philosophy. Accordingly, he devotes little attention to Eastern philosophy.
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ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY
The first division in intellectual history is the pericxl of classical Greek philosophy.
Henry says, "when we speak of the ancient mind, we mean that outlook on reality and life
that was shaped by the classic Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle."3 He
looks carefully at these ancient Greeks thinkers and concludes that we can learn from them,
but, in the final analysis, their views are inadequate.
The classical Greek view emerged to challenge the prevalent philosophies of the time.
These ancient idealists, as Henry calls Plato and Aristotle, were primarily responding to

and confronting philosophical naturalism--the view that nature is the sum total of reality.4
The most systematic and consistent ancient Greek naturalist was Democritus. 5 Henry
notes that Democritean philosophy had "reduced nature to the interplay of countless atoms
ruled by chance. In short, he held that nature, or atoms in motion, is the only reality; man
is a complex correlation of such atoms and, consequently, is not immortal; truth and the

3 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:31. "Plato (B.C. 428-347) and Aristotle
(B.C. 384-322) are the most significant Greek philosophic minds because classic ancient
thought rests on their idealistic principles." Henry, Remaking the Modern Mind, 186.
4 Henry refers frequently to Plato and Aristotle as idealists. A note explaining what
he means is in order. He uses the terms idealism and naturalism in a metaphysical sense.
Naturalism refers to the philosophical position that the material world is the sum total of
reality. Ideas and values are derivative. On the other hand, idealism asserts the ultimacy of
the supernatural or spiritual world. Henry writes, "a division of the history of ethics, or of
philosophy, into Naturalism and Idealism, may seem to be unfortunate since, while
Naturalism is a type of metaphysics, Idealism is tcxlay usually thought of as a type of
epistemology.... But the terms are used here to designate contrastive metaphysical views:
the one asserts the contingency of the mental and spiritual, and the other its absoluteness
and ultimacy." Carl F. H. Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1977), 22.
5 "This idealistic frame was consciously opposed to the naturalistic school which in
G~k antiquity had come to its most systematic expression in Democritus. The classic
philosophers realized that if Democritus remained unchallenged, Greek culture was
doomed." Henry, The Drift of Western Thought. 15. "Democritus stands out as one of
th~ key p~ilosophers of antiquity because, postulating materialism as an all-inclusive
philosoph1cal principle, he endeavored systematically to develop its implications." Henry,
Remaking the Modern Mind, 80.
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good. like everything else, are changing and relative. 6
11

The Greek philosophers argued that a systematic application of naturalism would
undermine civilization. They reasoned that "if nothing endures ... , if chance and change
penneate all reality, including truth and goodness ... then human life loses meaning and
purpose ... "7 Thus, Democritean philosophy "robbed human life and nature of purpose"
and "offered no basis for a durable Greek culture... g Democritus was guilty of this, they
argued, because he eliminated the categories of formal and final causation.
Explain men and things wholly in terms of efficient causation, account for effects
by the mere reference to whatever causes immediately precede them, and one
critically banishes the realm of ends, or final causes, for the sake of which all things
exist.9
Thus, "Democritus's theory rules out purpose or teleology; everything evolves from a
combination of necessity and chance." 10
Plato and Aristotle insisted there was an alternative, a superior explanation of life and
reality that gave purpose to life. For them:
The universe can be understood only teleologically; a world without meaning and
purpose .... is a meaningless universe, a worthless and purposeless universe; it
becomes necessary to forfeit the significance of everything, human existence and
thinking included.11
This loss of meaning, Plato argued, according to Henry:
flows from the fact that from experience one can gain no uniform idea of the
beautiful, the good, the just, the pious--indeed, of anything. Ideas of categorical
meaning, dealing with judgment predication, must precede experience, else we
6 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:31.
7 Ibid., 1:32.
8 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 16.
9 Ibid.
10 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:31.
11 Ibid.
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cannot account for their existence and claim to universal validity. Therefore, Plato
contends we must know the likeness at which particulars aim before we come to
particular objects of knowledge, since from the latter we could never confidently
distill the universat.12
Thus, "the Greek idealists ... entered the philosophic arena convinced that the case for a
teleological idealism could be rationally proved and that the naturalistic alternative rested on
insufficient reason." l 3
In response to their naturalist antagonists, "Plato and Aristotle stressed the reality and
priority of the supernatural, the qualitative uniqueness of man and the objectivity of morals
... "14 Henry insists that "these great affirmations are at the heart of Socratic-PlatonicAristotelian philosophy" and are the "most important achievement of the ancient mind." 15
Contrary to the teachings of the naturalists, Plato and Aristotle stressed "the reality
and priority of the supernatural." 16 The ancients insisted on an "ontologically real world
of Ideas" as logically prior to man.17 For example, Plato "affirms the existence, alongside
the corporeal sense world, of an immaterial realm of abiding and unchanging essences.
The eternal Ideas, for Plato, constitute the sphere of Being, and are known not by sensation
but by conception." 18 The physical world is not supreme nor is it the limit of reality.19
12 Ibid., 1:285.
13 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 17.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 14.
16 Ibid., 17.
17 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:285-286.
18 Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 187.
l 9 "The world of nature, in the Platonic interpretation, is dependent upon the world
of supemature not for the existence of the formless matter out of which it is shaped, but
ra~er for its pattern or design; that is, it exhibits a logical dependence. But the Ideas,
which comprise the realm of Being, themselves sustain logical relations to each other, with
the Idea of the Good as the highest and ruling idea All reality exists for the sake of this
supreme Idea of the Good; neither the world of nature nor the world of supemature
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To the contrary, "beyond the visible natural world of time and change is an invisible moral
11

and spiritual world that is eternal and unchanging. 20
Henry notes, interestingly, "the conflict between epistemology and ontology, which
is in the forefront of the modern disputes over knowledge, is conspicuously absent.
Thinking is represented as an ontological activity in and through which man comprehends
reality itself."21 The supernatural world was real. We do not know it empirically, only
conceptually, but that does not limit its reality. Henry says:

It is important, then, to emphasize that the "ideas" are not, for classic philosophy,
our own thoughts, but rather are objects of our thoughts; they are realities
apprehended, not ways of apprehending. Man is rational, not because he has
perceptual images ... but because man's mental powers are characterized by an
ontic reference to the world of changeless eternal ideas or forms. 22
Moreover, only to the extent that man knows this reality beyond the material world does
life become meaningful. For "only in relation to an eternal, purposive, spiritual sphere are
11

nature and man meaningful. 23
In regard to human nature, Plato and Aristotle argued for "the qualitative uniqueness

ofman."24 Their view of man, according to Henry, stressed the rationality of man and
man's a priori link to the transcendent world.25 The link was human reason. Henry says:
receives an adequate interpretation except in terms of teleology, or purposive goodness."
Ibid., 188.
20 Ibid.
21 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:288.
22 Henry, Remakin& the Modern Mind, 250.
23 Ibid., 14.
24 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 17.
. 25 "For Plato and Aristotle, man was differentiated from all other creatures by his
rationality. True, his animality linked him as them to the world of nature, to the laws of
wh_ich he was thereby subject. And, since classic Greek thought assumed that matter is evil
or imperfect, life in the body could never fully manifest the perfections of the eternal ideas
or forms of the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics.... Yet the essential goodness of man's

23
Plato held that the eternal ideas innately inhere in the soul of man. The inward eye of
reason is a faculty whereby man can grasp the unchanging eternal "forms" and
"ideas" that constitute the ultimate world By this faculty of reason men can rise
cognitively to the idea of the Good which is the source of all knowledge.26
Thus, "man is qualitatively superior to the animals because of this rational link to the
supernatural; he is not merely a creature of time and space... 27 The rationality of man
makes him distinct Henry explains:
Man, linked by his reason to the eternal ideas or forms, was to that extent lifted out
of his animal creaturehood, and made a participant in the world of supemature as
well as subject to the laws of nature.... As distinguished from all other creatures,
man is a spiritual and moral being; his differentiation from the animals is simply, as
Aristotle puts it, that man is a rational creature. This meant that .... contrary to
other animals man has a conceptual knowledge, can think in terms of universals,
can surmount the realm of flux and change and participate in the eternal forms of
goodness, truth and beauty.28
Thus, "while man is physically an animal, limited by space and time ... he is essentially or
spiritually more than an animal: his mind is an aspect of God's mind, and hence is
11

indestructible and immortal. 29
Epistemologically, the ancients insisted on the "a priori validity of the rational

reason is involved in the Greek assumption that, by his rationality, man has a link with the
world of supemature, or the eternal ideas. For rationality is viewed as a universal and
immortal principle which enters man from without, so that man in his essential or rational
nature is identified with the divine." Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 56. "Uniquely
constituted a rational animal, man has a capacity for valid knowledge in the world of
sensations. Man's possession of timeless universals is explained as a recollection of the
Idea-world inherited from a previous soul life. Plato suspends the a priori element in
human knowledge upon this theory of preexistence and recollection. Unable by perception
alone to come to any real knowledge, human beings can make judgments of general validity
only because experience of the timeless Ideas in a priori existence conditions man's present
experience through recollection." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:286.
26 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:86.
27 Ibid., 1:14.
28 Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 243-244.
29 Ibid.
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elements in experience, in contrast with sensation... 30 They argued that the
a priori factor in human knowledge is thereby connected with the supernatural
rational order. Man's rational experience is made possible only by a divine Mind, a
hierarchy of changeless Ideas, in which particulars gain their only reality by way
either of participation or imitation. For Plato, the priority of the rational element can
be understood only through an antecedent spiritual Idea-world31
For the Greeks, "... the possibility therefore exists of genuine theoretical knowledge of
the metaphysical realm... 32
Henry emphasizes three aspects of ancient epistemology. First, the ancients stress
"the priority of the rational over the perceptual." Second, they maintain "the ontological
reality of the eternal Ideas." Third, they believe in a "theory of preexistence and
recollection, which supplies the basis of man's ability to make rational judgments that
pierce through the sense manifold to the inner realm of changeless ideas." 33
Ethically, the ancients insisted upon "the objectivity of morals."34 There are
objective standards of right and wrong and humanity is morally obligated to discover and
abide by such standards. Contrary to the ancient naturalist position, Plato and Aristotle
argued that "moral distinctions are objective and eternal, not merely relative and
arbitrary."35 Henry writes: "What made possible a science of morals, for the classic
Greek mind, is the fact that man is not only an animal, subject to the laws of nature, but
that he also partakes of rationality, which gives him a reference to a world of supernature
30 Henry, God Revelation and Authority, 1:285-286.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 1:288.
33 Ibid., 1:286.
34 Henry, The Drift of Western Thoui:ht, 17.
.
35 Ibid., 14. "Truth and the good, moreover, are not relative and changing
distinctions but are eternal and unchanging realities." Henry, God. Revelation and
Authority, 1:32.
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with its unchanging absolutes, its eternal ideas and fonns."36 Humanity has access to
objective standards of right and wrong.
The influence of these ideas extended beyond their lives. Henry contends that "even
successors who repudiated the Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis were unable to avoid their
influence ..... 37 While naturalism remained in ancient times in some circles, the classic
philosophers were more influential.
Whether in government or sculpture, in literature or art, Greek culture, in major
manifestations, patterned itself around the convictions that man is uniquely related
to a supernatural realm of abiding goodness, truth and beauty. Greek customs and
institutions, political, social, and religious, aimed to realiz.e more fully that
supernatural ideal which the classic philosophers found implicitly embodied in the
actual structure of things, and which was uncovered to philosophic
contemplation. 38
In fact, according to Henry:

So convincingly and powerfully did they persuade their contemporaries, that
Greco-Roman culture--literature and the arts, politics, and all realms of learning and
life--was predicated henceforth on the premise that ultimate reality is spiritual, that
truth and goodness are objective and eternal, that man is qualitatively unique, that
human existence has ultimate meaning and purpose. The Greek populace thus
anchored its expectation of a purposive, reliable and intelligible life in the
confidence that an objective order structures our world, an order not derived from
or dependent on our experienced cosmos, but one, rather, on which the cosmos and
man depend for meaningful existence. 39
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the ancients was their decisive rebuttal of ancient
naturalism. Henry contends that the similarities to our time when naturalism has again
reared its head are obvious and thus "the classic struggle against ancient naturalism
immediately enlists our interest. .. 40 The Greeks wisely considered "both what things really
36 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Relation Between Conduct and Belief," Journal of the
Transactions of the Victoria Institute, 78 (1946), 63.
37 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht. 14-15.
38 Ibid., 18.
39 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:32.
40 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 15.
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are and why they are as equally important, and ultimately more important than how they
assertedlY behave."41 Henry believes that the classic philosophers answered and refuted
their naturalistic counterparts with an idealistic philosophy that more accurately portrayed
reality. This "idealistic rebuttal of naturalism" is one from which we can learn as we
confront naturalism in the twentieth century.42
Among those aspects of ancient Greek thought that Henry finds appealing is "an
interest in connecting the a priori with the ontic constitution of the metaphysical order, and
therefore in man's constitutive relationship to that order...43 Henry agrees with the notion
that an a priori supernatural world exists. Henry also agrees that knowledge regarding the
meaning of the world and of life is dependent upon one's relationship to the supernatural
realm. "Tested by the Christian view," Henry concludes, "the most important emphasis in
Platonism was its recognition of the need to transcend the world of change in order to reach
the ideal and eternal... 44
Henry also sees problems with ancient Greek philosophy. He is most concerned
with the notion that man has a rational connection with the supernatural. He says:
Among the most objectionable features of classic idealism was its connection of
human reason in a privileged way with a supposedly autonomous world of order
and meaning. Central to the New Testament is the Christian conviction of a
divinely structured creation whereby the transcendent Logos sustains the cosmic
order and supplies the direction and universally valid meaning of all things. The
contrast can hardly be overstated between this view and Greek notions of an
immanent rational a priori ungrounded in the transcendent Creator and unrelated to
the created structures of the universe. Christianity expounded its world-life view
on the basis of the transcendently revealed Logos of God, and grounded the
universal order of existence and meaning in the self-disclosed Creator and Lord of
all. Greek philosophy had insistently asked what speculative reason is driven to
41 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:32. Henry's italics.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 1:286.
44 Ibid., 1:35.
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affirm about ultimate reality, about being and becoming.... Christianity affirmed
that through chosen spokesmen and their inspired biblical writings the living God
had intelligently proclaimed his redemptive purpose, thus publishing to all men the
prospect of divine redemption. In gracious incarnation the Logos himself stepped
into history to unveil God in the flesh and to show himself the sinner's Savior.
From its beginnings this confidence in a rational-verbal and incarnate divine
disclosure, in the fully revealed Word of God, shapes the Christian outlook. 45
Henry contrasts the Greek nature/supernature distinction with the Creator/creature
distinction of Judeo-Christian theism. The former leaves open the possibility of
autonomous man reaching up independently to the supernatural realm in his quest for
knowledge. The latter distinction, the one adopted by Henry, rejects this possibility and
depends exclusively upon the divine reaching down to man in an act of revelation.
Granting this inordinate capacity to human reason, according to Henry, was the result
of the Greek's faulty view of human nature.
The Platonic construction assumes what Judeo-Christian revelation has always
called into doubt, that man's present reasoning powers are devotedly rather than
seditiously related to general divine disclosure. Since Platonism optimistically
subscribes to the notion that human nature is unthwarted by a sinful bent of will,
the a priori factor in combination with everyday experience is regarded as issuing in
a valid natural theology.46
The Greek failure to acknowledge sin and man's will as the root of human problems is a
significant error. They concluded that problems result neither from sin nor from a
depraved will but from ignorance. Politically, this meant Plato could attribute the problems
of society to ignorance. Henry notes: "Plato ... felt that humanity's central problem was
ignorance, and he projected principles for a state based on knowledge and ruled by
philosopher-kings. ,,47
Ultimately, ancient society failed "despite the concentration upon the supernatural and
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 1:286.
47 Carl F. H. Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," in Authority and
Interpretation, eds. Duane A. Garrett and Richard R. Melick, Jr. (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1987), 204.
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the objectivity of the moral claim." It simply lacked the "power to achieve moral standards
which were idealistic and supra-naturalistic. "48 What was the cardinal weakness? It was a
too simple view of human nature, however much more profound it was than that of
naturalism, [that] stood at the center of Greek idealism.... The PlatonicAristotelian emphasis on man's rational relation to the supernatural was developed
so as to minimize any disparity between man and God except in terms of man's
incompleteness .... That stress on sin which, in Hebrew theology, accented man's
separation from God not merely in terms of creaturehood, but also in terms of
conscious moral revolt, was absent. 49
Henry calls this a "misplaced confidence" in man.50

In another area, the classics did not satisfactorily answer the naturalists. The claim
for objective truth failed to materialize.
. . . the classic emphasis on the reality and priority of the supernatural created as
many problems as it solved, for the philosophers were less explicit about the
religious aspect of their views than the thirst of the human spirit requires....
Hence Greek philosophy, having promised rational certainty about the supernatural,
failed to deliver where it touched man at the deepest level; deep longings remained
unsatisfied and forceful questions were unsolved.51
As a result, philosophy became increasingly ethical and even mystical in later years.
According to Henry, "Platonic-Aristotelian obscurity, precisely in the area at which it
demanded clarity--concerning, that is, the nature of the supernatural--issued in later
philosophies in a concentration on the ethical more than on the metaphysical ...52 This led
to such movements as Neo-Platonism which "substituted a rational approach which
culminated in an ecstatic, mystic experience."53

48 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 19.
49 Ibid., 20-21.
50 Ibid., 22.
51 Ibid., 20-21.
52 Ibid., 22.
53 Ibid.
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In conclusion, Henry holds that classical Greek philosophy is insufficient. It does

not provide solutions to the problems of human existence. Its shortcomings include an
inaccurate understanding of human nature, a lack of objectivity regarding the supernatural
and an inability to supply a moral dynamic that would enable man to live according to the
principles of truth. The search for answers must continue elsewhere.
1HE MEDIEVAL ERA
The medieval era began with the coming of Christ. 54 The appearance of Christ in
human history led to the development of a culture based upon divine revelation. It was a
culture that would stumble eventually but one from which Henry believes we could learn a
great deal.
At the time of Christ, ancient Greek philosophy was struggling beneath two burdens;
the lack of objective standards and the lack of a sufficient dynamic to enable men to live
according to those higher moral standards. These weaknesses enabled Christianity to burst
upon the scene and to become the dominant cultural phenomenon for the next several
centuries. Henry writes:
When Christ came, the ancient view, to be sure, was already creaking under heavy
strain from its internal defects. The more insistently its philosophers had asserted
an invisible spiritual world, the greater had been the demand for information about
God's nature and way.... The classic philosophers had assumed, moreover, not
only that finite man could know the truth apart from special divine revelation, but
also that even in his present moral condition he could achieve the good apart from
special divine enablement. But both these expectations collapsed through the
weaknesses of human unregeneracy. 55
There were similarities between the ancient and medieval views. In particular, both
views accepted "the reality of the supernatural, the uniqueness of man, and the objectivity

54 "... Christian culture in its partial realization did not become an actuality for
many centuries and yet its beginnings were rooted in the singular events of B. C. 6 - 30
AD." Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 38.

55 Henry, QQd. Revelation and Authority, 1:33.
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of truth and right."56 Medieval Christians stood with the classical Greek philosophers in
opposition to ancient naturalism. At the same time, they were different from their ancient
counterparts on several counts. The medieval Christians, Henry explains:
stood opposed ... to the classic emphasis on the rational competence, in the realm
of metaphysics, of the natural man in his state of sin; to the dualistic reduction of
evil from a moral to a metaphysical problem; to the failure to identify the moral
realm with the will of God; to the emptying of history of redemptive significance. 57
The primary difference was epistemological. For "the medieval alternative appeals not to
philosophical reasoning but to divine disclosure, to the truth about God revealed supremely
in Jesus Christ." 58 Epistemologically, medieval assertions regarding the reality of the
supernatural, the uniqueness of man and the objectivity of truth and right were not based
upon human reasoning but upon divine revelation.
This revolutionary explanation of man, life and meaning came to dominate the
Western world for several centuries. Henry claims: "For more than a thousand years, until
modern philosophy raised its head, the shaping ideals of the masses are rooted in this
spiritual understanding of reality and life." 59
What are some of the specifics of the medieval mind? Henry writes:
... the medieval mind affirms that God is the ultimate sovereign and personal
Spirit, the free Creator of the cosmos; that by creation man bears God's unique
rational-moral image for the intelligent obedience and service of his Maker; that man
voluntarily fell into disobedience and only by repentant reliance on divine grace can
now escape the power, guilt, and penalty of sin that issues in final doom; that God
has mercifully revealed himself ... and fulfilled his promise of salvation in the
divine gift of his Son; that as incarnate, crucified, risen and exalted, Jesus Christ is
the living head of the regenerate church enlivened by the Holy Spirit; that the risen
Redeemer is the first-fruits of a general resurrection and pledges and guarantees a
final outcome of history involving his second advent and messianic reign as Prince

56 Ibid., 1:33-34.
57 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 27.
58 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:33.

59 Ibid.
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of Peace, the vindication of righteousness, conformity of all believers to his
glorious image, and the final doom of the impenitent. f>O

In spite of its distinctively Christian character, medieval society is not necessarily
worthY of imitation. For "it can hardly be maintained that the Middle Ages issued in the
fullest sense in a Christian culture." To the contrary, "sometimes its inner message was
lost"61 We cannot forget the
crass superstition and religious intolerance to which Roman Catholicism
accommodated itself, moreover, and the needless years of darkness in the wake of
the passing of the Graeco-Roman culture, the ecclesiastical institutionalizing of
Christianity, the emphasis on credal subscription apart from genuine spiritual
decision, the ascetic and monastic movements, the supplanting of the exclusive
mediation of Christ--these unhappy perversions are an indubitable element of
medieval times.62
Nonetheless, there is much to be admired about the medieval era. A distinctive
culture emerged based upon a self-conscious attempt to relate faith to all of life.
Nothing can be clearer than that the medieval mind related to Christ, at least in
intention, not only theology and worship, but philosophy, government, art, music
and literature. It did so not in terms of human initiative, but of divine disclosure;
not in the spirit of groping for God's forgiveness, but rather of expressing gratitude
for the divinely provided gift of salvation, and of an awaiting of the complete
vindication of God's promises.63
Nevertheless, the medieval era was a passing phenomenon. The seeds of destruction were

f>O Ibid., 1:34. The central tenets of the medieval mind were not new, rather they
were a reiteration of views first stated in the Hebraic Old Testament "That the one eternal
and sovereign God created the world and all things by divine fiat; that man was created in
the divine image, and hence possessed a distinctive dignity, being made for personal
~ellowship with the Deity; that man, by voluntary revolt, fell from original righteousness
mto a state of moral and spiritual revolt; that salvation is impossible of attainment by human
e~fort but is a provision of the God of holy love, who through His prophets promised a
vicarious mediation from the divine side; that the promise of salvation is to be realized
within history itself by the God who in a special way reveals Himself to His chosen
people--what are these, but affirmations which stand at the core of the Old Testament, no
less than of Biblical Christianity." Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 25-26.
61 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 31.
62 Ibid., 32.
63 Ibid., 33-34.
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planted and the medieval era would be superceded by modernity. 64 The transformation
from medieval times to modernity was a
change more radical ... than the ancient replacement of philosophical idealism by
Biblical theism, since both these views affinned the reality of the supernatural. But
the modem transition ends with the denial of the supernatural, whether it is affirmed
on speculative or on revelational ground. 65
A notion held in common by the medieval Christians and the ancient Greek
philosophers was the idea that man was rationally connected with the supernatural. In the
medieval era, this conviction led to disparate ends. Henry writes:
The medieval confidence that man's spirit stands in the loftiest areas of thought in
an immediate rational connection with the divine Spirit could be carried forward in
two ways. One is essentially theological-revelational, the other philosophicalspeculative. Of this twofold division, Augustine and Anselm may be considered in
some respects the representatives. 66
Henry considers St. Augustine as a philosopher par excellence and the best example of the
theological/revelational approach to knowledge. He will be discussed in greater detail in
the next chapter. Two Benedictine priests, St. Anselm ( 1033-1109) and St. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274), led medieval thinkers down the road of speculative philosophy.
While Anselm is often considered Augustinian, his most interesting contributions are
related to natural theology as later developed by Aquinas. 67 Anselm argued that "man
11

possesses the idea of God innately. 68 Based upon our innate knowledge of God, Anselm
provides "surprisingly detailed information concerning the nature and works of God,"
64 "In its appeal to natural reason, the Thomistic pattern contained within itself the
seeds of its destruction." Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 231.
65 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 34.
66 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:288.
. 67 See Frederick Copleston, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2 Mediaeval
P~~qscmhy, Part 1, Au~ustine to Bonaventure (Garden City, NY: Image Books, A
div1s1on of Doubleday and Co., 1962).
6 8 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:291. This is an Augustinian notion.
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including truths such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, the
doctrine of election and the reprobation of the wicked as well as divine attributes such as
God's aseity, his goodness, his justness, his truthfulness, omnipotence, compassion,
omniscience, wisdom, eternity, and omnipresence.69 His discussion of these attributes
can be found in his Proslo&ion and Monolo&ion. 70 Henry admits it is unfair to categorize
Anselm as a speculative philosopher, but he believes "Anselm's confident employment of
the ontological proof for a complete doctrine of the nature of God nonetheless lent itself
easily to a conjectural metaphysics which would work itself free of any and all dependence
upon special biblical revelation.•'71 Ultimately, Henry believes that "Anselm ventures to
prove the Christian doctrines without appealing to scriptural revelation, and ... views
reason itself as a source of truth." 72
This emphasis on natural theology was carried forward by the scholastics, in general,
and Thomas Aquinas, in particular.73 Aquinas and the scholastics sought to reconcile
Christianity with ancient philosophy, and thereby laid the foundation for subsequent
philosophers who would reject divine revelation outright. Henry argues that scholasticism
... by its alliance with Greek metaphysics helped to obscure the serious noetic
effect of sin and thereby aided the concealment of the principle of special revelation.
The classic Greek confidence in the competence of human reason in the
metaphysical realm, which Christianity had overthrown, became a cardinal
emphasis of the early modem rationalistic philosophies which had been
encouraged, by medieval theology, to pursue the case for theism by speculative
philosophy alone and without appeal to Biblical theology. The synthesis of

69 Ibid., 1:296-297.
70 Both works can be found in volume one of Anselm of Canterbury, ed. Jasper
Hopkins, tr. Herbert Richardson (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1974).
71 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:295.
72 Ibid., 1:299.
73 A discussion of Henry's understanding of general revelation and natural theology
as well as his interpretation of Aquinas is in chapter three.
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Thomas Aquinas, ... calls for certainty to be reached by natural theology on the
questions of the existence of God and the existence and immortality of the soul.
What Thomas did not discern ... was that when once the case for theism was
pursued apart from the environmental conditioning of Christianity, the emphasis on
the competence of human reason in the area of metaphysics would work itself
around from a case for theism into a case against theism. 74
Henry points out that
The medieval scholastics ... revived ... particularly through Thomas Aquinas, an
optimistic doctrine of human reason and stated the case for biblical theism in a way
that attracted speculative doubt The movement of Western philosophy away from
the biblical outlook may be summarized as a decline of faith in the existence of an
objective, transcendently created structure of law and order. Replacing this view is
a speculative projection of autonomous structures that are directly accessible to
human reason independent of divine revelation, and are discontinuous with the
sense world. Despite their assertion of a transcendent Creator, the medieval
scholastics failed to recast effectively the classic Greek emphasis on immanent
structures of truth and order. Instead they incorporated into their exposition of a
Christian world-life view speculative elements that widened the possibilities of
human autonomy. Christianity had discounted the Greek emphasis on an immanent
rational a priori in mankind; but by synthesizing a revelationally grounded theism
with the classic Greek view of Aristotle, medieval scholasticism indirectly hastened
a philosophy of the autonomy of man and nature independent of the Logosstructured meaning and law of creation.75
Henry agrees with Martin Luther and John Calvin whom he feels argued that
"Christianity was presented to the modem world in most unsatisfactory and self-defeating
terms by the Thomistic relating of reason and faith. "76 For Aquinas had "shifted the case

74 Henry, The Drift of Western Thought, 98. "Thomas Aquinas affirmed that, by
reason alone, man can attain to the knowledge of the existence of God, the existence of the
soul, and immortality; his 'five-fold proof,' developing Aristotelian premises, by which he
sought to 'mediate' Christianity to the 'Gentiles,' provided a logical demonstration of
God's existence, he affirmed. For further light, however, conceded Thomas, man's
reason is inadequate." Henry, Remaking the Modem Mind, 230.
75 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:36. According to Henry, some
evangelical theologians such as Charles Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd and A. H. Strong have
made a similar error. The Drift of Western Thought, 98. "Once medieval thought had
granted the competency of reason to some extent, the modems widened its competency so
as wholly to exclude the revelational principle.... The disastrous consequences invited by
th~ c?mpromise apologists for Christianity grew out of a failure to appreciate fully the
pnnc1ple of revelation.... Thinkers who had come under the influence of the Thomist
view, that the divine existence is logically demonstrable from natural theology, soon found
th~mselves yielding important ground to their opponents." Henry, Remaking the Modem
Mmd, 201.
76 Henry, The Drift of Western Thought, 35.
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for the existence of God, the soul, and immortality, from special divine revelation to
universal experience...77 Thus, "the Thomistic synthesis of science, philosophy and
theology involved such an obscuring of the inner genius of Christianity that sooner or later
the revelation view must lose its hold."78 The path to modernity was started.
MODERN PHILOSOPHY
For Henry," ... the modern mind, in its outworking, becomes an alternative to both
the Greek idealistic and the Hebrew-Christian theistic views." The predominantly
naturalistic view of modernity provides a "stark contrast to the outlooks of ancient and
medieval times ...79 This modern naturalistic mind, and its nihilistic consequences, receive
careful attention by Henry.
To call the modern age a naturalistic age appears to be an oversimplification. Henry
admits that modernity has had "its great theistic and idealistic traditions." But, he claims,
"it is the naturalistic philosophy which has worked itself out to dominance and victory on
the modern scene. n80
What does Henry mean when he suggests that the modern mind is naturalistic?
Ontologically, this view contends that all existence has a naturalistic or materialistic
foundation. 81 The basic ontological presupposition of modern naturalism is clear to

77 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:36.
78 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 35.
79 Ibid., 36-37. Henry accepts Rene Descartes as the father of modern philosophy.
See God. Revelation and Authority, 1:36.
. 80 Ibid., 38. See also p. 63. Henry claims: "The conviction that nature is man's
widest and deepest environment now dominates virtually the entire Western intellectual
wo~ld. The contemporary conceptualization of reality is deliberately anti.theological and
annsupernaturalistic." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1: 135-136.
81 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:135.
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HentY· He says: "The central postulate of the modem mind, in its final expression, has
been the ultimacy of nature. "82 The modem mind has reverted to "the suppressed
naturalism of the Graeco-Roman era ... and in spirit united with its affirmation of the
ultimate reality of nature."83 In the final analysis, Henry believes this to be true for almost
all modem philosophic traditions. 84 Epistemologically, modem naturalism has adopted the

scientific empirical method as the sole source of knowledge.
It is almost ironic that modem philosophy becomes thoroughly naturalistic. Henry is

convinced that "in its beginnings, modem philosophy was not intentionally naturalistic; it
was, on the contrary, determinedly theistic or idealistic."85 He argues that "the initial
movements in modem philosophy were, in most regards, far nearer to Plato and Aristotle
11

than they were to Democritus and Lucretius. 86
In its beginnings, from Descartes to Hegel ( 1600-1800), the modem mind shows
itself remarkably like the ancient mind ... It affirms what the great Greek
philosophers had also affirmed: the reality of the su~matural, the uniqueness and
immortality of man, the objectivity of truth and right. 87

Nonetheless, modernity has left behind its idealistic and theistic origins and has become
82 Henry, The Drift of Western Thoui:ht, 41.
83 Ibid., 47.
84 "Not that modem speculation was a one-colored cloak; unquestionably, it was a
coat of many colors. Between rationalists like Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza, and the
empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, stands an immovable obstruction. Kantian
criticism and Hegelian idealism have their weighty differences and both together are far
i:moved from Comtean positivism, at least in intent Yet they all disclose a concurrence by
virtue of which they may be catalogued in federation. They declare, as if by one voice, for
the ultimate reality of nature and the ultimate animality of man." Henry, Remakin~ the
Modem Mind, 21.
85 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:37.
86 Henry, The Drift of Western Thoui:ht, 48.
87 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:37. In time, the modem age becomes
Pred?minantly naturalistic. Henry says that "the modern mind reached its naturalistic
tenrunus not at once but by a gradual process ... " The Drift of Western Thou wt, 38.
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predominantly naturalistic. The consequence of this is the crisis of nihilism.
Henry thinks that the key to understanding the evolution of modem philosophy is the
progressive abandonment of revelation. While the modem era did not deliberately begin
down the road of anti-supernaturalism, the compromises made resulted in a trend that soon
became explicitly naturalistic. The most significant compromise was the depreciation of
special divine revelation. Slowly but surely the acceptability of divine revelation

disappeared and with it the existence of a supernatural became increasingly problematic. 88
As man depended on himself for knowledge of the supernatural, he became
increasingly skeptical about the reality of anything beyond the physical material world.
Epistemological questions came to the forefront of philosophical speculation. This
preoccupation with epistemology had not existed in either the ancient Greek nor the
Christian medieval eras. 89 However, "in modem philosophy ... ontology and
epistemology were to be merged, so that the problem of being was frequently lost in
exploring the problem of knowledge. Here what classic ancient thought had been able to
take for granted, that human thought has an ontic reference, came now into dispute ...90
Ultimately, naturalism denies the reality of the supernatural and "explicitly rejects the

88 "If there is one ingredient in modem philosophy which made quite inevitable its
removal from supematuralistic to naturalistic terrain, it is the fact of its rejection of the
principle of special divine revelation." Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 46.
89 Ibid., 49. Henry believes this is a logical result of modem man's rejection of
divine revelation. He writes: "Since Christianity had made more specific and more
compulsive that belief in the reality of the supernatural which classic idealism had projected
as a necessity of contemplative thought, the dismissal of the Christian claim to the
possession of special revelation meant that much that ancient idealism had assumed was
!low also to be called into question. It was not an accident of philosophy that, once the
llllpact of revelational theism had been felt and repulsed, this occupation with the
epistemological more than with the ontological should ensue, so that western thought
should have to face first on almost every hand the question of what and how men know."
49-50.

90 Ibid.
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possibility of special divine revelation."91
Descartes, the father of modem philosophy, is identified by Henry as a philosophical
rationalist in the tradition of the ancient Greeks. Both the ancient Greeks and the early
moderns, such as Descartes, agreed that "thought mirrors the ultimate intelligibility of the
real world ...92 Descartes "contended that the mind possesses faculties productive of
intuitive knowledge, including the certainties of self-existence and mathematics. From the
intuitive certainty of self-existence he tried to derive all other truths... 93
Descartes and others claimed that man with his innate ideas had the competence to
understand the nature of reality apart from divine revelation.
The competence of the mind to know metaphysical truth now means that, apart from
any dependence on and necessity for divine disclosure, man is in his present
condition able by rational inquiry to arrive at the whole truth about reality and life.
On the basis of innate truths held to stock the human mind independently of
revelation, mathematical rationalists expected mathematical inquiry to demonstrate the
nature of the externally real world and to unveil the secrets of its inner behavior. 94
This philosophical undertaking had both strengths and weaknesses. Henry writes:
The strength of philosophical rationalism lay in its insistence that the principles of
logic and the mathematical sciences are not derived from experience, but make
experience possible, and that truth is self-destructive unless noncontradictory and
governed by the canons of reason. Yet the "impartial truth" which rationalists
philosophers extolled was something far more elusive than they thought Although
emphasizing the priority of reason, the most brilliant rationalists had themselves
produced a spectacular array of impressively competitive and conflicting world
views, each highly consistent with its postulated first principles, yet diverging from
the others despite the high claims made for certainty, consistency and coherence.
Such disagreements among the early modem rationalists, no less than the correction

91 Ibid., 41.
92 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:321. "In their mutual regard for human
re~son as an immanent a priori, endowed on the basis of man's intrinsic dignity to cope
Wl~ t!te deepest problems of life and being, the early modem rationalists (Descartes,
Le1brutz and Spinoza) and the classic Greek idealists (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle)
essentially agree." 1:387.
93 Ibid., 1:74.
94 Ibid., 1:87.
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of some of their contentions by empirical evidence, had already lent force to the
counterviews of the scientific empiricists. The early modem era of philosophical
theism gave way to the post-Kantian era of philosophical idealism, and that in tum to
the age of philosophical naturalism, with its leading thinkers all the while justifying
their conflicting schemes by an appeal to the demands of human reason. 95
Henry believes that:
The excesses of philosophical rationalism therefore encouraged an empirical reaction
that boldly substituted a new methcxi of knowledge alternative to reason, but one
which was as hostile to transcendent revelation as was the rationalistic option, in view
of the emphasis that the content of knowledge is supplied not by human reasoning but
by sensation alone.96
Locke, Hume and the empirical school led the charge against the doctrine of innate ideas.97
The empiricists "do not derive so-called intuitive knowledge from some innate faculty that
provides man with first principles, but ascribe all knowledge to inferences from
11

observation. 98 Philosophical rationalism found itself on the defensive.

An attempt to mediate between the rationalists and the empiricists was a turning point
for modernity. Unfortunately it was a tum for the worse. Kant, often identified as an
idealist, had wanted to halt the skepticism of modem empiricism, but he actually set the
stage for the emergence of a dominant naturalistic viewpoint. Henry writes:
The effort of idealists, particularly of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), to mediate
between rationalists and empiricists, only widened the broadening emphasis on
human autonomy, and thus extended the concessions already made by medieval
95 Ibid., 1:90.
96 Ibid., 1:88.
97 "The modem empiricist counterattack against philosophical rationalism ...
proclaimed human sense perception rather than human reasoning to the sole source of truth.
Led by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, the empirical alternative was proposed to offset evident
weaknesses of secular rationalism. The supposedly immanent rational a priori on which
early m?<fern rationalists relied issued in remarkably diverse and irreconcilably divergent
conclus10ns about reality and truth. Their conflicting theories clearly reflected not a
~SJ?~nt ultimate reality and objective truth but a considerable range of subliminal
eo~ng. Their views of nature, moreover, were subject to obvious correction by
empmcal observation." Ibid., 1:387.
98 Ibid., 1:75. "The empiricist ... considers sense observation the source of all
tru th and knowledge." 1:78.
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scholastics. Kant viewed the forms of reason as wholly immanent; he connected
moral and religious postulates with the practical reason only; the content of
knowledge he connected with sense experience alone. He held, moreover, that
reality gets whatever order it has from the mind's own creative activity in the
whirlpool of sense experience.99
Kant argued that we can have real knowledge, but it was real knowledge of the
natural or phenomenal world, not the noumenal world. The noumenal world was mere
postulation. Kant denied "that either divine revelation or innate factors communicate
trustworthy knowledge of metaphysical realities."100 Thus, the physical world is the
extent of sure knowledge. Henry summarizes:
There is no objective knowledge of any reality outside of and independent of human
consciousness, no knowledge of the nature of objects considered in themselves.
What we know we know only under the conditions of (the innate forms of) time
and space, and only as structured by a priori categories supplied by the human
knower.101
Since Kant had asserted "the incompetence of human reason in the area of metaphysics"
due to the "supposedly severe intrinsic restrictions of finite reason," man's attention turned
to the physical material world.102 Henry says:
Kant's philosophy set the mood in many ways for the modem regard for the
method of natural science as the normative source of the content of our knowledge,
99 Ibid., 1:38. "Kant recognized that empiricism, most fully elaborated by Hume,
abridges knowledge experience to disconnected animal sense perceptions, and can supply
no reason for assuming that the parts of our experience are connected. Such a skeptical
reduction of human experience, to mere atomistic individual perceptions and one's private
psychic responses, destroys the universal validity of human knowledge." 1:388.
100 Ibid., 1:281.
101 Ibid., 5:29. "Kant becomes influentially decisive for a whole movement in
philosophy that erases the significance of cognitive reason for metaphysical realities. The
categories of thought are correlated only with empirical data. All thought is time-bound and
space:~und because time and space are universal conditions of human experience. By the
very ltmits of human reason as Kant stipulates these, man is cut off from any possession of
transcendent truth. God is indeed an indispensable postulate, a regulative ideal demanded
by !he moral nature, contends Kant, but not an objective of cognitive knowledge.... All
~l~ by the metaphysicians about the objective nature of the ultimate world are considered
mval1d and outside the range of human knowledge." 1:88.
102 Ibid., 1:281.
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and the consequent distrust of all claims to cognitive knowledge of any reality that
transcends the natural world. Through the Critical Philosophy, metaphysical
affirmations came to be looked upon as unjustifiable, and conceptual knowledge
was associated solely with empirical observation or sense experience.103
When Kant "cut man off from rational knowledge of the noumenal.... Shrewder eyes
would read it as prolegomena to future naturalism." 104 The logic of this position was best
illustrated by Comte. "With Auguste Comte (1798-1857) we have the inauguration of the
era of so-called positive science, where reason is reconnected with reality now understood
solely as the phenomenal world." 105 Other very important naturalists include Karl Marx,
Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey.
Following Kant, even the idealistic tradition in modem philosophy led away from

and even attacked the theistic world view of the medieval era. "Whereas naturalism struck
at the Biblical view from the side of naturalistic monism," Henry maintains, "idealism did
so from the side of spiritualistic monism; both philosophies, however extensive their
differences, conspired to remove man from his Biblical status." The idealists did this by
"making nature itself part of ultimate reality, indeed, the very thought-content of the
Absolute, and then absorbing man to this thought-content ."106 Ultimately, "whereas
naturalism absorbed man to nature, idealism in modem times came to absorb nature and
man to God." 107
Judeo-Christian theism, as understood by Henry, is opposed to idealism in both its
ancient and modem manifestations; primarily because idealism ignores the problem of sin.
Henry says, "the Biblical doctrine of sin finds no place in either the ancient or the modem
103 Ibid., 1: 193.
l04 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 53-53.
105 Ibid., 38.
106 Ibid., 48-49.
107 Ibid.
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idealistic tradition; the idealistic distinction between nature and the supernatural rather than
between creation and Creature, has always absorbed man's spiritual nature to the divine
nature. 11 108 For Henry, sin has so stained human nature that he is hopelessly estranged
from the supernatural. Apart from the grace of God, man has no sure knowledge of truth,
no reason for hope and no chance for eternal salvation.
Having eliminated the problem of sin, idealists develop an extremely optimistic view
of man. Modem idealists have done so to a greater extent than their ancient predecessors.
Modern idealism, Henry says:
eliminated any notion that matter and the body are evil and hence a drag on human
achievement; hence it divorced itself from a certain hopelessness which
characterized classic Greek thought Rejecting the Christian emphasis that man ...
is a sinner in revolt against God, it rejected also that the ~ Greek emphasis that
man, on his physical side, is prevented from realizing his ideals due to an evil
body.109
Without the inherent limitations that sin or evil bodily existence place upon man, human
achievement knows no bounds. This idealistic notion, in large part, contributed to the
modern emphasis on inevitable progress.110
Interestingly, Henry believes that one of the reasons modem idealism adopted its
optimistic view of man was the Christian teaching regarding the incarnation and the
perfection of Christ. He explains:
In the revolt against Greek thought [modern idealism] was encouraged by the
Christian emphasis that nature and man are a divine creation, so that matter or the
body as such are not intrinsically hostile to the divine.... The Christian emphasis
of a divine incarnation in Christ ... became in idealism the pattern for a universal
externalization of the divine in humanity at large; that conformity to the divine image
which Christian theology had reserved for the state of glorification in the
eschatological experience of redeemed sinners, modern idealism now made a
108 Ibid., 50-51.
109 Ibid.
110 "From the Kantian and Hegelian streams did come, in large measure, the
modem emphasis on the inherent goodness of man and on his inevitable advance ... "
Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 25.
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potentiality of all men, in their natural state, who were conceived at the core of their
personalities in their present relationship to God not as sinners but as intrinsically
divine. Here were the outlines, of course, of the recent belief in the essential
goodness of man.111
Such potential practically insures historical progress. Modem idealism, he says, "...
united the divine with history and time in such a way as to underwrite the recent dogma of
the inevitability of progress. The events of history were the divine activity externalized...
. History which, since it was conceived as the divine self-manifestation, could only reflect
the divine in a progressive spirituality." 112
Thus, modem idealism was characterized by "an explicit revolt against special
revelation, by a preoccupation with the problem of knowledge, and by an intrinsically
optimistic view of men and events which concealed the reality of sin and evil." 113 These
characteristics correspond with much of modem naturalism and contributed to the
progressive rejection of the Judeo-Christian theistic view of reality.
As the modem idealistic tradition continued, it became more difficult to differentiate it
from naturalism. For "a deity so identical with the world process was too easily dismissed
as only a reverent title for the process, and not in any way different from the process." 114
Thus, modernity in both its naturalistic and idealistic modes adopted similar positions on
essential philosophical questions. In direct contradiction to the basic presuppositions of
classic Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian theism, the modem mind "gains a viewpoint
all its own.... It declares that nature is the ultimate reality, man is essentially a time-bound

animal, truth and the good are relative and changing." 115
111 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht. 50-51.
l12 Ibid., 51-52.
l 13 Ibid., 52-53.
114 Ibid., 54.
l l5 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:38. "Assuredly, vigorous forces in
modem thought appear to resist a naturalistic view. But even where Kantian and Hegelian
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In the place of revelation, man depended increasingly upon human reason. In the
early modem philosophical scheme of things
the external world is presumably structured by immanent mathematical laws, and
man's mind simply on the basis of man's own identity is assumed to be a
storehouse of prefabricated concepts, and to possess universally valid knowledge.
Reason as a human a priori is independent of transcendent divine revelation as a
special source of knowledge and now confidently speculates about reality on its
own.116
Henry identifies five presuppositions of the early modem era. (1) The inevitability of

human progress; (2) the inherent goodness of man; (3) the absolute uniformity of nature;
(4) the ultimate reality of nature; and, (5) the ultimate animality of man.117 These
presuppositions provided modem man with a coherent explanation of the world and of life.
Henry, however, rejects each of these presuppositions as incompatible with his
understanding of J udeo-Christian theism.
Man's belief in the inevitability of progress was based upon a variety of factors.
Modem technological science, political and economic revolution, and the modem scientific

and philosophic evolutionary theories of Hegel and Darwin combined to portray the future
as inevitably better than the present 118 Modem intellectuals "anticipated a benevolent
thinkers link man to a world of supemature or insist that nature is not so ultimate as the
Absolute, a solution for human difficulties is sought without recourse to special revelation;
the competence of unaided human reason to dissolve all enigmas is taken for granted.
Idealism busied itself with a man-made realm of supemature and a man-projected Absolute.
Th~ who argued for a superworld were either committed to a Kantian epistemology
w~ch precluded real knowledge in the realm of metaphysics and encouraged only a faith
without evidence, or were ambiguous about the personality of the Absolute, or so merged
the realms of nature and supemature that the one was lost in the other ... " Henry,
Remakin~ the Mo<lem Mind, 23.
116 Ibid., 1:37-38.
l 17 See Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 26, and The Drift of Western

Th ou~m. 58-59.

. .118 . Ibid., 31-37. "Thus did Hegelian idealism and Darwinian biologism blend with
scientific mvention and discovery and with western political trends to encourage the grand
~earn ?fa sociological utopia for all mankind. The implications of evolutionary science
lb .dPhilosophy seemed always the same: the unlimited progress of the human race."
1 ., 41.
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earthly kingdom spawned by the genius of experimental science." They were convinced
that history was on their side. For "by virtue of the evolutionary process, mankind and
society presumably were rising to ever higher potential and achievement. Only surviving
strands of selfishness stood between man and his day of earthly bliss." 119
A corollary to this optimistic future was a belief in the inherent goodness of man.
Man was good and was capable of improving upon himself. The problems of human
existence were identified in strictly naturalistic terms and the solution to those problems lie

in the hands of humanity. "Modem scientific culture thinks that the great problem of
human history is the control of man's external environment and that man himself has the
wisdom and skill to achieve an ideal heaven and earth." 120
Modernity also assumed the uniformity of nature. Henry writes: "Man had come to
view all reality as subject to an unchanging network of mathematical law, which became the
vantage point from which every scientific explanation of events was formulated." 121
Henry claims:
That nature and history are dominated by a universal causal necessity from which it
is impossible to exempt any experience of the space-time universe ... was a dictum
which by the tum of the past century had succeeded in dominating modem
philosophy and science. It became the cardinal tenet of western research.122
This emphasis furthered the doubt of skeptics regarding the truthfulness of Christianity.
"The insistence on the absolute uniformity of nature, more than anything else, had created

. 119 Carl F. H. Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," in The Word for This Centwy,
edited by Merrill Chapin Tenney (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1960), 4.
120 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:42. "From Descartes to Dewey one
finds the same confidence that man, apart from any reference to a special supernatural
revelation, can solve all his problems ... " Henry, Remakin~ the Modem Mind, 22.
121 Ibid., 1:93.
122 Ibid., 1:96.
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the impression that the Christian Weltanschauung is demonstrably unscientific, and thus
promoted a permanent estrangement of theology and science." 123
The moderns also assume the animality of man. "No longer is he [man] defined, in
contradistinction from the other animals, as a rational or spiritual creature.... Modem
thought ... discovers man's difference not in rationality so much as in complex
animality."124 Charles Darwin, more than anyone else, convinced the intellectual class
that man was little more than a more advanced form of animal life.125
One of Henry's frequent arguments is that much of the modern mind has been
borrowed without logical justification from its Judeo-Christian and classical Greek
heritage. Henry writes:
For, although it had rejected the supernatural, even the naturalistic m<Xiern mind at
the turn of the century nonetheless retained the notion that reality is structured by
rational order, by an intelligible pattern, which science presumably could discover
by empirical observation and experimentation. And while it rejected man's
qualitative difference from the animals, it still retained the notion that nature has
reached its apex in the appearance of man as a rational creature, and viewed reason
as man's highest faculty; rational meth<Xiology was expected to promote man's
power over nature and to demonstrate his superiority and autonomy. While it
rejected an eternal, unchanging truth and go<Xi, the naturalistic modern mind
insisted nonetheless on universal norms such as scientific objectivity, human
brotherho<Xi and democracy, and even assumed that human progress implies
standards normative from generation to generation.126
Eventually despair set in as the logical philosophical conclusions of modern
naturalism began to emerge and as practical experience began to demonstrate potentially
horrendous consequences. Logically, man began to ask himself some serious questions
for which answers were found wanting.

123 Ibid., 1:97.
l24 Ibid., 1:245.
125 Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 4.
126 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:39.
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Why if the world of events is ultimately natural, man should be essentially good,
why 'if progress is inevitable, man's goodness or badness would be at all relevant;
why: if nature is totally uniform, there should be real progress--these were some of
the inner difficulties of the modem eclecticism.127

On a practical level, Henry insists that our experience in the twentieth century contradicts
the basic assumptions of modernity.
History itself disclosed a progress in warfare so destructive that by the midtwentieth century it had brought both hemispheres into crisis, and raised for
western culture the fear of the inevitability of disaster. Recent anthropology, from
Freud's studies to the Nazi atrocities, and then the Russian slave camps, afforded
no ground for angelicizing man. Contemporary physics, with as much of a distaste
for the biblical miraculous as philosophical rationalism, acknowledged
discontinuities in nature, whereas the modem revolt against miracles had grown
from the dogma that there could be no discontinuities. And western man, who had
acted more and more for several generations on the conviction that nature is the only
ultimate reality, lacking an orderly pattern of convictions, hesitated in indecision
when, armed with military advantage in the superior possession of hydrogen and
atomic bombs, he could have swept to victory by brute power--hesitated in
indecision because somehow he felt to be real what he thought he must deny: an
objective moral order, an ought not dictated by human expedience.128
As it became increasingly apparent that many modem beliefs were not supportable
given their naturalistic presuppositions, modem naturalism began to change. Many modem
assumptions such as the inherent goodness of man and the inevitability of progress came
under attack. The optimism of the early modem period began to fade. Attempts were made
to adhere more closely to the axioms of modernity with its logical conclusions. In the
subsequent reaction, Henry argues:
the twentieth century stripped away the quasibiblical remnants. The naturalistic
modem mind now veers away from any and every recognition of the universe as a
rational network of laws. Man is no longer viewed as nature's final climax, nor
reason as necessarily man's highest faculty, nor ethical behavior as necessarily
related to objective principle as opposed to situational decision. The emphasis on
evolution, on change and progress, undercuts even the modem insistence on
immutable, unchanging a priori aspects of human rationality. Whatever binds man
firmly to the past is now viewed as a threat to his freedom and autonomy; man faces
a wholly open future, whose outcome and general course assertedly depend upon

127 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 58-59.
128 Ibid., 58-59.
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man's creative ingenuity.129
More and more, philosophers began to realize and accept that "secular naturalism ...
acniallY deluges reality with comprehensive contingency, total transiency, radical relativity
and absolute autonomy." 130
What does this mean? When Henry speaks of the comprehensive contingency of all
reality, he is referring to "the merely provisional character of all reality, [that] allows no
transcendent dimension to existence." 131 "The universe and man are not to be explained in
terms of intelligible and purposive causes. There is no decisive reason for the universe and
man, no ultimate plan or design .... We live in an environment lacking ultimate meaning
and goodness."132 This premise becomes the "controlling premise of contemporary
philosophy."133 Ultimately, comprehensive contingency deprives life and the world of
meaning. "Everything is dynamic and moving and changing.... Reality is inherently
11

irrational, nature is blind, history is unpredictable and chaotic. 134
Epistemologically, knowledge to the extent we can know anything, is grounded in
nature.
The presumption that we can know only contingent processes and events is coupled
with a congruous theory of knowledge and view of worth. Its knowledge theory
grounds reliable cognition in what is directly perceptible and testable, that is, in
sensory observation of the physical world and of the persons around us. The
129 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:39.
130 Ibid., 1:137.
131 Ibid., 1:137-138.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid. In this regard, Henry identifies with the German scholar Karl Lowith.
Henry ~ys that Lowith "identifies contingency--the idea that all is finite and mutable--as
the bas~c characteristic of modern man's view of existence. Henry, God. Revelation and
Authonty, 1:138. See Karl Lowith, Nature. History and Existentialism (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University, 1966).
11
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value-scheme cherishes empirical reality above interest in the invisible and
transcendent. Since empirical science is thus valued as the most reliable index to
ultimate reality, the view of existence that it accredits, namely, that the world and
man are by-products of impersonal forces and events, is considered to be more
intelligibly based than are projections that ground or anchor human values in some
invisible spiritual context Only what is scientifically investigable has rational
significance; everything else falls outside the scope of reality.135
But even this is problematic. Man can know nothing absolutely, all is relative.
The far-reaching consequences of this must be stressed.... Man, like the animal,
can never get beyond himself, if his own mind is the point of reference for reality;
what he knows, he knows only relatively. His "ideas" are no longer true because
they mirror the eternally valid rational pattern which permeates the natural order;
they are "true" only in proportion to man's insights--which comes simply to saying
that they are not absolutely true, and that man in this respect, like the animals, is
bound to the world of nature alone.136
Increasingly, scientists are accepting that they can tell us nothing absolutely because
ultimately we cannot know absolutes.
Science today makes no claim to tell how reality is actually structured, nor does it
presume to discern "the laws of nature." Instead it ventures only to depict "how
things work," and that merely in terms of statistical averaging. For its
interpretations of nature it relies increasingly on creative postulation.... Nature is
presumably haphazard and man's own creative ingenuity imposes intelligibility and
direction upon the environmental sense-flux.137
Thus, science can reach no final conclusions. For "science has so little basis for fixed and
final truth about reality that it must stand ready to alter every pronouncement it makes and
then to alter that alteration ad infinitum."138 It is a simple fact that "the empirical approach
135 Ibid., 1:136.
136 Henry, Remakin~ the Modern Mind, 253.
. 137 Ibid., 39-40. "There is presently a notable fallout from the infatuation with
science characteristic of the recent past This growing disenchantment is not due simply to
the fact. that virtually all its insights can be deployed by barbarians for malevolent ends, nor
to ~e Cll'Cumstances that every conclusion of empirical science is in principle refutable or
!'CV1sable, nor to observations like Karl Popper's that 90 percent of what is done in science
is~ .waste of time. It has more to do with science's unfulfilled promise to ennoble man's
spmt ~d elevate the quality of human life.... However comfortable and sometimes
convement modern science has made human existence, it has bestowed neither character
~or the good life, and the kind of knowledge it confers is something other than wisdom."
enry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:167.
138 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:173.
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cannot arrive at the truth because it is committed to an unending search. 139
Henry also argues that modernity is characterized by total transiency. By this he
means "time is presumed to be the ontological structure of all being; becomingness and
mortality are held to pervade all reality. Temporal process is the essence of nature and
history, of existence as a whole, and leaves nothing unchanged." 140 Nothing is
pennanent, all is momentary, brief and fleeting.
The modern secular view also champions radical relativity. Henry writes:
It affirms the relativity of all truth, values, and events to their changing cultural
context and historical situation. Man's total existence is held to be embedded in
historical relativity, and all human phenomena are therefore evaluated in terms of
natural processes.... Therefore no claim to ultimate truth can be ventured....
Implicit in radical relativism is the rejection of all authoritative norms, and the
inevitable obsolescence of all ethical standards and moral codes.141

The meaning or significance of anything depends entirely upon the situation. Nothing has
permanent significance or importance. In regard to ethics, nothing permanent remains. To
the contrary, "ethical claims become merely culture-relative, for an evolving humanity
decides what truth and morality signify at any moment."142 The reasoning is simple: "An
empirical outlook ... cannot establish or sustain any norms, least of all objective moral
norms; it is descriptive and at best can detail only what is perceptibly observed."143 If
knowledge is grounded in experience, we must acknowledge that "the verdicts of

139 Ibid., 1:95.
140 Henry, Remakin~ the Modern Mind, 138.
141 Ibid., 139.
142 Carl F. H. Henry, "The God of the Bible and Moral Foundations," in The
Christian Vision: Man and Morality, ed. Thomas J. Burke (Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale
College Press, 1986), 6. "In the field of ethics ... this assertion of human autonomy
expresses itself either as the selfs conformity to the crowd or in the selfs repudiation of
~ociety. Truth and the good become merely what the pack or the herd wills, or what the
mdividual prefers on his own." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:41.
143 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:146.
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experiment and experience are always tentative and revisable." Thus, he concludes,
"ethical norms cannot be derived from empirical observations."144 The modem
perspective is left with ethical relativity.
Lastly, modernity implies the absolute autonomy of man.
Man's uniqueness is found not in his special relation to a transcendent Creator, nor
in an immanent rational a priori, nor in a relation to a rational order in nature nor
even in man's methodological thinking. His uniqueness, rather, is seen in
subjective decisions and in the selfs freedom to shape the future. Put in other
words, man's uniqueness consists in the possibilities of an empirically based
autonomy whereby he ... imposes upon his senseless environment his own goals
and means.145

In another place, Henry writes:
Man alone remains, self-sufficient and autonomous, to rescue the cosmos from
absurdity and worthlessness. No divine sovereign places human life under
unchanging commands, no divine revelation tells man what is true and trustworthy,
no divine book stipulates what is permanently right and wrong.... Man does not
need God either to know the truth or to do the good but is considered inherently
capable of coping with all concerns nonreligiously.... Man's problem is not one
of recovering a forfeited selfhood, a lost relationship to an eternal order of meaning
and value, but rather one of freely fashioning his life, history and nature through
self-creativity.146

In this regard, man "creates his own future by exercising inherent powers of mind and
will."147 In fact, "naturalism considers every man his own lord, setting his own standards
and implementing them by his own powers. Man alone is able to decide his life's course,
he alone is the source of what truth he affirms and of what good he champions." 148
Thus, naturalism has stripped itself of any and all biblical remnants and has reached

144 Ibid., 6:267-268.
145 Ibid., 1:41.
146 Ibid., 1:139.
147 Ibid., 1:140.
148 Ibid.

52
its logical conclusions. As a result, a wholly secular view has come to predominance.

Henry describes it as follows:
The secular outlook postulates man's being and destiny solely in view of finite
forces, the interrelatedness of all cosmic processes, and the relativity of all historical
events. It affirms that nature alone has produced man. This carries with it a special
understanding of man's place in the tangible world and bears upon all the central
elements of human existence. All that man does and achieves is shadowed by
transience and relativity. Within this context of existence his station and role and all
his sociohistorical institutions are conditioned by his social environment, which
alone shapes and sharpens his capacities. Nothing traditional is sacrosanct. ... No
objectively given order of reality seems wholly impervious to his manipulation;
technology has enabled him to rearrange his once apparently uncontrollable
environment to serve his own interests and desires. All convictions and creeds are
considered to be culture-bound, all commitments of truth and morality tentative.
The very possibility of human progress on an empirico-scientific basis is held to
require the human revaluation of all standards and structures; change alone is the
way into a helpful future. Secularism sponsors a new self-consciousness which
divorces man from a dependent relationship with God. In a world without
objective reason and purpose, man needs autonomous freedom to create and recreate his own meaning and security. Man is viewed as a creature competent
without gods to cope with all problems through social rather than supernatural
resources, and all his powers and choices are contingently grounded.149
Two individuals who express modem naturalism most fully are Marx and Nietzsche.
Nietzsche was particularly straightforward about his view, although, Henry contends, he
fell short of accepting the radical implications of his own views.
Nietzsche's program was to rid the earth of ordinary men, and at the same time of its
reverence for the God-man, and to substitute therefore the man-God, the superman,
who knows no ethics of humility, of submission, of love for enemies.... For one
reason only--for the ironic reason that Nietzsche was still "too Christian"--did his
view halt short of a thorough pessimism, or even nihilism.... That was the
confidence ... that human nature can be changed, that the superman could somehow
rise out of the herct.150
Marx also borrowed from Christianity to avoid the decline into despair. Not only did
Marx maintain a "Nietzschean confidence that human nature can be improved," but he
adopted a quasi-Christian view of history. Henry argues that "in its assurance that history
is put together so as to guarantee the ultimate triumph of the proletariat, Marxism gets its
149 Ibid., 1:136-137.
150 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 56.

53

vitality not from a naturalistic view of history, but from the biblical teaching that history
moves to a goal ... "151 Both Marx and Nietzsche were unable to accept fully the logical
conclusions of their philosophical assumptions. But the logic of modernity is becorriing
increasingly apparent and Henry is convinced that "when this conviction, that human nature
is thus pliable, is set aside, then the drift to nihilism will really run its course."152
One of the great weaknesses of modem naturalism, according to Henry, is the fact
that humanity cannot and does not live according to its own precepts. Rather, mankind
strives to exhibit purpose in life. Naturalists cannot accept the nihilism implicit in their own
assumptions about the nature of reality. "Secular man refuses to see himself as merely an
animated cog or self-asserting animal, having no real future but only a day after tomorrow
empty of lasting life and purpose, a temporary phenomenon ... that finally succumbs to
and in nothingness."153 Modem man still posits certain values as worthy of pursuit.
For all the emphasis that cosmic reality is a natural process wholly indifferent to
human purposes and values, secular man devotes himself energetically to human
welfare, social justice and human dignity. While insisting that the cosmos respects
no human aspirations except as self-interest prevails on its own, secular man
champions self-giving and service to others, elevates love for neighbor and pursuit
of justice as inviolable ends, proclaims a positive view of the earth as an object of
ethical duty, and finds the core of human life in man's moral commitments. Hence,
secular man adjusts his life to norms of truth and value which the naturalistic
outlook cannot validate or accommodate.154
Henry is convinced that this is inconsistent with the precepts of modem naturalism.
"Secular naturalism can hardly reconcile these confident assertions of the meaning and
worth of human life ... with its relativization of reality and life." 155 There is no room for
151 Ibid., 56-57.
152 Ibid.
153 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:41.
154 Ibid.
. l55 Ibid. "Although contemporary humanists champion an agenda of social ethics,
therr proposals involve little more than a pirating of selected aspects of biblical morality that
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an "ought" in the scheme of things posited by modem naturalism. All things are
characterized as that which "is." "Ultimate transiency and relativity provide no court of
111

appeal from the simple verdict that 'that's the way it is. 156

In fact, no one should expect the modem naturalist to develop a compelling ethical
construct. Henry is convinced that "naturalistic morality ... can neither summon nor
vindicate fixed ethical principles of any kind. If homo sapiens is essentially but an animal
he can hardly be expected to subordinate self-interest to the good of the community." 157
This secularistic view of reality is totally unacceptable. Henry is convinced that
modernity is ripe with relativism and "relativism begets pessimism and pessimism begets
nihilism." 158 Henry insists:
A culture lacking a conviction that any goal whatever ought to be pursued
permanently, and without any single unifying objective in its academic life, and
dedicated progressively to the elimination of the "fetish" of changeless norms and
the substitution therefore of temporary ideals which are somehow obligatory for us,
has already imbibed the hemlock of death.159
Biblical theism is the only solution. Henry claims "a comprehensive naturalistic
philosophy ... could be met only by a supernaturalism which found its vitality not in
philosophical postulation, but in the self-revealing God." 1(j()
Man is confronted with a choice. Henry maintains "the final choice for modem man

are totally unrelated to the naturalistic theory of the universe." Henry, "The God of the
Bible and Moral Foundations," 3-4.
156 Ibid. "An empirical outlook, of course, cannot establish or sustain any norms,
least of all objective moral norms; it is descriptive and at best can detail only what is
perceptibly observed ... " 1:146-147.
157 Henry, "The God of the Bible and Moral Foundations," 10.
158 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:29.
159 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 66-67.
l60 Ibid., 70.
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is between Christianity and nihilism, between the Logos of God and the ultimate
meaninglessness of life and the world."161 Henry is convinced that" ... the widespread
acceptance of [modern] premises hastened the breakdown of western culture."162 He
emphasizes that "wherever secular man tries to live consistently by these convictions, he
drains his own life of meaning and worth and progressively empties his existence of
everything that makes human life desirable."163 Henry quotes Karl Lowith who wrote:
"How can one feel at home in a universe which is conceived as the chance result of
statistical probabilities and which is said to come into existence through an explosion?
Such a universe cannot inspire confidence or sympathy, nor can it give orientation and
meaning to man's existence in it."164
One need not accept the Judeo-Christian world-view to have foreseen these
consequences. To the contrary, Henry argues that "any disciplined reader of Plato's
Republic ... could have foretold the final issue of such assumptions, for the classic
ancient mind was philosophically convinced that, given a full-fledged naturalism, the
meaning would evaporate from existence." 165
Henry is adamant, "the dilemma of secular man is this: In order to escape the
~

nihilism and personal worthlessness implicit in naturalism, he invests his life with
11

sequestered meanings and values that naturalism cannot sustain. 166 Henry reminds us

161 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:41.
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that

man is not born with the naturalistic prejudices about reality, and they go against his
deepest intuitions and his own essential humanity.... The dilemmas and
ambiguities of his personal experience are such that secular man himself does not
practice his naturalistic commitments with life-and-death seriousness. Instead,
secularists themselves repeatedly contradict their own naturalistic claims in their
daily lives, and adjust their private affairs to quite different presuppositions.167
As things now exist, "secular man therefore lives by a double standard--by the
naturalistic credo which he affirms and reveres when it serve his purposes, and by hidden
alternatives for action that he readily accepts whenever he prefers. His private life gives
unwitting testimony to the omissions and inadequacies of a naturalistic outlook." 168
This view of the world is not necessarily the perspective of a rational man. To the
contrary, the premises of naturalism are accepted without reason and the inability of
naturalism to fully account for man's desires and inclinations only demonstrate the
inadequacy of this view of reality.
Reason, we are told, requires the secular perspective; faith in God is derided as
emotive or volitional in character. The plain fact is, however, that naturalism is not a
demand of reason but reflects an arbitrary conceptualization of reality. It is
inexcusably limited as an account of the ultimate world and is grounded in a perverse
will and rebellious heart.169
Humanity need not despair. Solutions to the problems of human existence are
available, according to Henry, in the revealed will of God. Thus, our attention should tum
to Judeo-Christian theism.
CONCLUSION
Today, humanity is confronted with a naturalistic view of reality that, according to
Henry, will never resolve the plight of humanity. To the contrary, the modem view of
reality is a direct result of man's rebellious nature and will only lead him further astray as

l67 Ibid., 1:145.
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he seeks his own solutions to problems that he misunderstands and misconstrues.
The solution, according to Henry, is not a return a classical Greek philosophy. For
all its strengths, in the final analysis, it too falls short. Henry argues that solutions are not,
however, impossible to find. A return to the philosophy of St Augustine and a renewed

faith in divine revelation is the key to our quest for answers to the questions that most
perplex humanity. Only a continuous effort to consistently and accurately understand and
apply these great truths will suffice. Man's sinful nature which inclines him to seek his
own solutions to his own problems is even a possibility within Christian circles. St
Thomas had fallen prey to this tendency.
Thus, Henry calls for a rearticulation of Judeo-Christian theism as the only solution
for humanity. Humanity's greatest need, of course, is the need for salvation. Other needs
such as the need for a just social order also require human acknowledgement and
dependence upon God for solutions. Fortunately, our quest for a just social order has been
given some direction by God in his Holy Scriptures. Divinely revealed general principles
can point humanity towards solutions in our quest for a just social order. Chapter five will
begin to sketch out those principles that Henry has identified as essential for the world of
politics. They are principles derived from the divinely revealed Scriptures. Prior to that,
the next chapter will explain Henry's understanding of Judeo-Christian theism.

CHAPTER THREE

JUDEO-CHRISTIAN THEISM

Given the inadequacy of both ancient and modern philosophy it is necessary to
consider a third alternative, Judeo-Christian theism. Henry has argued that all explanations
of reality necessarily rely upon basic axioms or presuppositions. I Such is also the case for
Judeo-Christian theism. Henry attempts to delineate carefully the presuppositions that he
posits and proceeds to demonstrate how these presuppositions more adequately explain all
of reality than the alternatives of ancient idealism and modern naturalism. He insists that no
theologian can avoid "philosophical discussions involving ontology and epistemology. "2
He does not shy away from the task. He maintains:
The Christian faith stands or falls with certain specific and explicit assertions about
reality. Christianity offers its own ontology, and any statement of the ultimately
real world not based on divine revelation and relying instead merely on human
reasoning will show itself less than adequate if not hostile. Christian theology is
metaphysically affirmative, in the sense that it ventures to inform us on the basis of
revelation what is actually the case about God and the spiritual world.... There
cannot be a Christian theology in the sense in which Christianity has historically
understood its own claims without ontological and metaphysical assertions. 3
Acknowledging the declining interest in metaphysics in recent decades, Henry insists
1 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:245. "The basic axiom of every system
l~ undemonstrable, that is, cannot be deduced from some still higher or prior knowledge,
s1~ce the whole system of theorems and propositions is dependently suspended upon this
pnmary axiom. The axioms of the Christian system of truth are not presuppositions shared
m common with secular thought." Ibid., 1:223.
.

2 Ibid., 1: 190. Although he pursues tangents frequently, the first four volumes of
.God. Revelation and Authority focus on the question of epistemology. The remaining two
volumes focus on ontology.
3 Ibid., 1:198.
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a reversal is occurring and an intelligent expression of Christianity is extremely important at

this time.
We stand at the threshold, it may be, of an exciting renewal of philosophical
activity, a development which could shape the outlook of world thought in the
twenty-first century and beyond. The human mind, just because man is by nature a
spiritual-rational-moral agent, will not and cannot forever shun the larger issues of
truth and reality; the nonmetaphysical and anti-metaphysical eras always turn out to
be transition interludes.... Metaphysics tomorrow will be either Christian or nonChristian, but metaphysics there will be.... The task of Christian leadership is to
confront modem man with the Christian world-life view as the revealed
conceptuality for understanding reality and experience, and to recall reason once
again from the vagabondage of irrationalism and the arrogance of autonomy to the
service of true faith.4
Henry does not hesitate to investigate the truth claims of Christianity. He contends
that "Christianity has no fears in respect to truth and reason. No philosophy and no
religion presses the concern for intellectual and moral integrity more insistently than does
the Bible."5 To the contrary, he insists that one must do so and when done properly, he
believes Christianity can withstand careful scrutiny and prove itself as the superior
explanation of reality.
The fundamental presupposition of orthodox Christianity, according to Henry, is

God known in revelation. 6 This axiom includes both an ontological and an epistemological
..

element. He argues that the ontological element is central and the epistemological is
secondary. He refuses to adopt the modem approach that places epistemology in the
forefront of philosophical inquiry. The proposition that "God exists" is the principle axiom
of Judeo-Christian theism. For "the self-disclosed God ... exists forever in a selfspecified condition free of external determination; his reality, purpose and activity are not
4 Ibid., 1:43.
5 Ibid., 1:264.
6. Ibid., 1:212 and 1:14-15. See also 1:219 where he specifically identifies God as
the basic ontological presupposition and divine revelation as the basic epistemological
Presupposition of Christianity.
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. gent on the universe. He continues steadfast, unimpaired and immutable. •'7 The
conon
derivative epistemological assumption is important for apart from divine revelation
humanity would not nor could not know of God's existence and nature. "The living God
is the original Christian axiom, both ontically and noetically, for God discloses himself in
revelation as the God who is eternally there."8
Henry views epistemology as "a prolegomenon to ontology," while insisting upon
the centrality of ontology as the most vital philosophical concern. 9 Henry has written that
"the determinative question may be expressed: Is there or not, a reality beyond nature."10
Portions of Henry's discussion of the attributes of God that are relevant to this study will

be presented in subsequent chapters. This chapter will serve as a prolegomenon and will
present Henry's understanding of Judeo-Christian epistemology. First, I shall discuss
each of the following propositions.
Divine revelation is the source of all truth, the truth of Christianity included.
Human reason is a divinely fashioned instrument for recognizing truth; it is not a
creative source of truth. The Bible is the Christian's principle of verification. Logical
consistency is a negative test of truth and coherence a subordinate test. The proper
task of theology is to exposit and elucidate the content of Scripture in an orderly way.
The theology of revelation requires the apologetic confrontation of speculative
theories of reality and life.11
•

Following that discussion, I will review the fifteen theses regarding divine revelation
proposed by Henry in God. Revelation and Authority.
DIVINE REVELATION

7 Ibid., 5: 11. "God's existence is the foundational biblical doctrine; from it flow all
other Christian principles and precepts." Ibid., 5:9.
8 Ibid., 5: 10.
9

Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 49.

10 Henry, "The Relation Between Conduct and Belief," 58.
11

Henry, God. Reyelation and Authority, 1:215.
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Henry claims that "God in his revelation is the first principle of Christian theology,
from which all the truths of revealed religion are derived."12 This means that our
knowledge of the nature of being and of God is dependent upon divine revelation and is
limited to the extent to which divinity reveals truth to us.13
What is revelation? It is the divine manifestation or unveiling of truth to man. Henry
explains:
The term "revelation" means intrinsically the disclosure of what was previously
unknown. In Judeo-Christian theology the term is used primarily of God's
communication to man of divine truth, that is, his manifestation of himself or of his
will. The essentials of the biblical view are that the Logos is the divine agent in all
revelation, this revelation being further discriminated as general or universal (i.e.
revelation in nature, history and conscience) and special or particular (i.e.
redemptive revelation conveyed by wondrous acts and words). The special
revelation in sacred history is crowned by the incarnation of the living Word and the
inscripturation of the spoken word.14
While he readily accepts general revelation, and insists that any sound theology does
likewise, he is particularly concerned with the relationship between general revelation and
special revelation.15 General revelation requires special revelation; apart from it, general
revelation is inadequate. It would not have been so except for man's choice to reject God

and pursue life and meaning apart from his creator. "Because of sinful alienation from
•

God, fallen man culpably thwarts the ongoing general revelation of God in nature and
history, a revelation which constantly invades even his mind and conscience." 16
12 Ibid.
13 ".The knowledge of God is both as limited and as vast a topic as God himself is in
.
his revelatton; only on the basis of God's self-disclosure is man able to make any legitimate
state~nts whatever about him." Ibid., 1:216. Our knowledge is entirely dependent upon
od himself. "Only as God manifests himself and as the truth of his revelation determines
our affirmations do we truly know him." Ibid., 5:13.

G

4
ed WI Carl F. H. Henry, "Revelation, Special," in Evangelical Dictionazy of Theology,
· alter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 946.
15
16

Henry, The Drift of Western Thought, 103.
Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:223.
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fortunately, special revelation fills the void.17
In Scripture an authorized summary of all God's revelation--in the universe, in
redemptive history, in Jesus of Nazareth--is divinely provided for us in inspired
form .... The Bible openly publishes man's predicament and God's redemptive
remedy in the form of objectively intelligible statements. The scriptural revelation
takes epistemological priority over general revelation, not because general revelation
is obscure or because man as sinner cannot know it, but because Scripture as an
inspired literary document republishes the content of general revelation objectively,
over against sinful man's reductive dilutions and misconstructions of it Moreover,
it proclaims God's way of redemption to sinful man in his guilty condition.18

It appears that general revelation has as its primary purpose to demonstrate to man
one truth, the truth that he is a fallen creature. The Bible
does not present general revelation on the thesis that the true knowledge of God is
possible to fallen man through the natural light of reason apart from a revelation of
Christ, but rather introduces general revelation alongside special revelation in order
to emphasize man's guilt. Thus the Scripture adduces God's unitary revelation,
general and special, to display man's true predicament; he is a finite creature with an
eternal destiny, made for spiritual fellowship with God, but now separated from his
maker by sin.19
The purpose of special revelation, on the other hand, is to reveal the plan of
redemption.
Special revelation is redemptive revelation. It publishes the good tidings that
the holy and merciful God promises salvation as a divine gift to man who cannot
save himself (OT) and that he has now fulfilled that promise in the gift of his Son in

17 "... the necessity for special revelation is grounded in the inability of man the
sinner to read off general revelation as man unfallen would have translated it. To confuse
general revelation and natural theology is not to take sufficiently seriously either the
sinfulness of man or the uniqueness of special revelation." Carl F. H. Henry, Notes on the
Doctrine of God (Boston, MA: W. A. Wilde Co, 1948), 68.
18 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:223. Henry is not the first to argue for
the limited utility of general revelation. Demarest places Henry within a tradition that
Henry prefers to identify with by including him in a long line of widely recognized
theologians. He writes: "Authorities such as Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Hodge, Warfield
and Henry argue for the objective reality of general revelation and its limited utility in
!?ediating an elemental knowledge of God's existence and character." B. A. Demarest,
Re~elation, General," in Evangelical Dictionruy of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 945.
19 Henry, "Revelation, Special," 946.
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whom all men are called to believe (NT). The gospel is news that the incarnate
Logos has borne the sins of doomed men, has died in their stead, and has risen for
their justification. This is the fixed center of special redemptive revelation. 20
THE ROLE OF HUMAN REASON

If revelation is the basic epistemological axiom of Judeo-Christian theism, then what
is the relationship between human reason and divine revelation. Henry identifies the three
classic ways of describing that relationship as those of Tertullian, Aquinas and
Augustine.21 He places himself firmly in the camp of Augustine.
Henry believes that the Tertullian way is exemplified by several modem theologians
such as Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann and Tillich. This view, which Henry says was
"never typically Christian," attempts to "sharply contrast revelational truth with
metaphysical and scientific knowledge." Tertullian is often quoted as saying: "What has
Jerusalem to do with Athens?" He was not simply emphasizing the "priority of faith, but
rather ... the disjunction of faith and reason." In other words, for Tertullian, "Christianity
requires belief in what to the unregenerate mind seems absurd." Henry rejects this
approach. 22
The second way is that of Saint Thomas Aquinas. While Tertullian was guilty of
depreciating human reason, Henry thinks Aquinas went too far in the other direction. He

grants too much to human reason and sets the stage for the subsequent modem
abandonment of divine revelation.
The Thomistic way ... made room for natural or philosophical theology as
preparatory for revealed theology. While Thomas Aquinas approaches the
existence of God both from man's ordinary experience and from supernatural
revelation as starting points, he nonetheless invokes philosophical theology, or
20 Ibid.
. 21 "In the long history of Christian thought, revelation and reason have in fact been
depicted as standing in three remarkably different relationships, sometimes designated as
the 'three ways'--that of Tertullian, of Augustine and of Aquinas." Henry, O..Qd..
Revelation and Authority, 1:182.
22 Ibid.
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metaphysics, a natural type of knowledge open to anyone, to supply the
foundations of faith. Aquinas considers the first use of philosophy in respect to
theology to be the demonstration of "items that are preambles to faith." All
Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God rest on an appeal to sense
observation without reliance on divine disclosure. 23
The great strength of the Thomistic position is that it provides common ground between
believers and non-believers. A common ground that believers can rely upon in their
demonstration to non-believers of the truth of the Christian faith.
It is important to point out that Aquinas does not rely upon human reason alone. To

the contrary, Scripture is very important.
To be sure, Aquinas insists that the theology taught in Scripture gives
supplementary information about God and his purposes for man that cannot be
derived from any source but divine revelation--so, for example, the doctrine of the
divine incarnation in Jesus Christ, the Trinity, bodily resurrection, and so on. But
the truths of the existence of God and the existence and immortality of the soul are
not grounded on religious considerations but are considered inferences from sense
observation, and philosophical reasoning is viewed as capable of supplying a
demonstrative proof. 24
This interpretation, according to Henry, depreciates divine revelation and mitigates the
depravity offallen humanity. It assumes that individuals have reasoning potential that
exceeds their true capacity. Henry does not believe that a depraved and fallen individual
can come to a knowledge of eternal and supernatural truth apart from divine revelation.
"'

The Thomistic emphasis on unaided human reason only encourages humanity to seek truth
via their own capacities. Thus, Henry accuses Aquinas of contributing to the subsequent
modem abandonment of revelational knowledge. He writes:
When early modem philosophers were unpersuaded that Thomas's philosophic
approach to God issued in the conclusions he adduced, difficulties arose.... In
particular, the claim that the divine existence can be logically demonstrated by
mferences from sense experience was assailed, first by philosophical rationalists
and then by empiricists. Since Thomas suspended the case for the existence of God
on philosophical demonstration, a breakdown of the five-fold proof could only

23 Ibid., 1: 184.
24 Ibid.
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leave revealed theology floating nebulously in midair.25
In other words, when subsequent thinkers, using unaided human reasoning, rightly or
wrongly, concluded that Thomistic philosophy was not true, it was a very short time before
they began to lose faith in Scripture as well. Henry need not and does not agree with the
arguments of the modern rationalists and empiricists; rather, he believes that reason,
uninfonned and ungrounded in revelation, will inevitably lead one astray. Our fallen nature
guarantees it.
The third way, that of Augustine, is the way with which Henry identifies. Augustine
appealed "to revelation in the interest of a more fully informed reason." He is identified as
the originator of the notion that one should "believe in order to understand." Belief is the
first step to understanding. Faith is essential for proper understanding. Human reason is
incapable of knowing apart from divine revelation. Henry says: "Human reason is not
viewed as a source of truth; rather, man is to think God's thoughts after him. Revelation is
the source of truth, and reason, as illuminated by the Spirit, the instrument for
comprehending it. "26
One must begin with revelation for "the revelation of the living God is the
precondition and starting point for human understanding; it supplies the framework and
corrective for natural reason." Reason and philosophy survive but within a limited context.
They merely "explicate the wisdom found in Scripture... 27 For both Augustine and Henry,
"divine revelation and authority rather than human reasoning are ... the starting point of
'Christian philosophy.'" It is "inspired Scripture," not "philosophical speculation," that
"constitutes the gateway to truth. "28
25 Ibid., 1:184-185.
26 Henry, "Revelation, Special," 948.
27 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:183.
28 Ibid., 1:183-184.
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Henry provides a relatively full exposition of Augustine's view in the first volume of

Q_od. Revelation and Authority. This view, one that Henry labels the "theological
rranscendent a priori," is based upon the axiom that man innately knows of the existence of
God.29 Henry says:
Augustine of Hippo stands unrivaled as the brilliant exponent of the Christian
thesis that the knowledge of God and of other selves and the world of nature is not
merely inferential. Whatever else is contributory to the content of human cognition,
this knowledge involves a direct and immediate noesis because of the unique
constitution of the human mind Knowledge of God is no mere induction from the
finite and nondivine, but is directly and intuitively given in human experience.
However much knowledge of the self and of the physical world may be expounded
by inference, it is bracketed always by a primal antecedent relationship to the
spiritual world which makes man's knowledge possible and holds him in intuitive
correlation with God, the cosmos, and other selves. 30
Thus, all of humanity has a "primordial ontological awareness of God."31 What does this
entail?
Augustine held that on the basis of creation the human mind possesses a
number of necessary truths. Intellectual intuition conveys the laws of logic, the
immediate consciousness of self-existence, the truths of mathematics, and the moral
truth that one ought to seek wisdom. Moreover, he held that in knowing immutable
and eternal truth we know God, for only God is immutable and eternal. 32

29 Ibid., 1:323.
30 Ibid., 1:325.
31 Ibid., 1:149. Not only does humanity innately know that God exists but we also
have "knowledge of moral accountability to the eternal Sovereign, a sense of personal guilt
~d ~ulnerability to final judgement for wrongdoing." To those who would argue that this
~s ~hgious nonsense, Henry replies by saying: "To insist that the living God of the Bible
is mescapably an aspect of everyday experience may strike the man 'come of age' as
no~se!lse, since the very possibility is excluded by his definition of reality and his
del~tation of experience. Nonetheless his conscience and behavior remain much more
ambivalent than his secular presuppositions imply, and his mind itself is in touch with
transcendent divinity. Although dismissing the nonsecular in theory, the secular man
~trays in his practice a self-awareness that incorporates and acknowledges the nonsecular;
is. eyeryday life mirrors a dimension of the ultimate that gives meaning to those very
rehgiou~ symbols he has professedly discarded. His conduct, moreover, reflects private
ahssumpttons about personal interrelationships and the given character of external reality that
s arply contradict the naturalistic framework." Ibid., 1:149.
32 Ibid., 1:76-77.
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Augustine saw man as a unique creation of God designed for knowledge of both the
~--1

OaIUHU

and supernatural worlds. This involves the theory of preformation. This

Augustinian theory, adopted by Henry, maintains that "the categories of thought are
aptitudes for thought implanted by the Creator and synchronized with the whole of
reality." 33 The means of know ledge for each are the product of God and are uniquely
designed for the nature of the object being known. It is "the senses [that] link man to an
objective world of sense perception, while the intellect links him to the objective world of
intellection."34 Henry is quick to remind readers that even our knowledge of the sensible
world is based upon forms of thought given and sustained by God. "Never," Augustine

and Henry contend, "is human knowledge adequately described as an achievement of
human factors operating wholly in isolation from a divine activity."35
Both Augustine and Henry are also quick to discount any notion of the divinity of

man. Man is a creation of God. He is created in the image of God but he is not God. As
Henry says, "the Augustinian doctrine of immediate awareness in knowledge experience-of God and the self and the world--presupposes the Hebrew-Christian view of man's
creaturely relationship to his Maker, even in its emphasis on man as bearer of the divine
image."36
The fact that humans have this innate ontic point of reference is an ongoing process.
It was not the result of a once-for-all creative act of God. To the contrary, man's ontic

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 1:325.
35 Ibid., 1:326. In another place, Henry says "there is no such thing as 'unaided'
h
uman ~o~ledge." Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 104. In all cases, knowledge
0
~ any kind is a gift of God. Henry says: "Knowledge in all its ramifications is a divine
giftthto ~ for the sake of spiritual fellowship and moral obedience." God. Revelation and
Au__ ontt, 1:330.
36 Ibid., 1:327.
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reference is the product of an ongoing act of divine revelation. At no point is man
independently capable of knowledge of the divine. Henry explains further:
Augustine has no sympathy, therefore, for a deistically conceived doctrine of
innate ideas. He resists the notion that man as a rational being stands in possession
of a body of ideas impressed once-for-all from birth upon his constitution as a
human being, and of which the intellect becomes aware by its own subsequent and
independent activity. Rather, Augustine's a priori flows from his view of the
creaturely soul standing in the process of intellection in unbroken relation of
dependence upon God. The theistic conception of the universe requires that the
creature, while endowed with real activities of its own, yet stands constantly
supported by God in the exercise of all its activities. In the process of intellection
the human soul is not only active, but is acted upon. Whatever light it sees, it sees
illumined by divine light. 37
Augustine refers to this ongoing act of revelation as the "divine activity of illumination. "38
The divine source of knowledge is what provides man with certainty. He explains:
"That all knowledge is constituted by divine revelation ... surrounds truth with assurance.
Since God is the author of our rational faculties ... God is the ultimate ground of man's
certitude and is surety for the validity of knowledge."39 This certainty, however, does not
imply the omniscience of man in any way. For man is limited both by his finite and fallen
nature. Human finitude limits the scope of human knowledge. Henry says, "man as a

finite creature doubtless does not grasp anything exhaustively, but he may have genuine
...

knowledge nonetheless ...40 For, "the soul, although finite, can indeed know 'perfect'
knowledge, that is, it can attain truth, yet it is not omniscient. Yet even when we know in
part, we may have unlimited certitude. 41
11

Human depravity limits the apprehension of knowledge. "Man's knowledge is
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 1:328.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 1:335.
41 Ibid., 1:329.
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·oned by his ethical state, which has a determinating effect upon his mental activity.
condin
This effect is especially vitiating with regard to the knowledge of God... 42 Thus, our
sinful condition limits our ability to know. Scripture makes clear the condition of the
human soul. It is fallen. Henry argues: "Revelation itself affirms that man is depraved in

consequence of the fall, and that this depravity affects him in the entirety of his being--in
volition, affection and intellection... 43 Because our fallen nature impedes us, "a right
perception of the truth becomes impossible...44 Henry insists that "human faculties
become so impaired by sin that the natural man is precluded from the ascertainment of
truth ...45 Because of our sinful nature, that which God has revealed to man in a general
way is distorted by sinful man. Sinful man postulates new explanations of reality based
upon his cloudy understanding.
The competitive views implicate man in an artificial ontology, misstate the nature
and condition of the soul, reconstruct or falsify the image of God in man, and
arbitrarily exclude the factors of sin and special redemptive revelation in
knowledge-theory by their very misdefinition of the a priori. In brief, they so
fabricate the intellectual processes as to make man's created finiteness and
contingent sinfulness virtually irrelevant before the discussion of epistemology even
gets underway. 46
The fallen state of humanity does not mean that man has wholly lost his rational

42 Henry, The Drift of Western Thought, 107. "Although divine revelation opens to
us the divine world of ideas ... the human mind is not merely passive in the acquisition of
knowledge. Man's knowing activity is conditioned both by the intrinsic nature and
c?ntingent state of his soul; it is qualified, both by man's finitude and by the ethical
disposition of his will. Knowledge is a function of the whole man. The soul must prepare
for reception of the truth, and also embrace it." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,
1:328.
43 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:226-227.
44 Ibid., 1:329.
. . 45 Ibid. He insists that "the rebellious human knower erects a barrier to adequate
spmtual truth which only special divine revelation can overcome." Ibid., 1:281.
46 Ibid., 1:331.
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capacities. To the contrary, the fallen state of man does not mean "that man's rational
abilities are wholly nullified."
The fall conditions man's will more pervasively than his reason. Man wills not to
know God in truth, and makes religious reflection serviceable to moral revolt But
he is still capable of intellectually analyzing rational evidence for the truth-value of
assertions about God. If the noetic effects of the fall were totally and utterly
damaging, thus making man incapable of thinking aright and immune to the rational
validity of the basic categories of logic (e.g., the law of contradiction), then no
rationally persuasive case could be mounted for or against anything whatever.47
Thus, the fall of humanity does not mean that man cannot know God, rather it means that
man chooses not to know God. Our lack of knowledge is not so much a result of a
defective rational capacity but the result of a defective will.
The problem is not one of fundamental intellectual incompetence, or men could
know nothing at all. Nor is it that the canons of reason and forms of logic are
irrelevant to ultimate reality. Were that the case, we would be doomed from the
outset to ontological skepticism. Rather, man the thinker, for whatever reason
(Judeo-Christian theology would point to the fall and sinfulness of man) employs
his intelligence to formulate comprehensive explanations of reality and life that ...
rival ... transcendent cognitive revelation.48
The solution to this condition of man is revelation.

~.

Only special revelation and grace, which aims to restore man to the knowledge for
which he was created, can master the noetic effects of sin. Already dependent on
God alone for existence, and continually sustained as a rational creature by the
activity of God, the sinner is restored to light and life only through special divine
intervention. 49
At another point, Henry writes, "revelation lifts human reason beyond restrictions of
intellect limited by finitude and clouded by sin through the knowledge it conveys of man's

47 Ibid., 1:226-227. "Not even the cataclysmic moral tragedy of the fall has wholly
der_nolished man's capacity for knowing God and his revealed truth." 1:227. Man is still
rational in spite of the fall for "... man bears the divine image on the basis of creation and
~>'·this image while distorted by sin is not destroyed." Henry, "Revelation, Special,"
48.
4 8 Ibid., 1:91.
49 Ibid., 1:329.
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Maker and Redeemer."50 Revelation, however, requires rationality. For apart from
human reason, man could not understand that which God has revealed to us. Henry

explains:
Knowledge of God is indeed wholly dependent upon divine revelation, but
man was divinely made with rational and moral aptitudes for intelligible communion
with his Maker and for the joyous service of God. The possibility of man's
knowledge of divine revelation rests in the created capacity of the human mind to
know the truth of God, and the capacity of thought and speech that anticipates
intelligible knowledge and fellowship .... That man's reason is a divine gift for
recognizing God's truth is a main tenet of the Christian faith. Human reason was a
divine endowment enabling man to have knowledge of God and his purposes in the
universe. 51
Thus, Henry concludes, "the Christian religion assigns a critical and indispensable
role to reason." That role is to "to recognize and elucidate [truth]."52 Any other
explanation of human reason is inadequate if it overestimates or underestimates the
capability of man.
THEOLOOICAL SCIENCE
Henry believes that theology is a science in the classical sense. He writes:
In its classic definition, science meant any clearly defined subject matter that yields
valid knowledge communicable from mind to mind and from generation to
generation. Science therefore was not limited to only one particular methodology;
each science elaborated its content by the method appropriate to its own subject
matter.53
Modern usage of the word "science" has departed significantly from this definition.

Today, science has been "narrowed to include only systematized information gained by the
observational method of the physical sciences... 54 But taken in its classical sense, theology
50 Ibid., 1:201.
51 Ibid., 1:227.
52 Ibid., 1:226.
53 Ibid., 1:202.
54
.
Ibid. Henry does not dispute the utility of modern science. "Common sense
l'Cqwres modern man's recognition of the scientific method as a spectacularly useful
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is a science and, as such, the basic axioms and methods appropriate to this science need
explanation.
Christian theology is interested no less than any other science in discussing
presuppositions and principles, sources and data, purposes or objectives, methods
of knowing, verifiability and falsifiability. Indeed, Christianity is a genuine science
in the deepest sense because it presumes to account in an intelligible and orderly
way for whatever is legitimate in every sphere of life and learning. 55
Henry begins with a basic axiom. Theology, he asserts, "sets out not simply with
God as a speculative presupposition but with God known in his revelation."56 He
continues by arguing "the appeal to God and to revelation cannot stand alone, if it is to be
significant; it must embrace also some agreement on rational methods of inquiry, ways of
argument, and criteria for verification ... 57 Henry believes it is essential for theologians to
explain why Christianity offers a legitimate and truthful account of reality.58 Without an
apologetic defense of itself, Christianity is unarmed against the onslaught of modern
historicism.
Without persuasive epistemic credentials, Christianity will be assimilated to the
historical approach prevalent in the modern intellectual world where all events are

'"'

instrumentality for transforming our environment. Respect and gratitude are indeed due the
scientist for many comforts and conveniences furnished to modem living ... " But he is
quick to place limits on modem science. Respect for the successes of modem science with
its use of the empirical method need not be extended to permit empiricism to apply to
metaphysical or moral questions. "Taken by itself, the empirical method provides no basis
for affirming or denying supernatural realities, since by definition it is a method for dealing
~nly ~ith perceptible realities. It cannot, therefore, validate supraperceptible being; nor can
it validate moral norms either ... " Ibid., 1:85.

55 Ibid., 1:203-204.
56 Ibid., 1:14-15.
57 Ibid.
. 58 He says: "Since theology is a rational discipline, it must of necessity declare
w~ch method or methods of knowing it considers appropriate to the knowledge of God,
an wh~t tests for religious truth it approves. When a non-Christian asks, 'What
pers~as1ve reasons have you for believing?' the basic issue at stake is, is theology
credible?" Ibid., 1:213.
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set in the context of developmental contingency and any claim to finality and
absolute uniqueness is leveled. If the theology of revelation holds more than an
antiquarian interest, Christians must indicate their conviction that Christianity is
distinguished above all by its objective truth, and must adduce the method of
knowing and the manner of verification by which every man can become personally
persuaded. 59
.
A rational account of one's belief is also important to the believer. For "if the question of
method and verifiability is left unanswered, even the Christian himself can have no rational
certainty in his commitment to God. "60
The first step is to affirm the existence of truth itself. Henry says "the evangelical's
first task is to insist upon the truth. An age that submerges questions of religious truth
must be confronted with an insistent call to face the truth or falsity of its doctrines. The
next task is to identify truth and indicate how one can recognize and be assured of it. "61
How does one verify the claims of the Christian faith? Henry insists that "the Bible
is the Christian's principle of verification."62 For only "the inspired Scriptures are the
11

proximate and universally accessible form of authoritative divine revelation. 63
Christianity claims to assert basic truths that are universally applicable.64- Since the
truths are universally applicable, the Christian must be able to show their logic to the nonbeliever. For "if Christianity traffics in the truth--not merely 'truth for Christians' but truth

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 1:214.
61 Ibid., 1:215.
62 Ibid., 1:229.
63 Ibid.

~.

"Christianity contends that revelational truth is intelligible, expressible in valid

propos~t:J.ons, and universally communicable. Christianity does not profess to communicate

a meamng that is significant only within a particular community or culture. It expects men
of all cultures and nations to comprehend its claims about God and insists that men
everywhere ought to acknowledge and appropriate them." Ibid.
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valid for all men--it must speak to the outside world."65
Theological verification is not dependent upon personal faith or national or cultural
perspectives. If a person must first be a Christian believer in order to grasp the
truth of revelation, then meaning is subjective and incommunicable. Regeneration
assuredly creates new attitudes toward the truth of revelation and facilitates man's
comprehension of it, but the new birth is not prerequisite to a knowledge of the
truth of God. 66
Thus, Henry refuses to deny "all common ground between the believer and the
unbeliever. "67 This does not mean one can logically convince others to become a believer
but, one can demonstrate to others that it is not irrational to become a believer.
To be sure, we cannot commit others to the truth of revelation simply by theoretical
arguments, but we can demote and demolish nonrevelational counterclaims. Men
do not appropriate the Christian revelation through conviction reached solely on the
basis of rational argument. Personal faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit, but truth is
God's revelational provision, and the Spirit uses truth as a means of persuasion and
conversion. 68
Thus, Henry encourages the non-believer to investigate Scripture.
The truth-content of theology can be investigated--as can that of astronomy and
botany and geology--quite apart from the moral character of the technical scholar
and his interest or disinterest in a new way of life. The truth of revelation is
intended for sinners, and the unbeliever can indeed examine the content of
theology. If the truth of revelation cannot be known prior to commitment to Christ,
then men cannot be culpable for its rejection; moreover, it would be a waste of time
and energy to try to persuade them of its validity.69
Demonstration to the non-believer of the legitimacy of biblical Christianity involves
the use of logic. Henry does not hesitate to test the validity of what he believes. To test his
assertions, Henry claims that "logical consistency is a negative test of truth and coherence a

65 Ibid., 1:244.
66 Ibid., 1:229.
67 Ibid., 1:227.
68 Ibid., 1:228.
69 Ibid., 1:229.
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subordinate test.

11

70

These logical tests are essential.
Without noncontradiction and logical consistency, no knowledge whatever is
possible. Christianity insists that verification answers the question, "How can I
know that this claim is true?" and not the question of personal preference. To
rational minds, the credibility of a religious claim, like anr other, rests upon the
availability of persuasive evidence and adequate criteria.7
Henry acknowledges that some people reject the use of these criteria in establishing

truth but he maintains their legitimacy.
Some decry the rational emphasis on logic and consistency in considerations of
divine revelation. God is not bound by such criteria, it is said; he is assertedly
above the canons of human reasoning, so that the "truth of revelation" confronts
man in terms either of contradiction or of paradox or of mystery. But without
appeal to sufficient reason, the mind of man has no basis for discriminating
between mysteries, paradoxes and contradictions. 72
He explains his use of these logical tests as follows:
Consistency is a negative test of truth; what is logically contradictory cannot be
true. A denial of the law of contradiction would make truth and error equivalent;
hence in effect it destroys truth. How else except by persuasive rational evidence
that unmasks the inconsistencies of other views and exhibits the rational
consistency of Christian claims shall we make it apparent to the nonbeliever that his
alternative, however fantastic are its promises, lacks the intellectual compulsion of
the Christian view?73
Such arguments are useful in demonstrating to the non-believer the legitimacy of
one's beliefs.
Attention to logical consistency will clarify that nonbelievers thrust aside the
Christian revelation not because of any illogicality of Christian truth, but because of
their own personal illogicality and sinfulness. Logical consistency alone can

.
70 Ibid., 1:232. "Some may think that tests of revelation or truth are highly
mapp!<>priate, and that human creatures ought to accept the divine without question. But
questtons of truth are wholly appropriate." Ibid.
71 Ibid.
7 2 Ibid., 1:232-233. Examples would include Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr.
7 3 Ibid., 1:233-234.
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adjudicate whether any alternative is worthy of one's commitment 74
But the actual commitment is an act of will. However, he adds quickly, one does not
usually commit oneself to something that is obviously inconsistent or contradictory. Thus,
according to Henry, "the Christian system of doctrine prizes internal consistency. The
uuths of revealed religion do not contradict each other; [and] the theorems derived from the
11

axiom of revelation are self-consistent 75
But logic is not the final word To the contrary:
Given divergent starting points, the possibility remains that several logically
consistent alternatives might be postulated; a nontheist might even grant the
consistency of the Christian system of truth, given its primary axiom of the reality
of God in his self-revelation. But if such considerations lead one to dismiss the
importance of logical consistency, one demolishes any possibility of truth
whatever. Logical consistency is not a positive test of truth, but a negative test; if it
were a positive test, logical consistency would accredit all views, however,
conflicting, that consistently follow from differing starting points. While logical
consistency as a positive test might commend too much, logical inconsistency is a
liability to any view. As a test, logical consistency disqualifies any serious
contender whose truth-claim is characterized by logical contradiction.76
Nonetheless, Christianity "offers a more consistent, more comprehensive and more
satisfactory explanation of the meaning and worth of than do other views. "77 Quite
simply, "it accounts most adequately for human experience."78
What role exists for theology? Henry is again clear: "The proper task of theology is
to exposit and elucidate the content of Scripture in an orderly way. 11 79 He explains
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 1:235.
77 Ibid., 1:238.
78 Ibid.
. ti 79 .Ibid. Later in this same work, Henry sketches out a fuller exposition. "Its task is
six old Wkl: (1) to explain the methodology appropriate to its special object of
unde~~ding, that is, God; (2) to adduce the truths and facts knowable by that method; (3)
to exh1btt persuasive epistemological credentials, including a proper verifying principle and
test of truth; (4) to present its data in an orderly and systematic manner; (5) to display the
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theology as follows:
Christian theology is the systemati7.ation of the truth-content explicit and
implicit in the inspired writings. It consists essentially in the repetition,
.
combination, and systematization of the truth of revelation in its propositionally
given biblical form. The province of theology is to concentrate on the intelligible
content and logical relationships of this scripturally given revelation, and to present
its teaching as a comprehensive whole. 80
Such efforts will never succeed fully but their merit should be obvious. "The fact
that no theologian has succeeded as yet in fully arranging the truth of revelation in the form
11

of axioms and theorems is no reason to abandon this objective. 8 l
Henry also indicates that one must confront alternative explanations of reality and
reveal their shortcomings. Much of his own work is devoted to this task. "The theology
of revelation requires the apologetic confrontation of speculative theories of reality and
life. 82 He does not hesitate to use logic in this regard.
11

By applying the laws of logic, the Christian apologist will mount internal
criticism of contrary positions and expose the contradictions inherent in the axioms
of secularism; he will thereby reduce to absurdity the successively proffered
alternatives to Christian theism and force the intellectual abandonment of speculative
views. At the same time, he will exhibit the internal consistency of the Christian
axioms and show that evangelical truth far better accounts for any desirable facets
of a proffered alternative while also avoiding its logical inconsistencies. 83
• logical superiority of revelational theology over rival views; (6) to stimulate Christian
proclamation and evaluate it by its proper norm; and (7) to invite a fallen and otherwise
doomed humanity to regenerate life in a new society shaped by the transforming truth and
dynamic redemption found only in Christ Jesus." Ibid., 4:475.
80 Ibid., 1:238-239.
81 Ibid., 1:240.
82 Ibid., 1:241. "The Christian can show that his epistemology avoids the problems
latent in and impeditive of alternative views of knowledge.... Evangelical theology is not
~nly ready to debate any and all rival axioms proposed for an understanding of reality and
life, but is also more eager than its rivals to do so, as attested by its evangelistic initiative
and missionary expansion. To support its own claim and to contest competing claims,
reVealed religion is fully prepared to adduce criteria and principles for verification." Ibid.,
1:224.
83 Ibid., 1:241.
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Defenders of the faith should begin with divinely revealed truth as the starting point and
utilize human reason in the service of the faith to explain the truths of Judeo-Christian
theism and to expose the logical fallacies of alternative explanations of reality.
SUMMARY
This discussion leads to a very simple, yet important, question. Is Christianity
rational?. H enry says "yes. "
Henry insists that all philosophical systems are based upon unprovable
assumptions. 84 Such assumptions, or axioms, are pre-philosophical. How does one
apprehend basic assumptions? Ultimately, they are accepted as a matter of faith.
Acceptance of Christian principles relies upon the faith that is made available to humanity
via the grace of God. Does this mean that Christian principles are somehow irrational?
Henry says no. No basic principles are rational in the sense of being a product of rational
deduction. All axioms are based upon faith and, therefore, Christian axioms are no more
or no less rational than any other set of axioms. 85
Once these assumptions are accepted, Henry argues, one must be logically consistent
in their application. He insists that Christianity can be logically consistent given its first

84 "Just as geometry has basic axioms from which its theorems flow, so theological
and philosophical systems also have governing axioms. Axioms are the ruling principles
with which any system of thought begins. They are never deduced or inferred from other
principles, but are simply presupposed. No axiom is arrived at by reasoning; as the
starting point, an axiom is therefore in the nature of the case beyond proof." Carl F. H.
Henry, Toward a Recovezy of Christian Belief (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1990),
64.

.

85 Henry denies the possibility or even the necessity of proving that his first
are true. "Throughout its long history, philosophy has always recognized the
~e~timacy of assuming without proof a philosophical axiom or postulational principle as an
imttal basis of reasoning. Democritus never demonstrated that all substance consists of
indivisible and imperceptibly small particles; he postulated his premise and attempted to
explain all existence consistently in terms of it Plato never demonstrated the independent
existence of the invisible world of Eternal Ideas; he argued that all lesser existence
Panicipates in or mirrors them.... Kant, for example, did not derive his transcendental
forms of thought through his epistemic theory .... [he] postulated them independently of
the theory." Ibid., 45-46.
pn~ciples
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principles that "God exists" and "God has revealed himself."86 Thus, Henry believes,
Christianity is as rational and logically consistent as any other comprehensive explanation
of reality·

87

This apologetical defense of the faith is useful and important Henry has defended
the faith against the charge of irrationality and has shown that Christianity is not bankrupt
intellectually. He succeeds in showing that Christianity is as legitimate as any other
comprehensive explanation of reality. He seems less effective in arguing for the superiority
of the Christian world-view.
From Henry's perspective, since axioms are not based upon rational proof--they are
based upon faith--one cannot rationally convince others to reject their interpretative
framework and adopt Christianity. Thus, in one sense, "final verification or demonstrative
proof of the truth of any metaphysical overview is presently impossible. "88 Yet in another
sense, it is important for Henry to demonstrate that Christianity is not merely a viable
alternative but that it is the truth. Such efforts encourage individuals to seek the gift of faith
86 "The argument that the Christian system is circular because it sets out with what
needs first to be proved would apply to all systems, since no system exists without basic
axioms. The fact is, all arguments involve circularity. Circularity is not a liability; it cannot
but be an asset, if all premises mesh in a comprehensive unity of discourse. In a logically
' consistent system, all propositions comprise a comprehensive unity in which the
component elements find their logical validity. Interrelated in a conceptual framework, the
various aspects interpenetrate each other to constitute a complex categorical scheme. Every
consistent system becomes self-complete and self-contained in this way, apart from
possible illogical departures from its starting point" Ibid., 90-91.
87 The believer has "spiritual reassurance" that his or her assumptions are true, but
even .the non-believer can be shown that Christianity is not irrational or illogical. Henry is
convmced that a Christian apologist can explain the basic axioms of the faith and
demonstrate the logical cohesiveness and consistency of Christianity to non-believers.
Such understanding does not lead to belief. One can understand the basic axioms and see
how ~e Christian logically and consistently applies those axioms and still refuse to accept
the.a:c-1o~s as true. "Rational presuppositionalism, in contrast to fideism, does not sponsor
a disJu~cuon of faith and reason. It insists that all humanity can comprehend God's
rethvelauon and, moreover, can comprehend it prior to regeneration or special illumination by
e Holy Spirit." Ibid., 105.
88 Ibid., 88.
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and to become believers. 89
Henry tries to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian faith but his argument
seems to lack cogency. His primary effort in this regard revolves around logical
consistency. Even if one cannot rationally convince a non-believer to believe, it is possible
to demonstrate that alternative "interpretive frameworks" are inconsistent and, therefore,
flawed. "There can be but one comprehensive system of truth. If the true system is
comprehensive, every false system must contain contradictions."90 Ultimately, Henry
believes that basic and profound inconsistencies will emerge in all non-Christian
explanations ofreality.91 The superiority of the Christian faith becomes apparent when it
withstands all similar logical challenges.
He weakens his own argument in two ways. First, he admits that logical consistency
grants validity but it does not prove something is true.92 It is "only a negative test of
truth."
By exposing logical inconsistency in an interpretive scheme, we call its truth claim
in question. But although logical inconsistency invalidates any truth claim, logical

'

89 Without such efforts, Christianity is merely one alternative explanation of reality-no more or no less rational. If one has no reason to choose Christianity over other beliefs
then one's choice is a blind subjective leap of faith. Furthermore, if one has no reason to
choose Christ over the infinite alternatives, how can one be held morally culpable?

90 Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief, 88. "If Christian revelational
claims are true, no system will or can be more comprehensively consistent." Ibid., 82.
"All systems other than the Judeo--Christian revelation are but partial or segmented....
Only the Christian revelation embraces all of reality and can claim for its positions both
validity and truth." Ibid., 92.
91 Henry has contradicted himself on this point For example, he wrote,
"Consistent systems may be elaborated on the basis of rival and mutually exclusive a
prioris." Ibid., 87 .
. 92 Validity is a characteristic of an argument that is logical. Validity has nothing to
do with the character of the premises on which the argument is based. Truth is a possible
~h~cteristic of a premise on which an argument is based. This point and other arguments
10 this ~tion are discussed systematically in Ronald Nash, Faith and Reason: Searchin~
~a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1988), parts 1 and
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consistency does not of itself establish the truth of a particular claim. For a system
to be true, more is required than simply not harboring a contradiction.93
Therefore, the logical consistency of Christianity does not compel non-believers to accept
it When "alternative frameworks" are refuted on this basis, non-believers simply turD.
from one falsehood to another.
Second, Henry confesses that at times it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively
demonstrate logical inconsistency and/or consistency. Christians are still fallen creatures
and susceptible to human frailties. One should not expect Christians to apply their axioms
perfectly and logically nor demonstrate irrefutably the logical inconsistencies of all
alternative frameworks. Only when Christ returns will the truth become fully obvious and
wholly compelling. Moreover, even the most astute apologist will find that it is impossible
to demonstrate logical contradiction, on occasion, because contradictions have not
manifested themselves.
Henry hints at, but seems to avoid, two other considerations that might contribute to
the argument that Christianity is the most superior--and therefore true--explanation of life.
These arguments revolve around inductive reasoning and innate ideas--both of which
Henry employs at times and disparages at times. Henry's reluctance to employ inductive
,

reasoning and his failure to sketch out the ramifications of intuitive knowledge or innate
ideas weakens his argument when he attempts to argue for the superiority of Christianity.
Henry is wedded to deductive reasoning. He rejects inductive thinking because it--at
best--only provides probability, not certainty. However, Henry has admitted that certainty
in matters regarding basic beliefs comes only through the God-given gift of faith. If
certitude cannot be achieved--via deductive reasoning--then demonstration of probability-via inductive reasoning--seems to be an asset since it might encourage non-believers to seek

the gift of faith. Therefore, it seems that one must ask questions such as: does this view of
9 3 Henry, Toward a Recoyezy of Christian Belief, 87.
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the world correspond with my experience? Does it adequately account for life as I know it?
J)oeS

it seem coherent? Henry concedes this point, partially, when he contends that the

consequences of a consistent naturalism are existentially unacceptabJe.94 It seems that the
cumulative effect of probable arguments could lend greater credence to the truthfulness of
christianity. 95
Henry also refuses to sketch out the ramifications of innate ideas or intuitive
knowledge. He admits that humans were created with an innate knowledge of God's
existence. But, he is convinced that human understanding of such knowledge is so
clouded by the fall that it is rendered virtually worthless. This view is not uncommon in
protestant Christian circles. However, Henry does not claim that man's innate knowledge
of the existence of self, other selves, and the external world has been clouded beyond
utility. Why must that be so for the knowledge of God? I wonder if one's cloudy and
somewhat vague sense of a supernatural could, at the least, lend support to those views
which proclaim the existence of a God.
If human experience or intuition bears witness to one choice over another, then

humans have guidance in making their choice and they can be held morally accountable for
it. If human experience has a religious or spiritual element and if we experience order and
design in the universe, then any comprehensive account of reality must account for these
things. Any view which discounts the reality of what we experience must be viewed
94 "Man is not born with the naturalistic prejudices about reality, and they go against
his deepest intuitions and his own essential humanity.... The dilemmas and ambiguities
of his personal experience are such that secular man himself does not practice his
naturalistic commitments with life-and-death seriousness. Instead, secularists themselves
repeatedly contradict their own naturalistic claims in their daily lives, and adjust their
private affairs to quite different presuppositions." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,
1:145.
95 This argument is nothing new. For example, see Nash, Faith and Reason:
Searchin~ for a Rational Faith; D. Elton Trueblood, Philoso.phy ofReli~ion (New York,
NY: Harper and Row, 1957); and, Edward Camell, An Intro<luction to Christian
Apolo~etics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1956).

83
skeptically. Furthermore, if humans possess an innate sense that God exists and that good
and evil exists, then one must reject any view that denies the existence of a transcendent
and a moral order, for it defies what we know innately. 96 These kinds of arguments could
aid in establishing the rational superiority of the Christian faith.
Henry does not claim that we have no evidence for choosing Christ To the contrary,
he insists that Scripture itself is sufficient evidence. He calls this evidence "objective" and
"decisive."97 We should tum our attention to Henry's claims regarding divine revelation.

FIFIEEN THESES
If divine revelation is the starting point and if only inscripturated propositional
revelation is adequate to overcome the fallen nature of man, then the legitimacy of all
subsequent claims will depend upon the authority of Scripture. In his magisterial work,
God. Revelation and Authority, Henry provides fifteen theses relating to divine
revelation.98 Each thesis contributes to his understanding of revelation and helps establish
the authority of the Bible.

Thesis One: "Revelation is a divinely initiated activity, God's free communication by
which he alone turns his personal privacy into a deliberate disclosure of his reality ...99
•

96 If, as I have argued, evidence or intuition suggests that Christianity is true, why
would someone hold assumptions that are diametrically opposed to those innate ideas
divinely implanted in man as a part of the imago Dei? The only possible answer is through
volition. Our fallen nature permits and even encourages us to accept as true that which runs
counter to truth itself. We choose to believe that which is false and then attempt to
demonstrate logical consistency to rationalize our disbelief. Even when proven illogical,
we prefer to seek a new and different explanation of reality rather than accept God's truth.
For such choices, we are morally culpable.
97 Henry, Toward a Recovety of Christian Belief, 55.
98 A brief summary of the fifteen theses can be found in Henry, God. Revelation
and Authority, 2:7-16.
99 Ibid., 2:8. Scriptural support for this thesis includes: "The things of God none
owe~h, save the Spirit of God" (I Cor., 2: 11 b, ASV), and "a man can receive nothing,
~cept it. have given him from heaven" (John, 3:27 ASV). A more complete discussion of
is thesis can be found in God. Revelation and Authority, 2:17-29.

kn
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Man alone can know nothing about God. All knowledge is dependent on the divine.
Henry comments: "Apart from divine initiative man could not perceive even God's
existence, let alone his perfections and purposes; God's very reality would remain wholly
problematical had he not chosen to disclose himself." 100 All we know about God is a
result of God's initiative and revelation.
Henry refers to revelation as "God's unmasking of himself." 101 He contends that
"the essence of revelation is that God steps out of his hiddenness to disclose what would
otherwise remain secret and unknown."102 Why has God done this? God's motivations
cannot be explored but we do know that the "essential purpose of divine disclosure is ...
to communicate truth." 103

Thesis Two: "Divine revelation is given for human benefit, offering us privileged
communion with our Creator in the kingdom of God." The beneficiary of divine revelation
is humanity. While it is true that revelation unveils God's glory, it is done "specially for
11

man's sake. 104 Through divine revelation, "we may know him personally as he is, may
avail ourselves of his gracious forgiveness and offer of new life, may escape catastrophic
judgment for our sins and venture personal fellowship with him." Henry calls this
,

"priceless good news." 105
What is the content of this good news? Divine revelation offers humanity "a lucid

100 Ibid., 2:18.
101 Ibid., 2:17.
102 Ibid., 2:20-21.
103 Ibid., 2:27 .

.G

l04 Ibid., 2:9, and 2:30. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in
od. Revelation and Authority, 2:30-46.
105 Ibid., 2:31.

85
divine assessment of its woeful predicament" as well as information regarding "God's
gracious provision and indispensable condition for reversing that condition." 106 This
information requires a decision and a response on the part of individuals. The proper
response leads to personal salvation.
Henry rejects the universal salvation implicit in the theology of Karl Barth. Barth and
others have argued that revelation itself is salvific and "intrinsically redemptive." They

claim that God has revealed himself in a personal way to individuals and that "personal
awareness of revelation is itself redemptive" because it "involves the restoration of a broken
relationship." 107 To the contrary, argues Henry, revelation conveys the message of
salvation but is separate from it. Revelation informs us of the requirements for salvation
and calls individuals to respond but it is not salvation itself. Henry contends that "salvation
is conditioned upon personally accepting and appropriating the truth of revelation." 108
Thus, revelation is beneficial to man because it conveys truth that is essential to salvation
but in the final analysis this truth benefits humanity only if one accepts the message.

Thesis Three: "Divine revelation does not completely erase God's transcendent
mystery, inasmuch as God the Revealer transcends his own revelation." What we know of
N.

God, based upon divine revelation, is true but not exhaustive. As Henry says: "The God
of revelation transcends his creation, transcends his activity, transcends his own
disclosure."109 Revelation tells us a great deal about God but we should not assume that it
tells us everything.

106 Ibid., 2:38.
107 Ibid., 2:42-43.
108 Ibid., 2:45.
l09 Ibid., 2:9. Scriptural evidence for this thesis can be found in I Cor. 13:12. A
more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in God. Revelation and Authority,
2:47-68.
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Judeo-Christian religion insists that God's revelation does not totally exhaust
bis being and activity; even in his revelation he is the free sovereign God. Yahweh's
voluntary self-disclosure does not wholly cancel his incomprehensibility nor eliminate
all mystery. Scripture does not deplete all possible revelation; even on the basis of
biblical revelati~n our knowledge of God is an incomplete knowledge. There is more
to God's perfecttons and plans than we now know.I IO
·
Since revelation is separate from "human insight and discovery," the scope of
revelation is not determined by man but by God, the sole source of truth. Scripture tells us
that there is more to know about God than what he has chosen to reveal. Henry reminds us
11

that "God's divine revelation does not bestow human omniscience. 111
Henry is cautious in his explication of this thesis. He is careful to avoid what he
considers to be the exaggerated transcendence common to neo-orthodoxy. For example,
Barth, with his emphasis on God as "wholly other," claims that "the finite cannot know the

infinite, that nature and history cannot manifest what is beyond the relative, and that human
11

thought cannot comprehend or convey divine revelation. 112 This neo-orthodox "revolt
against the applicability to the sphere of transcendence of reason and the forms of logic"
11

results in an emphasis upon "noncognitive divine encounter. 113 Henry argues that "the
fact that we now know only 'in part,' however, does not destroy the validity and
trustworthiness of that portion of knowledge we have through divine disclosure. That God
"' does not reveal himself to man exhaustively does not mean that he does not reveal himself
truly." 114 We know truly but only in part. Furthermore, our knowledge of God is not a
noncognitive encounter but a rational and cognitive understanding of those things God has
chosen to reveal to us.
110 Ibid., 2:47.
l l 1 Ibid., 2:52.
l l2 Ibid., 2:53.
l 13 Ibid., 2:60-61.
114 Ibid., 2:54.
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Thesis Fow: "The very fact of disclosure by the one living God assures the
comprehensive unity of divine revelation." Divine revelation is the work of one sovereign
God. He "guarantees a unified divine revelation." 115 Revelation may come in different

forms but it reveals one truth. Revelation does not contradict itself; rather it presents to
man a logically consistent expression of truth.
The forms of revelation are varied but the truth conveyed is unified. Much can be
made of the universal and particular character of different forms of revelation but Henry
insists that the message remains the same. The distinction between special and general
revelation is useful, but "in no way can the distinction ... imply dual or rival revelations.
The essential continuity of general and special revelation is a pervasive biblical assumption.
Special revelation does not annul general revelation but rather republishes, vivifies and
supplements it." 116 Thus, different forms of revelation do not translate into different
messages. Revelation is multiple in forms but one in message.

Thesis Five: "Not only the occurrence of divine revelation, but also its very nature,
context, and variety are exclusively God's determination." Theologians often characterize
God's revelation as either "general" or "special." Henry agrees that this classification is a
useful way of describing the works of God. God has manifested himself to humanity in
many ways, in history, in nature, in the conscience of man, in Scripture and in Christ.
These various means of manifestation and the message and significance of each is wholly
detennined by God alone. "God determines not only the if and why of divine disclosure,
but also the when, where, what, how and who." 117
l 15 Ibid., 2:9. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in God.
Revelation and Authority. 2:69-76.
l l 6 Ibid., 2:71-72.
1 7
~ Ibid., 2:9-10. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in !lWa
Revel¥ton and Authority, 2:77-150. "God alone in his sovereign initiative determines the
actuality, direction, nature, content and diversity of his self-disclosure." Ibid., 2:78.
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Henry is particularly interested in discussing general revelation due to what he
considers a misrepresentation of the concept by both neo-orthodox theology and Roman
Catholicism. The neo-orthodox reject the possibility of general revelation while Roman
Catholicism, following the lead of Aquinas, "conflates general revelation into natural
theology." 118
Neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth denies that either Scripture or general revelation
is truly divine revelation. This notion is drawn from his understanding of religious
knowledge. Henry writes: "A key emphasis in Barth's theory of religious knowledge is
that because God is the only being of his kind and dissimilar to all else, he is unknowable
by the ordinary categories of human knowledge." 119 General revelation simply does not

and cannot exist. The infinite qualitative difference between God and man, the supernatural
and the natural, preclude the possibility of general revelation or propositional special
revelation. Barth believes that revelation only occurs in "special personal confrontation."
Scripture is a "witness to revelation" but is not revelation in and of itseif.120

In response to the neo-orthodox rejection of general revelation, Henry argues that
"general revelation of the Creator in his creation is integral to Christian doctrine ... "121
Henry claims the neo-orthodox position is an explicit rejection of the teaching of Scripture
itself. General revelation, he maintains, is taught in Scripture. In support of this premise,
Henry cites several biblical passages.

In the words of an Old Testament Psalm: "The heavens declare the glory of God;
and the firmament showeth His handiwork" (19:1); in the words of a New
Testament epistle, "Ever since the creation of the world His invisible nature,
namely, His eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that
l18 Ibid., 2:84.
l l 9 Ibid., 3:228.
l20 Ibid., 2:88.
121 Ibid., 2:83.

89
have been made. So they are without excuse ... " (Rom. 1:20 R.S.V.). And
John's Prologue tells us that the true Light, the Logos, "lights every man" (1:9),
that this Light "shines on in the dark, and the darkness has never quenched it" (1 :5,
NEB). Man the sinner does not walk in total ignorance of the living God; what
makes him as a sinner is revolt against light, both in Adam and on his own
account.1 22
Furthermore, the rejection of general revelation has serious theological repercussions.
He asserts that "God's invisible being has been clearly seen ever since the creation through
his created reality; it is here that God universally confronts man." 123 In addition, God is
universally revealed internally through man's moral conscience. It is the rejection of this
universal revelation that imputes universal guilt to humanity.
God's general revelation is presupposed not only because the revelation of
Scripture declares it to be the basis of man's moral and spiritual responsibility to
God. In an even deeper sense it is mankind's revolt against this general revelation,
both in Adam and on each one's individual account, that constitutes human beings
sinners. The universal revelation in creation makes all humans responsible....
Rejection of God's general revelation is what makes men and women heathen.124
The traditional Roman Catholic stand on general revelation also troubles Henry. He
believes that Aquinas, the most profound Roman Catholic expositor on the subject,
confused general revelation with natural theology. Aquinas taught that "truths about God
[could] be learned from created things (nature, man, world) by reason alone."125 Most
important, by reason alone man could know of God's existence as well as know many of
God's attributes.126
122 Carl F. H. Henry, Evangelicals At the Brink of Crisis (Waco, TX: Word
Books, 1967), 112-113. "Psalm 19, often considered the classic Old Testament text on
God's disclosure in the creation, may be taken as a summary statement of what many soc~ed 'nature psalms' affirm. New Testament passages that emphasize the doctrine are not
difficult to find; among them are John 1:4, 9; Acts 14:17; 17:26-28; Romans 1:18-20; 2832; 2:14-16." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:84.
123 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:84.
124 Ibid., 2:85-86.
125 J. Van Engen, "Natural Theology," in Evan~lical Dictiomuy ofTheolo~, ed.
Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 752.
126 Henry describes the five-fold Thomistic argument as follows: "The first
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Henry believes that "neither Scripture nor human experience warrants the notion that,
as a recipient of God's general revelation, man in sin can translate that revelation into
undiluted truth about God, that is, into a 'natural theology."'127 To the contrary, Scripture
and experience teach that fallen humanity either rejects general revelation or twists it to
serve their own purposes. Henry says: "It is not into 'proofs' of the living God's
existence, but into an occasion of revolt and estrangement that man the sinner turns the
general disclosure of God. The Bible connects the universal or general revelation of God
11

not with 'natural theology' but with man's guilt (Rom. 1:20). 128
In the final analysis, Henry's rejection of natural theology is threefold. He rejects it

"because of the express nature of supernatural revelation, because of man's epistemic
nature and because of the invalidity of empirically based arguments for theism." 129 He
argues that "divine revelation is neither a distillation of history nor of the spirit of man, but

argument, in brief, is that we perceive things in motion and, since no body moves itself,
the cause of this motion must be external.... There must, therefore, be a first mover....
The second argument proceeds similarly from our perception of external cause-effect
sequences to a first efficient cause; it does so on the ground that without this first cause no
intermediate causes would exist in a causal series .... The third argument is that anything
capable of non-existence ... is not self-sufficient and has its ground elsewhere.... In
brief, whatever is not self-explanatory demands what is necessarily eternally existent as its
' explanation.... The fourth argument is that no perfections can arise in anything except
through a cause that displays these qualities in equal or infinite amount; the ultimate cause
of the universe, moreover, must exhibit all the varieties of perfection of goodness in infinite
degree.... The fifth argument [begins] ... with the behavioral adaptation of many
observed objects. Blind mechanism, Thomas argues, cannot explain this complex
adjustment toward ends; required are a controlling intelligence and providential wisdom...
. Taken in order, the arguments, if valid, establish (1) an unending source of all change; (2)
a first cause of all productive efficiency in the universe; (3) a necessary ground of all
co~tingent beings and events; (4) an infinitely perfect cause of all excellences in the finite
umverse; and (5) an intelligent, providential governor over everything." Henry
acknowledges that a few evangelical scholars such as Norman Geisler accept the validity of
the Thomistic argument. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:105.
127 Ibid., 2:86.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 2: 123.
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a transcendent disclosure ... "130 All knowledge is grounded in and comes from God.
From the time of Adam man's epistemic nature has been fallen and Aquinas
"underestimates the epistemic predicament of finite man."131 Fallen man willfully distorts
general revelation, he does not marshal! it in the service of the living God.
Furthermore, the use of the empirical method as a key component in our knowledge
of God's existence is invalid.
God's universal disclosure in nature, history and to the human mind and conscience
is not in dispute. What is rejected rather is the expectation that fallen man will
translate general divine revelation into a natural theology that builds a secure bridge to
special revelation; in that event special revelation has significance only as a crown that
caps natural theology elaborated by man in sin. Those who expound the theistic
proofs often do so not expressly in view of general revelation at all, but simply on the
basis of empirical observation, and look to man's inferences from experience to
prepare the way for any and every clue to divine reality. Their stance is ... that "we
have a basis for affirming God's existence in observational data" and that "without
empirical evidence no basis remains for affirming his existence." In this way a denial
of empirical evidence becomes tantamount to a denial of God's reality .132
Subsequent philosophers have weakened the Thomistic argument and thus the case for
Christianity. Henry identifies Hume and Kant as the most widely accepted destructive
critics of the Thomist proofs. Hume argued that causality is not "a basic law of cosmic
reality, but rather a psychological necessity that arises in the mind." Hume goes on to
argue that even if we were to accept causality as an explanatory principle, "the terrors of
natural evil allow us to infer empirically a god of only finite power, since a deity who is
good would prevent such destructive occurrences." Kant "rescued causality from merely
psychological significance ... but he too limited its application to the sensually perceived
world so that causality has no relevance whatever for God." 133

130 Ibid., 2:121.
131 Ibid., 2: 122.
132 Ibid., 2: 117-118.
133 Ibid., 2:113-118.
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In the final analysis, Aquinas' argument "encompasses too many concessions to the
empirical method to turn that method skeptically against its naturalistic devotees."134
Modern empirical science no longer considers "an infinite series of motions to be irrational"
nor do they see a need to explain a first cause.135 Reliance on the empirically based
arguments of Aquinas have not resulted in widespread acceptance of Christianity. To the
contrary, use of empirical arguments more often than not have led modern thinkers to the
conclusion that Christianity is not true.
Thus, Henry concludes, divine revelation alone is sufficient. Furthermore, one must
take revelation in its totality. Only when revelation in its general and special manifestations

are taken seriously and together, can we come to a proper understanding of truth.
Universal or general revelation came first.
Because God willed to make himself known thus, he provided a universal
revelation in the cosmos and in history, a general anthropological revelation in the
mind and conscience of man, and to the Hebrews as a chosen people a particular
salvific revelation consummated in Jesus Christ as the promised Messiah and head of
the church. God is universally self-disclosed, therefore, in the created world, in man
who bears the remnants of the divine image even in his moral rebellion; and in the
whole sweep of history that repeatedly falls under God's moral judgment.136
Because of human depravity, such general revelation is inadequate in and of itself. Its
,,

purpose was not to convey propositional truth but to prepare humanity for what was to
follow. It is important to remember that special or redemptive revelation has also occurred.

In redemptive revelation, God discloses himself in the once-for-all saving acts of
Judeo-Christian history, particularly in Israel's exodus from Egypt and the
consequent founding of the Hebrew nation, and in Jesus' resurrection from the tomb
and the consequent founding of the Christian church. And he is disclosed in Jesus
Christ the incarnate Logos. He is revealed, moreover, in the prophetic-apostolic
Word, in the whole canon of Scripture which objectively communicates in
propositional-verbal form the content and meaning of all God's revelation. In
Scripture, moreover, God forewarns mankind of his final eschatological disclosure
l34 Ibid.
135 Ibid., 2: 106-107.
136 Ibid., 2:87.
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and reminds the world that the resurrection of Jesus Christ supplies an actual sample
of a future resurrection of men everywhere from the dead 137
Henry concludes that general and special revelation are interdependent. The first
prepares the way for the second. The second, special revelation, enables man to properly
comprehend the first 138

Thesis Six: "God's revelation is uniquely personal both in content and form." God
is not an impersonal being nor is He an impersonal thing. To the contrary, God is a person
and has revealed himself as such to mankind. He has disclosed his name and character.139
In response to those such as Barth and Niebuhr who argue that we cannot have

objective knowledge of God, Henry claims that merely because God is ontologically other
than man does not preclude objective knowledge of him. To the contrary, God has taken
the initiative to provide humanity with objective information about himself. Henry agrees
with Barth that "revelation is personal communication," but, contrary to Barth, Henry
believes that personal communication need not be noncognitive.140
Only the superimposing of arbitrary views concerning the externally real world is
what restricts God's self-revelation merely to internal confrontation. Only alien
views concerning the nature and limits of human knowledge are what confine
revelation to the inner non-intellective existential surd championed by recent neoProtestant religious theory .141
""

God's revelation is uniquely personal and objective when God reveals a name for
himself; for a name "not only serves the purpose of identification ... but also serves a
descriptive and definitive function in the disclosure of inner nature." 142 Thus, God has
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 2:90.
139 Ibid., 2: 10. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in .QQd.
Revelation and Authority, 2:151-246.
140 Ibid., 2:151.
141 Ibid., 2:166.
142 Ibid., 2: 173. The variety of names used by God to describe himself tells us

94
personally revealed himself to us in an objective manner that we can understand.

Thesis Seven: "God reveals himself not only universally in the history of the cosmos
and of the nations, but also redemptively within this external history in unique saving acts."
The most significant historical revelation of God occurred in the development of the
Hebrew nation and in the "incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ." 143
Henry contends that "biblical religion neither denies the reality of history, nor is
indifferent to it, but rather regards history as a focus for Yahweh's revelation and the realm
where Yahweh actively operates as Redeemer and Judge."144 In fact, "evangelical
Christianity insists that certain specific historical acts are integral and indispensable to
Judeo-Christian revelation."145 God has revealed himself in specific acts and in directing
the course of human history. However, Henry claims, "Christian certainties are not
suspended on the probabilities of historical investigation." Fortunately, "the biblical
revelation is epistemically foundational in enabling man in sin to perceive revelational
meaning undistorted by his volitional rebellion" and this includes historical revelation.146
Scripture "declares the direction and goal of history and identifies the great events and their
redemptive meaning."147 God has acted in history and Scripture provides us with an
,,.

explanation of the significance of such acts.

different things about him that he wants us to know. Henry discusses the many names of
God and gives special attention to Elohim, (Almighty One); El Shaddai, (Omnipotent One);
Yahweh; Adonai (Lord); and, Jesus (God's Salvation). See Ibid., 2:184-246.
143 Ibid., 2:11. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in God.
Revelation and Authority, 2:247-334.
144 Ibid., 2:249.
145 Ibid., 2:311.
146 Ibid., 2:310.
147 Ibid., 2:320. See also 2:330.
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Thesis Eight: "The climax of God's special revelation is Jesus of Nazareth, the
personal incarnation of God in the flesh; in Jesus Christ the source and content of
revelation converge and coincide." Christ is divine revelation in its highest manifestation.

In Christ, "the divine source of revelation and the divine content of that revelation converge

and coincide." 148
Christ is the central figure in all divine revelation. It is Christ "through whom and for
whom God made the universe; likewise he is the sole mediator of redemption through
whom he redeems man and the world. It is Christ, moreover, who sustains the creation as

an ordered whole and will bring it to its destined finality and consummation." 149 It is
through Christ that we know God.
The Almighty manifests himself in the form of the Nazarene who, by falling prey to
death exposes the depth of human animosity toward God, and by his resurrection
reveals himself to be the unconditionally omnipotent executor of the Father's will and
thus discloses in the public arena of cosmic life the secret of his existence. In Jesus
of Nazareth we reckon and deal with God; the Godhead is revealed in embodied
existence (John 1:14; Col. 1:19). In Christ, moreover, the divine being has been
made fully evident; his earthly life and ministry mirror the perfections of divinity.150
The earthly manifestation of God in Christ is critical. Henry reminds his readers that
"Jesus' earthly life and work are therefore of controlling importance; human destiny is
"'

predicated on individual decision concerning his historical manifestation and work." 151
The ultimate message of Christ is the gospel. "The New Testament meaning of the term
gospel is clear and precise: the gospel is the good news of God's merciful rescue of an
otherwise doomed humanity through the mediatorial life and work of Jesus Christ. At its

1

~8 Ibid., 2: 11. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in QQd.
R
_eyelat10n and Authority, 3:9-163.
149 Ibid., 3:16.
150 Ibid., 3:18.
151 Ibid., 3:66.
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center is the resurrection of the crucified Jesus, whose sinless life and atoning death supply
the ground of salvation for all who repent and believe." 152 Christ is man's salvation.
In addition, Christ came to assert his lordship and kingship. Christ is King and

U>rd· "The New Testament affirms not only that the risen Christ is the coming King who
in the end time restores royal dominion to God, but that he is also the present King whose
cosmological relationships extend throughout the whole creation (Phil. 2:10; Col. 2:6) and

the exalted and authoritative Lord to whom believers must render service (Rom. 12: 1, 11; I
Cor. 12:15; Eph. 6:7; Col. 3:23)."153 Henry notes that "Christ came not only to
inaugurate the kingdom of God in the flesh, not only to publish in his resurrection the fact
that he will universally vindicate righteousness and finally punish evil, but also to penetrate

and permeate every arena of human decision and life with his invincible claims." 154 Christ
is not only the central figure in revelation but he is also to be the Lord and King of all
earthly matters.

Thesis Nine: "The mediating agent in all divine revelation is the Eternal Logos-preexistent, incarnate, and now glorified."155 Not only is Christ divine revelation
incarnate but he is also the agent of all revelation. Christ is the Logos, the Word of God.
Henry describes Christ as the "preincarnate, incarnate and now glorified" Logos and the
"unique and sole mediator of the revelation of the living God." 156 Thus, "the Logos is

152 Ibid., 3:63.
153 Ibid., 1:14.
l54 Ibid., 3:67.
155 Ibid., 2: 11-12. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in God.
Revelation and Authority, 3:164-247. "The term logos is used biblically to indicate a
rken word, and also the living Word; the New Testament uses the term additionally of
e enfleshed Word and also to summarize the theme and content of the major New
Testament events, centrally the message of the incarnate Christ." Ibid., 3: 177.
. 156 "As preincarnate, the Logos was the mediating agent in the divine creation of the
umverse; as incarnate, he was and is the mediating agent of redemption; and as glorified,
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revealed both ontologically in Jesus of Nazareth, and epistemologically in conceptual
forms" with Christ as the mediator.157
Neo-orthodox theologians accept Christ as the Logos, but they reject Scripture as the
Logos. They argue that Christ alone is the Word; God has not spoken and cannot speak
otherwise. They claim the Word is known only in a "nonrational personal encounter."
Divine revelation is dialectical or paradoxical, it cannot be known as "an object of reason
but has its reality in an internal decision of faith." 158 Henry finds this position untenable.
He insists the Word of God was incarnate in Christ, but, in addition, the Word of God has
been revealed in other times and in other ways with Christ as the mediating agent.159
this same Logos of God is to be the mediating agent of the coming judgment. In brief, the
life-giving Logos is the giver of creation life (John 1:3-4), of redemption life (3:16; 5:2425), and of resurrection life. The Word of God attested in the Johannie prologue, indeed
the Logos of the Bible as a whole, is therefore not merely transcendent communication, but
Yahweh in action, whether it be in revelation, creation, incarnation, redemption, or
judgment." Ibid., 3:203. In another passage, Henry explains more fully. "The Logos of
God, perfectly embodied in Jesus of Nazareth, is the executor of all divine disclosure. The
divine Logos who became in Jesus Christ a concrete individual existing in the history of
man and the world, is and ever was the eternal Word and Truth of God. The preexistent
Christ was the revealing agent within the Godhead antecedently to creation; the preincarnate
Christ was the revealing agent in the created universe, and also of the Old Testament
redemptive disclosure; the incarnate Christ is the embodied revelation of God's essential
glory and redemptive grace. All these functions, as attested by the truth of Scripture, the
risen and exalted Christ gathers into one, and as the glorified Christ he will be the revealing
agent in God's final judgment and consummation of all things. Christ is not merely a
special feature within a larger panorama of revelation but, as mediating agent, encompasses
the whole revelation of God from eternity past to eternity future. All revelation is mediated
by the Logos of God who daily discloses the reality, eternal power and glory of God
throughout the created universe." Ibid., 3:206.
157 Ibid., 3:222.
158 Ibid., 3:164-166. "Neo-orthodoxy considered Jesus Christ alone to be the
Word or Logos of God, known to be thus solely in dialectical confrontation and internal
decision; any objectively given Word of God, whether in a coherent divine revelation in
ex~rnal nature and history or in the propositional affirmations of Scripture, is disowned."
Ibid., 3: 197.
159 For example, he argues that "while the revelation of the Logos did take place
perfectly in Jesus of Nazareth, it nonetheless did not take place there either exclusively or
completely." While the Word of God has been revealed in different ways, Christ remains
~e ~ator. Henry writes: "The Logos of God as scripturally identified is personal,
mtellig1ble communication centered in the transcendent Christ as the sole mediator of divine
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scripture is the most important example.
Henry believes the recognition of Christ as a mediating agent contributes to the
argument for objective and rational revelation. If the logos is something more than
personal, i.e. Christ, then subjectivity is replaced with the possibility of objectivity. If
something is being revealed, it must be revealed in a way that is understandable. Henry
argues that revelation is meant to be "apprehended and cognized" and eventually
"appropriated and obeyed" Christ, the mediating agent, guarantees the rationality of the
message which creates the possibility of apprehension, the prerequisite to
appropriation. I (j()
The logos is our insurance that life has meaning. In fact, Henry contends:
The Logos of supernatural revelation towers as the only effective barricade against the
meaninglessness of the world and human life. Christianity affirms that this world is a
rational universe, that it is God's world; knowability of the universe is grounded in
God's creation of man as a rational creature whose forms of thought correspond to
the laws of logic subsisting in the mind of God, as well as to the rational character of
the world as God's creation.161
revelation." Ibid., 3:211-212.
160 Ibid., 3:170.
161 Ibid., 3: 192. "The Christian doctrine of creation supplies firm guarantees that
the forms of human knowing and things-in-themselves are not totally heterogeneous. The
dependence of man and nature alike on the transcendent Logos as the ultimate source of all
created structures and forms assures an underlying affinity between man and his total
environment, and involves us at once in the knowledge of ourselves and of God and other
selves. The categories of thought are indeed a priori and not derived from experience, but
~either are they simply determinations of the human mind. The transcendent God makes
mtelligible human experience possible as the sovereign Creator and Preserver of all things.
Both the human mind and external reality have their basis of intelligibility in the Logos of
God who structures nature and sustains man in the divine image. Reality is knowable
because the categories of knowing are applicable to things-in-themselves; human
kn?wledge has ontic significance. Things outside ourselves have an independently real
existence, and stand in ontological and epistemic relationship to our cognition and sensory
perception on the basis of the intelligible creative activity of the Logos of God. The
dependence both of mankind and of the cosmos on the divine Logos vouchsafes not only
the ~~essary character and validity of human knowledge, but its objectivity as well. The
possibilities of valid and objective knowledge of God and of the universe lie in these facts,
that by creation man bears the divine image rationally and morally, and that the fall of man
W3;5 n?t completely destructive of this image, so that even in sin man is proffered revelation
0 bJecttvely communicated by the Creator-Redeemer God." Ibid., 1:393-394.
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The logos is "the foundation of all meaning and the personal source and support of the
rational, moral and purposive order of created reality." 162

Thesis Ten: "God's revelation is rational communication conveyed in intelligible
ideas and meaningful words, that is, in conceptual-verbal form." Scripture is not "a human
interpretation of the deeds of God or an existential inner response to a spiritual
confrontation," rather it is the words of God himself conveyed to humanity in terms that are
fully understandable by the human mind God is the creator of the human mind and he
communicates to man in a vein that that mind can comprehend.163 Despite the fall, Henry
contends, the ima.go Dei survives and communication between God and man remains a real
possibility. Man cannot independently know God, but he retains the ability to know God if
and when God reveals Himself to man.
Contrary to the claims of modem theology, Henry believes that "God's disclosure is
rational and intelligible communication" and that man's mind is fully capable of
understanding.164 Many modem theologians such as Barth, Bultmann and Brunner reject
this idea of objective rational revelation while maintaining the reality of divine selfdisclosure. For them divine self-disclosure becomes an "internal confrontation" that is
"existential or paradoxical rather than rational in nature." 165 Objective knowledge about
God is rejected and only an "inner awareness of forgiveness or of reconciliation"

162 Ibid., 3:195.
163 Ibid., 2:12-13. "God stoops to state his purposes in our language and thoughtf<:>nns which he first fashioned that we might think his thoughts after him, commune with
~1m and serve him." Ibid., 5:16. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found
m God. Revelation and Authority, 3:248-488.
l64 Ibid., 3:248.
l65 Ibid., 3:249. He is critical of evangelicals who have fallen under the influence
For example, he points to Donald Bloesch as someone who denies that revelation
is propositional in nature. Ibid., 3:475.

?f Barth.

100

. 166
remains.
These claims are problematic and some contemporary theologians have attempted to
overcome the ambiguity by positing revelation as historical in nature. For example,
Wolfhart Pannenberg rejected the idea of a merely subjective internal form of revelation in
favor of a view that maintains that "the historical events of the Old and New Testament
[are] a dynamic revelation of God."167 But while Pannenberg permits God to act in

history, he refuses to acknowledge that we have true knowledge of the meaning of such
acts. At present, the meaning of God's revelation lies not in Scripture but in "human
reflection and conjecture."168 Pannenberg believes that "the unity and meaning of all
events is to be understood only in the light of the eschaton anticipated in the resurrection of
Jesus Christ."169 We shall know when Christ returns. In the meantime, all knowledge is
tentative. Statements about God are "doxological in nature," and do not communicate
"valid information." 170 Henry accuses Pannenberg of committing a fatal error.
Pannenberg violates the provisionality which he casts over the theory of
knowledge whenever he considers his own theological formulations--including
even his theory of cognitive provisionality--to be the preferred explanatory premises
under which all else may be confidently subsumed.... If the meaning of history
cannot be known until the end of history, on what basis does Pannenberg identify
the resurrection of Jesus as proleptic of the end? 171
Nonetheless, both modem views, that of Pannenberg and Barth, reject the notion that
"Scripture embodies supernaturally given truths that interpret God's redemptive acts and

166 Ibid., 3:249.
167 Ibid., 3:259.
l68 Ibid., 3:262.
169 Ibid., 3:295.
170 Ibid., 3:369.
17 1 Ibid., 3:295-296.
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convey objectively valid revelatory information." 172
Henry believes the resistance of Barth and Pannenberg to the idea of objective
revelation is the result of the influence of modern philosophical trends. Since "radical
secularism presumed to explain nature and history comprehensively by naturalistic
categories; the only remaining role for God was therefore restricted to something internal in
man."173
Why did the neo-orthodox revolt against the notion of propositional revelation?
Henry adduces two primary reasons. The first relates to modern epistemology and the
second to modern linguistic theory.
Their first argument is that "God is absolute Subject, and hence, it is said, cannot be
an object of human knowledge." 174 This is a not a scriptural notion, Henry contends, but
a product of modern philosophy. Kant speculated that "sense experience alone supplies the
content of human knowledge." 175 This postulate excluded knowledge of the
supersensible. Furthermore, Kant claimed that "the form of knowledge derives solely from
innate forms and categories of reason" supplied by man himself. l 76 Hence the forms only
apply to sensate objects. If there is a God we can only know him in his relation to us.
...

Indeed Kant postulates the existence of God based upon the moral nature of man. He
detected an "internal logical necessity" for God.177
Modern theology has adopted this Kantian postulate and claims that "God can be
172 Ibid., 3:251.
173 Ibid., 3:252.
174 Ibid., 3:430.
l75 Ibid., 3:432.
176 Ibid.
l77 Ibid.
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known only as Subject and that only in personal response. 178 Neo-orthodox theologians
uansform Kant's "internal logical necessity" into sporadic divine personal revelation.
Much of this modern theological development stood in witting or unwitting
indebtedness to Kantian knowledge-theory, which sharply limited the reality
perceptible by theoretical reason. Restriction of the content of knowledge to
sensations of the phenomenal world in principle deprives man of cognitive
knowledge of metaphysical realities. Divine revelation on this basis can neither be
connected with cognitive reason nor can it have external and objective grounding,
since Kant's view excludes revelation in nature and history, as well as in an
objective scriptural revelation .... Kant's denial of the universal cognitive validity
of revelational knowledge became a feature of the theological movement from Barth
through Bultmann. We should note, however, that by denying cognitive
knowledge in order to make room for faith, Kant envisioned not what neo-orthodox
theologians stress, namely, faith, as a divine gift whereby man trusts the
supernatural God, but rather a moral response that issues from man as a rational
being.179
Henry argues, to the contrary, that while God himself is a subject, in his selfrevelation, God "gives himself also to be the object of man's knowledge."180 The modem
denial of "truth-revelation" in favor of "person-revelation" is ultimately self-defeating as the
foundation for revelation of any kind is undermined.181 "The weakness in neo-Protestant
theories of revelation stems precisely from this hesitancy to affirm the content of divine
disclosure to be cognitive and intelligible." 182 The rejection of objectivity inevitably lends

.

itself to relativism and skepticism.

178 Ibid., 3:431. "Kant's postulational theology ... rejects the human possibility
of factual knowledge of supernatural reality. His denial of the cognitive status of religious
beliefs directly or indirectly influenced a long succession of neo-Protestant thinkers, among
them Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Rudolf
Bultmann." Ibid., 3:463. It is also important, in this regard, to remember the influence of
~erkegaard. Henry considers Soren Kierkegaard as the "fountain of neo-orthdoxy" due to
his emphasis on "the priority of obedience over knowledge." Ibid., 3:277.
179 Ibid., 3:278.
l80 Ibid., 3:431.
181 Ibid., 3:433.
l82 Ibid., 3:283.
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Henry insists our knowledge of God is something more than a subjective necessity.
He writes:
The reality of revelation is far more than simply man's own self-consciousness
of the world propelled into a conviction of God's objective reality. Were that not
the case, theology would be not a science but only an illusion. To be sure,
knowledge relationships require a subjective knower. But that man must know
subjectively in order to know at all, surely does not mean that he cannot have
knowledge outside of and independent of himself. For in that event we would be
left not only without knowledge of God but also without knowledge of the world
and of other selves.183
The answer to this problem is God. God makes "possible man's knowledge of other
selves and of the world, and indeed of himself also, as well as of his Maker." 184
The second reason for the neo-orthodox rejection of objective propositional revelation
comes from modern linguistic theory. Henry writes: "Sometimes it is contended that since
propositions involve the use of language, propositional truth is of necessity culturally
conditioned."185 If one accepts that language is empirically based and/or historically or
culturally conditioned, as many neo-protestant theologians do, then divine revelation, if it
occurs, must occur in some type of noncognitive, irrational, divine encounter. We will not
have "objectively valid information about God's nature and ways" but merely an individual
subjective experience. This illustrates what Henry considers the decisive difference
between evangelicals and the neo-orthodox. Is revelation "rational and objectively true"
given in the form of propositions or is it "noncognitively life-transforming" given in a
personal manner?186 Henry insists on the former.
Henry contends that the argument regarding the cultural or historical conditioning of

183 Ibid., 3:274-275.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid., 3:436.
l86 Ibid., 3:455.
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language "is self-defeating: if this verdict conveys unconditional truth, it refutes the
assertion; if it does not, the assertion need not detain us." 187 Language is far too
important to permit sacrificing it to mere cultural conditioning.
Without a system of vocal symbols by which human beings of any social group and
culture interact and communicate, neither man's complex knowledge nor control of
his environment would be conceivable. Language is a human capacity, and its
possession is a necessary presupposition of society and civilization. It is a major
basis on which man's mental thought is organized, and a systematic means of
expression by which he communicates with others of his own species and transmits
his experiences.188
For Henry, language is a gift of God that "facilitates communion between man and God
and communication of the truth." 189 He insists that "language is possible because of
man's God-given endowment of rationality, of a priori categories and of innate ideas, all of
which precondition his ability to think and speak." 190
The Bible depicts man as specially equipped by God for the express purposes of
knowing God's rational-verbal revelation, of communicating with God in praise
and prayer, and of discoursing with fellow-men about God and his will. God
enabled the first Adam to express his thoughts linguistically. Human language is
adequate for theological knowledge and communication because all men are

187 Ibid., 3:436.
188 Ibid., 3:326. Admittedly, other species can communicate symbolically but
language is unique. Henry writes: "What distinguishes human speech and language is the
objective meaning that man attaches to symbols or words, and his logical ordering of the
units of linguistic communication. Human beings correlate language with abstract thought,
and they combine sounds as units to convey complex ideas and information. While the
watchdog can warn of intruders, he cannot report that two anned men and a woman who
jimmied a door are now escaping with important papers and valuable antiques. Parrots and
my~a birds can be taught to repeat two sentences--perhaps even a major and minor premise
of Simple syllogism--but they will never logically formulate the conclusion. There is a
structural characteristic of an empirical nature that separates animal communication from
~u~ language, viz., syntax and semantic arbitrariness. Language is a system of
linguistic units having an orderly representation and arrangement These units of language
are conventional; no particular identity prevails between them and what they publicly
sym!'olize." Ibid., 3:331. "Words are never only symbols; they combine to express ideas,
and ideas in tum have civilization-impacting significance." 4:492.
18 9 Ibid., 3:387.
190 Ibid., 3:389.
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divinely furnished with certain common ideas.191
We can uust the dependability of human language to the extent that it adheres to logic.
"Logic is indispensable to human thought and to human speech. Without the law of
contradiction no significant speech is possible; even attempts to refute the law of
11

contradiction would have to be formulated in intelligible language that presupposes it. 192
While propositional revelation means that language can and does effectively convey
the will of God to humanity, it does not mean that only one literary form is used. Henry
explains:
By its emphasis that divine revelation is propositional, Christian theology in no
way denies that the Bible conveys its message in many literary forms such as
letters, poetry and parable, prophecy and history. What it stresses, rather, is that
the uuth conveyed by God through these various forms has conceptual adequacy,
and that in all cases the literary teaching is part of a divinely inspired message that
conveys the truth of divine revelation. Propositional disclosure is not limited to nor
does it require only one particular literary genre. And of course the expression of
truth in other forms than the customary prose does not preclude expressing that
truth in declarative propositions.193

191 Ibid.
192 Ibid., 3:390. "The biblical view oflanguage therefore includes several
presuppositions. Language has a cognitive function; it is serviceable as a means of God's
revelation to man and of man's communion with God; it can and does convey an informed
.. interpretation of divine reality; it is an instrument for expressing God's disclosure of his
nature and will; intellectual and moral maturity requires familiarity with scripturally given
propositions. Religious language in the Bible, as elsewhere, has many functions, but its
basic function is cognitive: the purpose of religious language is to express and interpret the
nature of ultimate reality, and to invite the human race to share in the privileges of a
personal relationship with God and to warn of the costly and eternal consequences of
spiritual neglect." Ibid., 3:402.
193 Ibid., 3:463. Some might argue that the conventional nature oflanguage
prevents it from communicating eternal truths. Henry argues that if one holds that "because
?f their conventional or symbolic nature, words can convey no literal truth, then their thesis
~s self-refuting, since if no literal truth can be conveyed because words are symbolic, it is
unpossible to communicate even this literal truth about the nature of truth. Nonsymbolic
comn;mnication is humanly impossible; without words or signs others are unsure of our
meanm~. If all we mean by language as being symbolic is that all words are symbolic,
then religious language is no more threatened than any other language; if literal truth can be
conveyed anywhere, it can be conveyed by religious language as readily as by language
a00ut n?nreligious reality; if literal truth is precluded because religious language is
symbolic, then it is in principle precluded likewise in other realms of discourse." For
Henry, "the prime issue is therefore not whether human concepts and words are human,
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The Possibility of truth revealed in propositional form is based upon Henry's view of God.
An a}rnighty and sovereign God can and does communicate to the human race in
understandable linguistic forms.
If God is the sovereign, rational God, and if his incarnate Son is the Logos of
God. and if God desires to communicate indispensable information, than no
modern theory of linguistics can be considered a roadblock. The reason is twofold:
first, the truth of revelation implies its own view of language and its limits; second,
the secular contemporary theories of language are inconsistent and self-refuting.194

What then, in conclusion, does Henry claim about propositional revelation?
Claiming to speak for most evangelicals, he says:
We mean by propositional revelation that God supernaturally communicated his
revelation to chosen spokesmen in the express form of cognitive truths, and that the
inspired prophetic-apostolic proclamation reliably articulates these truths in
sentences that are not internally contradictory.... The inspired Scriptures contain a
body of divinely given information actually expressed or capable of being
expressed in propositions. In brief, the Bible is a propositional revelation of the
unchanging truth of God.195
He defines revelation as
that activity of the supernatural God whereby he communicates information
essential for man's present and future destiny. In revelation God, whose thoughts
are not our thoughts, shares his thoughts with man; in this self-disclosure God
unveils his very own mind; he communicates not only the truth about himself and
his intentions, but also that concerning man's present plight and future prospects..
. . However much or little it may be, the information that God discloses is
supernatural information, knowledge otherwise unavailable to man. Precisely for
this reason divine revelation is the most important truth that man can ever know .196

but whether--since man was made in God's image and God addresses man in revelation-our concepts and words can convey reliable information about God and his will."
Furthermore, Scripture teaches that "God by creation fashioned man for conceptual-verbal
knowledge of himself.... Man's sinful rebellion against God unquestionably clouds and
frustrates this knowledge. But the Bible insists nonetheless that man even in sin cannot
escape answerability to God for sure knowledge of his Maker and Lord." Ibid., 4:105-

111.

194 Ibid., 3:289.
l95 Ibid., 3:457.
196 Ibid.
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IlentY goes on to insist that humanity, even in a fallen state, can know and understand this
revelation of God.
All significant human experience is cast in rational and moral form. The fall of man
does not vitiate the rationality of knowledge, but rather impairs the human effort to
know. Man is subject to error and has a distorted apprehension of truth and
goodness. But what man knows, whether in the sphere of general revelation or of
special revelation, he knows within the bounds of the laws of consistency and
contradiction or he does not have genuine knowledge.... The divine image in man
did not, in the fall, suffer to such an extent that man's ratio is now unable on the
basis of general and special revelation to receive conceptual knowledge of the
supernatural world; rather, divine revelation is addressed to man as a totality both in
its general and special forms, and hence with a view to the rational as well as the
volitional and emotive aspects of his existence.197

Thesis Eleven: "The Bible is the reservoir and conduit of divine truth." Scripture is
central to Christianity. It is a form of special revelation that provides humanity with an
"authoritative written record and interpretation of God's revelatory deeds" and is a "source
of reliable objective knowledge concerning God's nature and ways."198 Scripture is vital.
Henry argues:
Without the Scriptures all knowledge of God is sullied by man's religious
experience as sinner. God speaks to us today by the Scriptures; they are the
trustworthy and adequate bearer of His revelation. They are ... fuller and more
explicit than revelation in its general form. The Bible is indispensable for fallen
man .... It is the final factor in presenting God's redemptive activity as a unified
and comprehensive whole, an indispensable mode of revelation through which the
redemptive events become coherent ... The inscripturation of special revelation is
the objective culmination, therefore, of God's redemptive disclosure in special
historical events and in propositions communicated to chosen prophets and
apostles.199

197 Henry, "Divine Revelation and the Bible," in Inspiration and Interpretation, ed.
John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), 262 .
. . 198 Ibid., 2:13. "Scripture itself is viewed as an integral part of God's redemptive
activity, a special form of revelation, a unique mode of divine disclosure. In fact, it
be<:omes a decisive factor in God's redemptive activity, interpreting and unifying the whole
~nes of redemptive deeds, and exhibiting their divine meaning and significance." Carl F.
Henry, "Bible, Inspiration," in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A .
. well ~Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 147-148. A more complete
discussion of this thesis can be found in God. Revelation and Authority, 3:7-128.
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l99 Carl F. H. Henry, "Divine Revelation and the Bible," 256.
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Modernity has revolted against practically all forms of authority. In fact, it was the
problem of authority that inspired Henry to undertake the project of producing ~
&velation and Authority. Henry decries the fact that modernity is "skeptical of all
rranscendent authority." This rejection stems from a belief that "finalities and objective
trUth simply do not exist." Secularism "repudiates divine absolutes, revealed truth,
scriptural commandments, fixed principles and supernatural purpose as obstacles to
individual self-fulfillment and personal creativity." Modernity has made everything
historically relative.200 Humanity sees itself as "living on a planet devoid of any intrinsic
plan and purpose, and supposedly born of a cosmic accident." Mankind must be free to
posit values. All external authority is threatening.201
Henry reminds us that Christianity is authoritarian by nature. "God commands and
has the right to be obeyed, and the power also to punish the disobedient and reward the
11

faithful. 202 These commands are not simply to be understood but to be obeyed. Thus,
"human beings are commanded by him not only to love the truth but also to do it (John
3:21; 1 John 1:6); knowledge is not merely an intellectual concern but involves ethical
obligation as well." Since the fall, humanity has been impenitent. But God, in his grace,
.. has presented humanity with an authoritative account of the creation and fall and holds out a
ray of hope. That account can be found in Scripture in which God "equips sinful rebels

with valid information about the transcendent realm, and discloses the otherwise hidden
possibility of enduring personal reconciliation with God." Fallen humanity must accept
and appropriate "this divinely inspired teaching. 203
11

200 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:9.
201 Ibid., 4: 10-11.
202 Ibid., 4: 15-16.
203 Ibid.
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Modem theology is skeptical regarding evangelical claims for the Bible because of
biblical criticism. Henry, however, tends to discount biblical criticism. Its tendency is to
reject portions or even the totality of Scripture by questioning the historical factuality, or
historical and literary development of some theory. Henry believes that most such theories

are the result of alien presuppositions and that even those change frequently when new
evidence suggests that the theories are in error. Henry does not mind a careful historical
and literary study of the Bible, but he questions the intentions of those who do so with a
predisposition to skepticism. Much of their work, Henry feels, is "characterized as much
by eisegesis as much as by exegesis. "204 Henry responds by insisting that "the first claim
to be made for Scripture is not its inerrancy nor even its inspiration, but its authority ... 205
Many neo-protestant theologians, while accepting many of the conclusions of biblical
criticism, still champion biblical authority. They argue that Scripture is "essentially a
human product" but is authoritative "in the manner in which it operates existentially in the
life of the believing community. "206 In other words, it is authoritative, not because it is
inspired but because it is inspiring. For Barth, Scripture becomes "a fallible witness
11

through which God in Christ personally encounters the trusting reader or hearer. 207
"'

Scripture is merely functional. This view, Henry warns, must be rejected.
The current effort to salvage a special role for "scriptural authority" in a merely
functional sense must be recognized for what it is: the newest phase in a continuing
antiscriptural revolt against divine authority. It repudiates the Holy Spirit's
inspiration of the scriptural writings, repudiates the contingent divine authority of
the apostles in their doctrinal witness to such inspiration, and repudiates the
objective truth of the inspired teaching of Scripture. 208
204 Ibid., 4:83.
205 Ibid., 4:27.
206 Ibid., 4:54, 68.
207 Ibid., 4:84.
208 Ibid., 4:97.
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To the contrary, Henry asserts:

In Scripture we are dealing with what the Holy Spirit tells and foretells, with
divinely inspired data, with what is known by special revelation, with what the
Spirit communicates in a definitive way. God is the authority who renders
Scripture authoritative; inspiration is the special phenomenon that imparts this
character of divine authority to the writings and logically necessitates fulfillment of
written prophecies. 209

Thesis Twelve "The Holy Spirit superintends the communication of divine
revelation, first, by inspiring the prophetic-apostolic writings, and second, by illuminating

and interpreting the scripturally given Word of God." The Holy Spirit first inspired the
writers of Scripture by superintending "the divinely chosen prophetic-apostolic recipients
of the Word of God in their communication of the divine message to others."210 Thus, the
original copies of Scripture are error-free, inerrant. This does not mean that Scripture is the
product of "divine dictation." Rather the divine inspiration of Scripture refers to "a
supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit upon divinely chosen men in consequence of
11

which their writings become trustworthy and authoritative. 211 Scripture represents a
unique "confluence of the divine and human."212 Admittedly Scripture reflects the
"psychological, biographical and even sociohistorical differences" of the writers;
nonetheless, it maintains its status as divinely inspired and therefore authoritative.213 The

209 Ibid., 4:75.
210 Ibid., 2:13. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in~
Revelation and Authority, 4: 129-493.
211 Henry, "Bible, Inspiration," 145. See also "Divine Revelation and the Bible,"
275. "Inspiration is a supernatural influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles
whereby the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of their oral and written
P~lamations." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:129. Henry denies that
Scnpture is a product of divine dictation. Ibid., 4: 138.
212 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:142.
213 Ibid., 4:148.
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doetrine of inspiration has more to do with the writings than with the writer. Henry
believes that "inspiration is primarily a statement about God's relationship to Scripture, and
11

onlY secondarily about the relationship of God to the writers. 214 The Holy Spirit
continues his work "in the activity of illumination whereby the readers and hearers of the
11

scriptural Word grasp the content of revelation. 215
Henry argues that many neo-orthodox theologians reject the idea of divinely inspired
authorship, opting instead for the belief that Scripture becomes the Word of God, as
opposed to being the Word of God. This occurs "as the reader hears and submits to the

divine Spirit speaking through the writings."216 In addition to the influence of Kantian
epistemology, many neo-orthodox theologians have been influenced by the historicalcritical method of biblical criticism. 217 Adherence to this hermeneutical approach leads
theologians such as Emil Brunner to say that the Bible "is full of errors, contradictions,
erroneous opinions, concerning all kinds of human, natural, historical situations. "218 The
neo-orthodox argue, however, the existence of errors in the text is unimportant. Scripture
is not divine revelation and we should not expect more of it than we do any other human
text. Regardless of the errancy of the text, God may and does speak to people through the
writings. Thus, Scripture is important but it is not divine revelation.

214 Ibid., 4:143.
215 Ibid., 2:13-15. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in .QQd.
Revelation and Authority, 3:129-493.
216 Ibid., 4:136.
217 There are three prongs of higher criticism "(a) detecting the presence of
underlying literary sources in a word; (b) identifying the literary types that make up the
composition; and (c) conjecturing on matters of authorship and date." R. K. Harrison,
"Higher Criticism," in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 511.
218 Quoted in Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:222.
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aenry is convinced that this hermeneutical approach creates significant problems and
leads to skepticism. Henry asks rhetorically: "In an errant text, how do we tell essential
truth from inessential truth, and all the more from inessential error?"219 Furthermore, "if
geographical and historical details are untrue, why should the events or doctrines correlated
with them be true?" 2 20 If we assume error in parts of Scripture, by what authority do we
distinguish the true from the false?
The methods of higher criticism, as accepted by many modern theologians, need not
lead to the conclusions that are often accepted in scholarly circles. In fact, Henry argues,
the attitude the scholar takes with him when studying Scripture often predetermines the
conclusions he reaches.
An interpreter will face difficult passages on either of two governing presuppositions.
If one accepts the biblical teaching of plenary inspiration with its implicate of
pervasive reliability, then he will probe all possibilities of reconciliation, even to the
point of patiently anticipating further light from the study of archaeology or
linguistics. If he does not accept plenary inspiration, he will likely consider every
biblical affirmation to be questionable unless independently verified. If phenomena
alone are considered determinative of the biblical doctrine of inspiration, then except
for the revelational assurances of pervasive divine inspiration of the writings, both the
surface textual difficulties and the possibility of human error become decisive.221
Henry is quick to distinguish between inerrant and infallible. "By inerrancy we mean
,,.without error; by infallibility, not prone to err." Henry insists that inerrancy only applies to
the original monographs and holds true because of divine inspiration. Infallibility is the
characteristic of the copies we possess today. "One may 'trust and believe' the copies
because, although they are subject to incidental verbal variation and linguistic deviation,
they faithfully convey the propositional truth of the original. "222 Thus, the copies
219 Ibid., 4:171.
220 Ibid., 4: 178.
221 Ibid., 4:191.
22

2 Ibid., 4:220. lnerrancy does not imply the following:
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"reliably and authoritatively communicate the specially revealed truth and purposes of God
__1r;nd u223 Henry concludes:

tO tlli1JUU

In summary, it may be said that although the copies are not inerrant, they are
nonetheless infallible, and that they possess this quality of infallibility because of
their perpetuation of the truth of the inerrant autographs. This acknowledgement of
error in copies and translations does not require the insistence on error in the text of
Scripture per se, nor is there anything logically contradictory or incredible about the
view that the sovereign God inspired inerrant autographs. While the content of the
autographs was subsequently transmitted or translated with less than perfection, the
trUth-content of the originals remains uncompromised. The distinction between
inerrancy and infallibility follows necessarily from the insistence on the divine

1. "Inerrancy does not imply that modem technological precision in reporting
statistics and measurements, that conformity to modem historiographic method in
reporting genealogies and other historical data, or that conformity to modem
scientific method in reporting cosmological matters, can be expected from biblical
writers."
2. "lnerrancy does not imply that only nonmetaphorical or nonsymbolic language
can convey religious truth. Scripture employs a wide range of figurative language
and many literary forms, such as parable, poetry and proverb. All are capable of
serving appropriately as vehicles to communicate truth."
3. "Inerrancy does not imply that verbal exactitude is required in New Testament
quotation and use of Old Testament passages."
4. "Inerrancy does not imply that personal faith in Christ is dispensable since
evangelicals have an inerrant book they can trust. ... The Written Word itself
demands personal faith in Christ."
5. "Scriptural inerrancy does not imply that evangelical orthodoxy follows as a
necessary consequence of accepting this doctrine."
Inerrancy does imply the following:

1. "Verbal inerrancy implies that truth attaches not only to the theological and
ethical teaching of the Bible, but also to historical and scientific matters insofar as
they are part of the express message of the inspired writings."
2. "Verbal inerrancy implies that God's truth inheres in the very words of
Scripture, that is, in the propositions or sentences of the Bible, and not merely in
the concepts and thoughts of the writers."
3. "Verbal inerrancy implies that the original writings or prophetic-apostolic
autographs alone are error-free." In a jocular fashion he rebuts a frequent criticism
of this proposition. "The familiar rejoinder that no one can exhibit the errorless
au~pphs need not discomfit evangelicals in their claims about the inerrant
ongmals. The critics similarly can furnish none of the errant originals that they so
eagerly postulate."
~· "Yerbal inerrancy of the autographs implies that evangelicals must not attach
b nahty to contemporary versions or translations, least of all to mere paraphrases,
ut must earnestly pursue and honor the best text." Ibid., 4:201-210.
223

Ibid., 4:246.
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inspiration of chosen writers over against even the most careful labors of devout
copyists who did not share that special superintendence. For all that, the copies and
the faithful translations of the copies give us a propositionally trustworthy statement
of God's truth, and the copies are to be honored as the Word of God written in
view of their infallibility. The infallible copies unfailingly direct mankind to the
redemptive grace of God and serve ongoingly as the conceptual framework
whereby the Spirit of God convicts human beings of sin and enables them to share
in salvific mercy. 224
Henry believes that inerrancy is the historic stance of orthodox Christianity.225
Today, the position has lost its popularity except in limited circles. Evangelicalism is one
such circle. "Most evangelicals insist," Henry reminds his readers, "not that the Bible
explicitly teaches inerrancy, but that inerrancy in logically implicit in and logically inferred
from its doctrine of divine inspiration." The biblical passage referred to most frequently is
2 Timothy 3:16.226 Nonetheless, Henry admits that there are a few glaring discrepancies
in the text that we have today. 227
The copies are only as inerrant as the copyists and that, of course, implies the
possibility of mistakes even in the course of uncompromised devotion. Alterations
in the copies of the biblical texts are of two kinds, intentional and unintentional.
Unintentional alterations would include such things as skipped or duplicated words,
misspellings, use of a wrong word due to a copyists' misunderstanding of
dictation, faulty judgment or memory... Intentional changes might be the inclusion
of grammatical or linguistic updating, and in some texts even elimination of an
apparent incongruity or an attempted harmonization of passages.228
The possibility and probability of error need not destroy one's commitment to the

224 Ibid., 4:253.
225 "Inerrancy is the evangelical heritage, the historical commitment of the Christian
church." Ibid., 3:367.
226 "All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting
and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for
every good work." 2 Timothy 3:16 (NIV)
. 227 For example, "the most troublesome discrepancies occur not in passages where
the biblical text is in doubt, but rather where the text is not in question. We read in Genesis
50:4-13, for example, that Abraham bought a burial place in Hebron and in Acts 7: 16 that
he bought it in Shechem." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:232.
22 8 Ibid., 4:235.
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text. To the contrary, "the possibility of harmonizing apparently contradictory passages
bas time and again been demonstrated by evangelical scholars. "229 Furthermore, Henry
argues that the range of error is far less than is frequently proposed. He points out that the
errors made by higher critics far outnumber the actual errors in Scripture. Henry finds no
evidence that any scribal error has jeopardized "any doctrinal teaching or other essential
biblical teaching. "230
Henry implores evangelical scholars to attend to problem passages and not put their
beads in the sand. The methods of the higher critics can be useful when rightfully
employed. Henry does not reject all forms of biblical criticism outright but he does reject
its abuse by "those who manipulate the historical-critical method on antimiraculous
11

prejudices. 231 Thus, he does not dismiss textual criticism as an illegitimate enterprise;
229 Ibid., 4:174.
230 Ibid., 4:358. For example, for many years higher critics insisted that Moses
could not have written the Pentateuch. Henry quotes Eric Voegelin on the consequences of
this assumption. "( 1) The disappearance of Moses as the author of the Pentateuch entailed
the disappearance of the meaning of the Bible narrative in its final form. (2) What was
found in its place turned out to be not worth finding, measured by the treasure of meaning
that had always been sensed in the narratives but now escaped the critics." Ibid., 4:458.
Henry notes that recent archaeological finds have revealed otherwise. Writings from the
time of Moses have been discovered. In other words, further research has once again
~ proven the critics wrong. Henry points out that "archaeological investigation and linguistic
discoveries ... have canceled many of the sensational charges of error made by negative
critics of the Bible." Ibid., 4:356.
231 Ibid., 4:387. "In summary, evangelical theology properly affirms that:
1. Historical criticism is not inappropriate to, but bears relevantly on, Christian
concerns.
2. Historical criticism is never philosophically or theologically neutral.
3. Historical criticism is unable to deal with questions concerning the supernatural
and miraculous.
4. Historical criticism is as relevant to miracles, insofar as they are historical, as to
nonmiraculous historical events.
5. Historical criticism cannot demonstrably prove or disprove the factuality of
either a biblical or a nonbiblical historical event
6. To assume the unreliability of biblical historical testimony--or of Xenophon's
Anabasis or Thucydides's Histozy of the Peloponnesian War--in order to believe
only what is independently or externally confirmed, unjustifiably discounts the
primary sources.
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indeed. it can contribute to the recovery of the original text 232
In superintending the writing of Scripture, the Holy Spirit was acting as the source of

inspiration. Today, the Holy Spirit is still active but in terms of illumination, not in the act
of inspiring man to knowledge of new truths. 233 The illumination that humanity receives
is mumination of Scripture; it is not the illumination of the individual. Henry accuses Barth
of confusing illumination and inspiration and it leads to his emphasis on the direct
inspiration of the individual in which Scripture becomes the Word ofGod.234 Henry's
understanding is that inspiration and illumination are two separate phenomena. The Holy
Spirit inspired the writers of Scripture and he illumines humanity today when we read the
Scripture.

Thesis Thirteen: "As bestower of spiritual life the Holy Spirit enables individuals to
appropriate God's revelation savingly, and thereby attests the redemptive power of the
11

revealed truth of God in the personal experience of reborn sinners. 235 The principal
purpose of revelation is redemption. God revealed himself and his will to humanity as an

7. Discrimination of biblical events as either historically probable or improbable is
not unrelated to the metaphysical assumptions with which a historian approaches
the data.
8. A historian's subjective reversal of judgment concerning the probability or
improbability of an event's occurrence does not alter the objective factuality or
nonfactuality of the event.
9. Although the historian properly stresses historical method, he is not as a person
exempt from claims concerning supernatural revelation and miraculous redemptive
history, for the historical method is not man's only source of truth.
10. Biblical events acquire their meaning from the divinely inspired Scriptures;
since there could be no meaning of events without the events, the inspired record
carries its own intrinsic testimony to the factuality of those events." Ibid., 4:403.

~

232 Ibid., 4:243.
233 Ibid., 4:258-259.
234 Ibid., 4:266.
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~5 Ibid., 2: 15. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in QQd..
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act of love and grace for the express purpose of delivering "doomed sinners from the

penalty and guilt and power--and ultimately from the very presence--of sin, and to restore
the penitent to vital fellowship with himself and to righteousness. "236 The life, death and
resurrection of Christ was intended to provide fallen man with a means of salvation.
Tue need for revelation was not due to a shortcoming of God. To the contrary, it
resulted from man's rejection of God. Humanity was created by God in his own image.
Following the creation, humanity recognized the sovereignty of God and the relationship of
Creator to creature was not estranged. However, the fall has indelibly shattered the image
of God in man and has resulted in estrangement. Henry says: "No longer does the human
race bear the divine image in an unbroken way; no longer does man give himself to truth
and right and love for neighbor; instead, man seeks his own selfish will at the expense of
others and in detriment to the earth and its creatures over which he was to rule in
11

righteousness. 237
Given the fallen condition of man and the resulting depravity, how can man know
and pursue that which is true and right? Henry believes that "the Holy Spirit is the personal
divine power who by regeneration and sanctification conforms believers to the image of
11

Christ. 238 Earthly man does not become perfect. Nonetheless, Henry is convinced
Scripture teaches us that
the Spirit shapes a new mindset for those who were formerly hostile to God, (Rom.
8:5-7), a mindset that prizes God's truth and stimulates wholehearted obedience to
his will. The Spirit, moreover, nurtures a new and godly life and provides the
dynamic for defying sin and its temptations.... The life-giving Spirit by whom
God raised Jesus from the dead is already active in Christians, liberating them, as
they appropriate his presence and power, from the moral inabilities of their sinful
past and bringing them forward toward a future eschatological defeat of the present
23 6 Ibid., 4:495.
237 Ibid., 4:497-498.
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mortality. 239

Apart from this divine dynamic, humanity is destined to sin and fail to live up to the
standards of truth, justice, and righteousness. "The biblical view is that sin hinders the
effort of natural man, unenlightened by divine revelation and untransformed by divine
redemption, to advance truth and the good. The biblical call for a new selfhood asks for
nothing less than crucifixion of man's unregenerate nature and birth of a new nature by a
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. "240

Thesis Fourteen: "The church approximates the kingdom of God in miniature; as
such she is to mirror to each successive generation the power and joy of the appropriated
realities of divine revelation." The church is composed of the redeemed; those among
humankind who have accepted the salvation proffered to them by God. They have a
corporate responsibility to be a witness to the world for Goo.241 As Henry says: "The
emancipating Redeemer grants new life to the penitent and enlists them as a committed
community, as the new society, to his ongoing victorious combat over the forces of
evil."242
It is certain that Christ, in an exercise of divine power, will return and "subdue the
forces of evil" and "establish the great age of peace and righteousness." In the meantime,
the Church cannot passively sit on the sidelines and await the victorious return of Christ.
The church is to act in God's behalf even now. Henry insists that
the church which bears his name is already called, now, to challenge and contain
the powers of evil: as the living Body of its living Head the church is now to resist
the Evil One, now to indict rampant injustices and support the afflicted and
239 Ibid., 4:501.
240 Ibid., 4:519. See also, Christian Personal Ethics, chap. 16.
241 Ibid., 2: 16. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in QQd.
R
_evelation
and Authority, 3:542-592.
242 Ibid., 4:542.
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oppressed, now to sensitize moral conscience against wrong and for the right, now
to exhibit the purpose of God in a new life and a new community while it proclaims
the revealed truth and will of God. 243
This world is to be evangelized not ignored. Henry argues that "the Christian should
know himself by spiritual birthright to be in the fallen world as a member of the already
existing 'new community' which is not only called 'out of the world' but also dispersed
through it as 'salt' and 'light."'244 As "salt" and "light" of the world, the church should
serve as a witness to unregenerate man. By example, the church should be the evidence
that "in fallen history a new humanity and a new society can arise where reconciliation and
righteousness, hope and joy replace the rampant exploitation and oppressions of fellow11

bumans and their despair of survival. 245

Thesis Fifteen: "The self-manifesting God will unveil his glory in a crowning
revelation of power and judgment; in this disclosure at the consummation of the ages, God

will vindicate righteousness and justice, finally subdue and subordinate evil, and bring into
being a new heaven and earth." Scripture teaches clearly that history is moving towards a
climactic end. At that time, there will be a "final eschatological judgment of the
unrepentant."246 This end does not mean extinction; rather it means "an end of spiritual
decision making and the sealing of human destiny on the basis of this life's choices. n247
The repentant will be escorted "into the eternal presence of the Lord of glory." At that time
many of the mysteries of God and reality will be unveiled. As Henry writes: "There, face
to face,

our heavenly Father will unveil intimacies of love and knowledge hitherto

243 Ibid., 4:545-546.
244 Ibid., 4:553.
245 Ibid.

~ Ibid., 2:16. A more complete discussion of this thesis can be found in God.
R
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and Authority, 4:593-614.
2

247 Ibid., 4:610.
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unknown, and reserved for those who love him. 248

SUMMARY
Henry has very clear notions about reason, revelation and theology. In many
respects his thought is Augustinian. The starting point for all knowledge is God. "God is
himself the source of all knowledge. ,,249 In his divine revelation, God has freely chosen
10

reveal himself to humanity. God has revealed truth and knowledge that is essential for

the salvation of individuals and for our earthly existence. This divine revelation does not
answer all questions about God and reality, but the answers that are given are true and
reliable. We can rely upon this truth because it comes from God through Christ. The time
and manner of God's revelation has been chosen by God for reasons unbeknownst to us.
Nonetheless, revelation has been conveyed in a way that we can rationally comprehend and
understand.
Our primary source of divine revelation is Scripture. For in Scripture, Christ, the
Logos, has spoken, through the Holy Spirit, in an intelligible and meaningful way that has
been preserved infallibly through the ages. Man alone, in his fallen nature, is unable to
appropriate this truth to himself, but the grace of God has enabled humanity to appropriate
'Ii

truth by the Holy Spirit.
Until God's final revelation of himself at the end of the ages, the Redeemed have a
charge to exhibit the truth to the world through word and deed. Theologians are to "exposit

and elucidate the content of Scripture" and "confront alternative explanations of reality."
Christians, both individually and collectively, are to reflect "the power and joy of the
appropriated realities of divine revelation." How might Christians do this politically?
Henry's answer will be explored in the following chapters.

24 8 Ibid., 4:614.
249 Ibid., 3:275.

CHAPTER FOUR

1WENTIE1H CENTURY CHRISTIAN POLmCAL 1HOUGHT

Henry has reviewed twentieth century Christian political engagement and is critical of
what has transpired over the last several decades. In particular, he rejects the liberal social
gospel at the turn of the century; the social isolation of the fundamentalists; neo-orthodoxy
of the 1930s and 1940s; and the theologies of liberation and revolution of the 1970s. Each
view, Henry believes, has crippling liabilities and falls short of the correct biblical
perspective. This chapter will review his critique of each of these important Christian
political movements.
Prior to an investigation of the liberal social gospel and its offspring, neo-orthodoxy,
it is useful to comment briefly about Henry's view regarding the impact of philosophical
trends on the modem theological view of revelation. In this regard, according to Henry,
Hegel and Kant were extremely important figures. The philosophical teachings of these
"'

great Gennan thinkers contributed to the decline of belief in scriptural divine revelation as a
special once-for-all explication of the will of God. When revelation loses its elevated
status, Henry contends, the authority for specific Christian contributions to the search for
social order is undermined. For supporters of Hegelian philosophy, revelation becomes an
ongoing activity while for adherents of Kant, the impossibility of knowledge of the
supernatural depreciates revelation altogether. Henry writes:
The theologians who were influenced most by Hegel obscured Biblical once-for-all

~ve~ation; for them, the universal movement of thought provided the most

significant disclosure of the Absolute. Those influenced by Kant repudiated it,
contending that the categories of thought do not extend to the supernatural;
co~sequently, they faced the problem of overcoming agnosticism about the
existence of the religious object. On both approaches, however, whether due to a
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pantheizing divine immanence or to the supposed impossibility of metaphysical
knowledge, revelation came to be simply another term for human insight and
discovery . 1
It is the depreciation of revelation due to the influence of German philosophy that Henry
believes underlies the inadequacy of twentieth century Christian theology. Furthermore,
Christian political thought loses a solid grounding when Scripture is undermined. The
political claims of theologians are no longer grounded in Scripture and, Henry claims, the
results are predictably dire.
TIIE SOCIAL GOSPEL
The first significant twentieth century statement of a Christian social ethic came in the
fonn of the liberal social gospel. Throughout the nineteenth century, theologians were
attempting to remake Christianity in light of the philosophical challenges of Hegel and

Kant. The most influential theologians at this time, according to Henry, were three
prominent Germans: Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), whom Henry identifies as the
founder of modem theological liberalism; Albrecht Ritschl ( 1822-1889); and, Ernst
Troeltsch (1865-1923).2 These powerful scholars began to redefine Christianity in modem
terms. They stressed "divine immanence, which annulled the distinction between nature

and the supernatural," "evolutionary development as God's method," and "the higher
.., critical view of the Scriptures."3
Liberalism had the scholarship and genius to restate Christianity definitively in
modem categories. Biblical theology was being "remade" in terms of the modem
mind. The determinative principles, ... were those of immanental and
evolutionary philosophy, with their rejection of special revelation, miracle, the
unique deity of Christ, and a divinely provided redemption, or, in a summary
word, the trustworthiness of the Bible.4

1 Carl F. H. Henry, Fifty Years of Protestant Theolo~y (Boston: W. A. Wilde Co.,
1950), 16.
2 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:218.
3 Henry, Fifty Years, 23.
4 Ibid., 33.
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Henry believes that liberalism became so enraptured with modern philosophy that it
eventually lost its Christian identity. He argues that "liberalism offered a Christianity
without atonement, without Christ's deity, without the triune God, without heaven and·
hell--indeed a 'Christianity' without anything distinctively Christian."5 Liberalism failed to
maintain its Christian character primarily, according to Henry, because of its rejection of
scriptural divine revelation. He insists that "liberalism lost its way when it lost the Bible. "6
It lost the Bible because of its reliance on modern epistemological theory, especially Kant.

Henry writes: "Protestant liberalism ... had dismissed miracle and the supernatural as
unjustifiable beliefs because unverifiable by [the] scientific method. Rejecting the
distinction between the natural and the supernatural meant declaring large segments of the
Bible to be unbelievable. •'7 If the Bible was not believable in all respects, then there was
little reason to rely upon it for guidance in political and social matters. As a result, the
liberal political perspective was only vaguely derived from Scripture.
The social ethic which emerged out of Protestant liberalism, frequently called the

social gospel, placed an emphasis on direct political action. The movement was influenced
primarily by Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918). 8 It was a Canadian, British and

5 Ibid., 93.
6 Ibid., 95.
7 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:253-254.
8 Walter Rauschenbusch, a Baptist minister in New York City and later a professor
of ~hurch history, wrote Christianity and the Social Crisis ( 1907), Christianizin~ the
Socia] Order (1912), and A Theolo~y for the Social Goswl (1917). For more information,
see Charles H. Lippy, "Social Christianity," EncyclQpedia of the American Reli~ious
Experienck, eds. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams (New York, NY: Charles
~~b!ler's Sons, 1988), 2:920. Rauschenbusch had stressed the importance of both
mdiv1dual regeneration and social involvement. Unfortunately, many of his followers
forg~t ~he former and focused strictly on social action. Henry writes: "Despite his
P~hnnnary insistence on personal spiritual regeneration, therefore, the 'social gospel'
viewed political action as a means not simply of promoting and preserving justice, but of
actually transforming society. This social emphasis of Rauschenbusch's thought became
characteristic of Protestant liberalism." Henry, As.pkcts of Christian Social Ethics, 109-
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American protestant movement "committed to the development of a social order grounded
in principles believed to be those taught by Jesus...9 This movement focused almost
exclusively on societal evils. One scholar describes the movement as follows:
The Social Gospel movement was an attempt by numerous and varied preachers,
theologians, and concerned laymen to emphasize the prophetic and social justice
aspects of Christianity. They specifically sought to respond to conditions brought
about by the rise of industrial capitalism, such as unhealthy and crowded urban
housing, exploitation of children as laborers, corruption of political processes, and
growing class segregation, by emphasizing the concept of social, rather than simply
individual, sins and by seeking appropriate reforms. ro
participants in the movement described themselves as follows:
The social gospel is the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God. It is the
old gospel of peace on earth among men of good will. It is the proclamation of the
kingdom of heaven, a divinely ordered society, to be realized on earth. It is the
application of Christ's Golden Rule and Law of love to all the business and affairs
of life. It is the glad tidings of peace and purity and plenty.11
Henry believes that the social gospel was based upon a truncated scriptural message.
Utilizing the scientific methodologies of higher criticism, liberal social gospel theologians
stripped away most of Scripture and reduced the biblical message to the "simple affirmation
of 'the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man' realized in the teachings of Jesus
about the kingdom of God." 12 They simply refused to accept the entire traditional
"

Scripture as authoritative. Thus, they needed to look elsewhere to sketch out the social and
political ramifications of the one simple message that they were willing to accept as divinely

110.
9 Lippy, "Social Christianity," 2:917.
10 John A. Mayer, "Social Reform After the Civil War to the Great Depression,"
Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience, eds. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
Williams (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 2:1441.
11 Quoted from the opening pages of an 1898 journal entitled "Social Gospel."
Quoted in Ronald C. White, Jr., and C. Howard Hopkins, The Social Gospel: Religion
and Reform in Chan&in& America, (1976). See Lippy, "Social Christianity," 2:917.
12 Lippy, "Social Christianity," 2:920.
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revealed·
This truncation of Scripture led to the reconstruction and redefinition of several
biblical doctrines. For example, the incarnation took on new meaning. Rather than
referring solely to the appearance of Christ, the son of God, on earth, it began to refer to

"the potential within all humanity for love of God and love of one's fellow human
being."13 Such potential was first realized and exhibited by Christ. Christ showed us the
"latent perfectibility of humankind" 14 We should emulate Christ
Such a view led to an emphasis on the kingdom of God as an earthly possibility.

Granted it would come about gradually, but "what was vital to Rauschenbusch and those
who adopted his views was the conviction that humanity had the skills and knowledge to

Christianize the social order."15 The resulting political perspective was "optimistic" in a
"secular rather than sacred sense." 16
Henry argues that the social gospel distorted the Christian message and redefined the
role of the political enterprise in a nonbiblical fashion. Politics was to provide solutions to
problems that Henry believes it was never intended to address. Preservation of the social
order was no longer the goal of politics. Social transformation, a goal that Henry feels
~

politics is ill-equipped to achieve, became the focus. Henry says:
Thus dynamisms originally intended to preserve social order were assigned the
additional expectation of transforming the social order, and their wholly proper and
indispensable role was distorted Reliance on social legislation as a moral dynamic
was now promoted at the expense of spiritual alternatives, and in contrast with
legislation the latter were disregarded as inferior methods of securing social
objectives.... In the long run, this attachment of excessive expectations to the

l3 Ibid., 2:926-927.
l4 Ibid.
15 Ibid.

.s.em· 16

Carl F. H. Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," Moravian
_mazy Bulletin (1960): 17.
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preseiving dynamisms could only lead to disillusionment, and to a subsequent
distrust of their adequacy not only for social regeneration (for which they never
were intended) but even for preseivation of social order (in which they have an
essential role.) 17
This view, Henry obseives, lacked an important component of biblical teaching. It

failed to emphasize the fallen nature of humanity and the resulting despair apart from divine
intervention.
The pessimistic note in revealed religion--the note of man's sin and the fall, of
condemnation and judgment, of the need of supernatural regeneration and
redemption--was suppressed. And the optimistic note no longer was attached to a
supernatural God inteivening redemptively in fallen history, and at last inaugurating
a spiritual Kingdom of righteousness and peace by the personal return of Jesus
Christ.18
In the final analysis, "the liberal social gospel was really grounded in non-biblical
considerations." 19 Their optimistic view of the future
discerned the outline and promise of a coming millennium in the modern age of
discovery, global expansion and scientific invention; in the enlargement of
democratic rights for middle and lower classes in the Western nations. The dogmas
of inevitable progress and of man's inherent goodness, taken from evolutionary
theory, supplied the real assurance of its future reality. 20
Henry attributes the social gospel to several questionable assumptions.
(1) that the world itself will steadily progress until it finally becomes
a kingdom of justice and peace.
(2) that this transformation can follow by inspiring human dedication
to Christian ethical principles.
(3) that this golden era does not depend on supernatural redemption,
regeneration, sanctification, or the Lord's return.21
These assumptions, Henry argues, were the product of secular philosophy, not divine

l 7 Henry, A&lJects of Christian Social Ethics, 111.
l8 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 17-18.
l9 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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revelation. And, unfortunately, this philosophy was primarily social and political as
opPosed to theological. Henry bemoans the fact that "as Protestant liberalism lost a
11

genuinely theological perspective, it substituted mainly a political program. 22 The
theological emphasis was lost after belief in propositional revelation was abandoned. In its
place, a man-centered political and social program was substituted. A political program that
lacks a grounding in Scripture, according to Henry, was a political program doomed to fail.
NEO-OR1HOOOXY

After two world wars and a great depression, theological liberalism and the social
gospel movement lost momentum. The theological weaknesses of liberal theology, Henry
theorizes, led to the emergence of a new school of thought, neo-orthodoxy, which became
dominant in theological circles. This neo-orthodox school was composed of "selfconscious liberals, who, under the sway of world war, economic depression, and
European crisis theology (or Barthianism, the European form of Neo-orthodoxy), became
11

increasingly disenchanted with the reigning assumptions of liberal thought. 23
The neo-orthodox quickly captured the attention of the theological academic
community. This new school of thought "found its inspiration in Soren Kierkegaard
~

(1813-1855)." Kierkegaard had "reacted violently to the [immanental and rational]
Hegelian atmosphere of Denmark by championing the qualitative uniqueness of God and
11

the supra-rational and paradoxic nature of faith. 24
The neo-orthodox were quick to distinguish themselves from other Christian
theological traditions.

22 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 116.

~3 Dennis N. Voskuil, "Neo-Orthodoxy," Encyclopedia of the American Reli~ous
Exl?enence, eds. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams (New York, NY: Charles
Scnbner's Sons, 1988), 2:1147.
24 Henry, Fifty Years, 34.
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As against classic liberalism, [the neo-orthodox] reaffirmed the Hebrew-Christian
movement to be an essentially unique revelation of God, and Christian experience
to be unintelligible in terms merely of the psychology of general religion outside
Biblical redemption; it insisted that man is sinful at the core of his personality, and
that Christology is crucial both for theism and for redemption. As against
immanental idealism, it stressed the transcendence of God, and the limitation of
human reason in a more radical sense than had Christian theology since Tertullian.
As against evangelical theology, it reduced the Scriptures to a record of revelation,
rather than viewing them as God's revelation written; it retained an evolutionary
view of origins and championed the necessity of higher criticism from the first; it
denied that divine revelation is propositional, and rejected the authority of Scripture
for a so-called objective authority of the Spirit. 25
While they were distinguishing themselves from other philosophical and theological
traditions, they maintained that they were returning to a more orthodox understanding of
the Christian faith. Henry agrees that in some respects they did just that, but they failed
miserably in other areas.
While the neo-orthodox retrieved several traditional orthodox teachings such as the
transcendence of God, human depravity and the reality of divine revelation, the doctrinal
restoration was incomplete according to Henry. For "in biblical scholarship, scriptural
interpretation, and social ethics, the Neo-Orthodox were deeply influenced by their liberal
predecessors. "26 Even in those areas where the neo-orthodox reverted to traditional
teaching, they often misconstrued the biblical emphasis in a way that had significant
implications. For example, "neo-orthodoxy protested liberalism's exaggeration of divine
immanence, and it reacted instead to an extreme emphasis on divine transcendence whose
implications are fully as important for ethics as for theology."27

In regard to divine revelation, Henry suggests, the return to orthodoxy was critically
flawed.
The dialectical theology is particularly deceptive in its attitude toward Scripture. It
25 Ibid., 36.
2

6 Voskuil, "Neo-Orthodoxy," 2:1147.
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Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 19.
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recognizes that the appeal to any part of Scripture as divine is exposed to higher
criticism, with which it has no desire to wage a constant warfare. Consequently,
the crisis theologians deny that the Bible at any point is God's revelation; rather,
they hold, any part of the Bible may become revelation by the testimony of the Holy
Spirit to me. The Bible is reduced to a "sign" or "witness to" revelation, which is
said to occur only in the encounter with the Holy Spirit. ... This position,
presumably, attacks higher criticism from behind, for the door is now open to as
much error in the Bible as criticism might insist upon, yet faith, resting not on
history nor on an inerrant Bible, would not be flustered.28
'Ibis new and rather unorthodox understanding of Scripture abandoned any notion of
objective knowledge of truth based upon propositional revelation. Knowledge of God and
of ethical precepts lost its objective and absolute character.
Neo-Protestant reconstruction of the doctrine of divine revelation eliminated its
external and objective features; and concentrated solely on an internal divine
confrontation; even this, moreover, was said to be existential or paradoxical rather
than rational in nature. Cognitive revelational knowledge concerning the very
reality of God and his disclosure even in Jesus of Nazareth was therefore
deliberately forfeited. Understood only as divine self-communication, revelation
was easily transmuted into only an inner awareness offorgiveness or of
reconciliation--that is, into merely relational categories--while the issue of
objectively valid truth was bypassed. 29
As a result, Henry feels, we are left with subjectivism and "vague mysticism... 30
Apart from propositional revelation, Christian doctrine becomes more difficult to
define and defend. Henry says:
The effect of dialectical and existential theories of divine revelation upon many
church leaders was to dilute the importance they attached to doctrine or dogma....
Once one abandons revelation as rational information, no specific doctrines need
any longer be asserted to maintain one's Christian identity, and ... theological
doctrines then become fallible human efforts to verbalize an essentially noncognitive spiritual relationship to God.... If the objective truth of theological
doctrine is forfeited, can theology escape being reduced to mysticism and
skepticism?31
The loss of objective doctrinal certainty had many profound ramifications, including an
28 Henry, Fifty Years, 100-101.
29
30
31

Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:249.
Henry, Fifty Years, 101-102.
Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:278-279.
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important impact on Christian political thought
Given the fundamentalist abrogation of the social arena during this era, neo-orthodox
theologians took the lead in Christian political and social involvement. Whereas the liberal
social gospel had engendered an optimistic social ethic, Henry characterizes the social ethic
of neo-orthodoxy as primarily pessimistic. Lacking specific divine directives, fallen
humanity has little hope of improving upon our lot.
The whole ideal of Christian culture is abandoned, the historical order being
consigned permanently and universally to the world, the flesh, and the devil. The
Christian believer is obliged passionately to advance temporary social expedients as
integral to the Gospel of reconciliation. 32
The best we could hope for was to jump on the bandwagon of secular social reform
movements in an attempt to mitigate our dour situation. The most prominent proponent of
this approach was an American thinker, Reinhold Niebuhr. 33
Rather than abandon the social sphere, neo-orthodox theologians such as Niebuhr
opted to participate in various social reform movements. In the process, Henry argues, the
neo-orthodox theologians minimized "the significance of evangelism and spiritual revival
for the advancement of social morality" and ultimately led to the formation of a Christian
social ethic that is "competitive with the proclamation of the GospeI."34 The emphasis
becomes man-made recommendations not divinely revealed guidance.
In spite of their reform orientation, Henry insists the neo-orthodox are unduly
32 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 19.
33 "Niebuhr formulated a perspective on religion and social reform known as
Christian realism in books such as The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941), The Children of
Light and the Children of Darkness (1944), and Man's Nature and His Communities
( 1965)." He was also an activist. "He ran for Congress on the Socialist party ticket,
founded the Americans for Democratic Action, was instrumental in the formation of the
World Council of Churches, and served on the Policy Planning Staff of the State
Department." Glenn R. Bucher and L. Gordon Tait, "Social Reform Since the Great
Depression," Encyclopedia of the American Reli~ous Experience, eds. Charles H. Lippy
and Peter W. Williams (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 2: 1465.
34 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 21.
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pessimistic about the potential of a Christian culture. Although his expectations are not
utopian, Henry thinks the neo-orthodox fail to recognize the power of God and the power
of his divinely revealed guidelines.
The disparagement of the ideal of Christian culture fails to do full justice to the
power of the Holy Spirit in the life of the redeemed community. Surely a sound
theology must recognize that defilement by sin precludes the believer's glorification
in present life, and also that aggregate group behavior is likely to compound the
weaknesses of individual behavior. Nonetheless, sanctification remains the New
Testament norm for the regenerate, and a distinctive social morality and culture
seem possible to the community of evangelical faith. 35
Henry admits that the neo-orthodox are not unified on many social and political
issues, but there are commonly held "controlling convictions."
(1) Human history is so determined by sin-in-depth that the ideal of Christian
culture must be dismissed, all cultures being judged negatively from the
standpoint of Christian criticism.
(2) Social problems are regarded as not decisively responsive to personal
redemption and social justice therefore relies strategically upon propaganda
pressures and legislative compulsion.
(3) In the absence of specially revealed ethical principles and doctrines, social
strategy is governed by "middle axioms" which, although lacking a basis
revelation, are held to be critically creatively relevant.36
A sharp critic of neo-orthodox theology, Henry is equally critical of neo-orthodox
social ethics. He argues that
<t

Distrust of rational revelation ... leaves neo-orthodoxy without an authoritative
basis for its theological and ethical positions.... The anti-intellectual element in
neo-orthodoxy thus divorces its ethical declarations from assured basis in revelation
and ultimately dissipates its social dynamic. 37

In other words, the neo-orthodox, having rejected Scripture as propositional revelation,
have no certain authority on which to base their proclamations.
The primary problem with the liberal social gospel and the neo-orthodox political

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 20.
37 Ibid.
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notions, according to Henry, relates to their theological errors regarding God's attributes-errors that he feels result from their rejection of Scripture as propositional truth. He
contends that a mistake in identifying divine attributes can effectively distort all subsequent
doctrine and it will certainly pervert one's ethical constructs.
Christian doctrine is a harmonious unity whose main axis is the nature of God. For
this reason a correct understanding of the whole range of Christian faith and duty
turns on a proper comprehension of divine attributes. How the theologian defines
and relates God's sovereignty, righteousness, and love actually predetermines his
exposition of basic positions in many areas--in social ethics no less than in
soteriology and eschatology. Even the smallest deviation from the biblical view of
divine justice and divine benevolence eventually implies far-reaching consequences
for the entire realm of Christian truth and life. 38
The key to a correct understanding of divine attributes, he claims, lies in the careful study
of Scripture.
In regard to social ethics, Henry believes that the liberals and the neo-orthodox have
misconstrued divine attributes. He suggests that liberal theologians such as Schleiermacher
and Ritschl have overemphasized the love of God at the expense of his justice and
righteousness.
The great fallacy of Protestant liberalism was its theological discounting of God's
wrath by losing or submerging God's righteousness in his love .... In effect, this
dissolving of justice into love cancels any separate function for justice in the moral
order of the world, shifts the motive force of ethical theory to benevolence instead,
and misinterprets love as a universal rather than a particular manifestation of the
divine nature. 39
Love becomes all-consuming and justice becomes little more than a synonym. Lacking a
sound understanding of God's justice and love, social gospel theologians looked elsewhere
for guidance in the realm of politics. Henry claims that,
since the rise of the "social gospel," Protestant ethical theory has lost vital contact
with biblical perspectives. Instead, Protestant expositors have tended to promote
the "practical idealism" of Anglo-Saxon social philosophy in the name of Christian
religion. Christian social ethics, therefore, has preoccupied itself mainly with
38 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 146.
39 Ibid., 147.
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material bettennent. Although now and then asserting a Christological foundation
in broadest generalities. Protestant moralists have addressed the social situation in
tenns of particular programs having ecclesiastical approval rather than in terms of a
theological interpretation of social order. Neither motivations nor goals are
distinguished clearly in relation to justice or love. As a result, the content of
Protestant social ethics has become scarcely distinguishable from the objectives of
secular reform: development of retarded nations, conservation of natural resources,
adequate housing, and higher wages are typical concerns. Political adjustment of
economic differences is regarded as a proper expression of Christian love for
neighbor, and even as a necessary aspect of "the kingdom of God."40
Henry claims that the response of the neo-orthodox theologians to the social gospel
left much to be desired because they too misunderstand the divine attributes. He argues
that "neo-orthodoxy merely modifies and does not rectify the error of liberalism. It relates
righteousness and wrath inadequately to the core of God's being, still subordinating them
to divine love."41 The modem church, influenced by neo-orthodoxy, finds itself with little

to say that is significant.
The Church is in a dilemma To make justice virtually akin to "righteous love" in
the sphere of human action is a tenuous social strategy, in which justice soon loses
its own status.... Basic to this confusion is the sentimental modem reconstruction
of the nature of God. This theological quagmire results from neo-orthodoxy's
failure to rise above the modernist refusal to identify righteousness and justice no
less than love with the essential core of God's being.41
Admittedly, the neo-orthodox approach does not "yield a wholly uniform scheme of
social ethics, for neo-orthodox theologians give divergent expositions of many questions in
politics and economics...43 But, Henry insists, to the extent that neo-orthodox political
solutions relate to the Christian faith, they do so in reference to love of one's neighbor.
The idea of justice is shunned.
Thus, theological leaders of both modem liberalism and modem neo-orthodoxy

40 Ibid., 129.
41 Ibid., 149.
42 Ibid., 167.
43 Ibid., 149.
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"have derived the content of the 'common good' from modern social theories rather than
from biblical principles. ,,44 It is important, however, to be reminded that there are
differences between these two schools of thought. Henry illustrates:
What distinguishes current statements of God's justice and love from those of
recent past may be put this way: Classic liberal theology (1) denied any recognition
of wrath whatever in divine experience; (2) merged divine righteousness into
benevolence, so completely identifying God's nature with love that justice became
simply one aspect of love's functions. But contemporary theology strikes deeper:
(1) it reinstates wrath as a legitimate divine experience; (2) it differentiates justice
from love (although sometimes only dialectically) so that righteousness no longer is
wholly submerged in the divine will of love; (3) it even makes righteousness a
constituent element of the nature of God. All this it affirms, however, within the
prior assumption that (4) love is fundamental to the divine nature. Righteousness
therefore becomes a constituent of the divine nature only as a constituent of love...
. This theological readjustment still denies righteousness the same ultimacy as love
in the nature of God. 45
Henry despairs of this "continued denial that God is sovereign justice as well as
sovereign love."46 He suggests, in summary,
that theology that obscures the distinction between justice and grace soon sponsors
alien views of social ethics, and any social theory that confounds justice and
benevolence will work against a true understanding both of the nature of God and
of the character of the gospel. 47
Without a grounding in Scripture, it does not surprise Henry that modern theologians fall
prey to the most powerful ideology of our time, namely Marxism. In the latter decades of
the twentieth century, we see powerful theological forces promoting liberation and
revolution. Marxist terminology and concepts are wrapped in a theological veneer and a
new political perspective emerges.

44 Ibid., 160.
45 Ibid., 167-168.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 171.
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TIIE TIIEOLOOIES OF LIBERATION AND REVOLUTION
Henry describes liberation and/or revolution theology as the "greatest modem
11

challenge to the evangelical concept of social justice. 48 While liberation theology is

primarilY a Latin American and Roman Catholic movement, it challenges orthodox
theologians to rethink the importance of political involvement and it has influenced some
left-leaning evangelicals.
Henry admires the concern for the poor that characterizes the liberation theologians

while specifically condemning them for their lack of orthodoxy.
Even if Christians should and must deplore pseudotheologies that deal inadequately
and objectionably with human oppression, they nonetheless must recognize the
positive concerns of theologies of liberation and of revolution with their indictment
of political, economic, and other injustice against the human spirit. The critically
desperate condition of vast masses of people strangled by oppressions pleads for
evangelism and social engagement. 49
Criticism of leading liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutierrez and Richard Shaull
cannot be merely negative. 50 A positive alternative must be proffered. Henry's efforts in
this regard will be explained in later chapters.
The emergence of liberation/revolution theology as a prominent movement does not
seem to surprise Henry. To the contrary, once biblical authority is undermined, as he
believes has been done by liberal and neo-orthodox theologians, it becomes easy for
48 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 208.
49 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:543.
50 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theoloey of Liberation (New York, NY: Orbis Books,
1973), and Richard Shaull, Encounter with Revolution (New York, NY: Association
~ess, 1955). Other important contributions to liberation/revolution theology can be found
m Ruben Alves, A Theolo~y Human Hqpe, 1969; Helder Camara, Church and
Colonialism, 1969; Paulo Freire, Peda~o~y of the (4lpressed, 1970; Jose Miranda, Mm
and ~he Bibl~. 1974; Hugo Assmann, Theolo~y for a Nomad Church, 1975; Jose MiguezB?mno! Doin~ Theoloey in a Revolutionary Situation, 1975; Jean Luis Segundo, :rhk
Li_berat10n of Theoloey, 1976; Eduardo Frei, Latin America: The Hopeful (4ltion, 1978;
Jon Sobrino, Christolo~y at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach, 1978.
R ese volumes are identified as several of the best representatives of the movement in
onald Nash, ed. Liberation Theolo~y (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1984).
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dominant secular perspectives to infiltrate and influence Christian political discourse.
Marxism has penetrated some theological circles and liberation/revolution theology is the
result Henry writes: "The emphasis on supposedly divine action divorced from both ·
biblical once-for-all miracles and a scripturally disclosed meaning is being exploited today
by the theology of revolution. This current movement transmutes an appeal to the God of
action into theological justification for Marxist-type economic social change."51
Liberation/revolution theologians differ from their liberal and neo-orthodox
predecessors in the emphases they chose to identify in Scripture. Henry writes:
When and as [liberation/revolution theology] claims biblical legitimacy, it differs
from the recent existentializing of faith-concerns in at least three ways. First, it
insists that divine action involves transforming external history and demands the
forced alternation of unjust social structures. Second, it champions a literal divine
deliverance of the Hebrews from Egyptian oppression under the leadership of
Moses since it considers the exodus a paradigmatic sanction and imperative for
revolutionary sociopolitical action. Third, it assumes the validity of eschatological
representations of God's vindication of righteousness and final containment of evil,
and in present history promotes an anticipation of this ultimate triumph. 52
There is a difference between liberation and revolution theology, although the
differences begin to blur together in the practical realm. Liberation theology is often
characterized as evolutionary and more moderate while revolution theology is more radical
.~

and revolutionary by definition. For Henry, "the main difference between revolution
theology and liberation theology is that the former affirms that God actively promotes
historical justice through revolutionary violence, whereas liberation theology approves
violence only as an activity of final desperation ...53 The difference is important but not
significant ultimately.
Liberation theology stresses that violence is not absolutely or always necessary to
achieve the socialist overthrow of the existing order; revolution theology, on the
51 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:278.
52 Ibid.
53 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 217.
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other hand, unhesitatingly sponsors violence and even tries to confer biblical
legitimacy upon it. For all that, liberation theolo!l' almost always champions
countercultural violence in the Marcusian sense.
He goes on to say: "Liberation theology gives only a situational verdict on violence rather
than a verdict of principle; although violence is not theoretically espoused, its possible
necessity in practice is admitted. "55 Thus, he believes, acceptance of violence as a point of
distinction is, in practice, a relatively unimportant difference.
There are many similarities between the two theological positions. These similarities

are more important for Henry than are the differences. Liberation and revolution
theologians base their thinking, according to Henry, on several assumptions. These
include:

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

The divinely mandated task of Christianity is to enforce a particular
politico-economic policy upon the nations.
Socialism is a biblically legitimated economic view.
Marxism offers an objective analysis of society.
The world predicament can be rectified preeschatologically in terms
of universal justice.
God's covenant should be translated into a program of contemporary
political and economic idealism.
Universal redistribution of wealth will overcome the economic crisis.
The role of the church as an exemplary new society gifted with a new
mind and will is less significant than the alteration of social structures.
Jesus Christ enlisted the apostles in a direct challenge to earthly political
powers and promoted a revolutionary alternative to the Roman empire. 56

~

Henry calls these assumptions "debatable." He does not develop an eight point rebuttal but
he does formulate a response. There are four thematic objections that he raises.
His first objection revolves around Scripture. Henry insists that Scripture is the only
proper starting point for Christian theology. He accuses the liberation theologians of
adopting a base other than divine revelation for their theology. They subvert Scripture.

54 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:557.
55 Ibid., 4:558.
56 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 217.
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It is important to understand from the outset that the basic gulf between the two
schools of thought concerns the authoritative basis on which each system is
founded. Instead of building on the Bible as inspired revelation, liberation theology
begins with praxis and considers doctrine to be a second step. It considers action in
the social arena to be the true beginning point for a theology.57
.

This emphasis on action, involvement, praxis, is unique to liberation/revolution theology.
Henry explains: "The Christian life, Gutierrez affirms, is a 'praxis,' an involvement in this
world, and theology is 'critical reflection on Christian praxis in the light of the Word."'58

Scripture becomes secondary. Gutierrez illustrates the problem.
Instead of first focusing on Christ and the Bible as the revelational center of human
history and destiny, and by that light illuminating the cultural context, Gutierrez and
his praxis-oriented exegetes make existing social and political conditions the
necessary lens for viewing and interpreting scriptural data.... Man's factual
historical condition is considered the necessary starting point; from the outset faith
gains a political dimension and reference. What specially characterizes liberation
theologians is their insistence that theological reflection must begin with the
historical situation rather than with the biblical revelation, and thus becomes
directed toward a prestipulated social reconstruction. 59
As a result, liberation theology is preoccupied with a socio-political emphasis. Henry says:
"Politically oriented theology concerns itself primarily with criticism of the sociopolitical
orders and promotes action that aims to transform existing social structures.... Its
fundamental priority is sociopolitical action, action that aggressively promotes a radical
structural inversion of the status quo."()()
Henry does not object to the notion of praxis. In fact, he argues vociferously that
Christians have an obligation and a duty to become involved in the world. He expresses
admiration for the concern expressed by liberation theologians for the poor and the
oppressed. But he insists that praxis must be guided by scriptural guidelines. He says that

57 Ibid., 208-209.
58 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:556.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 4:555.
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"praxis is the carrying out of God's revealed will that is already objectively made known

and published. "61

Scripture must remain central and it must be the foundation for socio-

palitical involvement.
Liberation theologians do not reject divine revelation. They do, according to Henry,
demean it. A new priority is established. Henry writes: "Sociopolitical emphases are
given priority over the theological-revelational; the social sciences are considered the
contextual starting point for theological and moral reflection. "62 Scripture becomes
illustrative and tendential. When God speaks, he speaks through revolution not Scripture.
For the liberationists, "political revolution, not the once-for-all miraculous events in Jesus
Christ's redemptive death and resurrection, is God's decisive speech and act. "63
When liberation/revolution theologians use Scripture, according to Henry, they abuse

it He accuses leaders of both the theology of liberation and the theology of revolution of
"exegetical misuse of the Bible. "64 Shaull "appropriates biblical categories in defining and
canonizing its ideological proposals for revolutionary social change. "65 Gutierrez does
similar things with Scripture.
Gutierrez calls the Word of God his norm, but he seldom adduces Scripture in a
decisive way. Personal experience and social conflict are all exegeted by a selective
use of Scripture without in fact employing Scripture as the normative authority. He
... confers biblical legitimacy on much that is not really derived from Scripture and
need not actually be expounded in correlation with it. 66
The role of Scripture changes. It is used tendentiously. It does not reveal the secrets
61 Ibid., 4:563.
62 Ibid., 4:573.
63 Ibid., 2:248.
64 Ibid., 4:557.
65 Ibid., 4:555.
66 Ibid., 4:560-561.
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and mysteries of the supernatural.

Rather it is used to promote a particular cause.

[Their] use of Scripture is notably tendential. To restrict theology to the historical
sociopolitical context sidelines all elements of the biblical revelation that pertain to
transcendent reality--the nature of God as he objectively is, the divine nature a.lid
work of Christ, the transcendent aspects of the kingdom, and so on. 67
scripture loses its centrality. Something else must provide a basis for an explanation of all
oflife. In this case, sociological theory prevails. More specifically, Marxist sociological

theOfY becomes the grid through which we make sense of life. Scripture becomes relative
and a new absolute is substituted.
Biblical teaching then has merely an illustrative and supportive role; only political
reflection is considered "scientific" or authentic theological engagement. The
consequence is that scriptural teaching is relativized, while contemporary
sociological concerns are absolutized. 68
Henry's second objection revolves around the ready adoption of a Marxist
sociological analysis by the liberation theologians. Having rejected Scripture as
propositional truth, the liberation/revolution theologians looked elsewhere for a
comprehensive explanation of life. They found Karl Marx. Henry states explicitly,
"Marxism ... provides the scientific grid for constructing this praxis-oriented theory. "69
The influence of Marx is obvious.
Marxian analysis of class struggle and proposed Marxian solutions are accepted as
gospel. Marx traced the existence of social classes to stages of the determinate
historical development of production; this struggle was thought to channel
inevitably into the dictatorship of the proletariat, and this dictatorship, in turn, was
viewed as transitional to the abolition of all classes and to the establishment of a
classless society. Like Marx, liberation theology presupposes that social classes are
by-products of a capitalistic society, and that all ethical ecclesiastical thought and
effort must promote the overthrow of that society and replace it with a socialist
alternative. 70
67 Ibid., 4:562-563.
68 Ibid.
69 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 208-209.
70 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:558-559.
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'fhe Marxist critique of the status quo sufficiently explains, for liberation theologians,
existing conditions and provides motivation for action.
When Marxist interpretation confers this decisive role in hermeneutics upon the
sociopolitical situations, it proposes to judge the cultural status quo by the socialist
vision of utopia. Liberation theology demeans all theologizing outside such
commitment to a socialist society as inexcusably subservient to an ahistorical world
view; it deplores nonliberation theology as resigned to the "ideology" of the status
quo, and hence as aligned in spirit and fact with oppressive secular forces identified
as imperialism, capitalism, communism, and big business linked expressly to
technology or covertly associated with the missionary enterprise. It welcomes
Marxism for supplying the scientific content of Christian social ethics, and
considers Christian theology authentic only when and as it applies the demand for
socialist reconstruction to the concrete historical situation. By appealing to the
present historical milieu as the only legitimate context for theological reflection,
liberation theology thus readily colors, limits and even subverts the scripturally
given revelation even while it does not necessarily displace it. The biblical heritage
is glossed over to advance the modem ideology of socialism. 71
The end becomes the creation of a new society and a new man. Liberation is the
means to the end. Any means short of liberation is insufficient. The ready substitution of
Marxist notions of the new man and the new society for the biblical notions disturbs
Henry. He insists that the emphasis on a new society and a new man is understandable and
biblical. But Henry objects to the Marxist redefinitions of these notions that invade
liberation theology.
~

That Christians must be committed "both personally and collectively ... to the
building of a new society" is surely an acceptable and necessary premise if one
recognizes the regenerate church as the essential structure of that new society.
Indeed, it may even be said that "the new society must be a classless society"
insofar as the personal dignity and equality of its members are concerned. But, we
ask, what biblical basis exists for transmuting all this into the Marxist motif of "a
classless society in which there is a collective ownership of the means of
production ?"72
Liberation theology defines the new society as a forthcoming utopian socialist state.
Such a state must come into being at any cost. ''What matters is the creation of the new

71 Ibid., 4:556.
7 2 Ibid., 4:559. Quoted portions are drawn by Henry from the Lima Expresso, May
7' 1971.
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socialist society, even if that goal must be achieved by violence. Socialism has become the
eschatological hope and a parable of the kingdom of God. "73 Henry quotes Gutierrez,
Only a radical break from the status quo, that is, a profound transformation of the
private property system, access to power of the exploited class, and a social
revolution that would break this dependence would allow for the change to a new
society, a socialist society--or at least allow that such a society might be possible.74
No other choices are considered acceptable. "Revolution theology and liberation theology
can see and will accept no more than two possible alternatives--either the status quo or
social revolution predicated on a Marxist critique; indeed, they rarely suspect how easily
socialism itself reduces to an oppressive alternative that in its own way becomes the
inflexible status quo. ,,75
The correct view, according to Henry, is a view that defines the new society as the
church of Jesus Christ. He writes: "When Christianity discusses the new society, it
speaks not of some intangible future reality whose specific features it cannot as yet identify,
but of the regenerate church called to live by the standards of the coming King and which in

some respects already approximates the kingdom of God in present history."76 More on
Henry's view of the church will follow in later chapters.
There is also an emphasis on the new man. The idea of a new man is biblical, Henry
concedes. But, he holds, the notion is distorted in liberation thought.
Interestingly enough, Gutierrez insists that the deep motivation undergirding the
liberation struggle is the creation of a new man; liberation, he tells us, seeks "the
building up of a new man" who will be the artisan of his own destiny. The biblical
concept that Jesus Christ is the new man to whom the righteous are destined to be
conformed seems here out of view, and necessarily so in view of the special

73 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 208-209.
74 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:559.
75 Ibid., 4:560.
7 6 Ibid., 4:522.
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importance that liberation theology assigns to material concerns. 77
'fhis excessively materialistic understanding of the new man can be traced to a
misunderstanding of human nature.
Man is viewed as divinely endowed with a creative nature that enables him to shape
his own history.... Salvation is restated in terms of man's political liberation, and
the concept of grace is subordinated to human ingenuity. God becomes merely a
co-worker in an essentially man-centered program. The disposition to make
sociopolitical factors primary dissolves the biblically controlled message and
substitutes an anthropocentric theology for the theology of revelation.78
Liberation theologians have an inadequate understanding of the fall. Henry writes:
"Liberation theology is inadequately aware of the imperfection of all human efforts to
achieve justice in a fallen world history. To restate the fall of man in terms of private

property and economic disparity caricatures the depth of human sin ...79 Their faulty
understanding of human depravity leads them to proclaim a solution that is no solution at

all. To the contrary, their solution, according to Henry, is almost certain to create new and
perhaps even more intractable problems.
Simply because the theology of revolution lacks a profound understanding of the
most oppressive dimensions of human experience--and perpetuates man's alienation
from God--its ideological concentration on changed social structures (which glosses
the depth of individual human alienation while it concentrates on the social) can
only lead in time to another oppressive structure, and thus become a new status quo
no less unjust than its predecessor, and in some respects possibly more so. 80
The biblical view of the new man, according to Henry, is Jesus Christ. He writes:
"When Christianity speaks of the new man, it points first and foremost to Jesus of
Nazareth. In His sinless earthly life Jesus manifested the kingdom of God and in His
resurrection He mirrored the ideal humanity that God approves for eternity. "81 Christ
77 Ibid., 4:565-566.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 4:572.
80 Ibid., 4:570.
8 1 Ibid., 4:522.
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provides humanity with a vision of the new man, a vision that all men should strive to
Unitate.

This ready acceptance of Marxism requires a redefinition of many orthodox Christian
doctrines. It is the redefinition of these doctrines that leads to Henry's third objection to
liberation/revolution theology. Many biblical doctrines undergo serious change in the
hands of the liberation theologians. For example, Henry says, "the radical orientation of
Christianity espoused by liberation theologians results in a redefinition of salvation,
11

christology, eschatology and the church. 82
The doctrinal shift that most offends the sensibilities of Henry is the new definition of
salvation. Substituting the word liberation, the liberation theologians transform this central
doctrine into a materialistic and universal concept brought about by human action.
The liberation theologians, moreover, project a human socioeconomic and political
redemption that is universal; evangelism in the traditional sense has no role ....
The notion of salvation here is unbiblically universalistic; all men are potentially
saved, and actually so if they share in political liberation. The whole scheme of
liberation therefore dispenses with the act of saving faith, and with the
condemnation of those who do not have this faith (John 3:18, 36).83
Divine regeneration is left out of the picture. Henry asserts that "the participation of man in
his own liberation espoused by Gutierrez diverges radically from the view that only within
and because of divine regeneration does fallen humanity share and survive ultimately in the
kingdom of God. "84 He concludes that "liberation theology subserves a special interest
not found in the biblical witnesses: socialism (rather than God) is presented as the
liberator. 11 85

82 Ibid., 4:562.
83 Ibid., 4:561-562.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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The term liberation is not inherently objectionable to Henry. But, he does object to
its specific use by liberation theologians.
The term liberation, in contrast with revolution, is indeed a term that the Bible
notably associates with salvation. But the objection to its use as a Christian
umbrella-concept lies not only in its failure to sum up the whole of the gospel, but
also in its present interchange with the term revolution, and also because the
theologians of liberation often develop it in an objectionable manner. 86
It is objectionable because it does not deliver on what it promises. In other words, Henry

does not believe that liberation, as proposed by the liberation theology, is capable of
providing what humanity truly needs.
Liberation in the biblical sense involves ... man's whole existence .... Marxist
exegesis, by contrast, in no way deals with man's whole existence either in theory
or practice; its hermeneutic is reductionistic and misleading. On the theoretical side,
Marxism involves an uncritical denial of God, and thereby extends the alienation of
man to the fundamental relationships of human existence by trying to suppress
God-man relationships. On the practical level, Marxism ignores the fact that
wherever its socialist program has triumphed, as in Eastern Europe, alienation does
not in fact disappear.... In Marxist lands the ruling clique becomes the new
privileged class while Christians and critics become the new oppressed class in a
supposedly egalitarian society.87
The liberation offered by modem theology is actually slavery. Humanity will be enslaved
by a false notion. True salvation is different
Salvation, however, is primarily God's business, or rather, God's grace. The
Christian (one might also say, the church) is not the Savior of the people. God's
Messiah is the crucified and risen Jesus, while we--though a minority in any
generation--are first called out of the world, and then thrust back as light and salt.
We are sent first and foremost as Christ's servants, not as leaders of movements.
We are sent to nourish the global grapevine with a rumor of hope: the risen Lord is
present and at work. 88
Christology involves the doctrinal teachings regarding the person and significance of
Jesus Christ. The christology of the liberation theologians is also problematic for Henry.

86 Ibid., 4:565.
87 Ibid., 4:571.
88 Ibid., 4:566.
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What liberation theology does with Jesus Christ is especially illuminating.
However much it may stress an incarnational theology, it focuses attention
primarily upon the man Jesus encountered in the neighbor; the significance of
Christ Jesus as the incarnate Logos and of his historically completed atonement is
thrust aside for the sake of a contemporary extension of what liberation theology
considers good works. Christ is understood primarily in interhistorical terms; the
incarnation assertedly makes visible every man's potential as the temple of God in
history. The importance for apostolic faith of eyewitnesses to Jesus' resurrection is
evaporated. No sure standard remains other than the political criterion for
distinguishing validly Christian encounters with neighbors from non-Christian. 89
Liberation theologians, in their rush to emphasize the humanity of Christ and the good
example that his life sets for us, undermine, according to Henry, the divinity of Christ
Doctrinal teaching regarding the end times, eschatology, also undergoes
transformation in the hands of liberation theologians.
Liberation theologians perceive the eschatological as the realm of new possibilities
in the world's historical struggle. For them the catalyst of creative hope shapes
new horizons by boldly denouncing injustice and anticipates a new political future
bursting into the present; it celebrates the triumph of liberation amid particular
historical and cultural struggles. 90
Henry insists, in line with traditional Christian teaching, that the glorious end times will
only come by divine means when Christ returns.
The final doctrinal change that Henry finds objectionable involves the church. The
role of the church changes in liberation theology and the church becomes the leading
character in a task that Henry thinks does not rightly belong to it. Liberationists believe the
church
is to witness to God's presence in the contemporary struggle for liberation. The
church is understood not spatially and numerically but dynamically; it exists in
calling and mission, in the stand against social injustice, in celebrating God's
salvific action in human history, and in heralding political deliverance as the fruit of
evangelization. 91
The primary task of the church becomes providing leadership in humanity's quest for
89 Ibid., 4:565.
90 Ibid., 4:562.
91 Ibid.
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liberation.
These doctrinal redefinitions transform the nature of Christianity. Instead of
furthering human understanding, Henry comments, they restrict it. He insists they do little
rnore than perpetuate a false materialistic explanation of reality.
so-called Marxist exegesis of the Bible, moreover, perpetuates a materialistic
misunderstanding of reality and life. It transmutes the Savior and Lord of scriptural
revelation into a sociopolitical liberator who promotes a modem socioeconomic
ideology. For the redemptive conflict with Satan and sin and death at the heart of
the gospel, it substitutes the class struggle; it ignores supernatural aspects of the
kingdom of God and substitutes a temporal sociopolitical utopia; it miscasts the
promised Messiah as a political-economic liberator and dilutes the content of the
new covenant which seeks inscription of God's moral law on man's inner nature,
and it does all this in accord with a partisan modem social ideology. 92
Evangelicals must call attention to these distortions of scriptural teaching. In its
place,
Evangelical Christianity ought to espouse, instead, the liberation of exegesis from
prorevolutionary and all other extraneous ideologies, even those whose goal is
defined as human liberation.... A theology of transformation and preservation that
is biblical will not provide gratifying footnotes on a Marxian text, but will illuminate
liberation motifs to the extent that these are scriptural. 93
In response to this approach, Henry insists that "it is imperative that we forge a

socially concerned biblical alternative, a comprehensive scriptural vision of society." And,
<!

such a scriptural vision must includes among its aims, "the spiritual transformation of man
and society. Unless central significance is given for personal regeneration, one may have a
11

spiritual 'ideology' but not a biblical theology of social change. 94
The fourth objection of Henry revolves around epistemology. Henry is inconsistent

.
~2 Ibid., 4:571. "Much like the theology of revolutionary violence, the theology of
hberat1on encourages excessive materialistic expectations among the masses because it
takes the plight of the poor and oppressed as its definitive starting point rather than the
comprehensive principles of Scripture." Ibid., 4:572.
9 3 Ibid., 4:570.
94 Ibid.
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in bis analysis at this point At one point he refers to the "inherent rationalism" of liberation
theology while later referring to the "sophisticated spiritism."
Most liberation theologians are Roman Catholic .... Frequently they assume that in
the midst of social conflict either the religious institution or personal religious
instinct will discern the preferred course of action. Here one detects remnants of
Catholic rationalism, with its confidence that humans--despite their sinfulness--can
identify and appropriate ethical values from within the natural order, and do so
independently of supernatural revelation. 95
Foreign to Scripture, he writes in an earlier volume of the same work,
is the "secular theology ofrevolution" which allegedly hears God speak, as
nowhere else, in the social upheavals of the day. By declaring this social ferment to
be revelatory, it actually forfeits any objective standard for distinguishing the divine
from the demonic, for if God speaks in revolution per se, no distinction remains
between good and bad revolutions. The theology of revolution is actually a
sophisticated version of spiritism, since it knows divine disclosure only in terms of
vagrant voices that penetrate the chaos of modem life and culture. 96
Regardless of which charge is the most accurate, the essence of his argument revolves
around the lack of certainty and objectivity for what one knows. Apart from propositional
revelation, Henry maintains, one has no assurance that what he believes to be true is in fact
the truth.
Liberation theologians ultimately fall prey to historicism. They reject much of the
traditional Christian faith due to the historical nature of knowledge. Henry, however, is
quick to point out that if historicism were consistently applied, Marxism too, would not be
the final answer. To the contrary, skepticism must abound. Henry makes his point:
The Marxist repudiation of transcendently disclosed absolutes prepares the way for
relativizing revealed theology and for substituting a conjectural absolute, namely the
Marxist ideology itself. The Marxist welding of theory and praxis requires rejecting
the permanent self-identity of the Christian faith, and losing Christianity's ongoing
self-identity in the process of history. If consistently applied, of course, this view
would also cancel whatever absolutist claims are made for the Marxist alternatives,
yet social critics seem to absolutize Marxism while they relativize Christianity....
But if the truth does not yet exist, but must be achieved through change, then we
are locked up, not to the Marxist view as these protagonists think, but rather to
95 Ibid., 4:558.
96 Ibid., 2:79.
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ultimate skepticism.97
'Jbe one twentieth century movement that Henry believes retained an adequate
epistemology, namely fundamentalism, was also disappointing in regard to politics.
Upholding Scripture as the ground for all knowledge does not necessarily mean that one

will correctly interpret and apply its teachings. Why did the fundamentalists fail to apply
their faith to socio-political problems? Henry thinks he knows the reasons.
FUNDAMENTALISM
Henry emerged as a significant social critic when he issued his first critique of
conservative Christianity in the 1940s. In his ground breaking book, The Uneasy
.c_onscience of Modem Fundamentalism, he insisted that humanity's quest for a just social
order required a "rediscovery of the revelational classics and the redemptive power of
God... 9g Otherwise he posited little hope for the human race. He was convinced that
fellow conservative Christians had not "applied the genius of our position constructively to
those problems which press most for solution in a social way." It is essential to do so
because the truths in the Bible are "the only outlook capable of resolving our problems ... 99
He specifically criticized fellow fundamentalists for failing to search out, explain and act
upon the social aspects of their faith. Henry did not reject fundamentalism outright. He
was promoting "an application of, not a revolt against, fundamentals of the faith." 100
Speaking of his earlier work, Henry says, "Uneasy Conscience was not an angry diatribe
against fundamentalism. What it voiced, rather, was a conscience troubled by the failure of
American Christianity to relate biblical verities to crucial contemporary concerns." 101
97 Ibid., 4:563.
98 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 9.
9 9 Ibid., 11.
lOO Ibid.
101 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited,"
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fundamentalism had its strengths but the one shortcoming, according to Henry, was
central to its failure to engage in social and political affairs. There was a lack of "social
passion" among fundamentalists.102 So prevalent was the social isolationism of the ·
fundamentalists that many people believe that "there is something in the very nature of
fundamentalism which makes a world ethical view impossible. The conviction is
widespread that Fundamentalism takes too pessimistic a view of human nature to make a
social program practicable." 103 Henry found this "disturbing" and lamented that
"evangelical Christianity has become increasingly inarticulate about the social reference of
the Gospel"104 He was concerned "that a world changing message [had] narrowed its
scope to the changing of isolated individuals." 105 He insisted the idea that
"humanitarianism has evaporated from Christianity" was simply untrue.106 Rather, only
an accurate understanding of "the sinfulness of man and his need of regeneration is
sufficiently realistic to make at all possible any securely-grounded optimism in world
affairs."107 Thus, while appearing indifferent to social and political problems, in fact,
evangelical Christians had the only answers. Humanitarianism, defined as "benevolent
regard for the interests of mankind," was an important component of the Christian
"'

faith.108 Henry was convinced that Christianity is "socially as well as philosophically
Notes: Fuller Theolo~ical Seminary (December 1987): 3.
102 Henry, Tbe Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 17.
103 Ibid., 23.
104 Ibid., 26.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 23.
107 Ibid., 26.
108 Ibid., 16.
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pertinent" It was time for a reappraisal of Christian political engagement 109
What accounted for the lack of social engagement among fundamentalists? Henry
identifies several factors. One problem was that many 100vements calling for social
progress were antithetical to fundamentalism and hostile to the "historic Christian
tradition." The primary problem with these reform 100vements was their optimistic view of

man and his capabilities and their failure to take into consideration human depravity with
the concomitant need for personal regeneration.
The non-evangelical movements, however desirable their goals, encourage their
followers to place their trust in what, from the orthodox viewpoint, is the wrong
method for attainment of such ends.... The evangelical is convinced that the nonevangelicals operate within the wrong ideological framework to make achievement a
possibility. He believes they stimulate a naive and misplaced confidence in man,
growing out of a superficial view of reality. He believes the liberal, the humanist,
and the ethical idealist share a shallow sense of the depth of world need and an
over-optimism concerning man's own supposed resources for far-reaching reversal
even of admitted wrongs.110
Thus, even when non-evangelicals and fundamentalists were able to agree on ends,
they differed so significantly on means to those ends, that they were unable to work
together. "For example, the non-evangelicals were working for a just and durable peace ..
. [but they] ruled out specifically Christian regeneration as its conditioning context. The
end in view was a global peace without any reference to the vicarious atonement and
redemptive work of Christ." 111 Henry reminds us that "the rejection of non-evangelical
solutions does not involve--at least, logically--a loss of the social relevance of the Gospel."

In fact, he argues that "a Christianity without a passion to tum the world upside down is
not reflective of apostolic Christianity." 112

109 Ibid., 30.
l 10 Ibid., 27.
l 11 Ibid., 31.
l l2 Ibid., 28.
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Not only were Fundamentalists opposed to the means of many modem movements,
bUt often to the ends. When ends were materialistic in nature, fundamentalists were quick

wlabel them inadequate.

Henry writes: "Fundamentalists came to see that world peace,

.

the brotherhood of man, democracy and the new economy hardly meant for religious

libefalism and humanism what they meant for evangelicalism; that is, Fundamentalism
msisted that its ends, as well as its methods, were distinct from the non-evangelical
movements. The non-evangelicals were striving for inadequate ends." 113 When
fundamentalists denounced such movements or remained silent, they were accused of
11

revolting "against the Christian social imperative. 114
A second contributing factor to the lack of fundamentalist social involvement was the
cschatological teachings of many fundamentalist churches. Most fundamentalists are either
premillennialist or amillennialist. This doctrinal issue involves the return of Christ and the
meaning and significance of the thousand year reign of righteousness referred to in the
twentieth chapter of the book of Revelation. Most fundamentalists are premillennialist.
The premillennialists believes that the kingdom of Christ will be inaugurated in a
cataclysmic way .... The return of Christ will be preceded by signs including
wars, famines, earthquakes, the preaching of the gospel to all nations, a great
apostasy, the appearance of Antichrist, and the great tribulation. These events
culminate in the second coming, which will result in a period of peace and
righteousness when Christ and his saints control the world. This rule is established
suddenly through supernatural methods rather than gradually over a long period of
time by means of the conversion of individuals.... Christ will restrain evil during
the [1000 year] age by the use of authoritarian power. Despite the idyllic conditions
of this golden age there is a final rebellion of wicked people against Christ and his
saints. This exposure of evil is crushed by God, the non-Christian dead are
resurrected, the last judgement conducted, and the eternal states of heaven and hell
established.115

l 13 Ibid., 30.
l l4 Ibid., 32.
R. G. Clouse, "Millennium, Views of the," in Evan~lica1 Dictionary of
~1°.~. ~·Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 715. A

115

Shad discussion of premillennialism during this era can be found in Weber, Liyin~ in the
--ow of tbe Second Comine: American Premillennialism. 1875-1925.
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The amillennialists believe,
the Bible does not predict a pericxl of the rule of Christ on earth before the last
judgment. According to this outlook there will be a continuous development of
gocxl and evil in the world until the second coming of Christ, when the dead shall
be raised and the judgment conducted. Amillennialists believe that the kingdom of
God is now present in the world as the victorious Christ rules his church through
the Word and the Spirit. They feel that the future, glorious, and perfect kingdom
refers to the new earth and life in heaven.116
These theological positions do not undennine the power of the Gospel but insist that
Scripture teaches that there is "no hope for the conversion of the whole world" and we
must wait for the "second coming of Christ as crucial for the introduction of a divine
kingdom." Thus, they "despair over the present age" because of the "anticipated lack of
response to the redemptive Gospel." 117 The resulting despair is easily translated into
indifference toward earthly matters.118 Henry agrees that "Christ alone will usher in
116 Ibid. A third view represents the other end of this doctrinal continuum. Clouse
writes, "the postmillennialists emphasize the present aspects of God's kingdom which will
reach fruition in the future. They believe that the millennium will come through Christian
preaching and teaching. Such activity will result in a more godly, peaceful, and prosperous
world. The new age will not be essentially different from the present, and it will come
about as more people are converted to Christ. Evil will not be totally eliminated during the
millennium, but it will be reduced to a minimum as the moral and spiritual influence of
Christians is increased. During the new age the church will assume greater importance and
many economic, social, and educational problems can be solved.... The millennium
closes with the second coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the last
judgement." Ibid.
117 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 29. Henry's
position on this issue is pre-millennial. (51)
118 A similar argument has been adopted by some within the anabaptist tradition.
"This view ... considers civil government irremedially corrupt." The world is evil and no
good can come of efforts to reform it. They call for absentia from political involvement and
rely "wholly on interpersonal love to solve all problems." Our only hope, the anabaptists
claim, is to seek salvation and to hold out until the return of Christ. Henry admits that
"both the Bible and experience do, of course, attest the fact that institutionalized power can
be and is often badly abused," but that is an insufficient reason to conclude that all
government is necessarily corrupt and corrupting. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,
6:439. The argument that all earthly things are evil by nature is a variation of the
Manichean position rejected orthcxlox Christianity since the time of Augustine. The
institution of government is a divinely mandated entity and is not of Satan. Evil can result
from the abuse of governmental authority, but if Christians are willing to be involved, the
likelihood of such abuse is lessened. "The aim of the Christian's political activity is not to
produce a utopia, but to preserve justice and promote order in a fallen world." Henry
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God's kingdom," but that does not "excuse Christians from an energetic and zealous
pursuit of social justice. In fact, they ought to be in the very vanguard of public concern
for righteousness, everywhere pressing and exemplifying the claims of justice in fidelity to
God's revealed commands." 119
Another reason for the lack of fundamentalist social involvement was a reluctance to
endorse "kingdom preaching."120 Henry points out that "no subject was more frequently
on the lips of Jesus Christ than the kingdom."121 Nonetheless, "kingdom preaching" had
become the property of liberalism and the fundamentalists were not anxious to preach a
message that might be misunderstood.
There is growing reluctance to explicate the kingdom idea in Fundamentalist
preaching, because a kingdom now message is too easily confused with the liberal
social gospel, and because a kingdom then message will identify Christianity
further to the modern mind in terms of an escape mechanism.122
Henry praises the fact that
Fundamentalism has consistently witnessed to the fact that any culture from which
the redemptive element is absent is essentially distinct from the kingdom of God. It
is this concept of supernatural redemption that furnishes the unique ingredient of the
divine kingdom. Cultures which tend to be democratic rather than totalitarian may
be preferential for many reasons, but they are not, therefore, to be equated with the
kingdom. For this reason, Fundamentalism has resisted the kingdom now mood
concurs with Jacques Ellul's sentiment that Christians get involved politically in order to
have an influence on the world, not in the hope of making it a paradise, but simply in order
to make it tolerable ... " Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 96. "To the Christian
believer, social righteousness is not just an evolutionary possibility; it is a divine demand
The fact that it cannot be fully achieved in history until Messiah reigns, as evangelical
theology contends, ought not to destroy our commitment to it ... " Carl F. H. Henry,
"Christian Theology and Social Revolution," The Perkins School of Theoloey Journal 21
(Winter-Spring 1967-1968): 22.
119 Carl F. H. Henry, Faith At The Frontiers (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1969),
116.
120 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 49.
121 Ibid., 52.
122 Ibid.
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which characterized much liberal preaching.123
'fhus, Henry partially attributes the fundamentalist withdrawal from the social arena to a
"reaction to the Protestant liberal attempts to achieve the Kingdom of God on earth through
Political and economic changes." 124
Having rejected the liberal notion of a kingdom of God on earth, the fundamentalist
had little to offer. They proceeded to individualize the Christian message to the point that
they lost any corporate or social component. Henry insists that "the biblical view excludes
a privatizing or spiritualizing of religion that ignores the plight of fellow humans. It does
not view unjust social structures as self-existent and self-sustaining; instead they are byproducts of original sin." 125
Rejecting the illusion of an earthly utopia should not mean surrendering all interest
in socio-cultural affairs. Evangelicals needed to discard whatever in their thinking
decimated world compassion, needed to revive the global relevance of their
redemptive message, to formulate an evangelical social consensus. Their
eschatology needed to motivate, not dissipate, cultural concerns. To be sure, the
world crisis is not basically political, economic or social, but religious and moral,
and only Christ's redemptive dynamic is able to activate humanity to the highest
levels of ethical achievement. ... We must offer a new evangelical world mind
whose political, economic, sociological and educational affirmations reflect the
Christian world-life view.126
Christians do not have the right to ignore present political and social injustices. Contrary to
"' the fundamentalist line of thought, Henry argues that:

In order to become globally vigorous, Fundamentalism need not share the dream,
now being discarded by liberalism, of an immanent utopia; an adequate insight both
into human nature and into New Testament truth furnishes good ground for doubt
that the kingdom can be established without the advent of Christ.127
123 Ibid., 49-50.
124 Carl F. H. Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," Christianity Today 8
October 1965, 4.
125 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 205.
126 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4.
127 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern fundamentalism. 68. This does not
mean that one must espouse some sort of earthly utopianism. Henry believes that a middle
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Christianity entails more than salvation alone. Although the redemptive message is
certainly the most exciting and important news the Christian has to deliver, there is more to
be said.

Surely evangelical Christianity has more to offer mankind than its unique message
of salvation, even if that is its highest and holiest mission.... The Christian is not,
by his church identification, isolated from humanity, or from involvement in the
political and economic orders. Not only is he called to identify himself with
society: he is identified by the fact of his humanity, and as a Christian he bears a
double responsibility in relation to the social needs and goals of mankind. Social
justice is a need of the individual, whose dignity as a person is at stake, and of
society and culture, which would soon collapse without it. The evangelical knows
that spiritual regeneration restores men to moral earnestness but he also knows the
moral presuppositions of a virile society, and he is obligated to proclaim the 'whole
counsel' of God. He may have no message for society that insures unrepentant
mankind against final doom.... But he can and ought to use every platform of
social involvement to promulgate the revealed moral principles that sustain a healthy
society and that indict an unhealthy one.128
Proclaiming "the whole counsel of God" means that one should be as "explicit and urgent
about the justice God demands as he is about the justification God offers." 129

In the final analysis, "it was the failure of Fundamentalism to work out a positive
message within its own framework, and its tendency instead to take further refuge in a

.,

road position is more viable. "As to my own views, the depth dimension of sin in history
seems to me to weigh heavily against a Christian culture this side of Christ's return .... I
do not, however, permit the eschatological expectation that Christ alone will usher in God's
Kingdom in historical fullness in any way to excuse Christians from an energetic and
zealous pursuit of social justice; in fact, they ought to be in the very vanguard of public
concern for righteousness, everywhere pressing and exemplifying the claims of justice in
fidelity to God's revealed commands." Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Social Involvement:
Its Basis and Method--A Reply to Dr. Dengerink," International Reformed Bulletin 9 (July
1966): 29. The current state of affairs is not hopeless. Change can occur. Improvement
short of utopian perfection can take place in particular places in particular times.
128 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 6. We must not forget that "no
thesis of theology has been so much emphasized in this generation as the fact that biblical
redemption has a view to the whole man and to society as a whole, and that God is
co1.1cemed about human impoverishment at every level. Against the privatization of
religion, biblical theism not only embraces salvation of the soul and individual moral
~newal but also calls for service of God in the world and confrontation of social injustice
m the name of the holy Creator and Lord." Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social
Crisis," 212.
129 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:72.
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despairing view of world history, that cut off the pertinence of evangelicalism to the
modem global crisis. The really creative thought, even if in a non-redemptive context, was
now being done by the non-evangelical spokesmen." 130 Evangelicals either attacked·

social reformers or remained silent in the face of ideas they could not endorse. "But the
great majority cut loose deliberately from the social refonn movements of the times,
denounced as futile and deceptive the world-changing efforts on a non-Biblical formula,

and redoubled their efforts to rescue the minority for an increasingly hostile
environment." l 3 l
This lack of social engagement led to the uneasy conscience of many fundamentalists.
Because for the "first protracted period in its history, evangelical Christianity stands
divorced from the great social reform movements." 132 Henry calls this "the most
embarrassing evangelical divorce."133
Whereas in previous eras of Occidental history no spiritual force so challenged the
human scene as did Christianity with its superlife in the area of conduct, its
supernatural world view in the area of philosophy, and its superhope in the area of
societal remaking, the challenge of modem Fundamentalism to the present world
mind is almost nonexistent on the great social issues.134
Henry was disappointed that,
Modem Fundamentalism does not explicitly sketch the social implications of its
message for the non-Christian world; it does not challenge the injustices of the
totalitarianisms, the secularisms of modem education, the evils of racial hatred, the
wrongs of current labor-management relations, the inadequate bases of international
dealings. It has ceased to challenge Caesar and Rome, as though in futile
resignation and submission to the triumphant Renaissance mood.135
l30 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 32.
131 Ibid., 33.
132 Ibid., 36.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 37-38.
l35 Ibid., 44-45.
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His uneasy conscience results from the realization that conservative Christians were
not living up to the imperatives of their faith and their great tradition of social involvement

To regain their heritage, evangelicals must affirm two great convictions.
1) That Christianity opposes any and every evil, personal and social, and must
never be represented as in any way tolerant of such evil; (2) That Christianity
opposes to such evil, as the only sufficient formula for its resolution, the
redemptive work of Jesus Christ and the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit 136
Fundamentalism is not logically indifferent to social evil and it is not essentially unable to
deal with social problems. Instead, it requires it. Thus, he concludes:
Contemporary evangelicalism needs (1) to reawaken to the relevance of its
redemptive message to the global predicament; (2) to stress the great evangelical
agreements in a common world front; (3) to discard elements of its message which
cut the nerve of world compassion as contradictory to the inherent genius of
Christianity; (4) to restudy eschatological convictions for a proper perspective
which will not unnecessarily dissipate evangelical strength in controversy over
secondary positions, in a day when the significance of the primary insistences is
international.137
Fundamentalists were devoting their efforts to important concerns but were
unnecessarily limiting themselves.
Fundamentalists were devoting their best energies to unmasking the theological
defects of Protestant liberalism--its empirical disavowal of miracles, its optimistic
hangover-notions of inevitable progress and of humanity's intrinsic goodness.
Their usual approach was to scorn modernist efforts for an new social order.
Fundamentalism as such sponsored no program of attack on acknowledged societal
evils and ignored serious reflection on how an evangelical ecumenism might
impinge on the culture crisis.138
Fundamentalists "must confront the world now with an ethics to make it tremble, and with
a dynamic to give it hope." 139

136 Ibid.
l 37 Ibid., 57.
138 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 3.
l39 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 60.
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It had gotten to the point where, according to Henry, "the startling situation had come
to prevail, I lamented, whereby biblical Christianity, which had historically been the taproot
of legitimate public concerns, was now often seen to be undevoted to human wellbeing." 140 Henry insisted that it was time for a reassertion of the Christian faith and a
reapplication of Christian principles to earthy affairs.

If historic Christianity is again to compete as a vital world ideology, evangelicalism
must project a solution for the most pressing world problems. It must offer a
formula for a new world mind with spiritual ends, involving evangelical
affirmations in political, economic, sociological , and educational realms, local and
international. The redemptive message has implications for all of life; a truncated
life results from a truncated message.141
What is the solution? How and why should Christians become involved in politics?
What might they contribute to our search for order and justice? Henry's response will be
summarized and analyzed in the following chapters.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the problem with twentieth century Christian political engagement,
according to Henry, is that it lacks a solid ground for its political pronouncements. The
social gospel of modern liberalism and the political reform movement of the neo-orthodox
both surrendered the authority of the Scriptures to the critics of the Bible. Thus, they were
left with little more than vague Christian sentiments on which to base their political
prescriptions. This inadequate base failed to provide direction or substance to those
movements.
The liberation/revolution theologians and the fundamentalists lent more credence to
Scripture. They both rely on Scripture, to some extent, to provide authority for their
positions. However, the liberation/revolution theologians looked to Scripture only
secondarily to support their Marxist orientation. The fundamentalists, on the other hand,
140 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 3.
141 Henry, Tbe Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 68.
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had a solid grounding in Scripture, but even they failed to develop a sufficient Christian
palitical ethic. To the contrary, they seemed satisfied with a truncated scriptural message.
A message that failed to appreciate and act upon earthly social and political obligations:
Henry believes that a correct understanding of Scripture provides both substance and
authority for Christian political engagement The authority of Scripture permits one to say

some things with certainty. It also commands Christians to accept and serve in a certain
role until the return of Christ. The content and direction of this message is the focus of the
next two chapters.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE POLmcs OF REGENERATION

Since the days of the Roman Empire, Christianity has been often considered either an
enemy of the state or as apolitical. The charges have a prima facie validity. Christians look
to a higher authority; one that supersedes the state. The faithful put God first and insist that

all human institutions such as the state are answerable to God. Furthermore, the principal
concern of the Christian faith is salvation. Since humans have eternal souls, then issues
related to their destiny are surely more important than issues related to the short span in
which they inhabit this earth. Thus, to the extent that politics is merely an earthly concern,
it should be depreciated in the face of humanity's desperate need for personal salvation.
Does Christianity require its adherents to be apolitical? Does it undermine civic virtue and
the authority of the state? Why would Christians concern themselves with politics? And, if
they were involved, how should they proceed? These questions will be addressed in this
chapter.
Following the lead of St. Augustine, Henry asserts the importance of the political
realm. Christianity not only values politics, he argues, but it has something significant to
contribute. Rather than depreciating the political realm, Christianity, according to Henry,
elevates it. The world of politics is transformed into a realm that has the mandate of God
which humanity has a duty to obey. Thus, while Christianity maintains a certain
transpolitical character, it legitimates and even demands that believers give the state their
attention and allegiance.
How does Henry make the argument that political existence is normative for
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mankind? The most obvious answer to this problem would be to point to Scripture.
Christians need to be involved politically because the Bible tells them so. Henry does not
ignore this important component of the argument but neither does he stop here. That
argument would suffice for Bible-believing evangelicals, but what about the rest of the
world? What about those individuals who do not accept the Bible as the Word of God and
thus give little or no credence to its commands? What other argument might provide a
rationale for political involvement and, more importantly, an incentive to proceed on a quest
for justice? Henry relies upon Scripture, in part, but he also looks to what he calls a
"creation-ethic" for the answer.
In a recent article he writes: "The theological basis for evangelical involvement in

public justice is located in God's creation-ethic and his universal revelation including the

imago Dei that, however sullied, nonetheless survives the Fall." 1 Furthermore, Henry
contends, "social responsibility is not a responsibility that devolves one-sidedly on
Christians .... Responsibility for ... justice in the social order is as universal as the
human race .... social justice is due from all persons to all persons ... "2 All of
humanity, the regenerate and the unregenerate alike, has a responsibility to seek justice.
1

What does Henry mean by all of this and how does it fit within his broader philosophical
and theological positions? The answer can be found by turning to his view of human

nature.
Henry believes that humans were created by God as social and political creatures. He
claims that "man cannot live alone--he must live his life in society if he is to be truly man."3
1 Carl F. H. Henry, "The New Coalitions," Christianity Today, 17 November
1989, 27.
2 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:546.
. 3 . Henry, Evan~elicals at the Brink of Crisis, 79. "By divine creation man is made
for ~ife m three families--fellowship with God, marital love in the home, and justice in the
SOcial order. By redemption he becomes a four-family man; he is included in the company
of the redeemed. He must not, however, on that account, remove himself from the world."
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To do otherwise is something less than human. But if one is to live among others, certain
precepts must guide their interaction and conduct. What are these precepts and how do we
kflowthem?
The notion of a creation-ethic points to a standard established by God at the time of
creation. Our knowledge of this moral standard is based on the universal ongoing general
revelation of God to man. Humanity has known since the time of creation that there is a

standard of right and wrong to which they will be held accountable.4 This norm was
created by God and made known to humanity via general revelation.
Indeed, if he is to be ideally man--in the image of God--he must be told the criteria
by which God will judge men and nations, that is, the standards by which the
Creator expected human life to be ordered in obedience to His commands, and the
message of redemption that regenerates men in holiness. In the crisis of our times
the task and duty of evangelical Christians is to proclaim to men everywhere what
the God of justice and justification demands. 5
Humanity's ability to live according to this norm has been lost due to the fall of
Adam. Nonetheless, the standard remains. Human understanding of that standard may be
clouded by our fallen nature but, the dim realization of its existence remains due to the
remnants of the imago Dei that have survived the fall. 6 That norm is righteousness. It
Ibid., 53.
4 "Mankind everywhere has an elementary knowledge of what is ultimate and
abiding, of God's reality, and of final answerability to and judgment by him (Rom. 1:20,
32)." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:12.
5 Henry, Evan~elicals at the Brink of Crisis, 79 .
. 6 "However, sullied it may be, the image of God in the human person is not totally
by the fall. To be sure, the Bible alone gives the comprehensive content of
div1~e ethics with propositional clarity. But remnants of God's moral claim nonetheless
s~v~ on the basis of the created imago Dei and supply an inner contact point between
C~s~ans and the secular community for bringing into relationship the good in the
Chrisnan revelational understanding and the general or public conception of the good."
Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 121. Henry depends upon Calvin
~hen he looks for the content of the knowledge borne by the imago Dei. "The content
mc~udes the knowledge that God exists, that he is one, that he is a God of glory and
InaJesty, and that he is omnipotent. Alongside this seed of religion universally implanted in
men, he finds in conscience the engraved distinction between good and evil and a
knowledge-content involving 'some notions of justice and rectitude ... implanted by
e~cated
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includes standards of conduct and attitude. All people, regenerate and unregenerate alike,
have this realization, this common ground 7 Fortunately the details of this standard have
beeO republished in Scripture and the regenerate will seek to know and abide by such

standards. 8 In general, the unregenerate either seeks to deny that the standard exists or to
consnuct alternative standards more congenial with their fallen nature.9
nature in the hearts of men.... For though they have not a written law, they are yet by no
means wholly destitute of the knowledge of what is right and just." Henry, Christian
~sonal Ethics, 158.
7 "The apostle Paul was fully aware that the Roman state was not a 'Christian
government.' Yet in Romans 13:9 he adduces the prohibition of adultery, murder,
covetousness, and stealing on the apparent premise that the second table of the Decalogue-that is, the social aspect of the law--is somehow anticipated by the conscience of all persons
as part of the created givenness of humanity. These precepts speak of the inviolability of
human life, of preservation of the integrity of family life, and of property rights--principles
that today are under aggressive attack. And as Paul notes earlier in this same letter (2: 1415), even the Gentiles at times attest both in conscience and in outward behavior an
awareness of certain moral imperatives were clarified, reinforced, and supplemented to the
Jews by the Sinai revelation. Some cognitive awareness independent of special historical
revelation is stamped upon the moral consciousness of humankind on the basis of divine
creation. The spiritual and ethical rebellion of the Gentiles occurs, therefore, in a context of
an inner responsible knowledge of the living God as the source of moral law and as the
stipulator of the good. (1 :32)." Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 107-

108.
~

8 "Both Old and New Testament alike teach that God is manifested through his
creation and that man is responsibly knowledgeable of his Creator.... From Cain onward
the Old Testament repeatedly holds man guilty not only for his ignorance of God but also
for a knowledge of God that he suppresses in disobedience. The Epistle to the Romans
teaches that God's invisible being is manifest in his works (Rom. 1:18-20) and his moral
law inscribed on human hearts (Rom. 2:14-15). Apostolic missionary preaching to the
Gentile was predicated on the sound assumption that God had revealed himself long before
the time of Jesus of Nazareth, and that such revelation was known even to those outside the
~~al redemptive disclosure given to Israel (cf. Acts 14:8ff.; 17:22 ff.); in their
~ssionary preaching the apostles accordingly emphasize that no excuse exists for thrusting
aside God's fuller revelation in Jesus Christ." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,

1:399-400.

9 Some of the unregenerate have a great awareness and sensitivity to the message of
t:eral revelation. Evangelicals should be ashamed if "the concern for social justice
~e the special hallmark not of Christians but of strangers to God in whom remnants of
fut: imago Dei prompt awareness of man's special dignity and destiny and who therefore try
to im~ove the lot of society." Ibid., 6:454. "Since human experience has a general Divine
~vela~on as its background, man cannot forge his secular alternatives to the biblical way of
e without imbibing something of the truth." Henry, Christian Personal Ethics, 147.
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This norm of righteousness demands justice in our public lives. From the time of
creation, according to Henry, God has imprinted on the human conscience a need to seek
justice. Often this demand is overlooked or ignored, but it is everpresent. Christians and
non-Christians alike sense the need. Thus, the demand for social involvement is a result of
universal or general revelation. Scripture, as a form of special revelation, reiterates the
basic message of general revelation, namely to seek justice, in greater detail and with
greater specificity. IO
What does Scripture say about involvement in world affairs? Henry argues that
social withdraw is prohibited by Scripture. "Jesus' exhortation to 'render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's' (Matt. 22:21, KJV) and Paul's requirement of submission to
governing authorities (Rom. 13:1) preclude such withdrawal."11 There is a "biblical

mandate" for social involvement.12 The mandate is derived from various scriptural themes
such as the lordship of Christ, the stewardship of the creation and the importance of
service.
Christianity, as understood by Henry, entails the lordship of Christ in all areas of
human existence. He writes:
In brief, Christian evangelism must do far more than speak only to the emotional
vacuums in the lives of men; it must also help shape the intellectual mood of the
day, deal with cultural idolatries and national priorities, confront the problems
which erode a sense of human worth and dignity, cope with the moral paralysis that
emboldens multitudes to shameless vices, uncover all the subtle and alluring masks
that man wears in an age which believed itself at the gates of Paradise only to

10 "Special scriptural revelation normatively sets forth the propositional content of
general revelation, and does so as the framework of God's saving revelation. Scripture
confronts fallen man objectively and externally with a divinely inspired literary deposit that
s~tes the intelligible components of God's ongoing general revelation in nature and
history, and conveys as well the propositional content of God's redemptive revelation."
Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:460.
l l Ibid., 6:446.
. 1 ~ Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," in Let the Earth Hear
His VOIC<<, ed. J. D. Douglas (Minneapolis, MN: Worldwide Publishers, 197 5), 1177.
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discover a desolation and a waste.13

Jn other words, the Christian faith must penetrate every aspect of human existence,
including the political arena. Christ is lord of all of creation, not merely the private or
spiritual side of human existence. Certainly Christ will return and subdue all of creation to
his divine will but in the meantime Christians are commanded to strive to do the same.14
Recognition of the lordship of Christ requires believers to endeavor to influence and shape
earthly matters. To ignore any realm of human existence is to deny "the lordship of Christ
as the ruler of nature, the sovereign of the nations and the decisive center of history." 15
The lordship of Christ leads to two other biblical themes: the importance of stewardship
and service.
Henry looks back to the account of creation for guidance. Classical Christian
teaching stresses that God created humanity for a specific purpose. That purpose was to
glorify God.16 This was to be done, in part, by exercising dominion and exhibiting
stewardship over all of creation. The fall, according to Henry, has crippled man's ability to
achieve his task but the task remains. "Mankind was created in God's image and was

13 Ibid., 1169.
14 "In almighty power Jesus Christ himself will come to subdue the forces of evil.
Overturning all the structures of injustice he will establish the great age of peace and
righteousness. But the church which bears his name is already called, now, to challenge
and contain the powers of evil ... the church is now to resist the Evil One, now to indict
rampant injustice and support the afflicted and oppressed, now to sensitize moral
conscience against wrong and for the right, now to exhibit the purpose of God in a new life
and a new community while it proclaims the revealed truth and will of God." Henry, ~
Revelation and Authority, 4:545-546.
. 15 Henry, A Plea for Evam~elical Demonstration, 66. "Christians are less than
faithful to Christ's lordship over all political concerns if they imply that no moral choices
~ow from Christ's lordship in matters of political decision." Henry, The Christian Mindset
ma Secular Society, 126-127.
16 "The chief end of man is the glorification of God in and through spiritual and
moral union. Jesus spells this out in human flesh. He exhibits the perfect ideal of
humanity. He shows us by his own life what God intended man to be and what man in the
fullness of redemption will be." Henry, Christian Personal Ethics, 411.
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·gned stewardship or dominion over the earth to preserve it for Yahweh's creational

asst

intention. The task of the people of God is, as far as possible in sinful society, to reclaim
the cosmos for God's created purpose." 17 Christians cannot neglect things of the worid
without neglecting their divinely mandated earthly duty. A part of this task entails the use

of scientific and political means. These means enable humanity to exercise dominion over
the world and implement "the creation-mandate to realize the divine Creator's moral and
spiritual purposes." 18
This work, done in the name of stewardship, is not performed in order to earn
salvation but is the result of salvation. Work is performed out of "gratitude for divine
grace." "The Christian knows that he is redeemed by the mercy of God in Christ and is not
in legalistic bondage to works; he seeks nonetheless through the enabling grace of the Holy
Spirit to serve God obediently in gratitude for divine grace."19 Thus, in a spirit of
thanksgiving, the Christian strives to realize God's intentions on earth.
The final scriptural argument presented by Henry relates to the idea of service.
Service must be the "hallmark" of the Christian. 20 The duty to love one's neighbor is

17 Henry, Twili~ht of a Great Civilization, 117.
18 Henry, A Plea for Evan~elical Demonstration, 110-111. "For renewed
humanity, work and industry from the Christian perspective become a consecrating of
energy and matter to the good of mankind under God. By impressing the ethical aims of
!he Creator upon the material universe, the Christian community brings the physical world
mto the service of the spiritual .... Similarly the spiritual man aspires by mind and muscle
to make human culture an abode for the Spirit of God by extending the ethical purposes of
the Creator throughout the fallen world." Ibid.
19 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 133.

?

. . 2 See (Luke 22:25-27). Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:527. "A
di~tincttve feature of New Testament Ethics is its call to every believer to serve God and
neigh~~· Within family and community redeemed man stands in social relationship to
both di~me and human society. This dual relationship motivates his social responsibilities
~.by it he is linked to the whole enterprise of civilization." Henry, Aspects of Christian
~1a! EthiQS, 31.
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reiterated throughout Scripture.21 Henry emphasizes that "the Bible from the outset (Gen.
) declares man his brother's keeper. "22 Humans are commanded to love their neighbors
4

and to love God. What does neighborly love entail? According to Henry, it means
observing God's commandments. More specifically, "the commandments to love one's
neighbor has in view the social commandments of the Decalogue and therefore nourishes
11

and expects voluntary service toward one's neighbor (Rom. 13:9-10). 23
Thus, scripture demands that believers seek justice. Recognition of the lordship of
Christ and the responsibilities of stewardship and service requires disciples to strive for the
realization of God's justice on earth. Furthermore, gratitude for salvation requires that
believers live a life of service. With a flourish of biblical allusions, Henry summarizes his
argument by saying: "The divine mandate is to beam light, sprinkle salt, knead leaven into
an otherwise hopeless world. "24 The message of Scripture is the same as that of general
revelation: seek justice.
Henry does not deny that there is tension between one's "inner spiritual commitment"
and the "public confrontation of social injustice. "25 This tension between the "personal

i

21 '"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' (Lev. 19:18, Mt. 22:39; Rom. 13:9;
Gal. 5:14; Jas. 2:8)." "Man must love all with whom he comes in contact--family, friends,
countrymen, enemies (Uc. 10:27), the whole of mankind (Mt. 5:42, Lk. 6:32-35).
Everyman is neighbor." Henry, Christian Personal Ethics, 246.
22 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 205.
23 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:446.
24 Henry, "The New Coalitions," 26.
25 Henry, A Plea for Eyan~elical Demonstration, 107. "The question now
~uently asked, whether evangelism or ethics, kerygma or diaconia, preaching or service,
1
ai~ ~r works, deserves priority, erects an arbitrary dichotomy between word and deed and
?hJectlonably isolates evangelism and justice. Social action must not be viewed as an
independent and detachable concern, nor may the preaching of the gospel be aborted from
the ~h?le counsel of God. Fundamental to Biblical theology is the revelation of the true
~d hvmg God as the God both of justice and of justification. Only where the command of
od and the grace of God are both proclaimed can the church avoid a truncated message.
Where the God of justice--the God who demands righteousness in social as well as in
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and social facets of Biblical faith" has existed throughout history. Henry points to the Jews
who, in bis eyes, "fell easy prey to the temptation of viewing the Kingdom of God solely
in s()Cio-political terms"26 On the other hand, "whereas Judaism's temptation was to lose
the vitality of personal religion amid the aspiration for social justice, that of Christianity
was to neglect the universal requirement of a just society while concentrating on the
necessity of personal conversion."27 Neither position is right God demands attention to

both personal righteousness and social justice.
The Biblical view declares both individual conversion and social justice to be alike
indispensable. The Bible calls for personal holiness and for sweeping societal
changes; it refuses to substitute private religion for social responsibility or social
engagement for personal commitment to God. The Bible seeks righteousness
throughout God's creation, and commands man to live God with his whole being
(Matt. 22:37), to walk uprightly and to seek justice (Micah 2:7), in short, to love
his neighbor as himself.28
personal life--is not proclaimed, man's height and depth of rebellion against his holy Lord
is quickly obscured, and likewise the full scope of obedience to which God desires to
restore him through the forgiveness of sins and new life in Christ." Ibid., 120.
26 Ibid., 109.

~

27 Ibid "Eric Voegelin is therefore quite right in observing that While the Prophets
had to struggle for an understanding of Y ahwism in opposition to the concrete social order
of Israel, a long series of Christian statesmen, from St. Paul to St. Augustine, had to
struggle for an understanding of the exigencies of world-immanent social and political
order. The Prophets had to make it clear that the political success of Israel was no
substitute for a life in obedience to divine instructions; the Christian statesmen had to make
clear that faith in Christ was no substitute for organized government' (Israel and
Revelation, New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1958, pp. 182 f.)." Ibid.,

110.

28 Ibid., 107. "Sometimes the priority of social concern over evangelism is now
adduced on the basis of Matthew 25:31-46, where the Son of Man warns against neglect of
the h~ngry and naked and imprisoned, and emphasizes that these forms of faithful
o~ence separate the sheep from the goats. The passage seems to refer however,
specifically to the physical needs of Christ's disciples as itinerant bearers of the gospel
('my bf?ther,' vs. 40; cf. v. 45), and not to those of people in general. The cup of cold
water given in Jesus' name is elsewhere commended because it is proffered to one of
~us' traveling representatives (Matt 10:41; cf. Mark 9:41 ). Taken in this context,
tthew 25 would warn not against the church's insensitivity to the world's physical
needs, but rather as a warning against the world's insensitivity to the needs of Christians
sent to proclaim the gospel. In any event the derivation from Matthew 25 of current views
!hat C~st is to be specially found among the poor, or that the 'elect' are those who engage
10
SOc1al service, depends on false expositions of Christianity that violate the rest of the
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Ultimately, Christians must be politically involved because it is their duty. Henry
cJairns that "what the evangelical does in the social order, as in every other realm of life, he

does a matter of principled spiritual obedience to the lord of life. "29 Henry says there is
"no excuse" for the lack of social engagement He insists that "those who like evangelicals
believe that God wills the exercise of civil authority for the preservation of justice in a fallen
society, that civil government has limited powers, that God holds nations answerable to his
published will, that God acts purposefully and providentially in the history of nations, will
11

bear their responsibility and duty in the public arena. 30
Surrender of the political arena can have devastating consequences. "The penalty for
failure to lead and to be vocal is that others who misuse and exploit political power for
objectionable ends and by objectionable means preempt the field."31 Thus, Henry
concludes, the pursuit of social justice is essential. "Social justice is not, moreover, simply

an appendage to the evangelical message; it is an intrinsic part of the whole, without which

the preaching of the gospel itself is truncated... 32
New Testament." Ibid., 118-119.
29 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 5.
30 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:442.
31 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1177.
. . 32 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:551. Henry sees a distinct, although

~etdental advantage, accruing to the Christian faith when political responsibilities are not

ignored. "Where the claims of justice and law are obscure, there the understanding of
redemption will also be confused. On the other hand, a nation whose conscience is
sensitive to the objective character of justice and law and morality provides an ideal climate
among ~e citizens for the effective preaching of the Gospel. The Christian knows that the
PfOmouon of justice, whereby God wills the preservation of the State, can and must be-not as ~ ?peration of government but in the task of the Church--a strategic element in
evangeli.z~g a fallen race." Henry, ASllects of Christian Social Ethics, 94. To the extent
~ Chrisuan principles are employed successfully, it is possible that their attractiveness
th enhance the appeal of the Christian faith. "The Christian life must be lived out, among
e regenerate, in every area of activity, until even the unregenerate are moved by Christian
standards, acknowledging their force. The unregenerate are not, on that account,
~~mbeed; nevertheless, they are more easily reached for Christ than those who have made
rate break with Christian standards, because they can be reminded that Christian
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Having established the importance of social involvement, what strategy should the
evangelical community employ? How does one bring about good in society? Henry sees
several alternative social strategies confronting evangelicals today. All of them urge social
responsibility and cry out for at least some change in the status quo. However, according
to Henry, only one approach is congruent with Judeo-Christian theism properly
understood.
What is that solution? Henry refers to it as the strategy of regeneration.33 Although
he identifies four different social strategies, only regeneration is capable of bringing about

the good in society. The other three approaches, revolution, reformation, revaluation, are
serious but inadequate contenders. Reformation is the preferred strategy of some neoorthodox theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr. Revolution is most popular in nonChristian communist circles, although it has become the chosen strategy of the revolution
theologians discussed in the previous chapter. Revaluation was the strategy employed by
ethics cannot be retained apart from Christian metaphysics. To the extent that any society is
leavened with Christian conviction, it becomes a more hospitable environment for Christian
expansion." Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 72. He
stresses, nonetheless, that these are not the reasons for political involvement
i

33 Henry's explanation of the strategy of regeneration will be explained in greater
detail in the following pages. It is useful to understand the term theologically.
"Regeneration, or new birth, is an inner re-creating offallen human nature by the gracious
sovereign action of the Holy Spirit (John 3:5-8). The Bible conceives salvation as the
redemptive renewal of man on the basis of a restored relationship with God in Christ, and
presents it as involving 'a radical and complete transformation wrought in the soul (Rom.
12:2; Eph. 4:23) by God the Holy Spirit (Titus 3:5; Eph. 4:24), by virtue of which we
become 'new men' (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10), no longer conformed to this world (Rom. 12:2;
Eph. 4:22; Col. 3:9), but in knowledge and holiness of the truth created after the image of
God (Eph. 4:24; Col. 3:10; Rom. 12:2)' (B. B. Warfield, Biblical and Theolo~ical Studies,
351).. Regeneration is the 'birth' by which this work of new creation is begun, as
~cn~cation is the 'growth' whereby it continues (I Pet. 2:2; II Pet. 3:18). Regeneration
10
hi~hrist changes the disposition from lawless, Godless self-seeking (Rom. 3:9-18; 8:7)
w c~ dominates man in Adam into one of trust and love, of repentance for past
re~Ihousness and unbelief, and loving compliance with God's law henceforth. It
~?fJ)htens ~e blinded mind to discern spiritual realities (I Cor. 2:14-15; II Cor. 4:6; Col.
· • and. liberates and energizes the enslaved will for free obedience to God (Rom. 6: 14,
1
~-2W2;
Phil. 2:13)." J. I. Packer, "Regeneration," in Evao~elical Dictionary of Theolo~y.
· alter Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 924.
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proPo

nents of the social gospel at the turn of the century. 34
These strategies differ in several ways. Henry specifically identifies three: "(1) the

connection they maintain or disclaim between social action and theological priorities; (2) the
dynamism by which they propose to revise the social order; and (3) their attitudes toward

the Church in relation to social change."35
Certainly the most radical strategy is that of the social revolutionaries. "By revolution
[Henry] mean[s] the radical change of social patterns, in their essential constitution,
through violence and compulsion."36 Is this a suitable strategy for evangelical Christians?
Henry says no.
What is the connection between social action and theology from this perspective? In
general, Henry finds a "radical rejection of a theological basis for social action... 37 He is
convinced that, in the final analysis, "the strategy of revolution not only proposes to rectify
social evils, but it denies the existence of divinely given structures in history and
society."38 Communist revolutionaries and "revolutionary theologies that reach for this

34 I believe these generalizations are valid but I hasten to say that Henry has not
made them explicitly. In fact, this is a problem with Henry's argument. By failing to
identify persons and movements who have adopted the different social strategies he
• becomes susceptible to charges of creating and destroying straw men. It is impossible to
flesh out his analysis with examples or to respond in detail when the facts remain sketchy.
Who are these revolutionaries, reformers and revaluators? Can we be certain that their
approaches to social ethics are wrong when we know so little about them? Even if Henry
is not guilty, he seems to be caricaturing the views of others in such a way that make them
easy to refute.
35 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 23.
36 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 17.

~7 Ibid., 20. This is certainly true in Henry's eyes for revolutionary Marxists.

~IJ<?aking of that movement Henry writes: "Not only its dogmatic naturalism but its special

ms1ste~ce on economic determinism as the fixed axis of historical process, requires the

u:;qualified rejection of whatever metaphysical principle might weaken or threaten this
a solu_te.... The strategy of revolution must destroy every rival to the totalitarian state as
the ultimate source and sanction of human rights and duties." Ibid.
38 Ibid., 17.
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e through violent social change ... arrogate messianic powers and prerogatives to
new ag
. fol man who himself is the crux of the moral problem. Basic to man's misperception is

sin

bis elevation to ultimate priority of what is physical, material and natural over what is
spiritual, eternal and supematural."39 Henry is troubled by the attempt to rectify social ills
by human means alone. Apart from God's revelation, humanity does not know the good

and, apart from God's grace, does not have the ability to do the good. Thus, any
movement that proposes an earthly solution is bound to be objectionable.
Henry's major problem with revolution is that it often develops within a context that
promises final solutions to the problems of the world. Henry insists that Christianity posits
a different solution to social problems, individual regeneration. He writes:
When revolution is regarded as a self-sufficient objective (and hence is represented as
itself a panacea for social evil) it becomes insupportable and intolerable. Moreover,
when revolution is detached from spiritual and moral obligations and proffers
exemption from social responsibility it breeds irresponsibility and bestiality and must
therefore invite Christian condemnation. Christianity's interest in social change
always carries with it the demand for inner renewal, and not simply external
readjustments. But contemporary revolutions, advancing anti-Christian concepts of
life and society, seem usually to promote social disorder and to displace one form of
political injustice by another.40
Revolutionary efforts may achieve some positive gains, but they fall short of what is
· necessary for humanity as a whole. On the one hand, Henry seems to question whether
one can find any positive contribution from revolutionary efforts.
We must carefully examine the fruits of revolutionary social change to determine
whether they are as permanently impressive as the revolutionaries would have us
believe.... For all their talk about improving the lot of the masses, even the
revolutionaries tend to elevate themselves as a specially privileged class with
prerogatives a cut above the rest of society.41

39 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:416-417.
40 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 178.
41 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:547.
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On the other hand. he admits that some positive gains have been achieved in some selected
situations, but, even if improvements were achieved, they fall short of what is needed to

obtain a just society.
Whatever improvements the proponents of revolution may achieve in the social
realm, these too are defective from the standpoint of the Bible, which aims not
simply at the overthrow of existing unjust structures but at the regeneration of fallen
men and at the reestablishment of the divine orders of creation through observance
of the scripturally revealed principles of social ethics.42
By what means do the social revolutionaries propose to change the status quo? The
answer is both simple and unacceptable for Henry. "The strategy of revolution, of course,
relies on brute power for its promotion of social radicalism: Its upheaval of respected
social norms, and substitution of novel forms, depends primarily upon resorting to
incendiary methods of force. ,,43 Social structures must be changed, and aggressive
political and military action is the key to bringing about such change.
The use of violence and compulsion, according to Henry, contradicts the message of
Scripture.
While the New Testament indicates that disobedience may at times be a spiritual
duty, it does not encourage a revolutionary attitude toward the state.... The New
Testament instances in which Christians disobeyed rulers involve refusal to yield to
attempts to suppress the proclamation of the gospel. Fulfillment of the Great
Commission was explicitly commanded, and in this mission the followers of Christ
were constrained to obey God rather than men.... The New Testament sets
absolutely no precedent for the church's advocacy of mob pressures and guerilla
violence as ways of implementing socio-economic changes; the early Christians
relied on proclamation, persuasion, and example. 44
A biblical response to dire situations is quite different "The Epistle of James ... enjoins
patience in the face of injustice, and trust in both God's providence and Christ's return. ,,45

42 Henry, Evaneelicals at the Brink: of Crisis, 60.
43 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 23.
44 Henry, A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration, 47.
45 "Brothers, as an example of patience in the face of suffering, take the prophets
who spoke in the name of the Lord." NIV James 5:10.
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Ilenr)' gives great weight to the fact that, in spite of Roman oppression, the early "Christian
movement generated no revolutionary temper, and to such government Christian believers
pledged their prayers and paid their taxes. "46 Patience and submission are the lessons of
Scripture.
What is the attitude of the revolutionary to the Christian church? Certainly this
approach rejects out of hand the strategy proffered by Henry. "Revolution ... scorns
supernatural regeneration as a religious fiction ... 47 As for the church, it "may be tolerated
now and then for strategic purposes, especially if it confines itself to private piety and
morality. Indeed, it may even be humored if it co-operates in promoting revolutionary
social changes. "48 But, in the final analysis, the church is incapable of bringing about
social change, and is useful only to the extent that it does not impede the important business
at hand.
As for the church's attitude toward revolution. It must never advocate nor initiate
revolutionary change. Admittedly, Christians often approve of the consequences of
revolution such as "the abolition of tyranny," but "Christian social theory neither promotes
nor approves revolution itself as a method of social transformation. ,,49 Only on one
· occasion does Henry give tacit support to the notion of direct action to overturn political
authority and only when that authority clearly exceeds its God-given bounds. "The
Christian approach to government ... gladly obeys where government observes its proper

limits, protests where it exceeds those limits, and actively resists where a totalitarian

46 Henry, ASPects of Christian Social Ethics, 180.
47 Ibid., 25.
48 Ibid., 27.
49 Ibid., 176-178.
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demand requires disobedience to the revealed will of God." 50
Christians may sympathize with revolutionary movements but apparently Henry does
not believe they should participate in them. "Revolution can hope for Christian sympathy
onlY where it actually protests against an established government's persistent abuse of the
norms of government (maintenance of law and order, protection of the innocent, repression
of bad works) and where it openly purposes to re-establish these norms." 51 If Christians
benefit from the revolutionary activities of others, then Christians should not be ashamed to
receive the benefits. Henry summarizes the argument as follows:
The Christian Church is not revolutionary. The Christian Church does not initiate
movements for political independence. "My kingdom does not belong to this
world," said Jesus (John 18:36, NEB). Yet Christianity is not ashamed or
apologetic, as if on that account it merely laps up the privileges that others have
earned. For the Church remains ready to proclaim and ready to be martyred for
proclaiming those abiding truths and ultimate loyalties whose surrender reduces
every revolution to lawlessness and whose loss casts even a free people into
subjection and nihilism. 52
He seems to believe that people should seek redress of grievances and should
condemn injustice, but they should not revolt. Thus, "even if a government now and then
exceeds its proper authority, the Christian's hope of a better tomorrow is sustained by a
firm reliance on divine providence more than by enthusiasm for human revolution ... 53 If

change is required, we must depend upon divine providence alone.
Reformation is the second strategy of social change. "By reformation [Henry]
mean[ s] that gradual but pervasive ethical amendment of particular abuses which secures a

50 Ibid., 182.
51 Ibid., 179.

52 Ibid., 186.
. . 53 Ibid., 180. "God alone knows if and when the very institutions of law and
Justice require his terminating judgment because of corruption." Henry, God. Revelation
and Authority, 6:433.
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decisive improvement of prevailing social character and forms." 54 The steady
improvement of society is the key to progress.
Henry equates this approach with "the developmental (that is, evolutionary)
philosophy of a gradually emerging ideal society."55 This strategy lacks the radical
critique of the status quo maintained by the social revolutionaries.
Since the reform strategy must always consider the present as a necessary plateau to
the next emerging level, it therefore lacks a deeply indignant criticism, and also any
fixed criterion of judgment Appeal to the process of evolution in the interest of
social change and presumably progress necessarily rules out durable meaning and
worth; it substitutes transient for transcendent social principles. 56
While criticism is necessarily muted, reformers, nonetheless, are often vocal about the need
for social improvement

What about the connection the reformers maintain between social action and
theological priorities? Reformers "exalt the social issue above the theological, and prize the
Christian religion mainly as a tool for justifying an independently determined course of
social action."57 While religion is a "beneficent development in man's evolution," it is not
fully explanatory of the human condition. "Reform strategy considers speculative
philosophy a more trustworthy avenue of knowledge than theology and tends to find the
· essence of religious experience simply in loyalty to ethical ideals and social values. "58
Thus, religion is useful, especially the Christian religion considering its "high moral
insights" in regard to social morality. However, reformers only praise those insights
which coincide with their independently derived moral criteria Such selective use of
54 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 17.
55 Ibid., 18.
56 Ibid., 19.

57 Ibid., 21.
58 Ibid., 20.
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scripture, Henry warns, is destructive. The full message of Scripture is obscured and the
certainty that Scripture provides is lost. Consequently, "vagueness results just where
precision is most needed today, that is, in stipulating the content of the life of social
righteousness and personal virtue."59
What steps are necessary to bring about change in the present social order?
Refonners agree with their revolutionary counterparts that "social progress is best secured
through a change of social environment," and that "political action most effectively
implements this changed environment. "ti() They disagree about the necessity of violence.
Refonners are convinced that the democratic process is sufficient to bring about change in
society. "The reform strategy avoids use of violence and intimidation, but for a basic
instrument of change relies upon legislated morality, or political compulsion achieved by
democratic processes." Initially, public education and moral propaganda were considered
sufficient, but the failure of those approaches has led to the adoption of new methods.
Today, "social change more and more becomes political action, and government legislation
11

or compulsion the key instrument of such change. 6 l Henry has reservations about
assigning a role to the state that he believes it cannot play.
What is the attitude of reformers toward the church? Most reformers promote the
church as a force for good in society. Reformers "may deplore sluggish conscience in the
churches, but seldom does it decry the existence of Church itself as a historical
phenomenon. Reform strategy still values churches as influences for social idealism, and
even more, as latent pressure blocs for social action. "62 For Henry, the key component is

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 24.
61 Ibid., 23-24.
62 Ibid., 27.
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that they deny "the adequacy or the relevance of divine salvation for the basic social
problems of the day. n63 Thus, the reformers do "not look to the churches for any
significant reservoirs of moral energy. "64
The third perspective, the strategy of social revaluation, aims to revise the existing

social situation by reassessing it. "By revaluation [Henry] mean[s] a fresh intellectual
comprehension and direction, whereby social life and structures are critically reassessed in
the light of transcendent moral norms. "65 Reassessment requires standards of judgment.
Unlike the reform strategy, the revaluation strategy is capable, in theory, of establishing
fixed criterion of judgment since it posits "transcendent values discoverable in human
experience. "66
Henry questions the ground of these transcendent values.
Since the revaluation strategy appeals in its critique of culture and society to
permanent values, it escapes these difficulties [the lack of fixed criterion of
judgment] in principle. But this reliance on transcendent criteria, in turn,
experiences constant jeopardy, not only through its association with evolutionary
theory, but especially through its failure to exhibit a cosmic justification (as revealed
theology does) for unchanging norms and values. 67
He decries the lack of specificity and the lack of certainty in this approach that he finds in
divine revelation.
What connection does the revaluation strategy maintain between social action and
theological priorities? This approach is described in theological terms but rarely in terms of
Judeo-Christian theism. Why?

63 Ibid., 25-26.
64 Ibid., 27.
65 Ibid., 17.
66 Ibid., 19.
67 Ibid.
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The revaluation strategy, by its emphasis on the priority of ideas and ideals,
requires a spiritual interpretation of the cosmos which subordinates physical things
to the ultimate categories of mind and value. With this commitment to transcendent
nonns, therefore, the next step is usually (as in most philosophies of idealisms and
the theistic religions) to an infinite self-conscious will, to a deity of a sort, in
relation to which the social order finds its meaning and direction. The revaluation
strategy, moreover, stresses the immanence of these ideals and values in human
experience, or their universal accessibility to the minds of men. Thus it prizes
every religion and philosophy compatible with this quest for ideals .... But
because it stresses the universal and immanent accessibility of truth and morality,
the revaluation approach necessarily plays down the biblical teaching that all men
are corrupted by sin and need a special supernatural rescue. 68
The immanent character of these ideals, the universal accessibility of them, and the
discoverability of them in human experience, lead Henry to conclude that there is no
ultimate "cosmic justification" for the norms they establish.
How does this strategy propose to revise social order? While it emphasizes "moral
education, propaganda, conversation and persuasion as effective media of social change,"
these things alone are insufficient. 69 Proponents argue that
changed environment without changed human perspective will not effect a
fundamental revision of the social situation. Revaluation therefore seeks to
inculcate an awareness of the religious dimension of life, and to exhibit the
significance of the moral man for society and the universe. By stimulating
conscience, this strategy relates human rights to human dignity; by stressing man's
spiritual value as an individual, it supplies ethical fervor for social change.70
What of its attitude toward the church? The church is important but not vital.
"Churches may indeed be specially concerned centers of community action that could hold
the balance of moral power if once aroused to the social task. But the conviction seems to
remain that the central dynamic for social impact does not derive from the churches ... 71
The reformer's notion that salvation is inadequate is shared by this perspective.

68 Ibid., 20-21.
69 Ibid., 24.
70 Ibid.
71 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 31.
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"Revaluation strategy considers spiritual phenomena congenial instruments to social
change, but in energizing moral attitudes and action appeals only to religious resources that

are imJil3.llent and universally accessible, and not peculiar to the theology of revelation. ·Its
alternative to regeneration is moralization of the unregenerate man, and virtual indifference
11

to evangelism and missions. 72 Henry bemoans the fact that "the Church itself is no

longer honored and recognized as the authentic bearer of a revealed social ethic. "73
The fourth strategy, that of regeneration, is, according to Henry, the classical
Christian view. He believes, given humanity's fallen nature, that this is the only approach
that provides any lasting hope of satisfying our quest for justice. He describes this strategy
as the "transformation by supernatural impulse in individual lives whereby the social scene
is renewed through a divine spiritual motivation.•'74 In regeneration, "man's spiritual
renewal secures his respect for and return to the divine intention in society. The purpose of
redemption, therefore, is to bind man's will afresh to the purpose of the Creator and the
Lord of life. "75 Only when individuals change do they seek to do the will of God.
Regeneration guarantees such a change.
The regenerational strategy holds out great promise for the future, while maintaining
· a degree of pessimism about the present The optimism is based on God's sovereignty and
ultimate control of history. Thus, "the Bible envisages nothing less than a new man, a new
society, a veritable new heaven and earth in which universal righteousness prevails."76
The new man is the fully justified and just man and the new society is nothing short of the

72 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 25-26.
73 Ibid., 28.
74 Ibid., 17-18.
75 Henry, "Christianity and Social Reform," 22.
76 Henry, A Plea for Evan~lical Demonstration, 108.
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kingdom of God. This glorious promise will come into being, however, only when Christ
returns to earth in all his glory. In the meantime, all utopian earthly schemes will fail.
Nothing short of Christ's return is adequate to ensure perfect justice. Realism demands
that one temper one's expectations.
To continue this discussion in the format established above, we must turn to the three
questions that Henry raises regarding each strategy. First, what is the connection between
social action and theological priorities? This perspective "regards the social issue as
derived from the larger theological framework of divine revelation and redemption. ,,77 The
social issue is not ultimate.
Christian social leaders view their cultural objectives in the larger framework of the
Christian mission, and do not regard themselves primarily as social reformers.
They give no quarter to the illusion that Christianity is primarily an ethical idealism
engaged in denouncing political and social injustice, or aiming at social reform as an
end in itself. Even in the social thrust they preserve Christianity's basic nature as a
religion of supernatural redemption for sinners.78

In opposition to the other strategies of social change, "the regenerational strategy insists
that revelational theology is prior," and that "the Church derives her social message from
divinely revealed principles. ,,79 Divine revelation provides a context for understanding
social phenomena. Only by understanding the insights regarding the human condition that

God has revealed to us, Henry says, can we begin to grapple with social and political

77 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 19.
78 Ibid., 20.
79 Ibid., 21. "Least of all did the early Christians encourage the notion that fallen

~·s permanent felicity and ideal existence can be achieved through the reorganization of

his material environment-whether by socio-economic changes or by scientific techniques
and comforts. Although justice in the political order was God's will indeed, and injustice a
damnable thing, nowhere did the early Christians suggest that the permanent expectation
S?lely of justice was a hopeful condition for sinful man. The church's message was not
s~mply that God wills justice for and by all, but that God in mercy offers justification to
smners otherwise exposed to divine condemnation. New Testament Christianity always
finds the locus of human hope not in gnosis--or trust in man's justice or ingenuity--but in
grace as a divine provision." Henry, A Plea for Eyan~elical Demonstration, 46.
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problems.
Tue biblical message is basically one of supernatural redemption from sin, and the
problem of social justice is placed in necessary relationship to man's need and
God's provision of salvation. Hence such concepts as the will of God; man's fall;
the revealed commandments; the law of love; the prophetic promise of a Redeemer
and its fulfillment in Jesus Christ; the need for personal holiness and the gift of the
Holy Spirit; the Church as a society of twice-born men and women in union with
Christ; the ultimate triumph of the right and the final judgement of the wicked,
become central considerations in the Christian approach to the social crisis. 80
These concepts provide a framework for a proper understanding of social reality.
How does the regenerational approach propose to revise the social order? Quite
simply:
The strategy of regeneration ... relies primarily on spiritual dynamic for social
change. It aims not merely to re-educate man, but to renew the whole man morally
and spiritually through a saving experience of Jesus Christ. ... Regeneration rests
upon spiritual power. The Gospel of Christ is the Church's peculiar dynamis for
facing the entire world. Christian social action condones no social solutions in
which personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord is an optional
consideration. Personal regeneration and redemption are inherent in its hope for the
social order.... The new birth restores man to fellowship with God, and lifts him
not only to the vision of truth and goodness but also qualifies him with a new
nature and moral power to place his energies in the service of righteousness. The
Holy Spirit sunders the shackles of human sin, requiring men first to recognize
social evils in the light of personal wickedness. 81
Not only does Henry claim that people must be changed but that they must be changed by
· God. To the extent the human race becomes regenerate, and to the extent the regenerate
influence the rest of the world, justice is possible. Apart from such, there is little hope.
The need for regeneration resulted from the fall of humanity. Prior to the fall, Henry
claims, humans knew the good and lived accordingly.
On the basis of creation man had more than a mere capacity for knowing God, for
discerning good from evil, for discriminating truth from error. He not only knew
that God is not the not-God, but he also knew Elohim his Maker personally, truly
and intimately. He not only knew that good is contradictory of evil but he knew
also that God's revealed will defines the good, and he knew specific elements of
that will that placed him under God's command. He knew not only that truth and
80 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 21.
81 Ibid., 24-25.
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falsehood are antithetical, but also that the truth is what God thinks and says, and
by divine communication he also knew and treasured in his heart certain truths
enunciated by his Maker. Indeed, man in God's image knew God himself to be the
truth and the good, the Creator and Lord of all; he knew reason and conscience as
God's enablements to recognize and approve the true and holy Lord Created man
knew God's revealed truth and declared will, and loved, trusted and obeyed him.
His fellowship with God was unbroken; he lived a moral life in truth, a life
consonant with God's revelation pulsating through the imago Dei. To God he gave
his whole heart, his undivided self; God's light and law were his highest fealty and
felicity. 82
The fall changed everything.
The fall of man was a catastrophic personality shock; it fractured human existence
with a devastating fault. Ever since, man's worship and contemplation of the living
God have been broken, his devotion to the divine will shattered. Man's revolt
against God therefore affects his entire being; he is now motivated by an inordinate
will; he no longer loves God nor his neighbor, he devotes human reasoning to the
cause of spiritual rebellion. He seeks escape from the claim of God upon his life
and blames his fellow man for his own predicament. His revolt against God is at
the same time a revolt against truth and the good; his rejection of truth is a rejection
of God and the good, his defection from the good a repudiation of God and the
truth.83
Despite the fall, humans still can know what they ought to do but they lack the heart to do
it "Man's predicament is not that, like the dumb brutes, he possesses no insight whatever
into right and wrong, but that he lacks the heart to do even what he knows to be right. "84

82 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:134. "The evangelical Protestant view
of the nature of man is that he is "a distinct species, created by a divine act in a state of
primal holiness, from which the first man and representative of the human race Adam fell
by voluntary transgression, implicating his posterity in guilt, corruption and penalty; hence
man is, at the core of his personality a sinner, whose moral ideals and attainments rest
under divine displeasure, so that he is exposed to divine wrath; the divine standard of
morality is achieved on his account only by the Redeemer, in justification, and in gratitude
for divine grace, man, in the strength of a supernatural dynamic, seeks to realize
conformity to the divine will." Henry, The Drift of Western Thoui:ht, 134. Also see "The
Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4.
83 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:135.
84 Henry, Faith At The Frontiers, 41. "The fundamentalist holds that primal man
was a divine creation, endowed with moral righteousness, so that man is not a sinner by a
necessity of his original nature, but rather by voluntary choice; consequently, the hope for a
be~er order is directly proportionate to the appropriation of redemptive grace in human
society.... Evangelicalism does not believe that man's progress is limited by man's nature
as man, as much as by his refusal to appropriate divine regenerative grace." Henry, ~
lln
T_easy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 68-69.
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Sin has hampered humanity's attempt to do the right thing by corrupting the will. Speaking
of sin, Henry writes: "The biblical view is that sin hinders the effort of natural man,
unenlightened by divine revelation and untransfonned by divine redemption, to advance
trUth and the good. The biblical call for a new selfhood asks for nothing less than
crucifixion of man's unregenerate nature and birth of a new nature by a supernatural work
of the Holy Spirit."85
Given human nature, the prospects for improvement in society are not good.
Because, Henry remarks,
in the absence of moral men ... no body of law, however just, can ensure a good
society. Authentic Christian ethics concerns what is done through a desire to do
God's will, in obedience to his command; this is made possible only by spiritual
regeneration. No other motivation can counter the selfish drives that haunt the
noblest of unredeemed men and correct the faulty vision of an unredeemed
society.86
It seems obvious to Henry that "no new era of brotherliness and peace is likely to emerge in

the absence of a new race of men. "87 Good people are the key to a good society. "In the
last analysis, a good society is one that seeks the good not because it is legally coerced to
do so but because it is inwardly motivated. Christians cannot hope to reshape the world by
political crusades; they must address attitudes and motives as well as structures. They do
this most effectively when they speak of transformed humans whose perspectives Christ
has changed and altered ... "88
What is the nature of the new man? Who serves as the model? No one but Christ
has fully manifested the good. 89 Any approximation of this perfect standard is achievable
85 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:519.
86 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 5.
87 Ibid., 9.
88 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 127-128.
89 "When Christianity speaks of the new man, it points first and foremost to Jesus

186

onlY through divine intervention.
The New Testament focuses on the Spirit's presence and power to accomplish an
ethical transformation of life in which love (agape) is the forefront virtue. The
Spirit shapes a new mindset for those who were formerly hostile to God (Rom. ·
8:5-7), a mindset that prizes God's truth and stimulates wholehearted obedience to
his will. The Spirit, moreover, nurtures a new and godly life and provides the
dynamic for defying sin and its temptations. We must remember that the life-giving
Spirit by whom God raised Jesus from the dead is already active in Christians,
liberating them, as they appropriate his presence and power, from the moral
inabilities of their sinful past and bringing them forward toward a future
eschatological defeat of their present mortality. 90
What is the attitude of the regeneration strategy toward the church? Henry's
understanding of the church can be confusing. He has written very little about
ecclesiology. He defines the church as "a spiritually obedient vanguard of morally
regenerate persons," an invisible body of believers, but it is also clear that in much of his
discussion he is actually referring to the visible institutional church.91 Only by
distinguishing between the two, something he assumes his readers will do, can his
message be fully understood. More on the role of the institutional church will be presented
in the next chapter. At this juncture, it is useful to make two points. The church, in its
visible and invisible manifestations, is a vital component of the regenerational strategy. It
is vital because it contributes to the process of regeneration. Second, the church serves as a

model of the kingdom of God and in so doing it influences society for good. In this
regard, to the extent that the visible church is an accurate reflection of the invisible church,
it serves these purposes well. To the extent that it falls short, these purposes are
undermined.
Since the spiritual change that an individual undergoes via regeneration is the key to
of Nazareth. In his sinless earthly life, Jesus manifested the kingdom of God, and in his
resurrection he mirrored the ideal humanity that God approves for eternity." Henry, ~
Revelation and Authority, 4:522.
90 Ibid., 4:501.
91 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 131.
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social improvement, preaching the message of salvation is extremely important.

The

church has a special role in propagating this message. Thus, indirectly, it has a vital role in
Politics.
Supernatural regeneration therefore is the peculiar mainspring for the social
metamorphosis latent in the Christian movement Man's spiritual renewal vitalizes
his awareness of God and neighbor, vivifies his senses of morality and duty, fuses
the laws of love to sanctified compassion, and so registers the ethical impact of
biblical religion upon society. Man's personal dispositions are thus enlarged for
sacrificial service, and his benevolent desires are qualified by a new moral power.
The familiar evangelical call to be 'born again,' the high task of winning other men
to Christ, the pervasive work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification, all contribute to
the basic motivations of social impact92
The Church must spread the good news that salvation is available to humanity through the
redemptive death of Christ. If people respond to the message, the possibility for a positive
social impact is furthered.
In addition, the church must model the new social order for humanity. Although the

church is not the new society, it portends the future. The new society, the kingdom of

God, was the central theme of Christ. 93 The kingdom is both present and future. In its
present state it is incomplete and falls short of its potential, nonetheless it is here.
92 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 26.
93 "No emphasis finds profounder expression in Jesus' teaching than that on the
Kingdom of God.... According to the Synoptic Gospels, what best summarizes the
whole of Jesus' teaching is this theme of the kingdom or rule of God (Matt. 4: 17; Mark
1: 15; Luke 4:43). Jesus instructed His disciples to make it their main concern (Matt. 10:7;
Luke 9:2).... He focused as well on a climactic future consummation when he the Son of
Ma_n would return in universal power and glory (Matt. 26:29). In the present interim God
~tJ.cipatively extends His Kingdom or rule as human beings participate individually in the
kingdom through repentance and the new birth (John 3:3,5). Jesus' disciples constitute
earth's new society; they are light and salt to the world, a regenerate ecclesia that the Risen
Lord rules as living head of a body encompassing both believing Jews and Gentiles. His
followers are to model a character and behavior exceeding that of Pharisees and scribes
<Matt. 5:19f). While not itself the kingdom, the church is the kingdom's most vital
a~proximation and manifestation in the present age. Its ongoing mission is to extend the
~ng's victory over the hostile forces of sin and evil, injustice and oppression; this it does
~ P~laiming the Gospel, declaring and exemplifying the standards by which the King
will )Udge mankind at his return, and witnessing to the present privileges and joys of
~ng the Risen Lord to whom all humanity must ultimately bow." Henry, "The God of
ible and Moral Foundations," 19-20.
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The church is a new social entity of regenerate humans participating in the eternal
life of the kingdom. Personal redemption is its ticket of entry without which no
person shares in the kingdom of God. It is the nearest societal approximation of
God's kingdom on earth. In this body of humanity the kingdom takes visible fonn.
Its members are light and salt in the world through a lifestyle confonned to the ·
coming King's standards, through global confession of Jesus as the Christ, and
through vocational mission that consecrates talent to God for human good.94
The church is not to conquer the world politically.95 "Jesus obviously did not usher
in an earthly political kingdom at His Coming.... The kingdom which Jesus introduced,
it appears. was quite compatible with earthly government which did not interfere with the
realization of the summun bonam in the lives of regenerate believers ... n96 Nonetheless,
the church is to work for political betterment
The challenging of unjust structures is an imperative that requires a biblical vision
of the right, the sensitizing of community conscience, the escalation of volition and
devotion to duty, active support and promotion of good laws, and equally, a sense
of humility. In our fallen history, political and economic solutions never achieve
utopia and are but temporary adjustments which, for all that, need to be squared as
fully as possible with the plumbline of social righteousness. The justice God
demands is an imperative that daily hangs over men and nations. Every political
milieu is answerable to it. The task will never end until the risen Lord returns.
Those who would consummate it overnight only deceive themselves and others.97
Full realization of the new society must await the return of Christ. Henry rejects the
idea that "Christians prior to the eschatological end-time can successfully achieve a truly
Christian culture in a society that is universally infected by the consequences of original
94 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:69. "When Christianity discusses the
new society, it speaks not of some intangible future reality whose specific features it cannot
as. yet identify, but of the regenerate church called to live by the standards of the coming
~g and which in some respects already approximates the kingdom of God in present
history." Ibid., 4:522.
95 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 131.
96 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 53-54.
. 97 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:72-73. "The believer's own struggle
a~amst self-regarding impulse, and against that of fellow-believers, tells him that the
gdom of Heaven has not yet fully dawned. The Gospel can rescue men from the guilt
and penalty of sin, and in a remarkable degree from its power. But it does not wholly
transform the world into the church, nor wholly transform the church into the Kingdom of
God." Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1180.
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and in which Christians themselves are limited by their own fallibility and foibles. "98

He insists that "the climax of human felicity" will not occur on earth but "in a blessed
afterlife. ,,99 "The Evangelical vision of the new society, or the Kingdom on earth, is
therefore Messianic, and is tied to the expectation of the return of Jesus Christ in glory. It
is distrustful of world power, of attempts to derive a just society from unregenerate human
nature."100 Henry's optimism, at this point, is carefully circumscribed by a temporal
realism.
The glorious climax of history will result in a time of universal peace and justice. We
should look forward to the day when "in almighty power Jesus Christ himself will come to
subdue the forces of evil. Overturning all the structures of injustice he will establish the
great age of peace and righteousness." 101 The final solution to the political and social
problems of humanity will occur but not as a result of human effort. Rather Christ will

98 Henry, The Twilight of a Great Civilization, 117. "To strive for Christian culture
is one thing; however, to affirm that Christians can achieve a pristine Christian culture in
fallen history is quite another. We had best reconcile ourselves to the fact that in fallen
history not even the regenerate Church will elaborate an unqualifiedly normative systematic
theology, or Christian philosophy of law, or of literature and the arts. At best, Christians
will achieve something less than the ideal, something always answerable to the Biblical
revelation as the decisive criterion ... " Ibid., 118.
99 Henry, A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration, 45.
100 Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink of Crisis, 68. The "historical inevitability of
this public victory" is referred to in 1 Cor. 15:24; Phil. 2:10 and Romans 8:18-25. QQQ..
R~velation and Authority, 4:528. This optimism has been twisted by many modem
thinkers. "During the past 150 years, evolutionary conjecture has radically revised this
I?essianic vision. The biblical premise that history will crest in Christ's triumphant
ng~teousness and peace was recast by Hegelian 'immanentization of the eschaton' into a
logical evolution of the Absolute, by post Darwinian enlistment of biological evolution in
tan~em with inevitable human progress to utopia, and by Marxian economic determinism,
~h1ch looked to social revolution rather than to divine intervention to facilitate the coming
~gdol!l· These theories eclipse Messiah as the millennial catalyst. They minimize or
TeJect biblical redemption and regeneration and cloud the singular role of the church in the
world. They also view utopia as the inevitable outcome of forces already operative in
nature and history." Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 204-205.
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101 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:545-546.
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retufil and will "reign in full and final triumph" and "righteousness will once again prevail

thfOUgh the created sphere, and evil will meet its decisive doom."102
This is not to say that the biblical teaching regarding the kingdom of God has no
contemporary relevance. To the contrary, Henry claims, "the extent to which man centers
bis life and energy in the redemptive King now determines the extent of the divine kingdom
in the present age."103 Henry is not completely pessimistic about earthly possibilities at
this time. He believes that justice and peace can be achieved in particular times in particular
places through the efforts of good people. "Evangelicalism can view the future with a
sober optimism, grounded not only in the assurance of the ultimate triumph of
righteousness, but also in the conviction that divine redemption can be a potent factor in
any age. That evangelicalism may not create a fully Christian civilization does not argue
against an effort to win as many areas as possible by the redemptive power of Christ ...
11

104 This is a special message that cannot be forgotten if one hopes to bring about peace,

justice and order among the human race.
Henry admits that many, even in Christian circles, view regeneration as a simplistic
and ineffective solution to social problems. In its place, fellow Christians call for "moral
· propaganda and education, then legislation and ... non-violent public demonstrations and
even mob pressures." Henry acknowledges that
The Christian movement has a stake--a vital stake--in education and legislation. It
need not disparage every effort at reform and revaluation as abortively competitive.
. . . Yet Christianity knows--and it dare not forget nor let the world forget--that
what the social order most needs is a new race of men-men equipped not simply
102 Ibid., 5:17.
103 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 54.
. 104 Ibid., 69. The potential can be found in the church itself. For "the church
evidences that in fallen history a new humanity and a new society can arise where
reconciliation and righteousness, hope and joy replace the rampant exploitation and
oppression of fellow-humans and their despair of survival." Henry, God. Revelation and
Authotitt, 4:543.
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with new textbooks and new laws, but with new hearts.105
fie hastens to add that while "the Church has a legitimate and necessary stake in education
and legislation as means of preserving what is worth preserving in the present social order,

... it must rely on spiritual regeneration for the transforma.tion of society."106 He argues,
"those who think altering existing institutions is the surest way to achieve a just society
need to reread the biblical writings."107 Certainly, "unjust structures are, indeed, in need
of change, but to expect utopian improvement is futile without a moral alteration of the
character of humans who pervert the principles of justice." 108
Henry emphasizes that Christians must adhere to the whole message of God's
revelation. Christians must stress "both the holy demand of God for personal
righteousness and universal social justice, and God's gracious provision for a new man

105 Henry, ASPects of Christian Social Ethics, 30.
106 Ibid., 16. "Evangelical social action throbs with the evangelistic invitation to

new life in Jesus Christ. 'Ye must be born again' is the Church's unvarying message to
the world. Evangelical Christianity allows the secular world no hopeful program of social
solutions that renders merely optional the personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as Saviour
and Lord. It holds hope for the social order because it offers the prospect of personal
redemption. Individual regeneration is not only a chief but an indispensable means of
social reform." Henry, "Perspective for Social Action, Part II," 15. "The Christian
movement has no license to take its cue from modem social reformers in the matter of
content or strategy. Christian visionaries blur or distort the gospel of Christ in the world
when they seek to transmute the world into the kingdom of God apart from personal
regeneration, or to coercively impose upon society supposedly just structures which the
church herself ignores in her own life, or to promote as the content of social justice what
the scriptural revelation of God does not in fact sanction. But one blurs Christ's gospel no
less by emasculating its challenge to public leaders who, while presumably serving as
God's entrusted ministers of justice, manipulate power in covert liaison with the privileged
fe~ or by serving inordinate self-interest. Christian silence and inaction in the face of such
miscarriage of God's purpose in government obscures much of what makes evangelical
good news truly good. It needlessly thins the gospel to internal experience only. It
abandons biblically illiterate churches to indoctrination in social philosophies--communist
and other--that are alien to the scriptural revelation." Henry, God. Revelation and
Authoritt, 3:72.
107 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 2:123.
108 Carl F. H. Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 213.
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and a new society on the basis of redemptive grace. 109 When relating God's message for
society, Christians must avoid two possible errors: "first, that the world by structural
changes can be turned into the new society or the kingdom of God; and second, that
improving sociopolitical structures is unimportant in the distinctive call to proclaim the
gospel. 11 110 Politics is important but there are limits to its potential. If either component of
this message is ignored, the message is not truly Christian.

In conclusion, Henry's strategy of regeneration results in a position that is
reminiscent of St. Augustine, whose doctrine of the two cities posits a distinction between
the City of God and the earthly city.111 Regeneration is the key to citizenship in the
kingdom of God. Only in the kingdom of God do we find perfect justice, and that will not

be fully realired until the future. For now, the Christian must remain in the temporal
kingdom. In this kingdom, justice will never be fully realized. Nonetheless, particular
justice is possible. The state and the institutional church are temporal entities that should
promote particular justice.

In much the same way that Henry borrows from Augustine in his formulation of the
two cities, he will borrow from Aristotle in his discussion of justice. His reliance on these
· classical figures will become increasingly apparent as we turn to a discussion of life in the
temporal kingdom.

l09 Henry, A Plea for Evam~elical Demonstration, 120.
110 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 3:71.
.
l l 1 St. Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New Y orlc, NY: Modern
Ltbrary, 1950).

CHAPTER SIX

JUSTICE IN TIIE TEMPORAL KINGDOM

The kingdom of God holds out great promise of a perfectly just society. Complete
realization of that kingdom, however, is something only God can bring about. In the
meantime, citizens of that kingdom, the regenerate, must strive to live their lives, along
with the unregenerate, on earth. To the extent they do so according to the dictates of the
will of God, they may be rightly called just. However, until Christ returns and fully
conforms the regenerate to his will, not even those who have obtained citizenship in the
kingdom of God can be or will be perfectly just. If believers fall short of the perfect
standard, what can one realistically expect of the world-at-large?
Henry sees humanity in an interim period between the time Adam walked in the
garden of Eden with God and the time when Christ returns to rule the heavens and the
earth. During this interim the regenerate and unregenerate alike find themselves in a
temporal kingdom. Christians struggle with this reality since they maintain dual
citizenship: they are citizens of both the kingdom of God and of an earthly kingdom.
Citizenship in each has special duties and distinct rewards. Henry claims that citizenship in
God's kingdom does not negate one's responsibilities in the earthly kingdom. To the
contrary, citizens of the kingdom of God are specifically commanded to contribute to the
earthly kingdom in its quest for justice. This dual citizenship raises many questions. The
question of justice in the temporal kingdom is the most significant one. Is "civil
government answerable to a principle higher than itself," or does earthly justice mean
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nothing more that abiding by man-made law? 1
This chapter will focus on the temporal kingdom. Earthly institutions such as the
church (the visible institutional church) and the state, Henry insists, have a responsibility to
promote justice in the temporal kingdom.2 In short, Henry believes that both institutions
are divinely intended structures that can contribute to the realization of God's will on earth.
Before turning to a detailed investigation of these institutions, it is necessary to look more
broadly at Henry's understanding of justice.
What is justice? What do we know about it? How do we obtain it? Is justice
conventional in the sense of being mere law-abidingness or is it a higher principle to which
the state must aspire? I believe Henry is understood best if one applies Aristotle's classical
distinction between universal and particular justice to his thought. Henry's understanding
of justice is actually a Christian version of a classical Greek notion. Henry doesn't
explicitly acknowledge dependence on Aristotle but the influence seems clear. 3
1 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:421.
2 Henry does not equate the temporal and the heavenly kingdoms with the
institutions of church and state. In this regard he remains true to the traditional view
espoused by Augustine, Luther and Calvin.
3 In book five of the Nicoroachean Ethics, Aristotle makes several distinctions in the
course of his discussion on justice. The distinction that seems to receive the most attention
in scholarly circles is the distinction between distributive and commutative or corrective
justice. However, Aristotle's first distinction is between universal and partial justice.
Martin Ostwald points out that "although much of Book Vis devoted to a discussion
of justice in a narrow, or what Aristotle calls 'partial,' sense, Aristotle remains ever
conscious of the wider connotations of the term: 'justice' is for him the same as
'righteousness,' 'honesty.' It is, in short, the virtue which regulates all proper conduct
within society, in the relations of individuals with one another, and to some extent even the
proper attitude of an individual toward himself." (111) Universal justice means "complete
virtue or excellence ... in relation to our fellow men." (114) This use of the word
conveys both a moral and a legal component. Universal justice certainly includes law~bidingness, to the extent that law coincides with true justice, but it appears to go beyond to
mclude relations among humans not commonly covered in legal regulations. For example,
Aristotle points to relationships between a man and his slave or a parent and child
Furthermore, universal justice includes moral virtue apart from legal requirements. For
example, both the moderate, generous and gentle person and the self-indulgent, stingy and
short-tempered person may abide by the law, but Aristotle would not call the latter just.
Only the former would be justice in the universal sense.

195
Aristotle's notion of particular or partial justice appears in Henry's thought in
different terms, but he means something quite similar. His references to "relative" or

"social" justice refer to those standards which should regulate conduct between individuals
and within society.4 Justice in this sense requires fairness, impartiality, "outward
confonnity to law" and the allocation to each based upon what he/she is due. The person
who is universally just not only exhibits outward conformity but does so for the right
reason for this person has had "forgiveness of sins and new life in Christ" Justice in this
sense means righteousness. "Justice in the context of the kingdom of God must always
correlate outer action with inner character. Duty fulfilled out of wrong motives, or by
chance rather than intention, coincides with justice only incidentally or accidentally ...5
There is much evidence to support this theory. For example, Henry points to
scriptural instances where the Bible teaches that an unregenerate person may be just.
"Scripture nonetheless applies the term 'just' (dikaios) not only to the Messiah and to the
meritorious faithfulness of devout believers (Matt 1:19; Mark 6:20; Luke 1:17; 2:25,
23:50; Rom. 1:17, etc.) but also to some who are not yet Christian believers (Acts
Partial justice is usually thought of in terms of equality. On the one hand, it demands
that the honor and wealth a city bestows upon its citizens should be distributed in relation to
the contribution the citizens make to the welfare of the whole. Thus, partial justice
demands these things be distributed proportionately. On the other hand, in exchanges
between individual citizens, justice demands exact equality. The parties to any transaction
expect and should be able to profit equally. In this sense, the state should attempt to rectify
or correct any transaction that results in a loss of equilibrium.
.
I do not intend to imply that Henry's and Aristotle's understanding of justice and
nghteousness are identical. I am merely implying that Aristotle's distinction is instructive
fo! understanding Henry. The parallel is interesting even if not exact. See Aristotle,
Ntc<?machean Ethics, translated with introduction and notes by Martin Ostwald
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962) book V, and Ernest
Barker's remarks in The Politics of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press, 1958),
362-~69. The idea that Aristotle's typology is a useful explanatory tool for understanding
the biblical notion of justice is discussed in greater detail in Ronald Nash, Social Justice
and the Christian Church (Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1983), chapters 3-6.
4 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:414.
5 Ibid., 6:454.
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l0: 22). 6 This doesn't mean that the unregenerate are righteous, but it does mean that they
11

are fair, impartial, and conform to the dictates of law.

Henry also points out that translators

render biblical references to justice in two different ways.
The Hebrew nouns tsedeq and tsedaqah and the Greek noun dikaiosune are
properly translated either as "righteousness" or as "justice."... The word
righteousness tends to fix attention on inner divine-human relationships, whereas
the term justice suggests primarily man's conduct toward others, especially in
matters oflegal or personal rights (Lev. 19:35f; Deut. 25:13-16; Amos 8:5; Prov.
11:1, 16:11; Ezek. 45:9f). Just as the earlier preference for "righteousness" fixed
attention on internal integrity more than on external relationships, so the current
emphasis on justice focuses on social righteousness to the neglect of personal
righteousness. The fact is that the God of the Bible requires attention to both
individual righteousness and social justice.7
Both individual righteousness and social justice are required of humanity by God, but that
does not mean they are the same thing. Other evidence will be presented as the chapter
proceeds.
Henry identifies the parable of the unjust judge as one of the most instructive portions
of Scripture on the question of justice. 8
Then Jesus told his disciples a parable to show them that they should always pray
and not give up. He said: "In a certain town there was a judge who neither feared
God nor cared about men. And there was a widow in that town who kept coming
to him with the plea, 'Grant me justice against my adversary.' For some time he
refused. But finally he said to himself, 'Even though I don't fear God or care about
men, yet because this widow keeps bothering me, I will see that she gets justice, so
that she won't eventually wear me out with her coming." And the Lord said,
"Listen to what the unjust judge says. And will not God bring about justice for his
chosen ones, who cry out to him day and night? Will he keep putting them off? I
tell you, he will see that they get justice, and quickly. However, when the Son of
Man comes, will he find faith on the earth?" Luke 18:1-8
The central teaching of this parable is "the value of persistence not simply challenging
injustice but also in exercising expectant faith that divine providence assures the final reign

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 6:404.
8 Ibid., 6:418.
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of justice... 9 One should strive for justice without end and never give up hope. However,
Scripture points out that justice cannot be achieved by human effort alone. Perfect justice
awaits the return of Christ.
Henry derives four conclusions from this portion of Scripture that illustrate his
understanding of justice more fully. First, "Scripture unequivocally affirms the future final
triumph of justice and the decisive defeat of unrighteousness." 10 Perfect justice,
understood as righteousness, will prevail. In the meantime, "justice is not fully at home in
fallen man's history; more as a pilgrim, frequently as a harried pilgrim, justice struggles for
a fixed place in one civilization and culture after another. Only in heaven is justice truly at
home." 11 Thus, the justice of the temporal kingdom is somehow less than perfect, less
than complete, while deserving of the name justice.
Second, "the source, content, and sanction of justice exist exclusively and uniquely
in the nature and will of God." 12 Only God and his will are truly just. "The God of the
Bible declares himself to be just, not because he conforms to some superior external
criterion, but because he in himself consistently affirms his nature and is unswervingly
faithful to his own promises and his covenant." 13 Since only God is truly righteous,
· human justice is truly just only to the extent that it imitates divine justice.
Human justice is authentic justice if and when it implements the revealed will and

9 Ibid., 6:419.
10 Ibid., 6:419-420.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. "Justice is at home in heaven not only because God dwells there and will
reign as king over the coming new heavens and new earth, but also because justice has its
very foundation and essential structure in the kingdom of God. Moral law and justice are
not independent self-sufficient realities, nor are they a self-generated creaturely perfection
of human nature. Nor does universal human reason immanently postulate them." Ibid.
13 Ibid., 6:425.
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law of God, and not simply because government sanctions it or society approves ..
. . Because human justice has no firm independent status, it ideally patterns itself
after God's revealed will. Man lacks authority and wisdom to creatively forge
"what is right and just and fair" but through "the fear of the Lord and ... the
knowledge of God" (Prov. 2:5) he may in truth know "every good path" (Prov.
2:9).14
.
Third, "justice not only has both its eternal ground and final vindication in heaven,
but it also steps dramatically into fallen history in the holy person of the Messiah, Jesus
Christ. Only the life and work of Jesus Christ, declares the New Testament, wholly meet
and correspond to the righteous will of God." 15 Since only Christ fulfills God's
requirement, only he can fulfill "God's righteousness redemptively for contrite sinners,"
and only he can serve as a truly just judge of all the nations.
Fourth, "since the supernatural grounding of law and righteousness will be fully
vindicated in the transcendent coming of the kingdom of God, and since Jesus Christ has
been already unveiled as the sinless exalted Judge of mankind and the nations,
contemporary Christianity must explicate the role of believers in today's world."16
Believers are not mere messengers of the good news of eternal salvation, rather they must
also promote justice on earth.
Scripture unequivocally declares that unregenerate man falls far short of God's
righteousness.... But it also affirms that God has an eye for relative justice among
men that avoids aggression and chaos and promotes peace and righteousness.
God's establishment of civil government presupposes a fallen world in which God
wills human civil authority for the preservation of justice and order. The fact that
Jesus Christ is King of kings (Phil. 2: 10) and will judge "men and nations" at his
return (Matt. 12: 18) indicates both that in a fallen world civil government even at
best achieves but broken justice, and that the rulers of this world are answerable to
the justice of God (cf. "he will proclaim justice to the nations," Matt. 12: 18 NIV;
cf. also Isa. 42:1). Throughout history God's transcendent righteousness not only
points to the final judgement of mankind, but also, in anticipation of this, speaks of
the present accountability of men and nations to the will and rule of the Creator and

l4 Ibid., 6:432.
15 Ibid., 6:431.
l6 Ibid., 6:433.
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Lord of alt 17
IlenfY is certain that "the Bible is clear in propounding not only the just man but also the
just community." 18 Christians must understand the limits of earthly existence and strive to
realize the possible. What type of justice is the temporal kingdom capable of maintaining?
'!be answer, Henry posits, is particular justice. Particular justice must strive to imitate God
to the degree possible. This means treating people impartially and fairly. Scripture proves

this way of proceeding is truly just "The Bible declares that God is no respecter of
persons (Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:11; Eph. 6:9; Col. 3:25; 1 Pet 1:17).... This emphasis on
divine justice as equal or non-preferential treatment of all persons underlies biblical teaching
many times in many ways." 19 In fact, Henry claims,
Scripture locates the supreme precedent for human justice in the fact that the God of
justice grants each person his due. Ancient philosophers frequently observed that
of all the virtues justice alone pertains to what is due a neighbor. Only by giving
others what is due them do we at the same time preserve for ourselves what is
properly ours. Jesus declares the so-called "golden rule" ("whatever you wish that
men would do to you, do so to them") to be a summary of the law and the prophets
(Matt 7: 13). It calls for positive performance of what is right; the negative form
found in other traditions concerned itself only with avoidance of evn.20
Prior to moving on to a discussion of the roles of church and state in the realization of
particular justice, we should pause to consider the issue of knowledge of particular justice.
Might the principles of particular justice be anchored not in divine special revelation but in
natural law/natural justice? Henry says no. He accepts the definition of Jacques Ellul for

17 Ibid., 6:414.
18 Ibid., 6:454.
19 Ibid., 6:405. "It is important, therefore, to note the historic evangelical emphasis
that righteousness and benevolence are equally ultimate in the unity of the divine nature. In
a~?Td with biblical theology, evangelical Christianity affirms that justice is an immutable
divme quality, not reducible to a mere mode of divine benevolence on the fallacious theory
that love is the exclusive center and core of God's being." Henry, Aspects of Christian
Social Ethics, 146.
20 Ibid., 6:406.
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natural law.
The essence of natural law theory, says Ellul, is the belief that divine reason is
embedded in man and nature and is therefore accessible to man apart from
.
transcendent revelation. Declared to be immanent in man and nature, this natural
law is then adduced as the ideal criterion of justice. It is unnecessary, say natural
law theorists, to recognize the giver or source of an immanently given morality in
order to acknowledge its reality.21
Could natural law be interpreted differently and different terminology adopted? Perhaps it
could be understood as the belief that God has generally revealed certain laws to humanity
that humans, as beings endowed with divinely bestowed reason, can understand and apply.
This interpretation would permit Henry to retain his emphasis on the probability that fallen
creatures will willfully refuse to obey such laws or that humans may refuse or even be
unable to explain the giver or source of such laws, but they still exist and are often applied
in a beneficial way for all of man.kind. Perhaps the terminology could be altered from

natural law/natural justice to creation law/creation justice or eternal law/divine justice and,
instead of man's innate divine reason being the key, perhaps it should be described as
man's God-given rational endowment which deciphers general revelation.
Henry contends that all natural law theories fall short.
That a general sense of justice and of its objectivity is innate in all human beings is
no doubt true. To its credit, the natural law approach at least challenges all secular
theories that reject any transcendent a priori basis of justice by reducing law to
merely social consensus or to a product of evolutionary development. But because
the conjectural natural law alternatives introduce the self-revealing God too
belatedly into the human predicament they obscure the living Lord. The false
impression is thus made that man can penetrate a knowledge of God's will without
any necessary dependence upon revelational and redemptive realities. But unless
human life, human institutions, and human justice are comprehended in a
theocentric context that preserves God's self-revealed priority and precedence in the
concern of law, the fact is that justice and morality as well as the biblical conception
of a good and just society and general agreement on the meaning of justice will fade
from view. 22
While Henry rejects natural law theories, I believe he has left open the door. He claims that
21 Ibid., 6:423.
22 Ibid.
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the rejection of natural law is not a denial of "God's universal revelation in nature and
history, nor the fact that God by creation has endowed man in his image with an
ineradicable dignity that includes moral aptitudes, inalienable rights, and duties... 23 He
argues that "whether Christian or not, all persons share a common ground through
remnants of the divine image that survive in fallen humanity," but he refuses to take the
next step when he insists that "they do not share a common system of morality and cannot
shape a good society...24 But what is this common ground unless it includes that which
Henry has already argued exists: namely a common understanding of right and wrong.
Henry is not always consistent on this point For example,
the pluralistic nations are judged by the light of general revelation universally
available on the basis of God's creation of humankind. Amos's indictment of
ancient Israel's six pagan neighbor nations is particularly instructive. Damascus is
doomed for threshing Gilead "with sledges having iron teeth" (1:3); Gaza for taking
"captive whole communities" and delivering them to Edom (1:6); Tyre for
delivering up a whole people to Edom and for forgetting "a treaty of brotherhood"
(1:9). Edom is doomed for pursuit with the sword and for "stifling all compassion"
(1: 11 ); Ammon for ripping open the pregnant women of Gilead "in order to extend
his borders" (1:13); Moab for burning to lime the bones of the king of Edom (2:1).
These indictments for national crimes include havoc wrought by invasion,
occupation, and captivity; by bartering slaves and captives of war as a matter of
trade; by atrocity and treachery and other social evils. 25
Henry concedes that "the clear assumption is that ravishing neighbor nations, selling slaves
and prisoners of war, and violating treaties are all infractions known to be unjust
11

independently of the theocratic revelation to Israel. 26 This idea of natural law/natural
justice is worth further exploration. It will come up again later in this chapter and in
chapter eight

23 Ibid., 6:424.
24 Ibid.
25 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 105.
26 Ibid.
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Regardless of how one knows the principles of justice, we must move on to the
question of how justice is realized in the temporal kingdom. Henry claims that two
institutions, church and state, are concerned with justice. The roles of church and state in
society is an issue long argued. Henry enters that debate from within the Baptist tradition.
What is the proper role for the state? What about the church? What responsibilities fall
upon the individual and how should one conduct oneself in the often rough and tumble
world of practical politics? These issues are addressed in the remainder of this chapter.
Historically, Baptists have insisted upon a strict separation of church and state.
Henry is no exception. In this regard, Henry is outside the tradition of reformers such as
Martin Luther and John Calvin (who supported the notion of a state church) and certainly
opposed to the traditions of the eastern Orthodox church and medieval Roman
Catholicism. 27
Repeating the claims of Roger Williams, Henry views the church and the state as two
distinct institutions, created by God, with separate purposes and powers. 28 The biblical
basis for this notion is derived from the book of Mark. "In view of Jesus' differentiation
of the secular and the spiritual ('Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God

27 The prevailing theory in the Eastern Orthodox church is called caesaropapism.
This means that secular rulers exercise supreme authority over the church even in doctrinal
matters. In the West, the battle raged between the church and the state but, in general,
throughout the middle ages, the church claimed and often maintained supremacy. The
Reformation challenged the church in this regard In general, Calvin and Luther urged
separation of church and state but in practice they encouraged cooperation and even a
degree of political priority, esp. Luther. The anabaptists challenged this compromise and
endorsed total separation for which they were persecuted. Roger Williams and others
~~e_d that "the state had no right to interfere with the religious beliefs and practices of
mdiv1duals or congregations, and that the church for its part had no claim upon the state for
financial support. To receive public money was to invite government control and the loss
ofreligious identity." R. D. Linder, "Church and State," in Evangelical Dictiomuy of
Theology, ed. Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984), 234-235.
. . 28 "The New Testament ... declares both church and civil government to be
divmely willed instrumentalities with distinct powers, spheres, and purposes under God"
Henry, Christian Counteonoyes in a Decadent Culture, 115.
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the things that are God's,' Mark 12: 17), Christianity also has discriminated between the
religious and political spheres, yet without fully disjoining them. Both are indispensable
aspects of a faithful Christian calling, and each renders service to the other."29 Their ·
prirnaTY objectives are simple. "While the state's primary concern is to preserve justice and
maintain order, the church's role is to identify the true and living God and to proclaim the

Good News. As a new and distinct society of regenerate believers ... the church
functions among mankind to exemplify and demonstrate moral and spiritual obedience to
the crucified and risen Lord... 30 This clear separation does not mean the state is to be
merely secular. To the contrary, Henry argues that the state's responsibility to God is
everpresent. Both institutions have divinely imposed limitations. Neither should perform
tasks assigned to the other, nor strive to form a kingdom of God here on earth.
The Bible affords the church no basis for promoting evangelistic objectives by
political means and affords the state no basis for promoting political objectives by
ecclesiastical means. The notion that either the state or the church can achieve social
utopia (the kingdom of God) on earth, as romanced by the social gospel, overlooks
the fact of human sinfulness. Human perfectibility awaits the eschaton. 31
While remaining cognizant of their limitations, each has a role to play in combating
injustice in the world.
The confrontation of injustice, in the New Testament context, is to be waged on
two frontiers, church and state. The church's proclamation of God's Word,
evangelization of the masses, and example of moral concern is indispensable. But
no less important is the universal role of civil government, which in the New
Testament era is no longer theocratic but assumes diverse forms, and which deals
29 Carl F. H. Henry, "Church and State," in Christian Thou~ht and Action: The
Christian as Citizen, (Carol Stream, IL: Christianity Today Inc., 1985), 9.
30 Ibid. "The church is of direct divine origin, established by Christ for spiritual

en~; it is spiritual in inception, nature, function and purpose. This spiritual order is not

nanonal but supernational ... whereas the civil order is national and alters according to the
constitution of various peoples and nations. Membership in the New Testament Church,
therefore, is not on a national but on an individual basis, for the church is an organism
separate from the state, existing within the larger society." Carl F. H. Henry, "The Great
Issue," The Watchman-Examiner, 11 September 1952, 841.
31 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 102.
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with outward conformity to law but not with motivation and metaphysical
legitimation. The state is to promote justice (not to creatively define it). Civil
government, no less than the church, is divinely willed, and each instrumentality
has its distinctive mission. Civil government is to require conformity to law, under
threat of penalties; the church proclaims forgiveness of sins and new life in Christ
as an indispensable yet voluntary option. The state is not to decide between
·
theological alternatives, or to evangelize, or to impose penalties for spiritual
lethargy. The church is not to seek to legislate sectarian beliefs and practices. Yet,
both church and state have a necessary commitment to justice, the former on the
ground of a biblical revelation and mandate, the latter on the ground also of
creational, constitutional, and civil law. The Christian carries within himself this
dual commitment of church and civil government, knowing the latter no less than
the former to be theistically grounded.32
Both church and state are concerned with justice. The church is concerned with universal
justice, better defined as perfect righteousness. When one becomes regenerate the perfect
righteousness of Christ is imputed to the redeemed. Thus, the church is helping
individuals become just in the act of evangelization. But the church realizes that there is
another aspect of justice that cannot be overlooked. It not only recognizes the importance
of particular justice but it has a calling to promote it. The church must preach universal
justice. The state must enforce particular justice. Each institution needs closer
examination. What are their responsibilities, duties and limitations?
Henry is convinced that the state and all governmental authority is derived from
divine sanction which necessitates obedience on the part of the citizenry.33 In this regard
the state is not a conventional construct as viewed by modem thinkers and obedience is not

an act of the will but is divinely mandated. God's sanction of government is providential
for apart from such an authoritative structure, the fallen nature of humanity would
undoubtedly wreak havoc in the world. The very survival of mankind and of the church

32 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 214.
33 "God wills civil government as an institution for preserving justice and promoting
peace and order in fallen society." Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society,
.~ 00-101. This point is clear to Henry because of its explicit specification in Scripture.
Th~ revealed will of God, published in the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, sanctions the role
of ctvil government as the preserver of justice and promoter of social order and peace
(Romans 13)." Ibid., 131.
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requires government 34 Thus, humanity must honor, respect, and obey governmental
authority.35
Any discussion of governmental authority must be bracketed with a reminder of
God's sovereignty. The sovereignty of God logically leads to a limited authority for
government. This central attribute of God has important consequences for life on earth. 36
All earthly authority is derivative in nature. Such a notion both limits earthly authority as
well as legitimizes it
Paul's letter to the Romans emphasizes ... derived authority. "There is no
authority but by act of God and the existing authorities are instituted by him."
Precisely for that reason, "anyone who rebels against authority is resisting a divine
institution" (Rom. 12:1-2, NEB), one that reflects, even if indirectly, the lordship
of God into the fallen world. 37

34 "The church needs the state's preservation and promodon of justice in the world
because the power of the sword is able to restrain injustice and disorder where and when
mankind spurns grace and good will. But Christians also require civil government because
the professing family of faith, for all the transforming power of redemption, is not yet
perfect and remains vulnerable to self-assertion and self-interest." Henry, "Church and
State," 12.
35 "Rulers are designated 'priests of God' (Rom. 13:6) whom God entrusts to
promote his will by advancing good and suppressing evil." Henry, God. Revelation and
Authority, 6:446. "The classic New Testament passage on civil responsibility (Romans
13) affirms that civil government has divine sanction to preserve public order for the social
gocxl, the good of Christians as well as others. The New Testament nowhere justifies
anarchy. Rather it supports civil government as an institution, recognizing that at times
particular governments may be tyrannical and even anti-God, suppressing good and
rewarding evil (cf. the beast-state of Revelation 13)." Henry, The Christian Mindset in a
Secular Society, 132.
36 "The implications of divine sovereignty ... are far reaching. Take for example,

th~ political realm.... According to the Bible the state exists within God's providential
~ and has limited authority. When totalitarian states presume to define human rights and
du~es at will they illicitly claim divine prerogatives. The state's biblically stated role is to

rn_aintain God-ordained justice, not to devise or manipulate it ... " Henry, "The God of
Bible and Moral Foundations," 10.
37 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:25. "Civil government derives its
P<>wer ultimately not from military capability or from the will of the people but from God
(cf. John 19: 11). All organs of power can function properly only in obedience to his will.
G
. ~ purposes civil government in a fallen society for the promotion and preservation of
JUb~tlc~ and order (Rom. 13). Insofar as government arrogates to itself powers and
0 ~ectives contrary to its divinely intended purpose it becomes anti-God and anti-Christ
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Since its authority is derivative, the state has a ministerial or servant role to play. It should
serve God by performing those tasks and exercising that authority granted to it by God. To
the extent that it does otherwise, it becomes apostate.
Henry is quick to emphasize that the derivative authority of the state requires a limited
state. He believes that the idea of limited government has its origins in Christianity. 38
Henry admits that those who desire to forge a broader role for government have good
intentions and want to rectify persistent evils. "But political compulsion does not
automatically produce 'good' people, who, obviously are an indispensable ingredient of a

good society."39 To the contrary, only regeneration truly produces good people.
Continued expansion of the role of government encourages all elements within society to
try to co-opt the state for their purposes. It also lessens one's personal sense of

responsibility.40 Narrow self-interest prevails and government becomes the instrument to
serve such interests. To avoid these ills, it is essential that government limit its scope to
those areas where God has authorized it to act
What should the state do? The answer is simple. It should promote justice and
preserve order. Its most difficult and important task is to particularize the general principles
of justice. "The task of civil government is to interpret God's transcendent law, as
expressed in universal principles, into political particularities...41 It does this by
fonnulating statutory law.
The role of government is not to stipulate absolutes but rather to protect statute laws
(Rev. 13)." Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1176.
38 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 89.
39 Ibid., 108-109.
40 Ibid., 117.
41 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:449.
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that best preserve the imperative of justice in community life. Even if civil
government now has no basis for legislating statute law on the ground that God
reveals and commands it, it must nonetheless articulate what justice implies in social
relationships. The state tries to express in legal particularities what conduct is most
consistent with the moral absolutes that underlie law (e.g., the universal dignity and
worth of human life).42
·
The state is to deal with outward conformity to law and to impose penalties on those who
fail to comply. It should promote justice but not define it
What is law? Law is a formal articulation of and a particularization of the content of
justice.43 In Old Testament times, God revealed general principles of justice such as the
Decalogue as well as specific particular expressions of those general principles appropriate
10 the Hebrew nation in that time. To the extent that we may know the specific content of

justice today, we must rely upon the the second tablet of the ten commandments. Henry
refers to the "enduringly valid Decalogue" as having "principles that are universally
definitive for justice...44
Applying general principles of justice to specific situations, apart from God-given
positive law, is not easy. Nor is it impossible. Henry admits:
It may seem difficult to derive model civil laws and legal regulations from a
transcendent principle of justice. But without such a transcendent criterion for
evaluating the law, despotism becomes the basis of civil government and rulers can
spurn human liberties and cancel citizens' rights at will. ... It is only transcendent
objective authority, moreover, that can assure the fixed character of conventional
justice and positive law.45
Application of general principles need not be uniform. The lack of uniformity does not
discount the reliability of the general principles. Henry says that:
42 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 125.
43 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:438.
. . 44 Ibid., 6:444. "It is noteworthy that in summarizing the ideal behavior of godly
Citlzens, the apostle Paul repeats the social commandments of the law and that in the Book
~Revelation, the commandments reappear in the context of final divine judgment."
enry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 205.
45 Ibid., 6:446.
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The fact that juridical punishment for legal infractions and forms of retribution vary
from land to land is not necessarily a consequence of faulty deduction; legal
principles allow a variety of alternative courses. What course best promotes law
and justice is largely left to determination by particular governments, and is
properly subject to periodic review and revision.46
In many respects even the specific positive laws that we live under can be understood as
being from God.
Since not only the Hebrew theocracy but also Gentile nations are divinely judged by
the social commandments of the Mosaic law, positive law is not to be considered
entirely or primarily a creation of civil government, even if the body politic
elaborates most legal regulations. Civil law is not a matter of public convention
only. Britons may indeed drive to the left and Americans to the right, but what
underlies each statute is not whim or happenstance, but the principle of the value of
human life and property.47
To the extent that law merely reflects the will of an arbitrary ruler or the will of the
majority, it changes frequently, encourages promotion of narrow self-interest and is unable
to compel citizens

to obey. Citizens are less likely to respect and honor law if its source

and sanction is no higher than the government itself.48
Law is particularly important to Henry for its preservative nature. "The purpose of
statute law is to redirect fallen humankind's civil propensities so that justice prevails in
community life. Statute law particularizes the content of justice and love in social
relationships."49 We must "recognize in civil law the will of God by which he seeks to
redirect fallen humanity's evil propensities for greed and power and privilege, and by

46 Ibid., 6:451.
47 Ibid., 6:442-443. "When the apostle Paul stresses that government should be
obeyed for conscience' sake and not simply through fear of punishment, he reminds us that
positive law gains its moral authority because of its source and sanction in divine law....
The man of God knows that civil government has only limited authority and why: positive
law acquires its moral force from the will and power of the transcendent God, not from an
earthly sovereign or a commonwealth." Ibid., 6:451.
48 See Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 91.
49 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 109.
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which through civil order he seeks to reaffirm his intention for man's purposive and
creative life in community."50 It cannot transform society but it can maintain that which is

good·
Although the Christian Church ought to rely on the spiritual regeneration of
individuals to transform society, it must not on that account neglect the role of
education and legislation in preserving what is valuable in the present social order.
Christian social theory needs to distinguish between transforming and preserving,
and to recognize that education and legislation can serve only the latter of these
ends. But preserving the gocxl in society is worth doing ... 51
Law is vital. "Because there is no assurance that all men will repent and seek the will
of God, and because even Christian believers must contend with the remnants of sin, just
laws are indispensable in human history."52 It is also limited. It suffices to restrain some
of our worst tendencies, but ultimately it cannot do what can be done through regeneration.
Although just laws are desirable and imperative, law has the power only of outward
restraint; it lacks power to ensure outward obedience and inner conformity to its
command. In the absence of moral men ... no body of law, however just, can
ensure a gocxl society. Authentic Christian ethics concerns what is done through a
desire to do God's will, in obedience to his command; this is made possible only by
spiritual regeneration. No other motivation can counter the selfish drives that haunt
the noblest of unredeemed men and correct the faulty vision of an unredeemed
society.53
50 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:436.
51 Henry, As,pects of Christian Social Ethics, 72.
52 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 10. "The Apostle Paul knew that
even the Christian, who has repented of his sins, is not wholly free from this terrible grip
of sin. The struggle of Christ's disciples against sin and evil is deeper and profounder than
that of unredeemed and unregenerate men. For the Christian knows not only the law
written on man's conscience, but he knows the divine commandments written on stone and
their inner moral requirements as proclaimed and lived by Jesus Christ. The Christian
hates sin, and abhors his former immorality, and has a heart and mind for the larger moral
claims, of God; but he nevertheless falls into sin even if he does not make a practice of it."
Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 41.
.. 53 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 5. "In fallen human history no
polittcal document can be presumed to fully elucidate what divine justice implies." Henry,
God: Revelation and Authority, 6:422. Henry admits to underestimating the importance of
~aw m his earlier writings. He says that "many of us underestimated the indispensable
importance of legislative coercion in a fallen society." His mind has changed, however,
only partially. "Although redemptive vitalities in society continued to have priority in my
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The participation of God's people is very important. For they alone have a fuller
understanding of God's will as well as the heart to obey. They, therefore, are most likely,
most willing and most able to conform civil law to the divine will. "The Christian believer
knows that there is a secret inner connection between the transcendent justice of God and
the secular law of the state, and that ideally they will coincide."54 The only hope for
justice in society exists when "a nation knows that law derives its secret power from the
divine spiritual realm, from justice conceived as a supernatural perfection, only then is its
respect for law secure."55 Even this hope is limited for "in the absence of a will to do the

good, no law, however desirable, can assuredly achieve its public objectives. Evangelism
can bring to multitudes the good will and moral dynamic necessary to make good laws
work. 11 56 Thus, the state needs the church.
Strangely enough, Henry proceeds to encourage Christians to downplay the
thinking," he now exhibits "an enlarging emphasis on the state's mandate for preserving
public justice." Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4. "There was, for all that, a
notable weakness in my concentration on regeneration as the guarantee of a better world.
For Uneasy Conscience failed to focus sharply on the indispensable role of government in
preserving justice in a fallen society. Essential as regenerative forces are to transform the
human will, civil government remains nonetheless a necessary instrument to constrain
human beings--whatever their religious predilections--to act justly, whether they desire to
do so or not. At mid-century ... I was prone to minimize the role of law in society and to
exalt regeneration in view of its sensitizing of conscience and life-transforming power."
Ibid. Henry was taken to task by Lewis Smedes on this very issue. "The Evangelicals and
the Social Question," The Reformed Journal 16 (February 1966): 9-13. In a printed
response Henry tried to reassure him "that Evangelicals are neither skeptical about the role
of law nor disinterested in changing our environment, though we insist that environmental
processes, including the legal structuring of society, are not means specially granted to the
church for the transformation of human life." Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 109.
54 Henry, Evane;elicals at the Brink of Crisis, 72. To disobey civil law that does not
contravene God's commandments is also to disobey God and to deny him as the only
absolute King. But to resist law that does contravene God's commands is also a witness to
the divine sanction of law. Respect for law is grounded therefore not simply in the civil
and domestic desirability of its observance but in the fact that God wills it. Henry, God.
Revelation and Authority, 6:444.
55 Henry, Aiwects of Christian Social Ethics, 90.
56 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1178.
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supernatural basis of law in their promotion of law in democratic societies such as ours. In
promoting good laws, the evangelical should identify "ethical imperatives consistent with
and reflective of the will of God," and promote them on grounds "familiar to the general
public." In particular, he points to tradition in those societies with a Judeo-Christian
heritage, and social consensus. In addition, he encourages Christians to use ad lwminem
arguments which shifts attention away from reason, logic and the issue at hand and either
attacks the character of the antagonist or appeals to the feelings and emotions of the
audience. The pragmatic and utilitarian value of what he is saying is obvious, but it seems
to contradict his argument On the one hand, he is saying that without a biblical grounding
there is no permanent ground for justice, yet he urges Christians to promote laws on the
basis of social consensus or tradition. A restatement of natural law/natural justice would
alleviate this problem and permit Christians to promote justice on a revelational basis that all
people, redeemed and unredeemed, might be able to understand.
What is human law to protect? Basic human rights, Henry answers. 57 A proper
understanding of rights requires one to start with the notion of duty. Henry's understands
a right as a concomitant of a duty. It is something that accompanies a duty in a subordinate
· or incidental way. What are our duties?
Yahweh formulates human duties as an obligation to God, not as conferring
tangible rights or benefits upon humanity per se. Ultimately all duties reduce to
two: love of God with one's whole being, and under God love of others as
ourselves. The biblical theory divorces human rights discussion from metaphysical
or sociological speculation and preserves it in the context of divine creation, divine
disclosure, and present and future divine judgment 58

Our rights are little more than divinely imposed duties on others. They are not a priori
57 "The role of government is but to declare, to apply, and to enforce rights which

are given of God and therefore inalienable.... The purpose of law is to prevent one
~rson from injuring another, my rights end and become my duty where my neighbor's
nghts begin." Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 92 .

. . 58 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Judeo-Christian Heritage and Human Rights," in
Iw1h~ht of a Great Civilization (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1988), 148-149.
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claiJilS of one against another. "The Bible does not teach that human beings simply on the
basis of existence have inherent or a priori rights, or that they have absolute rights accruing
from sociological or political considerations. The Bible has a doctrine of divinely imposed
duties; what moderns call human rights are the contingent flipside of those duties."59

From these duties, we may derive rights.
Henry stresses three basic rights that governments are bound to respect in the name
of justice: the inviolability of human life, the right of private property, and religious
liberty. He alludes to a right of political liberty, but he never sketches out in any detail
what he means and where he claims to find it in Scripture.6()
His concern over human rights rises from his conviction that modem philosophy,
with its naturalistic bent, has lost its ground for any notion of human rights.
Since its methodology of observation can establish neither the source, nature, nor
content of law and justice, naturalism deprives law and justice of fixed and final
norms. A naturalistic exposition of law makes inevitable a positivistic relativizing
of law, since naturalism provides no safeguard against totalitarian rulers who
authoritatively arbitrate the nature and limits of human liberty; it actually puts in
doubt the very character and validity of human rights. 61
A truly secure understanding of human rights requires a supernatural grounding.
The modem controversy over human rights call urgently for a theological recovery
of the metaphysical foundations of these rights. Human rights are grounded in
59 Ibid.
6() "The evangelical view is that human rights are grounded in the revealed will of
God, that religious liberty and political liberty are alike based on the Bible." Henry, The
Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 67.
.
61 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:422. "For theists the principle of
Justice is primary and antecedent to civil government ... naturalists, on the other hand,
correlate justice only with political constitutions and hence with the state's power to enforce
whatever laws the state decrees. Theism evaluates justice not solely by the constitution and
~aws of the state; it invokes as well an ultimate standard of justice to which the constitution
itself, all legislation and all juridical actions must answer. By disallowing absolute,
~scendent justice naturalism relates justice entirely to man-made laws and precludes any
JU~gement of a nation's constitution, laws, and act according to a changeless superior
pnnciple; naturalism, in effect, rules out any objective distinction between good and bad
government." Ibid., 6:421.
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God's transcendent will for man made in his image. The basis of human rights is
not supplied by positive law nor can these rights be reliably defined by analyzing
human nature or human experience. Efforts to translate human insight and
conscience into a logic of rights stumble against the reality of man's fall, and
attempts to distill those rights from human experience collapse under the
incompleteness and inconclusiveness of that experience. 62
Judeo-Christian theism provides this needed foundation while providing a divinely
stipulated duty on government to protect human rights.
Evangelical Christianity acknowledges God as Lord of the cosmos, of history, and
of human life, and hence as the transcendent source, stipulator, and sanction of
human responsibilities and rights .... Civil government must preserve and protect
these rights as a presupposition of its own legitimacy, and the citizen must live in
responsible awareness that his or her rights terminate where those of a fellow
citizen begin and that citizens have responsibilities to the government which
maintains those rights. 63
God has endowed all people with inalienable rights and inalienable duties at the same time.
The state must recognize and enforce those rights and duties if it wishes to be called just.64
Henry insists that Scripture teaches both the dignity and equality of all human life.
Human worth is based upon God's creation of man and the redemptive death of Christ.
Both divine acts testify to the fact that God has imparted value to human existence.65 This
does not mean that human life is ultimate. To the contrary, Henry argues, "human life does
not have infinite value, to be sure, for man is both a finite and contingent creature. "66

62 Ibid., 6:426.
63 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 130-131.
64 Ibid., 121-122.
65 "Human worth is fixed by divine creation in the imago Dei, and Christ's
redemptive death, moreover, proclaims man's worth even in a sinful condition." Henry,
"The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 14. Speaking of the creation of humanity,
Henry declares: "The dramatic climax of the creation account comes with the creation of
man in the image of God. No statement rises more spectacularly from the Genesis
~arrative than the declaration: 'Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness.... And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good'
(Gen. 1:26-3la, RSV)." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:497.
66 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 14.
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This God-given worth is also the basis for human equality. What God has wrought,
be bas done for all. For all are created in the image of God, and Christ has died for all of

mankind.
Among the great religious traditions none has the design and dynamic for
materializing brotherhood more than the Hebrew-Christian revelation of God and
the world, which stresses the universal rational and moral responsibility of the race
as well as its physical similarities. Biblical religion declares that all men by creation
are children of the one Creator (Acts 17:28f); that they are obliged to love each other
(Luke 10:27, 36f); that as sinners they have forfeited man's original spiritual
sonship to God (John 8:42ff); that they are restored to divine sonshi~ through
supernatural grace and saving faith in Jesus Christ (John 1:12, 3:5).67
The right of private property is the second right that Henry claims to find in
Scripture. Speaking of private property, Henry insists that Scripture "assumes its
legitimacy and reinforces its propriety as a social institution. 0 68 Henry points to three
examples. First, God gave the Promised Land to the Hebrews. Second, "the Mosaic law
implies that private property is legitimate and not sinful. It confers the highest sanctity on
the principle of private ownership and reinforces the inviolability of property. The Eighth
Commandment teaches that it is sinful to take what belongs to another, and the Tenth
Commandment that it is sinful even to covet what belongs to another. "69 Third, Henry

claims the New Testament reaffirms the applicability of the Decalogue in Matt. 19: 18f and
Romans 13:9ff. In addition the actions of Christ and his disciples reinforce the

67 Carl F. H. Henry, "Brotherhood for a Week," Christianity Today, 2 February
1959, 20. "Emphasis on the equality of human beings is deeply rooted in the biblical
teaching. It is universally vouchsafed on the basis of divine creation (Job 31: 13-15) and
within this framework, to the Hebrews on the basis of unmerited participation in God's
covenant relationship and to Jew and Gentile alike on the basis of God's love expressed in
Christ the Redeemer (John 3:16). Alongside these elements stand also the biblical
warnings of man's universal guilt in sin and of God's coming judgment of all humanity
(Rom. 3:9)." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:406.
68 Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," in God and the
GQOd: Essays in Memory of Henry Stob, eds. Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1975), 97.
69 Ibid.
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appropriateness of individuals holding private property. Even in that one New Testament
instance that might be interpreted to call for common ownership, Henry reminds us that
peter "specifically reinforced the right of private property in his rebuke to Ananias: 'While
it remained, was it not thine own? And after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?'
(Acts 5:4)." 70
One's right to private property is not absolute: something Henry holds is true for all
rights. "In the Bible God's sanction of private property stands in a framework that
proclaims divine right above human rights; and only on this basis do human rights become
inalienable."71 "Man's property right in respect to God is never absolute or indefeasible,
but always derivative and conditional. In respect to the state and society, however, man's
property right has formal divine sanction even if his use of property subverts God's
spiritual intention. "72 "The transcendent Creator stands above all as the ultimate source,
sanction, and support of enduring rights; and on earth every man and all things are seen as
God's own--God's creatures and his creation. In a word, God is their absolute owner, and
man's possessions are a contingent and limited entrustment. "73
The third right that temporal law should seek to preserve is the right to religious
freedom. In writing about religious liberty, Henry posits a fourfold thesis:
first, that biblical theism alone provides adequate intellectual struts for a meaningful
doctrine of religious liberty and for other human rights, while non theistic views
render such rights merely postulatory and problematical; second, that religious
liberty as a universal human right is appropriate and indispensable to human beings
irrespective of creed; third, that the right of religious freedom in fact shelters and
nurtures all other human rights; and finally, that evangelicals who value human
freedom as the gift of the Creator, whom we seek in good conscience to worship
and serve, should engage more actively in championing religious freedom
70 Ibid., 98-99.
71 Ibid., 94.
72 Ibid., 100.
73 Ibid., 95-96.
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everywhere as well as in promoting the religious freedom of Christians in secular
American society.74
The argument that modern naturalism lacks a sufficient basis for human rights was
mentioned earlier. Henry bemoans the fact that religious freedom in the modern era is often
thought of in terms of religious tolerance. Religious tolerance, Henry insists, is little more
than a matter of expedience. The recognition that tolerance grants to unpopular religions is
temporary and lacks sufficient grounding to guarantee freedom when it becomes convenient
to become intolerant

Religious freedom is a right that accrues to every human being by virtue of the fact
that each person is a free moral agent. Recognition of religious freedom is an affirmation
of "man's inherent and primordial right to free spiritual decision, for which he is
accountable alone to God." Every person is answerable to no one but God. Henry insists
that "no person is to be restrained by the state for professing doctrine or practicing worship
contrary to any religion, nor is he to be constrained legally toward an unpreferred religion.
Since as a responsible moral agent man is directly answerable to God for his conscience in
spiritual matters, he must before the law of the state be accorded full religious liberty."
Consequently, Henry claims that "before the law of the state all religions are equal."75
Henry is convinced that religious freedom can suffice as a foundational right for other
treasured freedoms.
Religious freedom--that is, one's right to worship and to obey God in good
conscience--shelters and nurtures all other human rights, and in this sense
undergirds them. Only if human beings have political and civil liberty to worship
according to conscience can they worship and serve the living God meaningfully
and resist the efforts of arbitrary powers who require subjects to do what God
prohibits or to abstain from what God requires. In the absence of individual liberty
to worship conscientiously, citizens fall prey to pretentious powers that arrogate to
themselves the absolute authority and unqualified honor reserved only to God.76

74 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 64-65.

15 Henry, "The Great Issue," 841.
76 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 10-11. While religious
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God has given humanity the opportunity to choose whether or not to serve him. It is
essential that governments recognize and respect this fundamental right.
His final comment on religious freedom is actually a call for evangelicals to be
supportive of religious freedom for everyone. In supporting universal religious freedom,
Christians are proclaiming an essential component of the Onistian faith, namely the
importance of individual voluntary commitment.
The first test of a good evangelical conscience under God is commitment to
religious liberty not for Christians only but for all human beings. If evangelicals
have learned well the lessons of history, they know that genuine faith thrives best in
a context of voluntary religion, and that state religion is as costly to the religious
community as it is to government. To guarantee freedom of religious preference to
others underscores the importance of a voluntary faith .... God seeks humanity's
voluntary spiritual allegiance; coerced decision is of little spiritual value. 77
Henry's emphasis on religious freedom distinguishes him from other prominent
Christian political thinkers. Both Luther and Calvin were proponents of religious freedom,
but were often guilty of advocating use of the state's coercive power to punish heresy and
blasphemy. Hooker was more tolerate than either of his reformer predecessors, but he too
could not bring himself to proclaim unconditional toleration. St. Augustine's call for state
intervention in the Donatist controversy has often been identified as the precedent for the
crusades and inquisitions of the middle ages. Henry would reject the arguments of all of
these men. He might sympathize with the position of St. Augustine to the extent that the
Donatist controversy was more an issue of social disorder than of heresy, but the idea of
calling forth the sword to establish religious hegemony or to suppress heresy is an
anathema to Henry.78

liberty undergirds other rights, it is the right to life that Henry calls the primal right. "The
whole conception of human rights becomes tenuous unless it is theologically grounded in
~an'.s primal right--the right of freedom from being stripped of his divinely stipulated
dig~uty; all other rights are a part of this basic right and involve the principle of human
reciprocity." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:429.
77 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 7.
78 A general introduction to Augustine's political thought can be found in the
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What should government not do? While the state is very concerned with the outward
conduct of its citizens, it is not to be concerned with metaphysical or theological issues nor
with the epistemological basis for principles of justice and the motivations of its people to
obeY·

While what ground one affirms for arriving at the morality of particular acts is of
theological or philosophical importance and of great individual significance, one's
theological or philosophical rationale is not the business of civil government. The
state does not police and legislate the foundations of morality or the motivations of
citizens for keepi% the law. Its concern is with the content of legality and with
outward conduct.
Furthermore, it should not "decide between theological alternatives," "evangelize," or
"impose penalties for spiritual lethargy. 11 80
Perhaps the most controversial notion Henry has forwarded is the idea that the state is
not to be an instrument of love. Henry is responding to several fellow theologians, some
of them within the evangelical camp, who prefer to identify biblical justice with the notions
of grace and love. Acts of love are no longer differentiated from acts of justice and the state
becomes an instrument of compassion.

following sources: Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Au~stine
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1963). A thorough account of the Donatist
controversy is found on pp. 172-220. Other useful resources include Etienne Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of Saint Au~ustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, NY:
Random House, 1959); M. C. D'Arcy, et al Saint Au~ustine (New York, NY: Meridian
Books, The World Publishing Company, 1957); and, Reinhold Niebuhr, "Augustine's
Political Realism," in Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York, NY: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1953), 119-146.
79 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 122. "Only a totalitarian
society, whether theocratic or atheistic, imposes metaphysical beliefs upon its citizens....
The metaphysical grounds on which citizens affirm the content of justice is of high
!heological, philosophical, and apologetic importance but it is not a matter of political
~terest. The state can take sides in matters of religious or metaphysical disputation only by
disregarding religious freedom. To be sure, unless a methodology for validating
transcendent values exists, moral alternatives have no persuasive epistemological basis.
But adjudicating between religions and philosophies is not the task of civil government;
such concerns fall outside the scope of political authority." Ibid., 114-115.
80 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 214.
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This argument is usually based upon the idea that love is the preeminent attribute of

Qod. 81 Henry believes that many socially liberal Christians have made a significant
theological error in their understanding of God's attributes. Henry feels the contemporary
emphasis on the love of God leads us to ignore the other attributes of the divine at our own
peril. God is love but God is also just.
However much Scripture speaks about God's holy love and mercy, and of God's
provision of his Son as the penitent sinner's righteous substitute, Scripture focuses
first and foremost upon God's transcendent righteousness that rewards moral
creatures according to their works and requires reparation for sin. That the
righteous God is also the merciful God in no way diminishes his righteousness.
There is hope in the sinner's appeal to justice only if he lays claim by grace to the
Just and Holy One whom God set forth a propitiation for sin that he might remain
both "just and the justifier of him that believes in Jesus" (Rom. 3:26). It is God's
mercy that he does not deal with us according to our sins, nor requite us according
to our iniquities (Ps. 3: 10) .... Unless the sinner appeals to justice by way of
consenting to God's just condemnation of the transgressor, he cannot meaningfully
appeal for divine salvation proffered in the mediatorial work of the crucified and
risen Christ. Only by acknowledging God's just judgment can we truly share in the
matchless mercy of God. No guilty sinner can grasp the munificent grace of God
in Christ who fails to perceive the rightness of God's condemning him to an eternal
death from which there is no reprieve, who fails to see the reprehensibility of his
revolt against the Lord of the cosmos, who fails to acknowledge that each day's
denial of proffered reconciliation with the righteous Creator only compounds his
plight.82

God is love in that he "graciously takes our condemnation upon himself in substitutionary
death. Though our iniquities 'deserve to be rewarded' (Ps. 103:8) with unmitigated
judgement, God mercifully spares us on condition of faith in the righteous Redeemer. "83
But, God "does not circumvent his own justice in the demonstration of His love for

8 1 I am referring to scholars such as Stephen Mott, Robert K. Johnston, Lewis
Snx:des, Jan Dengerink, Karl Barth, and Reinhold Niebuhr. "Basic to this confusion is the
sentunental modern reconstruction of the nature of God. This theological quagmire results
~o~ nC?-orthodoxy's failure to rise above the modernist refusal to identify righteousness
~u~nce no less than love with the essential core of God's being." Henry, Aspects of
~U!!Stlan Social Ethics, 167. See pp. 146-171 of Aspects.
82 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:413-414.
83 Ibid.
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man.

1184
The tendency to dissolve God's righteousness and justice into love and to insist upon

love as the essential characteristic of God has not only misconstrued Scripture and the

nature of God, according to Henry, but it also has significant political ramifications.85
Namely, it permits and even encourages an expanded role for the state while depreciating
the church's contribution to society.
Just as in his theological view of God the liberal dissolves righteousness into love,
so in the political order he dilutes social justice into compassion. This kind of
merger not only destroys the biblical view of God on the one hand but also
produces the welfare state on the other. This confounding of justice and love
confuses what God expects of government with what he expects of the Church, and
makes the state an instrument for legislating partisan and sectarian ideals upon
society. Ideally the purpose of the state is to preserve justice, not to implement
benevolence; ideally the purpose of the Church is to preach the Gospel and to
manifest unmerited compassionate love. 86
To impose upon government the task of compassion commits two errors. First, "it diverts
government from an ideal preservation of equal human rights before the law" and second,
"it shifts to the state a responsibility for compassion or benevolence that belongs properly
to the Church."87 The state is not a "benevolence-dispensing agency."88
84 Henry, Notes on the Doctrine of God, 110.
85 "It is important, therefore, to note the historic evangelical emphasis that
righteousness and benevolence are equally ultimate in the unity of the divine nature. In
accord with biblical theology, evangelical Christianity affirms that justice is an immutable
divine quality, not reducible to a mere mode of divine benevolence on the fallacious theory
that love is the exclusive center and core of God's being." Henry, Aspects of Christian
Social Ethics, 146.
86 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 6.
87 Ibid., 7.
88 Carl F. H. Henry, "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" Christian Herald 85 (January
1?62): 15. Henry supports the notion of emergency government assistance in extreme
situations. For example, he acknowledges that private welfare agencies were simply
overwhelmed by the Great Depression. That same period, however, "created an
opportunity for social revisionists to promote theories of state welfare that involve the
go~emment in a continuing and perpetual role of dispensing benevolences. Whenever
SOcial welfare is permanently fixed as a dimension of state moral concern, public pressures
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What are some of the consequences of this action? First, Henry suggests, "by
encouraging dependence on government welfare statism undermines self-reliance. "89
second, "it [welfare statism] pre-empts the opportunities for voluntarism in a free
society. ,,90 Third, "at the expense of the few it caters not to genuine 'needs' but to the
exaggerated 'wants' of the many ...91 Fourth, "it promotes bureaucratic government."
Fifth, it "hinder[s] the Christian Church, with its compassionate concern, from fulfilling
legitimate aspects of her mission in the world" It does this by changing the nature of
charity which is supposed to be testimonial, personal and voluntary.92 Sixth, it
undennines individual responsibility.93 The notion of personal responsibility is neglected
and we substitute a new ethic: "In place of 'Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself, ' they
substitute the dogma, 'Force those who have to support those who have not. ..94 In short,
increase until government extends its provision to cover not only human rights and
emergency needs, but even the wants of the many. The end result of such a process is the
welfare state. The role of government becomes widened beyond its scriptural
responsibility for social justice to include a responsibility for welfare legislation." Henry,
Aswx:ts of Christian Social Ethics, 163-164.
89 Henry, "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" 16.
90 Ibid. "And welfare statism sustains itself only by increasing government
appropriation of private income and by progressive taxation; thus it siphons off and dries
up the reservoirs of voluntary philanthropy and benevolence." Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. "The Christian perspective defines three special objections to welfare
statism. For one thing, Christian giving to others is testimonial in character....
Furthennore, the relationship in Christian benevolence is specific and personal; it nurtures
responsible neighborliness, and thereby reinforces the living unity of God's created family.
···Moreover, as already stressed, Christian stewardship is voluntary. This quality
confers on the donor as great a benefit as on the recipient." Ibid., 58.
93 "The Christian message involves individual responsibility to use personal

po~sessions for the compassionate care of loved ones and of the needy; it suggests no
~s1gnment or transfer of legal responsibility to the state for the needs of others." Ibid.,

7.

94 Ibid., 16.
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"public welfare programs stifle moral conscience...95 It undermines Christian virtues such

as "the dignity and duty of work; personal responsibility and integrity; individual initiative;
equal justice before the law."96
Justice, not charity, is the proper concern of the state. "Justice is concerned with
what is man's right and due; charity goes beyond such claims."97 The best one can hope

for is a society that protects the rights of everyone impartially and fairly. "In a fallen
society justice best protects the civil and political rights of all because it is impartial; love is
preferential. "98
The plain fact is that in the social order all prattling about love is irrelevant when
what is needed is justice. The withholding of justice may be an expression of
lovelessness, and the performance of justice may be described as love in action.
But justice is not on that account formally identical with love, or vice versa. Nor
are they identical in content: love goes beyond justice, although it does not negate
it. Sinful men cannot really grasp the true nature of love, therefore, unless they are
first taught the responsibility of justice through their common subjection to impartial
laws that deal with all human beings alike; indeed, the transmutation of justice can
only lead as well to the perversion of love. Justice deals with one's neighbor as a
member of society as a whole, whereas love deals with him as a particular
person.99

95 Ibid., 58.
96 Ibid.
97 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:408.
98 Ibid., 6:407. "In law and justice--that is, the province of government--all men

are obliged to support man's God-given rights as universally due to human beings
whatever their race, color, or creed. The evangelical knows that no improvement can be
~e on a government that assures every man his rights, and that limits the freedom of
c1ttrens where and when it intrudes upon the rights of others. Evangelicals do not view
government as an instrument of benevolence or compassion, since love is preferential and
shows favor or partiality." Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 7.
99 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 171. Perhaps Henry could find
further support for his argument by focusing on the doctrine of vocation. In one's vocation
~a statesman or judge, one must treat everyone fairly and without partiality. Passing
J~gment and using force are required in one's vocation as a statesman and judge while one
nugh.t, as an act of love, avoid doing these things on an individual level. Henry is
COnvmced that Romans 13 specifically requires government officials to do these things.
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It is easy to see how a state committed to love can easily become a modem welfare

state. A worthy question to raise is whether a state committed to justice might not also have
a concern for economic welfare. It is not difficult to imagine the notion of distributive
justice having an economic element. Aristotle did not think of distributive justice as merely
economic in nature but neither did he exclude the economic realm. Henry seems to assume
that either relative justice does not include distributive justice or that distributive justice
excludes the notion of economic redistribution. I raise the question not to provide the
answer but to bring out an element that deserves further study.100
What forms of government are most appropriate for the task set out by Henry? "The
New Testament ... does not approve any one form of govemment--whether monarchy,
republic, or democracy--as ideal, although it does exclude tyranny. The New Testament
assumes the legitimate existence of divergently formed nations." 101 Henry does believe
that Scripture proscribes anarchy and totalitarianism as forms of political existence. I 02 He
says that democracy is a commendable form of government and that it even "incorporates
political virtues and blessings to an exceptional degree." The mechanical checks and
balances found in modem democracies, he seems to think, are useful restraints on the
· abuse of governmental power. Nonetheless, he encourages one to "guard against
overadulating or uncritically supporting some particular form of government." 103 Even
democracy is no guarantee for justice.
100 Calvin, for instance, would surely agree with Henry's love/justice distinction,
but that did not stop him from calling upon the state to, among other things, care for the
J>O?f and provide educational opportunity. See Strauss and Cropsey, History of Political
fhlloso.phy, 4th ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 329.
101 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 133.
102 "While the Bible prescribes no single form of government, it does repudiate
some forms of political existence (e.g. state absolutism and social anarchy)." Ibid., 100101.
103 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 73.

224
The weakness of democratic government lies in its tacit assumption that if people
have access to vital information they will automatically make the right decisions.
This premise overlooks two important things. First, man is preoccupied with
narrowly selfish concerns, and second, he needs moral motivation to do what he
knows is good and right Because inordinate selfishness and passion easily
overwhelm one's sense of justice, self-government requires spiritual direction in
order to succeed. Precisely at this point the Christian message stimulates those
virtues which contribute to political and social well-being.... To proclaim
universally valid principles and to incorporate them into national political documents
and life will not assure an adequate expression of political morality. These
principles must find reflection in the lives of the citizenry. And when properly
comprehended and appropriated, the Christian message energizes those very virtues
of community life which best contribute to social-well-being. If regenerate.cl men
permeate national institutions with the truth and power of dedicate.d living, a "new
order" of social life may be expecte.d to follow.104
What is the proper role for the church in the political arena? What should it contribute
to the quest for justice? Henry carefully circumscribes the role of the church. "The
Church's mission in the world is spiritual. Its influence on the political order, therefore,
must be registere.d indirectly, as a by-product of spiritual concerns." 105 There are several
things the church should do and several things that it should not do. First, we should look
at the former.
It is clear to Henry that "preaching and discipling constitute the church's primary
responsibility in the world" 106 When speaking of the church's responsibility to preach,
Henry has a specific task in mind. He means proclaiming the "Good News of God's
saving grace to a sinful and lost humanity" for the purpose of "persuading condemned and
lost sinners to put their trust in God by receiving and accepting Christ as Savior through the

104 Ibid, 133. "The weakness of the view that the majority will determine the
content of legislation is that while it suspends on a majority vote the validity of the
Christian or any other view of what is right, it provides no criterion for judging and
assc:ssing that consensus. A majority--even a majority of Americans--can be wrong.
Majority rule is preferable to minority rule in that it provides a shelter against tyrants, but it
doe~ not of itself guarantee the rule of justice." Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular
Soc1etl'.., 120.
105 Henry, Amects of Christian Social Ethics, 105.
l06 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:27.
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Power of the Holy Spirit, and to serve Christ as Lord in every calling of life and in the
fellowship of His Church, looking toward the day of His coming in glory."107 This is a
special task that is the sole responsibility of the church. If the church does not fulfill this
mission, she becomes apostate.

In a certain respect, even the faithful preaching of the gospel is a political act Henry
says the gospel "calls for decisions that lead to hope-giving and rehumanizing
possibilities." 108 But preaching is directed principally to individuals not communities. To
the extent that individuals respond, then society benefits. I()<)
The evangelical task primarily is the preaching of the Gospel, in the interest of
individual regeneration by the supernatural grace of God, in such a way that divine
redemption can be recognized as the best solution of our problems, individual and
social. This produces within history, through the regenerative work of the Holy
Spirit, a divine society that transcends national and international lines. The
corporate testimony of believers, in their purity of life, should provide for the world
an example of the divine dynamic to overcome evils in every realm.110
The second task the church must perform is that of mirroring the kingdom of God to
the world. Henry claims that "the church approximates God's kingdom in miniature,
mirroring to each generation the power and joy of the appropriated realities of divine
revelation." 111 Scripture teaches, Henry argues, that "the church's calling is to

107 Henry, Evam~elicals at the Brink of Crisis. 3-5. "The church's unique mission
is to announce to every nation the universal human need of redemption and the glad tidings
of God's ready forgiveness of penitent sinners on the ground of the Redeemer's
substitutionary life and death, and his offer of new spiritual life through the Holy Spirit."
Henry, "Church and State," 9.
108 "While individuals may be addressed either alone or in a group, all effective
evangelism in the final analysis must be personal. The goal of evangelism is to reach the
wor~d, that is, the great mass of unregenerate humanity, for individual commitment to
Christ." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:531.
l()<) Henry, Evaneelicals at the Brink of Crisis, 48-49.
l 10 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 88.
l l 1 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:543.
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demonstrate what it means to live in ultimate loyalty not to worldly powers but to the risen

Lord in a corporate life of truth, righteousness and mercy." 112 The church serves as an
example.
The Christian responsibility for a more equitable social order is thus to be fulfilled
first within the life of the fellowship of faith, where the passionate concern for
righteousness and love is presumably the daily burden of each and all. The mission
of the Church is not simply to condemn social injustices; it is to exhibit what can be
done to transcend them in a spiritual society of redeemed persons.113
This task is essential if the church has any hope of persuading the world of the truth of its
message. The church will fall short of the perfect standard for which it aims, but it must,
nonetheless, pursue righteousness.114
The third task the church must pursue involves the interpretation of Scripture. He
insists that "... the church is mandated to proclaim publicly the revealed principles by
which Christ the King of kings will ultimately judge nations and states and does so even
now ... "115 These revealed principles are those "which government must promote and

112 Ibid., 4:529.
113 Carl F. H. Henry, "Perspective for Social Action, Part II," Christianity Today.
2 February 1959, 16. "The Church faces the social task, first, of ordering its own life as a
community of the faithful in distinction from the world of unbelief, and this it does under
God for the sake of all mankind. In this ordering of its own life the redeemed community
ought to mirror what is implied in a good society." Henry, "Christian Social Involvement:
Its Basis and Method--A Reply to Dr. Dengerink," 29.
114 "To be sure, the church will always be less than perfect in history, and she
cannot wait to be perfect before she proclaims the joys of redemption by Christ. But if
sanctification is not glorification, nonetheless sanctification is more than justification, and
both justification and sanctification set the church apart from the world." Henry, A Plea for
Evan~elical Demonstration, 120-121. In another place he argues: "The Gospel can rescue
men from the guilt and penalty of sin, and in a remarkable degree from its power. But it
does ~ot wholly transform the world into the church, nor wholly transform the church into
the Kingdom of God." Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1180.
. . l 15 Henry, Christian Counteonoyes in a Decadent Culture, 118. "Because socio~hhtical. obligations devolve inescapably upon all Christians as citizens of two worlds, the
~~ is obliged to indicate what it means for political theory that the Christian life is to be
:intained not only distinct from the world, but in relevant and responsible relationship to
de whole social-cultural realms and to demonstrate the proper performance of political
uty." Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 82-83.
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men must observe for the sake of a just society." 116
... evangelical preaching in the pulpits ought to avoid the temptation simply to be
concerned with the evangelization of members who have already been evangelized,
and to shoulder the responsibility of declaring the revealed principles and criteria by
which God intends man and nations to live and by which He intends to judge the
world and which, when they violate, they do so at their own peril, inviting
ultimately the collapse of any civilization or culture as well as the judgment of
God.117
This entails rather direct involvement in the social realm. Nonetheless, Henry
argues, it is clear "the Church must expound the revealed will of God for the political order
no less than for the other spheres of life, for all are answerable and subject to divine
judgment" 118
Henry points out five reasons why the church must explicate proper social principles.
First, "if the Church fails to apply the central truths of the Christian religion to social
problems correctly, someone else will do so incorrectly." Second, the church must "dispel
misunderstanding of its attitude toward the State" for the "sake of self-protection and self
preservation." Third, in an age of excessive governmental power, the church must make it

clear what can legitimately be rendered to Caesar and what must be withheld.119 Fourth,
in an age of relativism it is essential that the church remind the world of the true basis of

human rights. Fifth, "national life always has a distinctive character." God uses and

116 Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 100.
117 Henry, "Christian Theology and Social Revolution," 22.
118 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 76.
l l 9 In regard to the principles the church must enunciate, none is more important

than that. regarding the limits of governmental power. "The Church's most important
concern 11.1 ~gard to law and order is that government should recognize its ultimate

ans~erab1lity to the supernatural source, sanction, and specification of human rights and
duties.,a.nd hence of government's limited nature and role as a 'minister' of justice. This
~g_rution implies a congruity between the social commandments of the Decalogue and the
Pnnc1ples expressed ideally in the laws of the State." Ibid., 98.
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judges nations in the course of human history, thus Christians must urge their nation to
manifest the will of Goo.120
The enunciation of principles leads to a fourth type of political involvement for the
church: passing judgement A clear exposition of scriptural principles will necessitate
drawing conclusions about current practices. When Henry calls for the "vigorous
declaration of the great principles of social order enunciated in the Scriptures," he means
that the church should be explicit in declaration and specific in application.121 As an
example, Henry claims, the church
... has the right and duty to call upon rulers, even pagan rulers, to maintain order
and justice. It must stress the divine responsibility of government, condemn every
repudiation of divine answerability, and challenge the State's neglect of its duty.
The Church cannot content itself simply with denying church membership to the
unjust and politically immoral. It must also criticize those who violate, misapply,
or refuse to enforce the law.122
All advice from the church regarding politics must have a sound scriptural base.
"The Church's guidance in socio-political matters is nullified unless its statements to church
members are guided in turn by scriptural principles."123 But when scriptural principles are
violated, the church must speak.124
120 Ibid., 82-88.
121 Ibid., 121.
122 Ibid., 81-82.
123 Ibid., 108.
l24 "Christ's church cannot signal hope to those whose destitution and deprivation
annul the dignity and the meaningfulness of human survival if it uncritically condones
members as those who profess devotion to Christ while they consciously support socially
and politically oppressive powers, policies and programs; or if it communicates the notion
that~ believer's only response to political or economic injustice is passivity and
acquiescence; or it if closes its eyes to the public or private abuse of the poor by those who
au~nt its coffers; or if it proclaims evangelism as its only interest in the needs of
~d so that other agencies must implement the concern for social justice. The
Christt~ world mission dare not be labeled sympathetic to ongoing domination and
opr~ss1on when its true mission encompasses new freedom in new life. If wicked
po Ibcal regimes require what God forbids or disown what God commands, then the
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At this point Henry is drawing a fine line that is easily breached. When the church
enunciates principles of justice and judges whether those standards are being met or
broken, it is, in fact, passing judgement on specific political acts. Its judgement also bears
difeCtlY on government officials whose careers hang occasionally in the balance. Thus,
while the church is discouraged by Henry from engaging directly in practical political
matters, as will be shown shortly, he has encouraged it indirectly.
The fifth task the church should undertake is to encourage individual Christians to
participate politically to the limit of their ability and opportunity. He argues that "the
Church as an organized movement must not allow its own energies to deteriorate into direct
political activity, but must encourage its individual members to fulfill their political duties as
a spiritual responsibility."125 Individual involvement will not proceed without guidance if
the church has fulfilled its mission by enunciating the scriptural principles of justice.

Anned with such knowledge, the church should encourage full individual participation in
the political arena.
The church as such must also stimulate members to apply scriptural principles with
sound reason and in good conscience to current political concerns, in quest of
preferred policies and programs promoting justice and peace. Since God wills the
state as an instrumentality for preserving justice and restraining disorder, the church
should urge members to engage in political affairs to their utmost competence and
ability, to vote faithfully and intelligently, to engage in the political process at all
levels, and to seek and hold public office.126
Lastly, the church must pray for the state and urge people to obey it. "The Church is

~stian community may not espouse an ethic of political neutrality and social
nomnvolvement; rather it must be clearly and openly devoted to the Lord of all principalities
and JX?Wers and stand unequivocally only for those purposes for which civil government
~as divinely intended in a fallen society." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:545 .
.;: .the. Christians' moral duty includes civic and political duty as well, the Church dare not
~~fferent to the particular structures and patterns of political order." Henry, Aspects of
~msttan Social Ethics, 99.

l25 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 105.
12
6 Henry, Christian Countermoves in a Decadent Culture, 118.
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obliged not simply to pray in private, but also, as part of the whole counsel of God, to
proclaim publicly the divinely intended role of civil government" 127 This plea for divine
assistance combined with a public endorsement of the legitimacy of the state helps to ·
solidify the opinion that Christians are neither apolitical nor antithetical to the state.

If the church should do these things, what are the restrictions on its activities. First,
"the church is not ... to use the mechanism of government to legally impose upon society
at large her theological commitments."128 The church has a purpose with specific tasks
assigned to it relative to that purpose. It is not to preempt those tasks assigned to political
institutions. The church is not called to implement or promote a modem theocracy or even
a Christian America depending on how one interprets that notion. "The church's
evangelization of society will rely on proclamation and persuasion, not on legislation and
political coercion." 129
The same biblical admonition that Henry uses to circumscribed the role of the state is
used to limit the church. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and render unto

God the things that are God's." (Mark 12:17) The church must focus upon the things of
God.
Were Christians to champion a modem theocracy, they would be at odds with the
New Testament doctrine of civil government, for Jesus Christ never instructed his
disciples to give to God what is Caesar's. Only at his return in the last days will
Christ rule in Caesar's stead; until then, nations will function in a variety of forms,
each awaiting its own final judgment when every ruler will bow the knee to the
King of Kings.130
The church should attempt to permeate the community by shaping the individuals

127 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 81.
128 Henry, Christian Countermoves in a Decadent Culture, 118.
129 Henry, "Church and State," 9.
l30 Ibid., 10.
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which compose it, but it should not attempt to use the state as a tool in that process.
The Christian community has every reason, of course, to seek a "Christian nation,"
that is, a citizenry voluntarily committed to the moral principles of revealed religion
and personally related to Jesus Christ, but the promotion of a Christian state raises
many problems. For this approach fails to understand that ideally the state is an
instrument of justice as due from and owing to all men irrespective of their personal
religious belief or unbelief simply on the basis of their divinely created
humanity.131

The state must remain apart from the church. Its goals, purposes and methods differ from
those of the church.

Present-day obedience to Christ does not require Christians to embody all Old
Testament law and all Jesus' teachings into law. On the contrary, obedience to the
New Testament requires that Christians not incorporate all biblical imperatives into
civil legislation, for two reasons. First, some Old Testament law was intended for
the Hebrew theocracy only; second, Christians are not to rely on legal
implementation to fulfill divine imperatives that they themselves are to communicate
to the nonbelieving world through preaching and persuasion.132
Henry believes the church is mistaken when it attempts to impose its moral code upon
the unregenerate world. He states clearly: "While among its own constituency the Church

may legislate its moral code under threat of discipline, it is not free to force its distinctive
requirements upon society as a whole through techniques of pressure and compulsion." 133

The Church must remember "the political order does not exist for the enforcement of
sectarian objectives." 134
To argue otherwise would make the church susceptible to two undesirable outcomes.

First, it leads to "ecclesiastical exploitation of the state, and second, it results in the political
131 Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 110-111.
132 Henry, "Church and State," 10.
133 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 77.
134 Ibid., 80. "Christ never committed the cause of his kingdom to a magistrate,
never urged that false religions be extirpated by the sword, but provided only spiritual
weapons for dealing with heresy and unbelief. It is dangerous for the church to permit the
state to assist her, since this may conceal Christ's exclusive authority in spiritual matters."
Henry, "The Great Issue," 842.
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deterioration of religion." He writes:
Wherever ecclesiastical hierarchies have sought to conform secular law to church
law, thereby extending the authority of church law to encompass virtually all of life,
Christianity has lost ground in the long run. Under ecclesiastical influence
politicians have sometimes adopted proposals initiated and promoted by the
Church, so that the Church was not openly responsible for their enforcement. The
end-results have been the same, however: ecclesiastical exploitation of the State
and political deterioration of religion.... To impose a particular theory of society
and Christian moral ideals upon unresponsive masses both abuses ecclesiastical
influence and breeds resentment of church interference in government Even apart
from trying to impose a comprehensive Christian program on society, the Church
breeds reaction whenever it seeks to enforce certain precepts that are unsupported
by public opinion.135
To preserve the God-given integrity of the church and of the state, the church should not
attempt to co-opt the state for its own purposes.
Second, Henry asserts that the church should not get involved directly in practical
political matters. All direct involvement must be done by individuals. The church should
not hesitate to instruct its members regarding biblical principles, but Henry insists this is
different from proposing specific policy alternatives and endorsing specific legislative
proposals.136 Henry writes:
I do not think it is the prerogative of the church as an official body to engage
directly in politics--whether the endorsement of particular political parties,
candidates, or legislation. Christians as individuals do indeed have the duty, to the
limit of their competence and ability, of engaging directly in the determination of
public issues as they seek in good conscience to particularize the principles of social
righteousness in terms of various political options. The corporate Church,
however, becomes spiritually vagrant if she becomes a political agency; her mission
rather is to proclaim the revealed will of God, including the divine standards by
which the world order will be judged, and which criteria Godly people ought
therefore to promote and support in the public order.137
His view runs counter to much of contemporary Christian social advice.
Today Christian social action is often so defined as to include the proposing and

135 Henry, As,pects of Christian Social Ethics, 78.
l 36 Henry, "Christian Social Involvement: Its Basis and Method," 27.
l 37 Henry, Evaneelicals at the Brink of Crisis, 71.
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drafting of legislation, its direct promotion by association with and membership in
agencies organized for legislative objectives, and direct lobbying. Thus political
action in virtually every sense becomes a function of the church as a corporate
entity, despite the fact that this is not the task for which ecclesiastical bodies spring
into existence.138
He condemns such activism in harsh language. When the institutionalized church becomes
active in practical politics it "prostitutes its calling and forfeits any claim to spiritual
obedience." 139
One reason for the church to avoid partisan activity involves those dissidents within
the church. For "whenever the Church advances a political ideology or promotes partisan
legislation," Henry argues, "its ecclesiastical leaders are soon forced into the position of
impugning the integrity of influential Christians who sincerely dissent from the official
views."140 Such action is unnecessary and potentially divisive. A second reason is that
"the clergy do not speak with the same competence and authority in practical politics as they
do in spiritual and moral affairs.... The dignity of the church is damaged when
ecclesiastical leaders appear before political bodies to plead special cases in areas where
churchmen obviously lack the information necessary to reach a sound political judgment ..
."141 Last, it opens the church to manipulation. "A church party can be infiltrated by

138 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 106.
139 Ibid., 108.
140 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 5.
141 Henry, ASJ>ects of Christian Social Ethics, 106. Some Christians disagree. Dr.
Jan D. Dengerink points to Abraham Kuyper of the Netherlands who founded a Christian
political party and was chosen prime minister when his party gained majority support. (See
Jan Dengerink, "The Power of the Reformation in Political Life," International Reformed
Bulletin, April 1962.) Similar problems arise when one forms Christian political parties.
Some Christian theorists have suggested that a Christian political party is a necessary tool
of political influence. Henry rejects this idea. "Formation of such Christian parties,
moreover, does not rule out infiltration by those who approve their program but deny their
faith; it encourages the temptation of politicians to use church identification and
ecclesiastical organization as vehicles of personal ambition. Nor does it preclude the
party's sponsoring a program that is only presumptively but not actually Christian, and
clothing a purely political program with a theological role or religious symbol. Moreover,
such parties may endanger Christian unity, since they imply that those who do not endorse
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candidates who share only limited sympathy for its goals; candidates in turn are tempted to
use church identification as a vehicle of political advancement; through its endorsements the
church is placed under subsequent constraint to defend political programs that have
unexpectedly gone awry."142 Therefore, he concludes, "nowhere does the New
Testament provide the institutional church any authority, jurisdiction, or mandate to wield
direct pressure upon government and public agencies for commitment to specific
ecclesiastically-approved policies and programs." 143
Third, the prohibition on direct political involvement includes fomenting revolution.

The church must not act to undermine government. Henry writes:
Certainly the role of the Christian community is not to forcibly demote alien powers
(vengeance is mine, saith the Lord). While they now work rebelliously to elevate
themselves to absolute value, to enslave mankind (Col. 2:20; Eph. 2:2; Gal. 4:3)
and to separate the redeemed from God's love (Rom. 8:35-39), these alien powers
were nonetheless first created in God's service.... The task of the church includes
supporting their rightful claims while calling them back to God's service; the church
is to challenge their wrongful ways, and remind them that the openly attested
lordship of Jesus pledges the sure doom of all oppressive social and political
structures.144
The church should obey, not undermine, government. As a God-given institution, the state
deserves respect and obedience. Rather than undermining government, the church should

the political program are deficient in their faith." Henry, AsPects of Christian Social
141-142.

~.

142 Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 112.
143 Henry, A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration, 46-47.
.
144 Henry, God. Reyelation and Authority, 4:529. "While the New Testament
mdicates that disobedience may at times be a spiritual duty, it does not encourage a
revolutionary attitude toward the state .... The New Testament instances in which
Christians disobeyed rulers involve refusal to yield to attempts to suppress the proclamation
of the gospel. Fulfillment of the Great Commission was explicitly commanded, and in this
mission the followers of Christ were constrained to obey God rather than men.... The
New Testament sets absolutely no precedent for the church's advocacy of mob pressures
and guerilla violence as ways of implementing socio-economic changes; the early
Christians relied on proclamation, persuasion, and example." Henry, A Plea for
Evangelical Demonstration, 47.
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reach people about the importance of the state and its appropriate role on earth. "The
Church must lead men to understand government as a guardian of justice, must condemn
legal infractions as crimes against the State, and must emphasize the culpability of
offenders and their need to repent" 145 When change is needed, it should be pursued via
legal and peaceful means. "Church bodies are obliged to observe civil and criminal laws.
And, if protesting those laws as less than just, such bodies should do so by exploring all
possibilities for change through legal means ... "146 Henry gives great weight to the fact
that "neither the prophets, nor Jesus, nor the apostles, spearheaded revolutionary
movements." 147
The last thing the church is not to do in regard to politics, is to seek narrow selfinterest. The church is not to be another special interest seeking to selfishly promote its
own agenda. "The Church as Church is not to seek from government its own favored
prestige and power in the political realms, nor to support merely what contributes to its
own advancement."148 Self-interest, properly understood, according to Henry, is much
broader. "The Church's 'self-interest' in matters of government is found in the protection
of the rights of all." 149 One should not forget that justice is a universal concern.
Churches should proclaim this important message. "The Church respects an eternal justice
and an authoritative law which is transcendent and objective, and which, on the ground that
all men are responsible creatures answerable to their Creator, allows and preserves the

145 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 81.
146 Henry, "Church and State," 12.
147 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:429.
148 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 78.
149 Ibid., 86.
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rights of non-Christians as well as of Christians." 150
Henry is certain that the Church should be concerned with public affairs in such a
way that is designed to further the public gocxl. It should not merely pursue self-interest.
Single issue politics is inappropriate. Henry decries "confrontational activism that
promotes Christian legislation and a Christian state."151 Henry looks back at 18th century
England when evangelicals
were concerned for public justice, not simply for special evangelical interests. They
identified themselves with the whole body politic in the effort to promote civic
righteousness. They championed a public philosophy and addressed national
conscience. This was not simply a matter of one's private vision of civic decency;
it was a divine compulsion to speak of public affairs in the context of transcendent
justice and of a universally binding social gocxI.152
The lack of direct church involvement does not translate into political indifference.
To the contrary, the church must be seriously concerned with the pursuit of justice while
cognizant of the fact that it cannot be the primary figure in the pursuit of it here on earth. If
the church should not be involved directly in politics, then how shall the Christian faith
shape the political arena? Henry insist that such influence be done by individuals. Even "if
church members are not to be marshaled in support of a political program formulated by an
ecclesiastical hierarchy, there is room nonetheless for a large collective impact by Christians

in society, as a movement of regenerate individuals seeking in gocxl conscience to apply
biblical principles in the arena of public duty, decision, and deed."153 In fact, it is a duty.
"Subject to limits of knowledge and competence, Christians ought to be in the vanguard of
the quest for better (that is, more just) laws.... Upon every believer falls a public duty to

150 Ibid., 81.
151 Henry, "The New Coalitions," 27.
152 Ibid.
153 Henry, Faith at the Erontiers, 113.
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register his influence in public affairs, in school and community matters, and in state and
national politics." 154
Biblical principles provide the guidelines which must direct the involvement of
individual Christians. Expounding upon principle is not enough.
Biblical revelation confines itself largely to ideal principles of social order; it does
not commit itself to particular parties or programs of social reform. A serious
approach to political responsibilities, however, must move from the norm of
principles to involvement with personalities, parties, and programs in the given
situation, and must grapple with their respective claims to serve the cause of justice
and truth. Here the individual Christian must commit his personal support; but he
has no right to commit the endorsement of the Church as a whole.155
The first duty of individuals is to obey the laws of their country. This obligation
applies to everyone. "Christian or not, all human beings are to live by the law of the land,
assured that God wills civil government to preserve justice and restrain anarchy, and that
the legal code itself is therefore answerable to the transcendent will and law of God.156
This is especially true of Christians. Henry insists that "the Christian's chief duty as a
citizen of the community is that of civil obedience." 157 One should be "spiritually
inclined" to obey all laws.158
The Christian's duty to support the State includes observance of tax laws and laws
of community order such as speed limits, parking regulations, and so on. He is not
to begrudge such obedience to statute law, as if the demands of civil government
represent an unavoidable encroachment upon Christian liberty. The Christian
community must promote public morality by personal example and a positive spirit
toward the State. This requirement is implicit in various scriptural injunctions.159

154 Henry, "Christian Social Involvement: Its Basis and Method," 27.
155 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 129.
156 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 214.
157 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 101.
158 Ibid., 79-80.
l59 Ibid., 80-81.
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obedience is required because God wills governments to act in such a way to maintain
order and preserve peace. Rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's means to
render obedience to the laws of the state.160
Are there any exceptions to the duty to obey? Yes.

There is one point, however, where the Christian in the political arena can properly
declare God's revealed will and command to be a principle of political action, and
that is where civil law requires him or her to do what contravenes what God
requires, or requires him or her to do what God prohibits. In the political realm the
Christian seeks by his or her actions to obey both God and governmental
authorities. But when "the powers" require what violates God's command, the
Christian like the apostles will openly declare his or supreme allegiance: "We must
obey God rather than men!" (Acts 5:29).161
There are consequences for individuals who opt for civil disobedience and Henry urges
them to accept them willingly.162 Guidance in this matter must come from the church.
"The church must increasingly clarify when obedience to God requires disobedience to the
state and, no less, when disobedience to the state constitutes disobedience to God. 11 163

160 Ibid.
161 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 122-123. "The mandate of
God's law and of universal justice and interpersonal love transcends that of obedience to all
. earthly authority." Ibid., 133. An exegetical study of Romans 13: 1 would have been
helpful. It says, "Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is
no authority except that which God has established." The key word is "submit" which is
alternatively translated as "obey" or "be subject." Cranfield says: "It seems virtually
certain that in the present verse what Paul is enjoining is not uncritical obedience to
whatever command the civil authority may decide to give but the recognition that one has
been placed below the authority by God and that it therefore has a greater claim on one than
one has on oneself, and such responsible conduct in relation to it as results from such a
recognition." C. E. B. Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, International Critical
Commentary Series (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Limited, 1979), 660-663. This leaves
open the possibility of civil disobedience. For when the state claims greater authority than
that assigned to it by God then it is one's duty to disobey the state and to obey the higher
authority.
162 "The right of conscientious personal protest and disobedience is recognized,
although the resister should be prepared to pay the legal penalties of civil disobedience."
Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 132.
163 Henry, Christian Couotennoves in a Decadent Culture, 118-119.
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Henry is quick to remind us of the societal consequences of unlawful and violent
protest
In a world in which deliberate violation, however, well-intentioned, readily
encourages massive disregard for law ... the refusal to seek change through duly
constituted legal processes may be civilizationally costly. The church knows that
God is the transcendent source and sanction of law, and the clergy especially ought
to know that man is not above it in the absence of a clear and scriptural mandate for
civil disobedience.164
Henry urges Christians to remain within the bounds of the law in combating injustice.
"While this process is slower than revolutionary violence, it is in the long run less costly
and more permanent in its effects, since it presupposes the legitimacy of law. Reliance on
due process of law to eliminate abuse or to reform law remains the best antidote to illegal
acts and unjust laws."165 Even if civil disobedience becomes necessary, revolutionary
violence is not.
This is an area where Henry remains close to the teachings of Luther and Calvin.
The reformers had insisted that civil disobedience, which they frowned upon, must always
remain civil. Resistance to the use of violent and revolutionary means began to dissolve in
the mid-sixteenth century during the religious wars that were prompted by conflicts
between Catholic rulers and Protestant subjects. Tracts such as Vindiciae contra Tyrannos
called upon Christians not to suffer injustice or respect existing authority but to rise up and
replace tyrants.166 Luther and Calvin had insisted that people should obey even a tyrant.
They reasoned that, (1) "no government can be totally bad," (2) "each people receives the
government it deserves," (3) "to suffer wrong destroys no man's soul, nay, it improves the

164 Ibid.
165 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:453.
166 Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, or "A Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants,"
published in 1579 was a very important tract during this increasingly revolutionary period.
Published under the name Stephanus Junius Brutus, it is attributed to a Huguenot author,
possibly Philippe DuPlessis-Mornay (1549-1623).
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soul," and, (4) obedience is the "basis of all stable social life."167 To resist is to defy
God's grant of authority to the ruler and is to sit in God's place as the judge of the nations.

Henry seems to agree. Obedience is God's will, resistance is rarely permissible and must
be civil in character.

Obeying the law is not enough. One must also strive to influence the law. Christians
must remember that
having emphasized the importance of prayer for the State; of study of the Scriptures
for principles of social ethics; of discussion among church members over the
Bible's bearing on current options; and having emphasized the personal influence of
believers upon their fellow citizens, we still face this inescapable fact: Christians
have a vital stake in the specific laws on the statute books.... The decisive test of
genuine political concern lies not simply in developing political theory; it is found
rather in transmitting theory into something concrete and politically relevant.168
"Christians are therefore in and through civil authority to work aggressively for the
advancement of justice and human good to the limit of their individual competence and
opportunity. This they do by providing critical illumination, personal example, and
vocational leadership." 169
The pursuit of justice must be an active one. It is a command that Christians act.

Henry says that "if one professes to be a Christian, talk is no more a substitute for action

167 Strauss and Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy, 338-339. While Calvin
to disapprove of almost all disobedience, Luther specifically permits it in two
mstances. One where "we are called upon to commit an act of clear injustice against other"
and two, "when secular powers step out of their proper realm and presume to prescribe
matters of belief and worship contrary to God's Word." Ibid., 340.
~ms

168 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 126-127.
169 Henry, God. Reyelation and Authority, 3:70. "Current issues will not be
resolved simply by reiterating elemental guidelines for Christian political involvement such
as voting regularly, elevating political integrity and competence above party loyalties, and
supporting spiritually devout candidates who manifest political competence and public
dedi~ation. Christian duty requires individual commitment to and implementation of
practical justice; it is not enough simply to believe in the right and to elect others to promote
and practice it." Ibid., 4:435.
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than faith is a substitute for works." 170 It is a part of one's witness to work for the good.
This not always an easy task, but "Christians as individuals do indeed have the duty, to the
limit of their competence and ability, [to] engage directly in the determination of public
issues as they seek in good conscience to particularize the principles of social righteousness
in terms of various political options."171 To do otherwise is an abdication of
responsibility. "Anyone who excuses himself from the need of understanding political
issues, and foregoes an intelligent opinion of them, is not really worthy of the privileges of
citizenship; he cannot escape a measure of blame for the political injustice and human
misery that follow ill-judged legislation." 172
Henry is eager for Christians to provide political leadership. What is the mission that
humanity ought to perform? "Humanity's work is to shape the cosmos in conformity to the
moral and spiritual purposes of the Creator. It is to be constructive, not destructive, and
hence is to glorify God and promote the good of humankind" 173 In pursuit of this
mission people have the opportunity to make a difference in this world.
170 Ibid., 4:547. "While the New Testament as well as the Old emphasizes the
social responsibility of the believer, it views good works not as the substance of
regeneration but as a consequence and evidence of it" Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink of
Q:W.s., 73.
171 Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink of Crisis, 71. "By active means he must
support and promote those legislative policies most compatible with biblical principles. He
must distinguish and evaluate the live options as competently as possible from the
standpoint of a just political order." Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 135.
172 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 132. Thus, he concludes, "the
Christian prays daily, and ought to work daily, for God's will to be done on earth, as in
heaven. As a citizen of two worlds he will engage actively wherever possible in the
struggle for social righteousness to the full limit of personal ability and competence.
Existing social structures that frustrate human freedom and public justice must be
challenged." Henry, A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration, 122.
173 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 104. Thus, "work is
permeated by purpose; it is intended to serve God, benefit mankind, make nature
subservient to the moral program of creation. Man must therefore apply his whole being ..
: to the daily job." Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 48. "Work for the believer
is a sacred stewardship." Ibid., 31.
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I have stressed that the realm of man's daily work viewed as a divine vocation
constitutes the most accessible and natural bridge from the contemplative world of
theology to the practical world of economic affairs; that to the extent of their
perceptiveness believers ought to be politically alert and active; that all Christi~s
should promote just laws and seek human equality before the law; and that in
confronting social injustice the carriers of revealed religion ought not to neglect its
unique contribution in nurturing personal regeneration, nourishing neighbor love,
and sustaining the noblest moral virtues.174
While all Christians have this responsibility, whatever their vocation, Christian political
figures have a special opportunity and merit special recognition. "Christians who opt for a
career in politics deserve praise [and] should be heralded, if not as missionaries by
vocation, surely as vocational missionaries." 175
Henry sees a real need for better people in positions of political leadership. He
argues that
what the political arena desperately needs is not merely better parties, platforms,
and policies, but better persons. The hour has struck for moral courage.... Paul's
exhortation to the Philippians remains a comprehensive motto for those in public
life: "Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure,
whatever is lovely, whatever is gracious, if there is any excellence, if there is
anything worthy of praise, think about these things (4:8)."176
Political leaders have a higher calling and should remind themselves constantly that they
rule not for the sake of power but for the sake of justice.
In a society in which human beings remain free to mold their immediate political
destiny, the principled politician will stimulate the conscience and will of his
generation to reach as much as possible for the lasting good. The political leader ..
. serves his country and his God best--and his own constituency as well--if he risks
all other claims in the promotion of what he confidently believes to be right and
just. The scriptural norms and principles will function incomparably to identify the
worthiest alternatives.177

174 Henry, Faith at the frontiers, 108.
175 Henry, Awects of Christian Social Ethics, 128.
176 Carl F. H. Henry, "Private Sins, Public Office," Christianity Today, 4 March
1988, 29.
177 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 141.

243
Henry is anxious for Christians to play leadership roles in society, although he

admits that non-Christians can play significant positive roles in the political arena. The
advantages to society of Christian leadership are severalfold. The principal advantage is
that the Christian should be wholeheartedly committed to justice. Once in power, "the
Christian political statesman seeks to sponsor and support just laws and to avoid
impositions that might require citizens to act contrary to the will of God and to a good
conscience." 178 In addition, "it is usually true that the moral principles of a dedicated
Christian politician engender trust. That a Christian politician operates on a distinctive code
of public and personal morality should be readily apparent; the public should recognize him
as an office-holder of high moral dedication." 179
Christians should not assume that only Christians are the best persons for the job. In
democratic regimes, where Christian citizens must engage in the tricky business of judging
candidates for office, an emphasis on the Christian commitment or personal morality of
competing candidates is wrongheaded. "Emphasis on candidates' evangelicalism often
overlooks the equally important matter of their political astuteness, even of their fallibility
simply as human beings; electing godly individuals, moreover, does not in and of itself
remedy institutional injustices." 180 Moreover, "to judge candidates, irrespective of their
positions on fundamental political issues, simply on the basis of personal vices like
profanity, drinking, or smoking, is too naive ... "181 We should not expect spiritual and
moral purity from political leaders. All people have sinned. There are some private matters

that are sinful in the eyes of God (lust and covetousness) that have no bearing on the
178 Ibid., 133.
179 Henry, As,pects of Christian Social Ethics, 140.
180 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:440.
181 Henry, As,pects of Christian Social Ethics, 131.
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qualification for public office.182 The thing that is important is one's political skill and
one's policy views. Henry maintains that:

in the last analysis, sound political judgement requires a verdict on policy no less
than on character.... In an imperfect world the choices are more complex than
whether to support a deceiver who champions flawed political policy or a saint
committed to sound policy. Political and ethical realities often force us to choose
the lesser of two evils.183
What practical guidelines might guide a Christian's involvement? First of all, Henry
encourages working with non-Christians in pursuit of justice. He says:
The truth is that a Christian need not restrict political cooperation to those who share
his theological convictions, because political order and justice are not
responsibilities that devolve only upon persons who respond to the gospel.
Whoever recognizes that justice confronts all men as an objective claim may
cooperate in seeking and advancing a society of law and order, even if the Christian
alone perceives the living God as the transcendent ground of jurisprudence and
justice.184
Quite simply "Christians may and must work with non-Christians anywhere and
everywhere in mutual quest and pursuit of social justice." 185
182 Henry, "Private Sins, Public Office," 28. "Because human beings have a
variety of faults, foibles, and frailties," Henry remarks, "we must distinguish persistent
and consequential moral failure from lesser transgressions, noting the stage of life at which
they occurred and how the offender handled them." However, "since legislation concerns
what is lawful and unlawful" and "respect for law is a prime requisite of an orderly
society," it is clear that one who is given to illegality should not serve in public office.
Henry says that "exposure of one's legal record is relevant to eligibility for election." Ibid
183 Ibid., 29.
184 Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 113.
185 Henry, A Plea for Eyan~lical Demonstration, 68. "Cobelligerency will be a
fact of political life in the decades ahead, not without both gains and losses for each
participating group, and not without frequently shifting alliances for preferred ends.
Nothing in scriptural revelation or in general revelation precludes an evangelical and a
secular humanist from standing together against race discrimination or ecological pollution.
A.humanist may not want to stand with a theist any more than a theist would prefer to stand
with an atheist. But if the issue at stake is human rights and duty or public pollution, not
su~maturalism or naturalism, each can ignore what he or she perceives to be a shaky
epistemology to jointly commend right action and public justice." Henry, "The New
Coalitions," 28. "The evangelical should be counted upon not only to 'go along' with all
Worthy reform movements, but to give them a proper leadership. He must give unlimited
expression to his condemnation of all social evils, coupled with an insistence that a self-
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Henry acknowledges that many Christians avoid the political realm because of the
necessity of compromise. His position is clear. May a Christian compromise on principle
in pursuit of a goal? The answer for Henry is yes. He thinks that
any Christian engaged in the pursuit of social justice is painfully aware that, in a
tragic world offallen men, government decisions often involve a choice between
greater and lesser evils rather than between absolutes of good and evil, and that
only the church of Christ can witness to a manifestation of absolute good in history.
He will, however, avoid both the liberal error of "absolutizing relatives," as if these
were identical with the will of God, and also the fundamentalist temptation to
consider any gain short of the absolute ideal in history as worthless or
unworthy) 86
In fact, statesmanship requires such.
The political statesman who seeks the ideal knows that he must cast his vote (if he
is also a realist) for the best approximation of that ideal among the surviving
options. He does so in humility born of an awareness that he too exists as a
member of a finite and fallen society, and in confidence that despite his own limited
insights he can rely on the operative providence of the God he serves. The laws
that the Christian statesman sponsors are those he conscientiously considers better
than rival options, yet he does not consider them unrevisable absolutes; the passing
of years, sometimes only of months, may require a preferable altemative.187
In conclusion, Henry has claimed the temporal kingdom will never achieve justice in
the fullest sense of the word: righteousness. It can, however, achieve a degree of justice

by being impartial and fair. The extent to which justice is achieved depends upon the
influence of a proper conception of justice: namely, justice as the will of God. Influence is
most significantly brought to bear upon modem society through the institutions of church
and state. Christians thus owe allegiance and obedience to both the church and the state.
Christians are to strive for righteousness in their personal lives and in their public lives.
While realizing that perfect justice is unattainable short of the return of Christ, the duty to
work for such is a requirement of God.
sustaining solution can be found only on a redemptive foundation." Henry, The Uneasy
Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 78.
186 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 7.
187 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 140.
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Maintaining a sharp distinction between church and state on Henry's principles is a
difficult task at best. To the extent that guidance for political matters depends upon
Scripture, the church will forever be tempted to extend its influence and transcend its limits.
To the extent that guidance in human affairs can be obtained apart from Scripture,
separation is more easily maintained but at the price of limiting the authority of the church
and limiting what it has to say. When the Puritans in England, the followers of John Knox
in Scotland, and the Huguenots in France disparaged human reason, we witnessed a
violation of that church/state distinction treasured by Henry. When Scripture is viewed as
the final authority, and the church is the only true expositor of Scripture, the possibility,
nay the probability of some form of theocratic government emerges. For in practice, the
state becomes answerable to the church. If, on the other hand, it were possible for the state
to know standards of right and wrong apart from ecclesiastic direction, then the distinction
is easier to maintain.
To the extent that Henry follows the two-kingdom approach of St Augustine and to
the extent that he relies upon the idea of a creation ethic, Lutheran scholar Mark Ellingsen
thinks Henry may be leaning toward a solution similar to that mentioned earlier in this
chapter. Ellingsen summarizes Lutheran social ethics.
The "two-kingdom" ethic is the fundamental basis for all Lutheran social ethics.
This view takes seriously the Pauline injunction in Romans 13, which suggests that
the state has its own integrity apart from the Church. The two kingdoms, the
kingdom of the law to which the state belongs and the kingdom of gospel, cannot
be confused. However, this is not to say that these realms do not overlap. The
Christian lives in both realms, and God rules in both. God is understood to have
established civil government as part of the created order. The state's Pl!fPOSe, then,
is to help safeguard the creation by restraining evil in human society. f88
The state has guidance in carrying out this important task because all humans have a
common ground on which to build. That common ground established at the time of
188 Ellingsen, The Evan~lical Moyement: Growth. Impact. Controversy. Dia1o~.
344. The purpose of this particular volume is to explore common ground between the
Lutherans and the evangelicals.
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creation is natural law.
Thus the task of the Christian, and of all human beings, is to ensure that
government is in fact ruled by the principles of the Second Table (final six) of the
Ten Commandments. That is to say, social ethical responsibility entails that citizens
work to see that justice is served. The Christian can work side by side with the
non-Christian in carrying out these responsibilities inasmuch as, since they are both
creatures who experience the law by which creation is structured, both have access
to a common criterion (the law, justice) for political decision making.189
This common criterion, natural law, was established by God at the time of creation
and is knowable via human reason. The idea of divinely established standards of right and
wrong remains and the clear distinction between church and state is safeguarded. The
church need not dictate to the state the principles of justice, it need only remind the state of
what the state can know on the basis of general revelation.

189 Ibid., 344-345.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES

In the 1940s, Carl Henry was regarded as a radical: calling for social involvement in
the midst of an audience that was increasingly isolationist This characteriz.ation of Henry
changed when younger and more reform-minded evangelicals responded to his message.
This new generation of evangelicals often criticire Henry for failing to be specific in regard
to practical political and social problems or for taking the wrong side on pressing current
political issues. Politically active evangelicals on both his right and left criticize their
mentor for failing to provide leadership on the hot button issues of the day. His image has
changed and he is now widely perceived as a moderate who is much more concerned with
theological than political battles. This characterization is probably correct.
Robert Fowler, who identifies Henry as a pioneer "within evangelicalism for a new
gospel of social concern," also labels him a political moderate. I His moderation is
exhibited in both his practical political views as well as in the spirit and tone in which he
presents them. While he encourages others to get involved, he prefers personally to remain
apart from the fray. His concern is the intellectual and theological battle, not the political
fights that ensue. Although he frequently comments briefly on raging political issues, he
has not made a practice of doing detailed and substantive studies of current political issues.
To the extent he became involved in policy issues, his views were generally
characterized as conservative. But Henry is not so easily pigeonholed. While he has been

1 Fowler, A New En~a~ement: Evan~elica1 Political Thou~ht. 1966-1976, 77.
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at odds with people such as liberal Republican Senator Mark Hatfield and the radical
evangelical editor of Sqjouroers, Jim Wallis,2 he has also been criticized by those on his
right. For example, it has long been rumored that his departure from Christianity Today
was due to his unwillingness to be more strident in his conservative political and economic
stances. Rumors abounded that he was a closet leftist While maintaining a cautious yet

firm commitment to free market economics his reluctance to lionize capitalism raised doubts
about his sincerity and may have contributed to his awkward departure from Christianity

IQday in 1968.
Criticism has also been leveled at Henry from the left, even though he addressed
squarely, and often sympathetically, many issues of great concern to social reformers. He
spoke of the need to care for the poor, to support civil rights, and to promote the cause of
peace. At the same time, however, he was patriotic, an avid anti-communist, an opponent
of socialism and all revolutionary movements, and a vocal proponent of limited
government.
His moderation has managed to both soothe and inflame fellow evangelicals. For
example, although he took a conservative stance on the issue of women's liberation, his
tone was so conciliatory that he rarely became the target of attack. 3 On the other hand, his
stance on abortion has angered many. While remaining a foe of abortion, he demonstrated
a willingness to compromise on the most volatile aspects of this issue: abortion in case of
rape or incest. His willingness to compromise in an effort to obtain at least some limits on

2 For example, see John Oliver, "A Failure of Evangelical Conscience," PostAmerican, May 1975, 26-29. He criticizes Henry and Christianity Today for their stance
on both the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement Also see Henry's review of Sen.
Mark Hatfield's book Between a Rock and a Hard Place, "A Senator's Quandary," in
Christianity Today, 18 June 1976, 24-27.
3 See Carl F. H. Henry, "Reflections on Women's Lib," Christianity Today, 3
January 1975, 25-26, and "Further Thoughts About Women," Christianity Today, 6 June
1975, 36-37.
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abortion brought him under fierce attack from some forces within evangelicalism.
His moderation is a reflection of both his understanding of what it means to exhibit a
Christ-like spirit and a reluctance to impose what might be perceived as a conservative
sectarian moral agenda upon society at-large. After all, the church is not to impose its
commitments upon society via legislative enactment But perhaps more so, his moderation
reflects what he describes as the difficulty of applying general scriptural principles to
practical real life situations. He points out that Scripture does not address every issue that
humanity is confronted with today. Thus, one cannot speak with the authority of Scripture

in "every realm of human inquiry."4 All one can do is attempt to apply biblical principles
to practical problems.5 This is a task fraught with difficulty. When one is "inferring
particulars from general principles," one should not assume infallibility.6 Henry confesses

that
Giving political expression to evangelical principles and ideals is not easy, for the
crucial problem is how to bridge from normative principles to specific proposals.
Supporting one-sided crusades where biblical imperatives seem clear--abortion,
capital punishment and pornography, for example--is an easy compromise....
Evangelicals need to learn that political action, even when it falls within
governmental authority, is often a matter of doing what seems right at the time in
view of biblical teaching and available empirical data, but also of being prepared to
make later revisions and even reversals in the light of additional information. To
work without governing principles from particulars to general policies carries many
risks, however, for it is then impossible to reach finality about anything. But even
when armed with biblically given principles, one may be confronted with
conflicting inferences concerning a preferred course of action; divergent policy
4 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:42.

5 "In respect to politico-economic philosophy the Bible establishes no approved code
of detailed legislation, but instead supplies principles by which to resolve particular
problems." Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 101. "On many important
contemporary issues we are left to make inferences from such Biblically-revealed principles
as the dignity of human life, the corruption of human nature, the indispensable role of civil
government. The Bible does not directly settle what these principles imply for some crucial
social concerns.... But one nonetheless makes the best decision he can in view of the
available empirical data illuminated by biblical principles." Henry, Twili!Wt of a Great
.Civilization, 30-31.
6 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 126.
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priorities also may result in varying practices.... What Scripture calls for is
responsible choice between options in view of its guidance. While the biblical
framework may often have theological support for some particular decision, it does
not give us ready-made answers for all legislative situations.?
His attempt to apply biblical principles to practical political questions is the focus of
this chapter. Although the number of practical issues demanding attention during the last
half of a century is almost limitless, I will focus upon five that have drawn the most
attention from Henry. In each of the five areas Henry attempts to begin with a scriptural
principle and proceed to apply it to the practical alternatives presented. The biblical
principles employed include the right of private property, the need to seek peace, the
inviolability of human life, the necessity to care for the poor and the importance of
impartiality before the law.

In the area of economics, Henry does not advocate any particular economic system,
although he does believe that some economic principles are taught in Scripture, namely the
right to own private property. He is reluctant to directly associate Christianity with
capitalism, but he comes close. He believes "in the compatibility of responsible free
enterprise with Christianity." His reluctance is due, in part, to the fact that many arguments
for capitalism are merely "utilitarian and libertarian," and thus defective in his eyes and, in
· part, due to the lack of a specific scriptural endorsement of capitalism. 8
His support for capitalism is based on the insistence by capitalist theory that private
property is essential which is congruent with Christian principles as he sees them. "The
Judeo-Christian revelation is clearly on the side of private property. While it provides no

cane blanche for a secular capitalistic civilization, the biblical view does not assail private
property per se, but assumes its legitimacy and reinforces its propriety as a social
1 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:442.
8 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4. Henry points out that many
adv?Cates of capitalism point to the fact that religion often enjoys greater freedom in
capitalist societies and then conclude that "capitalism is therefore pro-Christian." Henry
calls this argument erroneous. Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:587.
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institution ...9 Henry does not, however, insist upon the absolute inalienable nature of
private property. It is an inalienable right vis-a-vis other people, but in the final analysis all
things are God's and people are merely the trustees of what God has given them. "Man's
property right in respect to God is never absolute or indefeasible, but always derivative and
conditional. In respect to the state and society, however, man's property right has formal
divine sanction." 10
Yet this emphasis on a divinely given right does not negate individual responsibility.
To the contrary, every right entails a corresponding duty. "Scripture nowhere approves
private property as a possession that stands wholly at man's free disposition independent of
moral and spiritual obligations. Always and everywhere ownership implies responsible
possession under God and subjection to the just claim of one's neighbors." 11 One must
not forget the purpose for which God has given humanity a right to private property.
All land is intended for appropriate use, primarily that of meeting man's common
needs. It is intended first of all for those who work it, not for those who do not
work it. ... A fundamental fact of capitalism is the dependence of great masses of
people on land and assets that belong to others. Hence, one must distinguish an
order of priority between, on the one hand, property that is necessary for survival,
9 Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 97. "New Testament
Christianity is often erroneously depicted as normatively communistic. There were times
when, for a specific objective, believers voluntarily pooled possessions, but this procedure
is never declared to be a Christian moral imperative; private property is not scripturally
viewed as evil in itself, and a case can even be made biblically that some property is
universally necessary to personal fulfillment. The Eighth Commandment establishes the
principle of private ownership, 'Thou shalt not steal' (Exod. 20: 15). Scripture sanctions
the acquisition of property by legitimate means only (Deut. 25:41Cor.9:9ff), .. " Henry,
"Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1173.
10 Ibid, 100.
11 Ibid., 101. The ownership of property carries with it divinely given
"While Christ did not dispute the right of personal possessions, but
viewed them as a divine entrustment acquired through the use of God-given talents, he
noted that they could all too easily become one's prime concern (Matt. 6:24). Since all we
possess is held as a divine stewardship, the apostles emphasize that one who has more than
others has greater opportunity to bless those who have less (1Pet.4:14f). No true
Christian can be rich and use wealth merely for self-gratification (Luke 12:24)." Henry,
"Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1173.
~sponsibilities.
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property that is necessary for true freedom, property that is held as a service, and
property that is accumulated for profits, and, on the other hand, property that is
aggrandized for power and property that cancels the liberty of others. In the latter
area there exists a special responsibility for protecting the possibility of regular
industry, meaningful labor, and personal freedom for dependent workers. The
worst of all solutions is state control of power in a planned society; less
objectionable is legislative constraint on the free use of power in a democratic
society; preferable is voluntary use of economic power in a morally responsible
way in a spiritually sensitive society.12
When a society neglects its responsibilities to others, regardless of its economic
system, problems are bound to ensue. Capitalism, no less than other economic systems, is
susceptible to such problems. For all the virtues of a capitalist society, Henry says, "one
ought not ... overlook the ethical indictment justly due the possession-mad capitalist
man."13 The idea that a person's property is theirs to use as they please unconditionally is
a pagan notion.14 Crass materialism and the endless pursuit of wealth for the sake of
wealth alone is patently unbiblical.
The only real and permanent solution to economic dilemmas is a new society
populated by new men with new hearts. "Neither a capitalist nor socialist society can
function constructively apart from moral earnestness; only evangelical Christianity can
communicate the transforming virtues essential to the new man and without which society
soon mires in self-seeking selfishness."15 Given the fact that even regenerate people are
capable of sin, Henry concludes, "the Christian message holds out no prospect of
economic paradise" on earth.16
12 Ibid. "The right to possession is not absolute and unqualified, for God is the
ultimate Creator and owner of all (Lev. 25:23); man holds what he has in trusteeship for
God, and even then, Scripture provided safeguards less accumulation of property
permanently disadvantage the underprivileged." Ibid.
13 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:585.
.
14 Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 97. "The Judeo-Christian
view holds man spiritually accountable to God for the use of his possessions." Ibid.
15 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:583.
l6 Ibid., 4:549. "The Christian conviction that flawed man is by nature selfish will
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In a society populated by the unregenerate some limits must be placed upon them.
HeOfY is calling effectively for a regulated free market.
In the absence of voluntary discipline and as an expression of the corporate
conscience of the community, government may be called on to legislate restraints on
undesirable uses of property .... The exercise of freedom without moral and
spiritual maturity soon sets up a demand for legal restraints, including restrictions
on rights and liberty. Preventing the misuse of private property contrary to public
order and the general welfare is indeed the duty of the state, but that is not its first
duty; acknowledging and maintaining private property are the state's prior
responsibility .17
Regulation is essential but it must not extend to the point where it entails the negation of
property rights.
The failure of capitalistic societies to engage in self-regulation propagates socialism
and an enlargement of the state.
The socialist removal of certain functions of ownership from the determination of
property owners and institution of compulsory charity were aimed in part to
overcome the misuse or abuse of property. This possibility is encouraged
whenever the use of property is undisciplined by ethical and spiritual
considerations. Any doctrine of property devoid of biblical legitimation will
inevitably license immoral practices. When man as a sinful creature fashions and
justifies the right of property in isolation from divine prerogatives, he no longer
properly balances rights and responsibilities, but will compromise the one in
protecting the other. Unjustifiable excesses will incur the penalty of unjust
restrictions as well-intentioned but misguided reformers seek to erase social wrongs
by their techniques of compulsion.18
To avoid this plight, a responsibly regulated free market must prevail.
Henry relies in part upon empirical evidence to support his preference for a free
market. Henry reminds readers that "socialism has nowhere achieved the glittering goals it
promised, not even where totalitarian leaders hold absolute state power to enforce it." 19
alert him against the expectation that any economic or political system can be perfect."
Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 22.
17 Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property," 103.
18 Ibid., 95.
19 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 209. In the final analysis,
according to Henry, "the hard fact is that socialism has a plan for the redistribution of
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He also points to the "seldom acknowledged ... (yet) spectacular economic achievement
of the market system. Capitalist economics provides incentives that lift a vast multitude

from the lowest economic level of society to a self-sufficient middle class. "20 The faet that
capitalist economies do not do so perfectly leads him to conclude that unfettered capitalism
is no more desirable than unfettered socialism.
In conclusion, Henry attempts to redirect efforts to reform society away from the

economic realm and to look at the religious and moral realm. The right to private property
is a God-given right and any economic system that ignores this basic principle is unjust.
But adherence to this principle alone does not result in justice. Moral obligations exist for
those who possess private property. "Unjust structures are, indeed, in need of change, but
to expect utopian improvement is futile without a moral alteration of the character of
11

humans who pervert the principles of justice. 21 Thus, economic solutions will not solve
human problems. Individuals must use their property morally.
The second issue that has attracted Henry's attention is war and peace. War is a
difficult issue for many Christians. He says,
the tension in Christian ethics is nowhere more anguished than in regard to war. In
either case, whether it takes up arms or refuses to do so, the church seems to cloud
its mission. This becomes all the more true since modem nuclear weaponry
harbors the possibility of such monstrous destruction of civilian life and ecological
values; what armed conflict achieves by way of restraining injustice often seems to
be sacrificed in the disorder that follows. On the other hand, the victims of
unresisted tyranny grieve for the loss of human freedom and dignity.22
Peace must be the priority for Christians but not at the price of justice. "In regard to war,
wealth but lacks capacity to produce the wealth it would redistribute; capitalism can produce
wealth, provides multitudes of jobs and offers participation to any who would share the
risks and rewards of free enterprise." Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis,"
210.
20 Ibid., 210.
21 Ibid., 213.
22 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:532-533.
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the church must stand unequivocally on the side of peace as its ultimate loyalty, even if war
11

is not the worst of all possible evils and in fallen history justice sometimes requires it. 23
Peace is not mere cessation of conflict, it requires justice.
War is a result of the wickedness of humanity. "It is not governments that cause war
but the lists and imperial ambitions of leaders and privileged groups (James 4:2) ... 24 God
wills civil government to use coercion and force to maintain order and peace. Henry
accepts this as true both within and among nation-states. It is a serious moral shortcoming
for regimes to fail to perform this duty.
Terrible and terrifying as war is--in an atomic age approaching international
insanity--its moral necessity derives from the fact that the refusal to challenge an
unjust aggressor is an immoral response to wanton injustice, and invites the
enslavement and dehumanization of the victims of tyrannical aggression, and the
risk of annihilation as the alternative to subjugation. The ever increasing escalation
of nuclear destructive potential heightens the criminality of the aggressor, but it
does not eliminate the moral duty of potential victims to deny tyrants an unimpeded
victory in history. 25
Henry even violates his own dichotomy between justice and love when he argues that the
state must protect the innocent not merely as an act of justice but as an act of love. He
contends that "a just war is an act of love to those who are defended. "26
Henry is careful to respond to the pacifist position that is popular in many Christian
circles, including the evangelicals. While he agrees that peace should be the priority of any
Christian and that "war is a monstrous evil," he questions whether pacifism is biblically
based.27 In response to the pacifists, Henry asserts that Christ "did not promote 'armed

23 Ibid., 4:551.
24 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1178-1179.
25 Ibid.
26 Henry, As.pects of Christian Social Ethics, 156.
27 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1178.
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violent revolt,' but neither did he anywhere expound a philosophy of politically relevant
pacifism."28 At one point he says that the pacifist ethic is "incompatible with the New
Testament" and he characterizes the peace at any price philosophy as repugnant 29
He thinks the lack of response by the pacifists to gross injustice smacks of
indifference to the world. Such indifference has been a target of Henry's throughout his
career. Speaking of the prominent evangelical pacifist, John Yoder, Henry writes:
Yoder's doctrine of subordination seems to imply that Christians ought not to strive
for an end to slavery and other radical social stratifications in the world, or for an
end to military aggression by predatory powers. This seems like a sophisticated
way of saying that soul-salvation (the church) has nothing to do with responsibility
for the larger body (the world) within the framework of the whole human family.30
Pacifism misunderstands the means by which God wishes to maintain justice in the present
order. Henry points to the arguments of Reinhold Niebuhr.
As Reinhold Niebuhr noted, the effort of pacifism to make the peace of the
Kingdom of God a present historical possibility places a premium on surrender to
evil. It glosses over Christianity's profound insights into the universal sinfulness
of man and the fallen nature of human history, and oversimplifies the ethic of
Jesus. The New Testament ethic of political justice and peace relies on coercion-the power of the state--to restrain the selfish and sinful impulses of humans. Yet it
repudiates militarism, with its exaltation of military virtues to cultural priority, as
promotive of war. 31
War is undesirable but it can be necessary and Christians should not withhold their support
from nations that conduct wars justly.
The problem of poverty is another policy arena that Henry addresses. His profound
28 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:533. "Nowhere in the New Testament

?~s Jesus or Paul speak to the issue of war in terms of pacifism." Ibid., 4:536. He

ms1sts that Christians are "first and foremost on the side of world peace," and that they
"must pray urgently for peace among the nations." See Henry, The Christian Mindset in a
Secular Society, 106, 135.
29 Ibid., 4:535. Also see Henry, "The Peace Drive in the Churches," Christianity
~. 13 April 1959, 21.
30 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:533.
31 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1179.
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concern for the poor and his demand that not just Christians but all of humanity respond
strikes a responsive chord in many liberal and reform-minded circles. His repudiation of
the welfare state does similar things for his conservative comrades.
Henry notes that "concern for the impoverished is a biblical hallmark."32 "Poverty,
chronic unemployment, human misfortune of any kind are not matters of indifference; they
must stir social conscience to action ... 33 The real question is how to respond.
Biblical commentators interpret Scripture in a variety of ways in regard to its teaching
about the poor. Henry derides those who conclude that since "Yahweh has a 'special eye'
for the poor," the "rich are wicked per se or that the poor are exempt from the requirements
of justice." Rather, Henry contends, "the Bible places no premium either on voluntary
poverty or on the acquisition of wealth. But it does warn against materialistic
preoccupation and the deceitfulness of riches, and it severely condemns all exploitation of
the needy and underprivileged."34 While wealth is not inherently unethical it places upon
its possessors a special duty. Wealth is held "as a divine stewardship" which provides "a
providential opportunity to minister to others... 35 Thus, the real issue is not riches or
32 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 206. In the Old Testament,
"the Mosaic code stipulated certain rights for the poor, including access to gleanings and to
spontaneous sabbatical-year growth. No interest was to be charged by Hebrews on loans
to the poor, nor was a profit to be added when food was sold to them. The Old Testament
law built into Hebrew politic-economic structures a safety net that enabled the poor to
escape perpetual indebtedness." The Old Testament emphasis is repeated and more focused
in the New Testament. Henry affirms that "the New Testament even more vigorously than
the Old affirms God's concern for the poor ... " Ibid., 212-213.
33 Henry, "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" 16. "Yet throughout the long course of

~istory, nothing has done more to stimulate human concern for social compassion and

Justice than has the Bible. Almost all humanitarian effort in the modern world was nurtured
originally not by secular ideology but by biblical theology and ethics. The example of the
Good Samaritan bears permanent validity, calling every man to see himself as steward of
God's gifts and to respond to the needs of his neighbor." Henry, God. Revelation and
Authority, 4:546.
34 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 206-207.
35 Ibid., 212.

259
Poverty but the stewardship of what one has. "The Bible's main focus is on the use of
Possessions, and reflects a consistent concern for the poor. Possessions enable one to
support and advance evangelical witness in the world, to minister to the needs of the
household of faith (James 2:16), neighbors (Lev. 19:18), and others in need (Gal.
6:10)."36 In fact this message is applicable to both the wealthy and the poor.
The wealthy and the less fortunate also are to steward all they have for the good of
the whole; everyone's contribution and dedication is to nurture and enrich the global
Christian family. God has a special eye for the poor, a special duty for the rich
amid the seductive temptations that face both: the former, lust for things as the
essence of life, the latter, love of riches. Christians are to stand on the side of the
poor against exploitation, injustice and oppression; sensitive to human needs, they
are to respond generously as God has enabled them. They are to do all this,
moreover, not in a comer, but openly in the midst of mankind--not for ostentatious
show, but to manifest what it means to be God's people.37
Christians have a special motivation to care for the poor. "Christianity assuredly has
a distinctive motivation for compassion in its emphasis that all human beings bear the

imago Dei, that Christ died for sinners, and that love of neighbor is a cardinal
commandment"38 But the message is not merely for Christians. This message applies to
both Christians and non-Christians. "Social responsibility is not a responsibility that
devolves one-sidedly on Christians. Sensitivity to the destitute, even on the part of the
· poor toward each other, is a duty to be shared by all men inside and outside of

36 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1173.
37 Ibid., 4:496. To do so imitates the example of Christ. "Jesus unobtrusively gave
to the poor (cf. John 13:39) and Paul took up collections for the poor. Distribution to those
in need is viewed biblically as evidence of love for God (Lev. 25:55; Matt 19:21 ). "
Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1174.
38 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 207. Caring for the poor is not
merely a pre-evangelistic act. "Not every loaf of bread given to the starving prepares the
way for evangelistic commitment--nor need it, for feeding the hungry is a duty whether
they respond to Christ in this life or not. They have been kept alive not only for the
opportunity to find life's true meaning and center, but also for God's sake; unregenerate
man bears remnants of the divine image, and God has a purpose in the world even for
those who do not respond to the Redeemer." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,
4:553-554.

Christendom.... Responsibility for compassion in the presence of human destitution and
for justice in the social order is as universal as the human race ... 39
Scripture contains several necessary reminders about the nature of poverty. First,
The Bible speaks of poverty in two senses--material poverty and moral or spiritual
poverty, their interrelationships being far more subtle than many persons imagine.
For one thing, moral poverty often dooms its victims to ongoing material poverty;
the lack of a spiritual view of reality at any rate condemns man to materialistic
misconceptions which obscure even the sacramental significance of bread and water
and destine him to a double deprivation and depletion of life. While both kinds of
poverty are lamentable, spiritual impoverishment is far worse than material poverty,
because those afflicted by the former can, if they will, do something to reverse their
plight.40

All of mankind, apart from salvation, suffers from spiritual poverty.41 Second, Scripture
points out that while material poverty may indeed be the result of spiritual poverty it might
have other causes such as exploitation, personal idleness, negligence, or "neglect of good
counsel." Thus, "the notion of the 'innocent poor' therefore has somewhat limited
applicability...42 Nonetheless,
For all that, many of the Psalms do ascribe the plight of the poor to enemies and
evildoers. The fact that God has a special eye for them is ample reason for God's
people to take up the cause of the poor (Job 29: 14-16).... What Scripture says
about the insensitivity of the affluent toward the destitute ought to smite the
conscience of both Christians and non-Christians alike. To exploit the poor is
wicked, and to neglect their distress, equally so.43
How should we respond to poverty? The response must begin at the individual level.
"The Christian message involves individual responsibility to use personal possessions for
the compassionate care of loved ones and of the needy; it suggests no assignment or

39 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:546.
40 Ibid., 4:550.
41 Ibid., 4:587.
42 Ibid., 6:409.
43 Ibid.
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rransfer of legal responsibility to the state for the needs of others. ,,44 Just as individuals
have a responsibility to care for the poor, the individual in poverty also has responsibilities.

There is a need to "emphasize to the impoverished the importance of self-responsibility and
self-reliance, rather than of dependence on society and on government for survival. ,,45
Christians should establish work and/or training programs for the unemployed
according to Henry. "The alternative to government panaceas is voluntary action that
includes each and every person in some kind of constructive involvement As his brother's
keeper, man as man has universal obligations to his neighbor in need." Henry is willing to
concede that "where voluntary programs do not or cannot meet the need, temporary
government provision of useful public labor should be the answer. "46
Henry does not stop at this point He acknowledges that individual action alone is
not sufficient.
The next response is in terms of the nuclear and extended family. The critical
importance of the family as the primary social unit must not be undermined by an
emphasis on societal care that neglects familial responsibility.... Next, the state's
special duty to its citizens, paralleling the duty of citizens to the state, is to be
reinforced. 47
State involvement in poverty relief, however, is to be very limited in scope. "No one
questions government's proper place in relieving human needs in times of unusual
emergency.... For the government to assume a continuing, controlling role as
benefactors, however, is quite another matter. 48 Such a idea arises from a misconception
11

regarding the role of government. "Welfare statism stems from the spurious notion that
44 Henry, "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" 17.
45 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 210-211.
46 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:552-553.
47 Ibid.
48 Henry, "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" 15.
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government exists not primarily to promote justice but to extend economic security and
equality."49 When the desire to provide economic security becomes foremost among
governmental goals, undesirable side-effects emerge including the undermining of such·
Judeo-Christian virtues as "the dignity and duty of work; personal responsibility and
integrity; individual initiative; [and] equal justice before the law."50
Society has the responsibility to provide opportunities for individuals to provide for
themselves. "The duty of work implies the right to work. The New Testament correlation
of working and eating ('If a man will not work, he shall not eat.' 2 Thessalonians 3: 10)
implies that a society in which joblessness prevails should consider the provision of
constructive work a prime concern."51
In conclusion, Henry is quick to assert that, "one's response to the plight of the poor

is a significant test of one's sensitivity to biblical justice. "52 But the correct response is for
concerned individuals to act privately and aggressively to relieve the problem. Government
involvement is rarely desirable.
The next policy area concerns the biblical principle that demands equality before the
law. Justice demands that all of humanity be viewed equally before the law. This principle
. compelled Henry to become a proponent of civil rights in ways often unpopular in some
evangelical circles. In particular, as a proponent of Christian social activism during the
1%0s, he addressed directly the civil rights concerns of blacks. Later, in the 1970s and
1980s, his message was expanded to include homosexuals.
Henry wrote early essays condemning racism as it manifested itself in American

49 Ibid., 58.
50 Ibid.
51 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 104.
52 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:434.
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society.53 He was disappointed with conservative Christian acceptance of the status quo in

regard to racial issues. In his editorials for Christianity Today he urged legislative and
judicial bodies to move forward on civil rights issues. He boasts of the time when he
"personally wrote Lyndon Johnson heralding his signing of civil rights legislation as his
finest hour in the White House ... 54 At the same time, he urged leaders of the civil rights
movements to show restraint and to be law-abiding in their efforts to demonstrate and
provoke change.
The denial of civil rights on the basis of race is a denial of the principle of the equality
of all of humanity before the law. "Certainly created inequalities exist in individuals, but
just as certainly they exist irrespective of race...55 To imply that differences based on race
are sufficiently significant to permit legal distinctions is racism at its worse. "Scripture
condemns racism and God judges it in history."56 It is a rejection of our duty to love our
neighbor. Furthermore, "racial injustice to any minority should be considered implicitly a
threat not simply to one's own kind but to all humanity. The Christian has double
motivation for identifying with the victims of race discrimination, first, he knows that God
created all men of one flesh, and second, that Christ died for all and is head of a body
transcending racial situations. 11 57
The civil rights discussion among evangelicals becomes especially heated when we

53 Carl F. H. Henry, "The Church and the Race Problem," Christianity Today, 18
March 1957, 20-23, and "Desegregation and Regeneration," Christianity Today, 29
September 1958, 20-21.
54 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4.

55 Carl F. H. Henry, "Race Tensions and Social Change," Christianity Today, 19
January 1959, 22.
56 Henry, "Christian Personal and Social Ethics," 1175.
57 Ibid.
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tufI1 to the homosexual community. Most evangelicals agree with Henry that "the biblical

revelation declares practicing homosexuality to be offensive to God, a sin that violates the
sexual ethics of creation and that calls both for repentance and for conscious change... 5g
Regardless of the sinfulness of homosexuality, civil rights is a different issue.
Henry argues that Christian discussion on the issue of the homosexual rights is
hampered by the fact that the "distinction between human rights and civil rights on the one
hand, and human duty and moral license on the other" is often overlooked. 59 One may
condemn the sinfulness of homosexuality while maintaining their human and civil rights.
"To deprive the homosexuals of civil and human rights, as some critics propose, would
inexcusably deprive them of what is inalienable to human nature on the basis of divine
creation, namely, equality before the law in view of one's humanity. The homosexual is
entitled to justice no less than the nonhomosexual. "60 As difficult as it may be, "the
Christian must also defend and champion the civil rights even of those who live by
offensive lifestyles. Freedom to sin is a necessary component of life in fallen society.
Civil government does not define personal sin or seek to eliminate it; its concern is with the
public good and with justice. "61 Christians must distinguish between those moral
58 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:512.
59 Ibid., 4:511-512.
(JO Ibid. "The Bible emphasizes that Christians owe love and justice to all persons-homosexuals expressly included--and ought to be the special harbingers of love and justice
toward the outcast." Ibid.

.
61 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 124-125. It would be
mappropriate to characterize Henry as a gay rights activist He would neither want nor
deserve such a designation. Furthermore, the gay rights movement has not and would not
adopt Henry as voice for them. In addition to his emphasis on the sinfulness of
homosexuality, he has said other things that are certain to repel the homosexual
community. For example, he denies that homosexuality is natural. "The debate over the
h~an or civil rights of homosexuals should not be confused by analogies with race
discrimination or concerns of religious freedom; people are born with black or white or
brown but they are not born gay. Gays can and ought to alter their lifestyle even if we
must not infringe upon their political rights." Furthermore, he seems willing to permit
communities to place some restrictions on practicing homosexuals. Following his
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standards demanded of believers and the rights guaranteed to all members of the human
race. One falls within the purview of the church and the other of the state.
The last policy area to be explored relates to the biblical principle of the inviolability
of human life. In this regard it is interesting to look at Henry's views on abortion,
euthanasia and capital punishment
The debate over capital punishment has raged throughout Henry's career. His
position appears to be congruent with his first principles. First of all, it should be recalled
that rights are little more than the flip side of duties. Ignoring one's duties, in his eyes,
means forfeiting one's rights. One of man's duties is to respect and honor the lives of
others. When one ignores that duty and takes the life of another in a premeditated manner,
Henry believes they forfeit their own right to life. The state, in the name of justice, not
only may take a murderers life, it must do so.
Henry is convinced this position is biblical and he marshalls substantial scriptural
evidence for his position. Among other texts he points to Genesis 9:6.
The classic text on capital punishment (Gen. 9:6), ... reinforces universal res~t
for the sanctity of human life by dooming a murderer to forfeit his life for
destroying that of a fellow-human made in God's image. The sanctity of human
life is guaranteed not simply by God's original creation of it, but also by a
relationship to Him in which all human beings stand perpetually in distinction from
the animal world. 62

emphasis on the civil rights of homosexuals, he hastens to say: "That does not mean, of
course, that homosexuals ought to be welcomed automatically as teachers of sex education
courses (what about celibates?), or that they necessarily qualify for all other roles whose
criteria are determined responsibly by community decision. Homosexuality per se no more
automatically excludes or disqualifies a teacher from competence in most areas of learning
than celibacy or heterosexuality automatically qualifies someone to teach." Ibid.
.
62 Henry, Twili~ht of a Great Civilization, 69. The scripture verse reads:
''Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God
has God made man." (Gen. 9:6, NIV) Jesus "warned Peter that to 'die by the sword' is
!he .Punishment proper to those who take human life (Matt. 26:52) ... " Ibid., 71. "Paul
mdicates that capital punishment was a prerogative divinely conferred on civil government
(Rom. 13: 14), and in Acts 25: 11 he indicates he would submit to a death sentence if he
were 'an offender worthy of death."' Ibid.
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He concludes that "nowhere does the Bible repudiate capital punishment for premeditated

murder. not only is the death penalty for deliberate killing of a fellow-human permitted. but
it is approved and encouraged, and for any government that attaches at least as much value
to the life of an innocent victim as to a deliberate murderer, it is ethically imperative."63
Such an act on the part of the state has as its purpose the vindication of right In fact
for Henry retribution is the purpose for all punishment 64 The ultimate earthly penalty
reinforces the importance of human life. "Divine decree of the death penalty, which
declares murder an affront to the divine image (Gen. 6) affirms at one and the same time
both that human life has immense worth and that its worth can be jeopardized. "65
He argues that the same biblical principle is at stake in the debate over abortion,
although he strangely seems willing to compromise on this issue. His concern over the
abortion issue is obvious. "The present generation's most horrendous injustice lies in its
wanton destruction of prenatal human life. "66
Abortion runs contrary to Henry's understanding of human worth. He argues that,
Christianity does not measure human life by its functional value to society. Human
worth is fixed by divine creation in the ima.go Dei, and Christ's redemptive death,
moreover, proclaims man's worth even in a sinful condition. Functional worth to
society is therefore not the prime question to be raised about the survival of the
genetically unwanted or disadvantaged, any more than private sexual pleasure,
individual convenience, the cultural mindset or totalitarian decree are to be

63 Ibid., 72. "Mankind's duty of rendering life for life is not to be carried out in a
context of primate vengeance, but rather in a context of civil government which under Gcxl
wields the power of life and death. Where the state considers the life of a deliberate
~urderer to have greater value than the life of an innocent victim, it demeans the imago Dei
m mankind and weakens the supports of social justice." Ibid., 71.
.
64 "The primary purpose of punishment is not the reform of the offender but the
ymdication of the right and the peace and safety of society." Henry, The Christian Mindset
m a Secular Society, 134.
65 Henry, "The Gcxl of Bible and Moral Foundations," 14-15.
66 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 102.
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considered the final determinant in evaluating fetal life. 67
He denies the argument that the abortion debate is actually a debate over women's rights.
He insists it is a debate over human rights, namely the rights of the fetus. "Life in the
womb is not life as it exists after delivery, but it is human life in some form. This can be
argued both biblically and medically. "68 As a form of human life, the fetus has a right to

life that cannot be ignored.
A woman's body is indeed not the property of others but is her own to control
under God in responsible relation to society. But pregnancy indicates that she has
shared her body and stands in relationship to a second and third party, and through
those to society. Abortion cannot be catalogued with suicide as a merely personal
decision, since the life involved is not the mother's own, and the question remains
whether the fetus has its own right to life. 69
Henry is less adamant in his opposition to abortion, in a practical sense, than one
might assume. He readily concedes the acceptability of abortion in all of the difficult cases
such as incest, rape, when the mother's life is threatened and even when the fetus suffers
from severe mental deficiencies. 70 He reasons as follows:
67 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 14.
68 Henry, Christian Countermoves in a Decadent Culture, 59-60. He quotes the
psalmist:
"Thou it was who didst fashion my inward parts;
thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb
Thou knowest me through and through:
my body is no mystery to thee,
how I was secretly kneaded into shape
and patterned in the depths of the earth.
Thou didst see my limbs unformed in the womb,
and in thy book they are all recorded;
day by day they were fashioned,
not one of them was late in growing."
(Psalm 139: 13-16 NEB)
69 Ibid.
.

70 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 15. "That abortion may be

~ustified in relation to higher values--when the mother's life is threatened, for example, or

m cases in incest and rape--is not disputed." Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular

Societx. 139.
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When childbirth would endanger the mother's life abortion can be morally
justifiable. The fetus seems less than human, moreover, in cases of extreme
deformity in which rational and moral capacities integral to the imago Dei are clearly
lacking. The scriptural correlation of sexual intercourse with marriage and the
family, furthermore implies an ethical basis for voluntary abortion in cases of incest
and rape. But the ready sacrifice of fetal life as a means of sexual gratification and
of birth control is monstrous.71
He realizes some Christians disagree with his willingness to accept all of these
exceptions to a prohibition on abortion, but he seems to think the good that might result
from this significant concession would outweigh its disadvantages. He notes that
some persons contend that the sanctity of dignity of full personhood belongs to
every fetus--whatever its so-called quality--from the moment of conception, and
that the biblical precedent of compassion towards the weak excludes abortion on
any ground whatever. But even if therapeutic abortion should be allowable in cases
of radical mental deformity, of incest and rape, and of actual threat to the mother's
survival, no case could be made on moral grounds for destroying the at least
1,425,000 additional fetuses that comprise America's annual abortion statistics.72
Henry proceeds to encourage evangelicals to fight abortion not so much on biblical
grounds as on the basis of "the value system that undergirds the Western society and that
views the taking of human life as wicked." He also points to the United States Constitution
and its protection of human life.73 This view is congruent with his earlier emphasis on the
necessary dependence on tradition and social consensus as a basis for promoting the
Christian agenda.
Paul Fowler argues that the acceptance of exceptions in difficult cases provided the
open door through which abortion on demand entered American society. Thus, on

71 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 103. His argument is simple
but controversial. "Where incest or rape is involved, one might argue for the legitimacy of
abortion on the ground that God wills intercourse and conception within monogamous
marriage, and that the aggrieved victim of assault should not in these circumstances be
penalized by a violator's aggressions." Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral
Foundations," 15.
72 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 16.
73 Henry, "Church and State," 10.
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pragmatic grounds, he objects to Henry's position. But even more than that, he claims
Henry is waffling in his regard for the value of human life. Fowler asks, "Is Henry saying
that a child must measure up to certain 'rational and moral' standards to assume the imago

Dei?" Furthermore, "rape and incest certainly are horrible experiences. But how can the
fact that intercourse took place outside of the marriage relationship be used as the moral
basis for justifying abortion in these cases? Are we to believe that only those conceived in
a marriage relationship are sacred? Are all those conceived outside of marriage open to
abortion? We should note that the majority of abortions are done for women conceiving
out of wedlock... 7 4 In other words, if conception outside of wedlock is a good argument
for permitting abortions, then few abortions will be stopped. Sharp questions such as
these, and the failure of Henry to respond, has resulted in a division between him and those
within the anti-abortion movement in America
Henry feels that the same principles and arguments apply for the question of
euthanasia. He says, "in principle there is little if any distinction between euthanasia and
abortion ... 75 He points to the consequences of the pro-abortion position.

If the life of a helpless fetus is forleitable simply because parents sense no moral
obligation to spare it and the mother wills its death, do the mother and father, in
principle, forfeit any rights to their own survival if they become helpless and their
children are disposed to destroy them? If the decision to preserve or destroy rests
upon personal convenience or social considerations such as overpopulation, is not
the case even stronger for the child's disposal of a parent approaching senility.76
He doesn't, however, consider the consequences of his own position on abortion. If
abortion is permitted in the so-called hard cases, might not euthanasia also become
acceptable in hard cases.
Henry's practical political positions rarely please everyone, but the criticisms often
74 Fowler, A New En~a~ement: Evan~lical Political Thou~ht. 1966-1976, 82.
75 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 4:606.
76 Henry, Christian Counteunoves in a Decadent Culture, 59.
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leveled against him are patently unfair. Many evangelicals, if they disagree with an
argument, hasten to argue that the position is not biblical. The quick reference to such a
basic authority within evangelicalism effectively short circuits worthwhile debate. For·
example, one scholar wrote: "There is simply no axiomatic connection or logical necessity
between Henry's biblical principles and his specific prescriptions... 77 He goes on to assert
that Henry is merely parroting "the American way" and is attempting to use Scripture to
rationalize "democratic politics and capitalistic economics."78 Such inflammatory
accusations are not only incorrect but unnecessary and are not conducive to the pursuit of
truth.
While I would agree with some critics that Henry's biblical support for some of his
practical positions borders on proof-texting, it seems this assertion misses the main point.
Henry has never claimed that one can turn to Scripture to find answers to practical
problems of the sort discussed in this chapter. Rather one must use reason to apply
scriptural principles to particular situations. The question becomes, then, not whether a
specific position is biblical, but whether a principle is biblical and whether it is being
applied properly to the situation at hand. Henry's critics thus have the burden of proving
that Henry's understanding of biblical principle is in error or that the conclusions he
deduces are false. I would tend to agree that he does not provide as much biblical support
for some of his principles as one might expect or desire. Nonetheless, if for no other
reason, one should assume that there is more to the argument than Henry often bothers to
provide given that there is a long tradition within Christianity that espouses similar
77 Dempster, "The Role of Scripture in the Social Ethical Writings of Carl F. H.
Henry," 10. "As Henry argues for particular positions, he seeks legitimation by
surrounding that position with so-called biblical principles, imagery, parables, and stories.
The more controversial the issue, the more he alludes to parables, key-ideas, and narratives
to justify his moral prescription. Thus, the process of justification is more psychological
and sociological than logical ... " Ibid., 15.
78 Ibid., 59.
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Positions. Thus, one must turn to other sources to follow the debate in greater detail.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

It is surprising that so little attention has been paid to the contributions of Henry.
Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that evangelicals have spent the past several decades
on the fringes of intellectual and political life in America. This study has attempted to
demonstrate that Henry has seriously engaged intellectual and political concerns; perhaps
more so than any other leading evangelical figure. Because of his efforts, he merits study
as a serious and important thinker.
Henry does not consider himself to be a political philosopher, rather he is a
theologian. He has not attempted to construct a comprehensive political philosophy. Even
his most ambitious work to date, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, fell short of his own
expectations. After writing Christian Personal Ethics, he intended to write a
comprehensive volume on social ethics. His editorial responsibilities at Christianity Today,
which grew to a circulation of 150,000, were too pressing to permit him to do so. Thus,
his one extended effort in the field was little more than a compilation of lectures delivered at
Fuller Theological Seminary. In the text he admits that "a fundamental analysis of politics
from a Christian point of view lies outside the scope of this study, but it remains one of the
urgent tasks of our age." 1
Nonetheless, his theological studies have led him to what he believes are significant
1 Henry, Aspects of Christian Social Ethics, 77. As late as the 1970s, Henry still
was hopeful that he might be able to write a major work on Christian social ethics.
~owever, in a personal letter dated June 1, 1988, he noted regretfully that he had given up
his intention to write such a book.
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political insights. What can we learn from him? In terms of an analysis, we should ask
several questions. What are his contributions to political discourse? What are the political
principles that he concludes are indispensable in our quest for justice? What are the
problems, if any, with his analysis? What are the implications for further study for
evangelicals? What, indeed, has he contributed to the quest for a just political order?
What are Henry's most significant contributions? He has exploded the typical
political caricature of an evangelical as a knee-jerk intolerant conservative. He has
reactivated a significant element in American society and helped to transform them from an
apolitical, anti-intellectual community into a politically active and intellectually alive
segment of American society. His final contribution, and probably his most significant
one, has been a renewed emphasis on divine revelation as a source of knowledge to guide
our quest for justice.
In recent years, evangelicals have had to contend with an image, or more accurately a
caricature, that portrayed them "as a bastion of unwavering conservatism" possessed with a
"fanatical intolerance of cultural diversity." University of Virginia sociologist James
Hunter claims this image is not unrelated to historical reality but it is an inappropriate image
for evangelicals today. While the evangelical community is politically conservative, and
there are elements within evangelicalism that are extremely conservative, an accurate
portrayal of Henry makes it clear that this leading evangelical figure is hardly a knee-jerk
intolerant conservative. His conservatism is moderate and intolerance and fanaticism are
nowhere to be found. 2
2 In two interesting studies, these images are dispelled, in part, for the broader
evangelical community. See James Hunter, "Religion and Political Civility: The Coming
Generation of American Evangelicals," Journal for the Scientific Study of Reli~on 23
(1984): 364-380, and Evan~elicalism: The Comin~ Generation (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1987). Hunter claims that "fully developed political divisions
covering the entire ideological spectrum exist in [evangelical] subculture." He discovers
that evangelicals are more conservative than other voters but not radically so. Furthermore,
the fear that the rise of the Christian Right is a serious threat to the liberal traditions of
democratic tolerance is unfounded. In fact, "it is fair to say that in principle they strongly
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Henry's moderation is apparent when one looks at practical political issues of the past
three decades. 3 Throughout this period he was critical of those on both his left and his
right 4 His own positions often defy simple characterization. While a foe of abortion, he
seems quite willing to compromise on the issue in the public arena. While demanding that
public schools not ignore the decisive role religion has played in American history, he is
not an advocate of school prayer. While insisting we have a responsibility to protect
ourselves and others from unjust aggression, he questioned the build-up of the American
military establishment. While critical of the welfare state, he insists individuals are
responsible to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves. While deploring
unlawful forms of protest, he was an early advocate of the civil rights movement. While
adamant in his opposition to socialism, he warns of the dangers of unfettered capitalism.
His practical political positions rarely fit into the stereotypical liberal or conservative
framework. 5
defend the right of others to believe and to live as they wish." Evangelicalism, 151.
Hunter makes no attempt to credit Henry for these developments but it would be difficult to
imagine that he deserves no credit for influencing a movement that he helped spawn and
has nurtured throughout his entire life.
3 See chapter five in Fowler, A New Engagement: Evangelical Political Thought.
1966-1976. Another scholar who characterizes Henry in a similar vein is Ellingsen, The
Evangelical Movement: Growth. Impact. Controversy. Dialog. 277.
4 See Henry's criticism of the knee-jerk conservatism of the stereotypical Moral
Majority member in "The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Ricochet of Silver Bullets,"
Christianity Today, 4 September 1981, 30-31.
5 One interesting and surprising incident in Henry's life involves his signature on a
rather radical political statement in 1973. Given Henry's association with the political
right, his emphasis on the individual, and his patriotism, it seems surprising that Henry
signed the Chicago Declaration. Issued with great fanfare, this document, signed by over
fifty prominent evangelicals could be interpreted as both a confession that the evangelical
community had not sufficiently responded to Henry's call to political action nearly 30 years
prior as well as a declaration of an intent to act now. Implicit in the document is an
undercurrent of anti-Americanism, a stress on the priority of social structures and a
tendency to give an economic interpretation to politics. I have no explanation of why
Henry signed his name. He has indicated that he attended because he wanted to provide
"balance" to the meeting, but that does not explain why he would sign a document at the
end of the meeting that runs counter to his life's work. The signatories of the document
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Perhaps Henry's greatest practical achievement was to resuscitate political thinking
on the part of evangelicals who were neglecting both their theological heritage as well as
biblical directives. Henry is widely recognized for his efforts on this front Even critics
such as Lewis Smedes readily confess that "no single person has done more to awaken the
fundamentalist conscience on the score of social ethics than has Carl Henry. "6 His
message was sorely needed. Politics is not the final solution to the human dilemma but it is
far too important to ignore. "Though the modem crisis is not basically political, economic,

or social-fundamentally it is religious-yet evangelicalism must be armed to declare the
implications of its proposed religious solution for the politico-economic and sociological
context for modem life. ,,7 He insisted that evangelicals "are warriors with a mission in the
world. "8 That mission entails spreading the good news (preaching the gospel of
justification) and promoting the cause of justice.
By no means is Henry satisfied with the response to his call. Although his first
significant statement was made in 1947, he reiterated the necessity of public involvement
throughout his life. To the extent that portions of the evangelical community heeded his
call, they often did so in ways disturbing to Henry. "Having emerged from their
subcultural cocoon, evangelicals now are often politically and culturally engaged in ways
no less troublesome than their earlier disengagement. ,,9 He blames this faulty engagement
represent many leaders among left-leaning evangelicals. For example, John Alexander,
Stephen Mott, David Moberg, Richard Pierard, Ron Sider, Lewis Smedes, Jim Wallis and
John Howard Yoder. See Ronald J. Sider, ed. The Chicaiw Declaration (Carol Stream, IL:
Creation House, 1974 ).
6 Smedes, "The Evangelicals and the Social Question," 9.
7 Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism, 84.
8 Henry, Twili~ht of a Great Civilization, 44.
9 Henry, "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited," 4. "Devoid of a comprehensive
J>?litical philosophy, evangelicals as individuals or groups tended to be confrontational and
smgle-issue oriented." Ibid., 6.
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on a lack of serious thoughtful attention to politics. In other words, instead of thinking and
acting, fellow evangelicals are guilty of merely reacting. IO
While motivating and justifying active political involvement, Henry also attempted to
refute the image of anti-intellectualism among conservative Christians. His earliest serious
writings were careful critiques of classical and modern philosophy.11 Henry felt
compelled in his early works to investigate the truth claims of western philosophers. He
concluded that their errors were based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of reality,
man and knowledge. If Christianity was to be considered a viable alternative, then the
biblical response to these basic philosophical questions had to be articulated. He spent a
lifetime in an apologetical defense of the Christian faith. Even in the political realm, simple
involvement was inadequate. "The first order of business in presenting an evangelical
social ethic is to expose the false assumptions that control the contemporary alternative." 12
10 Henry is disappointed with the response of evangelicals in several respects. They
have either gotten involved in ways he disapproves of, or, even worse, their involvement
has become divisive within the evangelical community. In part, this is not surprising. As
evangelicals return to the political arena, they naturally begin to investigate their own
theological heritages in regard to political activism. Robert Johnston makes the interesting
observation that the differences today amongst politically active evangelicals can be traced
to their different theological heritages. The evangelical camp, broadly defined, includes the
Anabaptists, Calvinists, Pentecostals, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and Arminians.
Johnston writes: "In fact, it can be argued that the present divergences in social thought
throughout contemporary evangelicalism stem largely from this source--from differing
theological traditions that provide conflicting models for social ethics today. Evangelical
social ethics reflects in its diversity the variety of theological perspectives out of which
evangelicalism springs ... " Johnston, Evam~elicals at an Impasse, 79-80. A new text
that explores the different religious traditions that compose American evangelicalism is
Donald W. Dayton and Robert K. Johnston, eds. The Variety of American Evangelicalism
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1991).
11 Henry, Remaking the Modern Mind and The Drift of Western Thought.
12 Henry, A Plea for Evangelical Demonstration, 44-45. Henry called for
evangelical engagement in all areas, and even practiced it to a certain extent, viz his
involvement and memberships in the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Institute of Religion
and Democracy, the American Academy of Religion, the American Theological Society, the
American Philosophical Association, the Evangelical Theological Society, the Society of
Biblical Exegesis and Literature, the Victoria Institute (Philosophical Society of Great
Britain), the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Society
of Church History, and the American Society of Christian Ethics. Nonetheless, his
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The second order of business was to provide an intelligent statement of the Christian
position. Henry spent his career doing this.
Henry's final contribution is his emphasis on divine revelation. Apart from divine
revelation, he insists, humanity could not know truth. Our quest for justice would proceed
in an interminable fog. We would be lost with no hope of finding our way. He is
convinced that human effort alone leads to skepticism and despair. Interest in divine
revelation is sorely lacking in the modem era If our quest for certainty in regard to moral
and political matters has gotten us nowhere, perhaps a return to the classic Christian
tradition would enable us to regain our bearings.
Henry asserts that Scripture is especially valuable for its clear statements regarding
what humans are to do and what they are not to do. "Christianity says that human beings
are inescapably answerable to a transcendent, objective good. God has personally revealed
Himself and moreover, Christianity affirms, in doing so He has conveyed articulate moral
principles and commandments--in short, a divine-command morality that stipulates how we
ought to live. The written revelation of God, the Bible, is the sourcebook and standard of
Christian morality." 13 This doesn't mean every moral and political question is answered
in Scripture, but it does mean those that are addressed are answered in a definitive way that
demands our acclamation. "The Bible is not a textbook on science or economics or politics

writings were published for the most part by conservative Christian publishing houses
which rarely penetrate the larger market place. So while he urged Christians to engage their
critics and to actively promote orthodoxy in an increasingly agnostic era, many of his
efforts did little more than rally the troops. His most successful effort to engage the
broader theological community was his editorship at Christianity Today. Under his
leadership, Christianity Today attempted to forge a reputation as a thought journal serving
as a counterpart to the more liberal Christian Centwy. Henry was modestly successful in
this regard. After his departure, Christianity Today took a new direction and shifted its
emphasis from a scholarly thought journal to a more popular publication. The intended
audience shifted from scholars and pastors to the typical evangelical layman. The change
occurred much to Henry's dismay.
13 Henry, Twili~ht of a Great Ciyilizatiop, 28.
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or history, but whoever deletes what it says of relevance to these great concerns soon ends
up by repudiating the God of the Bible and substituting false gods and arbitrary views of
science and economics and politics and history."14
What are the specific teachings of Scripture regarding political reality? Henry has
identified several.
1. Above all else, the sovereignty of God is the most basic political principle. "The
sovereign God is ... the source, stipulator, and sanction of the right and the good.
He is the ultimate ground of law and morality. He defines human rights and
responsibilities and the powers and limits of human institutions. In matters of law
and morality there is therefore a higher referent than the will of the state or the will
of the majority, namely, the will of God."15
2. Justice has a transcendent basis in that the will of God is the very definition of
justice.16 "God is intrinsically moral and the sovereign source of all ethical
distinctions." 17
3. Perfect justice awaits the return of Christ. "Only Christ at his second coming
will by decisive power inaugurate the permanent and universal rule of justice and
peace."18
4. Justice is demanded of everyone. "Justice is nonetheless biblically revealed as
obligatory on all human beings and nations." 19 "Evangelicals insist that social
justice is a divine requirement for the whole human race, not for the Church alone.

14 Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 77. "The Bible is critically relevant to the whole of
modern life and culture--the socio-political arena included." Henry, Confessions of a
Theolo~an, 270.
15 Henry, "The Evangel and Public Duty," The Christian Mindset in a Secular
Society (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986), 99-100.
16 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:437.
17 Henry, "The God of Bible and Moral Foundations," 1-2.
18 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 218. "The resurrection of the
crucified Jesus openly identifies the divinely appointed judge of mankind who guarantees
the final victory of justice and righteousness in a triumphant personal return in power and
glory that Christians are patiently to expect." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority,
6:437.
19 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 218.
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The revealed commandments and rules of behavior are universally valid. "20
5. Government is a divinely mandated institution. "God wills civil government as
a framework in fallen human history for preserving justice and restraining
disorder."21
6. The social commandments of the Decalogue are applicable today. "Over and
above affirming the legitimacy of civil government for the stipulated objectives of
preserving peace and order, the Bible, on the basis of a divine-command morality,
sets forth certain enduringly valid social principles. 22 These principles expressly
include the social commandments of the Decalogue.
11

7. Christians should work through government and in obedience to it in an effort to
realize justice in this world "As citizens of two worlds, individual church
members have the sacred duty to ... extend God's purpose of justice and order
through civil government Christians are to distinguish themselves by civil
obedience except where this conflicts with the commandments of God, and are to
use every political opportunity to support and promote just laws, to protest social
injustice, and to serve their fellow men. 23
11

8. Social and political problems are the result of sin. "The evangelical recognizes
that social disorders are in the last analysis a commentary on the disorder of private
life, and that the modem dilemma is essentially a predicament involving persons
who need to be addressed individually. 24
11

9. The message of regeneration is vital. "Evangelical social action throbs with the
evangelistic invitation to new life in Jesus Christ. 'Ye must be born again' is the
Church's unvarying message to the world. Evangelical Christianity allows the
secular world no hopeful program of social solutions that renders merely optional
the personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. It holds hope for the
social order because it offers the prospect of personal redemption. Individual

20 Henry, "Perspective for Social Action, Part II," 9.
21 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:437.
22 Henry, "The Evangel and Public Duty," 112-113.
23 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 11. "A sensitive Christian
conscience may and should be one of the most potent forces for social justice, not only
when law requires transgression of divine commandment, but also when law promotes or
preserves what is unjust; the spirit of prophetic indignation and protest is the Christian's
holy heritage. While the methods of resolving social injustices take different forms in
different contexts, Christians should be among the first to indict blatant and intractable
injustice that contravenes the transcendent will of God and be ready to promote and support
constructive alternatives." Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 6:453.
24 Henry, "Perspective for Social Action, Part II," 15.
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regeneration is not only a chief but an indispensable means of social reform... 25
10. The church must proclaim God's will. "While the corporate or institutional
church has no divine mandate, jurisdiction, or special competence for approving
legislative proposals or political parties and persons, the pulpit is responsible for
proclaiming divinely revealed principles of social justice as a part of the whole
counsel of God. 26
11

11. The church must model a just community. "The regenerate church as a new
society is to exemplify in mind and will the standards by which Christ will judge
humanity and the nations. 27 "The mission of the Church is not simply to
condemn social injustices; it is to exhibit what can be done to transcend them in a
spiritual society of redeemed persons. 28
11

11

12. Human rights have a divine source and a divine sanction. God has granted the
basic rights to life, property and religious liberty to all humans. These rights imply
a corresponding duty that the state and everyone else have a moral duty to observe.
What are the problems, if any, with Henry's analysis? Henry deserves to be
defended in the face of two frequent accusations that have emerged from within
evangelicalism. He has been accused of two offenses: rationalism and individualism.
Prior to a defense of Henry against these charges, a third, and more important challenge,
should be addressed. The challenge of natural law. Although he denies being a natural law
theorist, Henry's position opens up the possibility of an evangelical natural law tradition.
His reluctance to go in that direction is my most serious criticism of his work. 29
25 Ibid.
26 Henry, "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle," 11.
27 Henry, "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis," 218.
28 Henry, "Perspective for Social Action, Part II," 16.
29 What is meant by natural law? A succinct definition by Leo Strauss is helpful.
"By 'natural law' is meant a law that determines what is right and wrong and that has
power or is valid by nature, inherently, hence everywhere and al ways." Leo Strauss,
Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, introduction by Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 137. Paul Sigmund provides a similar definition.
"There seems to be a central assertion expressed or implied in most theories of natural law.
This is the belief that there exists in nature and/or human nature a rational order which can
provide intelligible value-statements independently of human will, that are universal in
application, unchangeable in their ultimate content, and morally obligatory on mankind."
Paul Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thou2ht (Washington, D. C.: University Press of
America, 1971), viii. "The philosophy of the natural law is predicated upon the existence
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Except in some Roman Catholic circles, the idea of natural law/natural right is absent

in contemporary political philosophy. It was this realization that prompted Leo Strauss to
write and deliver his important Charles Walgreen lectures at the University of Chicago in
the early 1950s. Strauss argued that "the rejection of natural right is bound to lead to
disastrous consequences... 30 He foretold the consequences of this trend.
To reject natural right is tantamount to saying that all right is positive right, and this
means that what is right is determined exclusively by the legislators and the courts
of the various countries. Now it is obviously meaningful, and sometimes even
necessary, to speak of "unjust" laws or "unjust" decisions. In passing such
judgments we imply that there is a standard of right and wrong independent of
positive right and higher than positive right: a standard with reference to which we
are able to judge of positive right Many people today hold the view that the
standard in question is in the best case nothing but the ideal adopted by our society
or our "civilization" and embodied in its way of life or its institutions. But,
according to the same view, all societies have their ideals, cannibal societies no less
than civilized ones. If principles are sufficiently justified by the fact that they are
accepted by a society, the principles of cannibalism are as defensible or sound as
those of civilized life. From this point of view, the former principles can certainly
not be rejected as simply bad. And, since the ideal of our society is admittedly
changing, nothing except dull and stale habit could prevent us from placidly
accepting a change in the direction of cannibalism. If there is no standard higher
than the ideal of our society, we are utterly unable to take a critical distance from
that ideal. 31
When we can no longer judge between just and unjust, we will find ourselves in a world in
which anything and everything becomes possible. "If our principles have no other support
than our blind preferences, everything a man is willing to dare will be permissible. The
contemporary rejection of natural right leads to nihilism-nay, it is identical with
nihilism. 32
11

of an objective moral order, within the scope of human intelligence and the capacity of
human virtue, upon which the peace and happiness of personal, national and international
life depend, and to which all human beings, civil societies, and voting majorities are bound
in conscience to conform." New Catholic Encyclo_pedia, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill,
1967), s.v. "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," by W. J. Kenealy.
30 Leo Strauss, Natural Ri~ht and Histocy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press, 1953), 3.
31 Ibid., 2-3.
32 Ibid., 4-5.
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I believe Henry would agree with much that Strauss has said. He would certainly
agree "there is a standard of right and wrong independent of positive right," and rejection
of that standard leads to nihilism. The one area where he would equivocate is very
important. Henry would say that knowledge of natural law, a term he would prefer not to
use, depends entirely upon divine revelation. Moreover, mere general revelation is
inadequate; propositional Scripture is essential.
It seems that Henry's thought raises the theoretical possibility of an evangelical
acceptance of a natural law social ethic. However, he disavows the natural law position. I
believe Henry's disavowal is premature. I shall not develop a full-scale evangelical defense
of natural law. I will critique Henry and, in the process, demonstrate why I believe
evangelicals should pursue this idea 33
I hasten to say that one must separate the discussion of natural theology from that of
natural law. If one defines natural theology as knowledge about the nature of God and
natural law as knowledge of standards of right and wrong, then it is clear this distinction is
valid. Henry rejects outright the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas. That debate is
beyond the scope of this inquiry, although a reconsideration of Aquinas by evangelical

33 The literature on natural law is vast. Among the more useful starting points are:
Leo Strauss, Natural Ri~ht and History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1987); Yves R. Simon, The Tradition of Natural Law, foreword by John H. Hallowell
(New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1965); Paul Sigmund, Natural Law in
Political Thou~ht (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, 1971); Harry Jaffa,
Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1952);
Alexander Passerin d'Entreves, Natural Law (London: Hutchinson University Library,
1951); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Ri~hts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979);
and, Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theozy of Society. 1500-1800, with a lecture on
"The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity" by Ernst Troeltsch, translated with an
introduction by Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). One
should also consult the New Catholic Encyclo.pedia (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill,
1967), s.v. "Natural Law: Historical Development," by B. F. Brown; "Natural Law:
Thomistic Analysis," by J.C. H. Wu; "Natural Law: Contemporary Theology and
Philosophy," by I. A. Wassmer; "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," by W. J. Kenealy;
and, "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," by P. E. Sigmund.

283
scholars would be an invaluable study.34
We must ask, however, does the rejection of natural theology necessarily imply a
rejection of natural law?35 Even if natural theology is impossible, might humanity, on

some basis other than Scripture, know some truth that is important politically, even if
inadequate for salvation? I am suggesting that even if it is impossible to obtain salvific
truth or truth about the nature of the Godhead apart from Scripture, it might be possible to
come to a knowledge of some elementary moral truths. The latter may be argued without
accepting or conceding the fonner.
The natural law tradition has pre-Christian origins. It was first posited in the GrecoRoman world, most notably by Aristotle, the Stoics and Cicero. Early natural law theorists
argued that there was a "normative order immanent in the cosmos." This order was
governed by both physical and moral laws that were accessible to human reason.36 The
tradition was continued by some early church fathers but it reached its pinnacle with St.
Thomas Aquinas. 37 With Aquinas, natural law theory takes on a distinctively Christian
34 I am not defending Aquinas but in their reformation fervor, evangelicals are prone
to caricature Aquinas and are at least susceptible to misrepresenting his work. Perhaps a
careful study of Roman Catholicism would be helpful for a fuller understanding of the
Thomist position and its relevance to the evangelical community. One reviewer has written:
"Aquinas, in Henry's view, was too optimistic about the capabilities of natural reason
unassisted by grace and revelation. Possibly Henry himself overestimates the optimism of
Aquinas, who acknowledged that reason was wounded by original sin and that human
reason is incapable of perceiving all that creatures manifest of God. The praeambulafu:lei
for Aquinas are not so much steppingstones to faith as truths which, with the help of faith,
we recognize as being within the ambit of reason. Henry somewhat exaggerates the
importance of naturally acquired knowledge of God in the Thomistic system." A very
Dulles, review of God. Revelation and Authority by Carl F. H. Henry, in TheolQ~cal
Studies 38 (December 1977): 773-775.
35 The total rejection of any idea of a natural morality is typical of neo-orthodoxy
and can even be found in orthodox Judaism, anabaptists such as John Yoder and Roman
Catholics such as Jacques Ellul. See Allen Verhey, "The Use of Scripture in Ethics,"
Religious Studies Review 4 (January 1978): 28-35.
36 See Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice, 1-32.
37 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas AQuinas, translated by
L. K. Shook (New York, NY: Random House, 1956); A. P. Entreves, The Medieval
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character. Nature was believed to be the creation of the Christian God. "Natural law was
the divine Eternal Law immanent in the creation, accessible to and binding on human
beings. "38 These new emphases did not alter the essential character of the theory.
Aquinas did not destroy the rational basis of the pagan, Aristotelian-Stoic doctrine
of natural law by substituting the authority of supernatural law, in the sense of truth
revealed in the Bible, in its place. Rather, to use a metaphor, he taught that the
single coin of divine law is stamped on one side by the supernatural law of JudeoChristian theology, accepted on faith, through grace, as the word of God, and on
the other side by the natural law of philosophy, perceived by reason. Inasmuch as
both laws emanate from a single source, they can never be in conflict. 39
Thus, the divine law, in the form of scriptural revelation, and natural law, as perceived by
human reason, are both part of God's eternal law and do not contradict one another.40
Subsequent Christian thinkers were influenced significantly by Aquinas. The work
of Richard Hooker, the Anglican divine, closely resembled that of Aquinas.41 Martin

Contribution to Political Thought: Thomas Aguinas. Marsilus of Padua. Richard Hooker
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); Harry Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1952); and, Thomas Gilby, The Political
Thought of Thomas Aguinas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
38 Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice, 2.
39 New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967), s.v.
"Natural Law: Historical Development," by B. F. Brown.
40 "According to Aquinas the natural law is that part of the eternal law, God's plan
for the universe, in which man shares by his reason; the divine law is God's direct
revelation to man through Christ and the Scriptures. Since 'grace does not contradict
nature, but perfects it,' the divine law confirms the natural law, but it also adds precepts
which could not be known by reason alone." Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought,
39.
41 Robert K. Faulker, Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian En~and
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981); Gunnar Hillerdal, Reason and
Revelation in Richard Hooker (Lunds Universitets Arsskrift, n.s. 1, vol. 543, no. 7. Lund:
CWK Gleerup, 1962); A. P. Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought:
Thomas Aquinas. Marsilus of Padua. Richard Hooker (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1939); E.T. Davies, The Political Ideas of Richard Hooker (London: S.P.C.K., 1948);
John S. Marshall, "Hooker's Theory of Church and State," Anglican Theological Review
27 (1945): 151-160; and, Paul Surlis, "Natural Law in Richard Hooker," Irish Church
Ouanerly 35 (1968): 173-185.
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Luthei42 and John Calvin,43 both leading lights in the great Protestant reformation,
accepted the idea of a law of nature. J. T. McNeill claims:
There is no real discontinuity between the teaching of the Refonners and that of
their predecessors with respect to natural law. Not one of the leaders of the
Reformation assails the principle. Instead, with the possible exception of Zwingli,
they all on occasion express a quite ungrudging respect for the moral law naturally
implanted in the human heart and seek to inculcate this attitude in their readers.
Natural law is not one of the issues on which they bring the Scholastics under
criticism. With safeguards of their primary doctrines but without conscious
resistance on their part, natural law enters into the framework of their thought and is
an assumption of their political and social teaching.... For the Reformers, as for
the Fathers, canonists, and Scholastics, natural law stood affirmed on the pages of
Scripture. 44
The reformers acknowledged that the fall of humanity made our comprehension of natural
law more difficult. The difficulty of the task did not, however, make knowledge
impossible. To the contrary, Luther and Calvin insisted that reason is adequate to provide
guidance in human affairs. Henry departs, unnecessarily I believe, from this rich tradition.
Careful consideration of natural morality must include a dialogue regarding God's

42 See J. T. McNeill, "Natural Law in the Thought of Luther," Church History 10
(1941): 211-227; W. D. J. Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther
(Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1984); Sheldon Wolin, "Politics and
Religion: Luther's Simplistic Imperative," American Political Science Review 50 (March
1956): 24-42; and, William A. Mueller, Church and State in Luther and Calvin: A
Comparative Study (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1954).
43 See Ralph Hancock, Calvin and the Foundations of Modem Politics (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1989); Harro Hopfl, The Christian Polity of John Calvin (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982); William A. Mueller, Church and State in
Luther and Calvin: A Comparative Study (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1954); Arthur
Cochrane, "Natural Law in Calvin" in Church. State. Relations in Ecumenical Pernpective,
ed. Elwyn Smith (Pittsburgh, 1966), 176-217; David Little, "Calvin and the Prospects for
a Christian Theory of Natural Law," in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, eds., Gene
Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York, 1968), chapter 6; and, William Klempa, "John Calvin
on Natural Law," in John Calvin and the Church: A Prism of Reform, ed., Timothy
George (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 72-95.
44 J. T. McNeill, "Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers," Journal of
Reli~on 27 (1946): 168. A classic source on this and other related topics is Ernst
Troeltsch, The Social Teachin~ of the Christian Churches, 2 vols., translated by Olive

Wyon, with an introduction by H. Richard Niebuhr (New York, NY: Harper and Row,
1960).
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willingness and ability to speak clearly and significantly to fallen man, a discussion of
man's ability to hear and understand God's message, and an examination of scriptural
teaching on the subject Henry has done this task rather well for special revelation but
more needs to be done in regard to general revelation.
Henry has argued forcefully and effectively for the ability of God to communicate to
humanity. If the sovereign God can create the entire universe and all of humanity, ex

nihilio, he can certainly find a means to speak to humanity. In fact, inherent in the doctrine
of creation is the teaching that knowledge of some basic truth is assured by the very
structure of creation itself.
The Christian doctrine of creation supplies firm guarantees that the forms of human
knowing and things-in-themselves are not totally heterogeneous. The dependence
of man and nature alike on the transcendent Logos as the ultimate source of all
created structures and forms assures an underlying affinity between man and his
total environment, and involves us at once in the knowledge of ourselves and of
God and other selves. The categories of thought are indeed a priori and not derived
from experience, but neither are they simply determinations of the human mind.
The transcendent God makes intelligible human experience possible as the
sovereign Creator and Preserver of all things. Both the human mind and external
reality have their basis of intelligibility in the Logos of God who structures nature
and sustains man in the divine image. Reality is knowable because the categories of
knowing are applicable to things-in-themselves; human knowledge has ontic
significance. Things outside ourselves have an independently real existence, and
stand in ontological and epistemic relationship to our cognition and sensory
perception on the basis of the intelligible creative activity of the Logos of God. The
dependence both of mankind and of the cosmos on the divine Logos vouchsafes not
only the necessary character and validity of human knowledge, but its objectivity as
well. The possibilities of valid and objective knowledge of God and of the universe
lie in these facts, that by creation man bears the divine image rationally and morally,
and that the fall of man was not completely destructive of this image, so that even in
sin man is proffered revelation objectively communicated by the Creator-Redeemer
Goo.45
Henry concedes that not only has God created man with the capacity to know him but that
God has generally revealed truth to man via general revelation.
Through the imago Dei given at creation every human person gains an ineradicable
awareness that God exists and that other selves and the external world exist. Every
human self, to begin with, knows to be genuine and inescapable a distinction
45 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:393-394.
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between God and the not-God, a distinction between good and evil, and a
distinction between truth and falsehood. Every human being is aware, moreover,
that knowing truth and the good puts one in touch with divinity. Not only do all
human beings share these formal aspects of the imago, however, but also they
know instinctively and intuitively that God does in fact exist, that the world ~ally
exists, and that other selves actually exist. 46
Regardless of man's "volitional rebellion," general revelation "has an
inextinguishable presence" that "renders the human species morally and spiritually culpable
for revolt against the Deity. "47 Indelibly impressed upon the human heart is the
knowledge of God, self, the world, other selves, and the existence of a moral order. Such
knowledge is not salvific, just as the laws of logic are not salvific. Not everyone adheres
to the moral law, just as not everyone adheres to the principles of logic, but that does not
negate the truthfulness and the usefulness of the idea itself. It is the human tendency to
ignore such knowledge that intrigues Henry.
That the living God continues to reveal Himself universally in nature and
history and in and to the mind and conscience of man is not here in debate. Nor is
the lucidity of that universal revelation in doubt, or its potency in actually and
everywhere penetrating human reason and conscience. We are not to fault the
universal divine revelation as epistemically flawed. There is in divine revelation no
inherent necessity for its epistemic distortion.
The fault, rather, lies with humanity. The frustration of general divine
revelation is due to obstinate and unstable human volition.48
Therefore, we should turn our attention to the ability of man to understand and benefit from
God's generally revealed message.
Henry's argument loses some of its cogency at this point. On the one hand, Henry
11

argues that the fall has affected man "in the entirety of his being. 49 On the other hand, he
argues that "the fall conditions man's will more pervasively than his reason."50 The latter
46 Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief, 57-58.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Henry, God. Revelation and Authority, 1:226-227.
50 Ibid.
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argument seems predominant. He then argues that "only special revelation ... can master
the noetic effects of sin."51 Why only special revelation? If the effects of sin do not
render it impossible for the unregenerate to comprehend special revelation (the Bible), why
is that so for general revelation?52
Henry's preference for special revelation is based on two arguments. First,
propositional Scripture is objective and, therefore, less susceptible to distortion by fallen
man. Second, the idea of "unaided reason," which Henry believes is a part of natural
law/natural theology arguments, is unacceptable.
Regardless of his criticism of modem empirical science in the realm of metaphysics,
its influence on Henry is apparent. The desire for certitude and objective, definite
propositions is undeniable. However, the modem desire for certitude led to the conclusion
that values, "oughts," cannot be derived from facts, that which is. Thus, moral truths
became the sole province of the will. Henry has endorsed explicitly the existence of moral
standards that are knowable by the human race. How does one know these moral
standards? Henry claims it is by revelation. And, in his mind, only special revelation is

51 Ibid., 1:329.
52 "Henry's insistence on the rational intelligibility of special revelation also raises
questions. He affirms the reality of general revelation, but denies the possibility of natural
theology on the grounds that the epistemic consequences of sin have rendered human
beings incapable of perceiving this revelation aright (2, 122-123). Only when clearly
identified within the contents of special revelation can God's revelation in nature be
understood. Special revelation, in contrast, is so perceptible that human beings can
ascertain its contents without any supernatural illumination (4, 210). So the epistemic
effects of sin do not, evidently, render special revelation unintelligible.
Because Henry never identifies the precise effects of the fall on man's cognitive
faculties, it is not clear just why they should be so devastating in the one case and relatively
inconsequential in the other. If the consequences of sin are as damaging as he suggests in
denying the possibility of natural theology, it is hard to understand how fallen human
beings could grasp the contents of special revelation without difficulty. On the other hand,
if the effects of the fall are primarily volitional rather than cognitive, as Henry asserts in
propounding the intelligibility of biblical revelation, it is hard to understand why natural
theology is impossible." Ronald Rice, review of God. Revelation and Authority by Carl F.
H. Henry, in Relie;ious Studies Review 7 (April, 1981): 107-115.
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sufficiently explicit to penetrate the mind of fallen man. But, he has also argued that
general revelation penetrates the human mind and because of it the human mind intuits
certain basic truths or first principles which can be expressed in the form of a proposition.
For example, the axiom that "God exists" is a clear propositional affirmation that Scripture
verifies but which exists independently of Scripture. Perhaps Aquinas was right when he
asserted that the first principle of the moral law--good is to be done and evil is to be
avoided--is directly known to all humans. 53
The idea of "unaided reason" is an anathema to Henry. Henry is extremely reluctant
to assign any sphere solely or even primarily to human reason. He believes it limits the
authority of Scripture. Furthermore, he claims, it opens the door to the possibility of
knowledge of truth apart from Scripture which encourages humanity to seek truth apart
from God. Thus, Henry claims, when Aquinas posited the possibility of natural law, it
was inevitable that Grotius, a 17th century Dutch Protestant, would come along and
secularize the idea. Henry seems to think this possibility outweighs the possible
advantages. 54 But one should ask if the possible misuse of truth should negate its

53 "When Aquinas elaborates on the specific content of natural law ... he begins
with the principle that 'good is to be done and evil avoided,' which he describes as a selfevident premise comparable to the principles of contradiction in logic. Like all basic
principles of morality, this principle is perceived by a process of direct moral intuition
through a special capacity (Latin: habitus) called synderesis, which is sometimes equated
with and sometimes distinguished from conscience." Sigmund, Natural Law in Political
Thoueht, 39-40.
"Aquinas states repeatedly that the basic principles of natural law, those principles
that determine human ends according to human nature, are known to us directly and
immediately. The promulgation of natural law is that God has 'instilled it into man's mind
so as to be known by him naturally.' The basic principles are self-evident, indemonstrable,
and common to all. They are 'to the practical reason, what the first principles of
demonstrations are to the speculative reason.' The first principle of speculative reason is
the principle of noncontradiction.
The first principle of natural law, or practical reason, is that 'good is to be done and
pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice, 57-58.
54 Henry asserts that Grotius is responsible for secularizing the idea of natural law
in Twili~ht of a Great Civilization, 153.
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advantages. Surely not.
I wonder if the idea of natural law requires the notion of unaided human reason?55 It
seems to me that human knowledge of moral truth via general revelation does not create an
independent sphere of human knowledge. God has created the universe and in its
structure, and in the structure of the human mind, he has revealed truth to man. Man's
God-given rational abilities are capable of receiving, understanding and applying these
truths. The human race has imprinted upon it certain innate ideas, and retains the ability to
logically think about what they know. The fact that fallen men refuse to acknowledge or
obey such principles is significant, but not as significant as the existence and knowability
of the principles themselves. Our predisposition to believe our innate ideas may be
suppressed due to the fallen nature of sinful man. Our understanding of the natural law
may be warped due to our willful distortion of it None of this effectively eliminates the
idea that the natural law exists objectively as a standard for guiding human affairs--a
standard that must be forever sought and applied to whatever extent possible. Since Henry
asserts, carte blanche, that sin has so distorted the human mind that perception of the moral
law becomes impossible apart from propositional Scripture, he must provide scriptural
documentation. No supporting documentation has been provided.
To the contrary, there is explicit scriptural support for the idea of natural law.
Scripture teaches that all humans have a moral sense of right and wrong. The best evidence
is found in the writings of the apostle Paul. In particular, the book of Romans is useful,

55 It is common to argue that natural theology/natural law base knowledge of God
and moral law upon empirical data and that such data constitutes proof. Paul Sigmund
argues otherwise. "The protagonists of natural law do not really appeal to empirical data as
proof that a given principle is contained in the natural law. Such evidence is cited as an
indication of a more fundamental (or even 'self-evident') purposive order, or goal in man,
which is part of his essential being. The objection, then, to natural law thinking must go
further than to deny that one can argue from fact to value--it must deny the possibility of
perceiving purposive order or essential regulative principles in human existence."
Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thou~ht, 207-208.
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both for its more explicit attention to this theme and due to the audience, the Romans, who
could not be expected to be familiar with divinely revealed Jewish law. The most important
passage is Romans 2:14-15. Paul writes: "Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the
law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though
they do not have the law, since they show that the requirements of the law are written on

their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing, now
even defending them." (NIV, emphasis mine) In this passage, the apostle is declaring that
the basic precepts of the Jewish moral law, generally considered the Ten Commandments,
are known by the Gentiles because they are inscribed by God on their hearts. In spite of
this knowledge, humans do not obey, but that does not take away from the fact that they
know.
Furthermore, since they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God,
he gave them over to a depraved mind, to do what ought not to be done. They have
become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity. They are
full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice. They are gossips, slanderers, Godhaters, insolent, arrogant and boastful; they invent ways of doing evil; they disobey
their parents; they are senseless, faithless, heartless, ruthless. Although they know
God's righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only
continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.
Romans 1:28-32. (NIV, emphasis mine)
In the Reformed tradition, Paul's teachings have evolved into a doctrine of common
grace.
In general it may be said that, when we speak of 'common grace,' we have in
mind, either (a) those general operations of the Holy Spirit whereby He, without
renewing the heart, exercises such a moral influence on man through His general or
special revelation, that sin is restrained, order is maintained in social life, and
righteousness is promoted; or, (b) those general blessings, such as rain and
sunshine, food and drink, clothing and shelter, which God imparts to all men
indiscriminately where and in what measure it seems good to Him. 56
56 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theolo~y, 4th revised and enlarged edition, (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1941), 436. "The origin of the doctrine
of common grace was occasioned by the fact that there is in the world, alongside of the
course of the Christian life with all its blessings, a natural course of life, which is not
redemptive and yet exhibits many traces of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The
question arose, How can we explain the comparatively orderly life in the world, seeing that
the whole world lies under the curse of sin? ... How can we account for it that sinful man
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Christians could argue that as an act of common grace, God has generally revealed a
natural law to humanity through nature and conscience that stipulates a nonnative moral law
to guide human existence on earth. This natural law is knowable because God has reveaied
it in a way that human reason can discern. The generally revealed natural law is not
salvific--no one can be saved by works alone--but that does not limit its earthly utility.
This moral law may or may not be acknowledged by sinful people who willfully ignore the
truth. But others will accept the message because it coincides with the guidance of their
own conscience.
The argument that man can know nothing from general revelation except that he is a
sinner is not scripturally warranted. It is an assumption based on an interpretation of the
fall that emphasizes total human depravity. But the doctrine of the fall does not eliminate
the possibility of natural law. Humans may lack the will to do that which they know they
ought to do. Nonetheless, the law still exists. Experience and Scripture teach us that on
occasion fallen people can and do adhere to the guidelines of this moral order. If humans
are totally depraved, then even rational propositional revelation is worthless. Only an
unexplainable personal miracle could change a person. One might believe that sin has so
altered human nature that knowledge of God and of the moral law is impossible apart from
a divine work of God. Even if this proposition were accepted, it would not negate the

still 'retains some knowledge of God, of natural things, and of the difference between good
and evil, and shows some regard for virtue and for good outward behavior'? ... How can
the unregenerate still speak the truth, do good to others, and lead outwardly virtuous lives?
These are the questions to which the doctrine of common grace seeks to supply the
answer."
Calvin "finnly maintained that the natural man can of himself do no good work
whatsoever and strongly insisted on the particular nature of saving grace. He developed
alongside the doctrine of particular grace the doctrine of common grace. This is a grace
which is communal, does not pardon nor purify human nature, and does not effect the
salvation of sinners. It curbs the destructive power of sin, maintains in a measure the
moral order of the universe, thus making an orderly life possible, distributes in varying
degrees gifts and talents among men, promotes the development of science and art,
showers untold blessings upon the children of men." 432-434.
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possibility of a natural law social ethic. For it leaves open the possibility that God has
wrought a miracle and reintroduced the moral law to humanity as an act of common grace.
Acceptance of natural law does not entail the belief that its teachings effectively
replace those of Scripture. Scripture may reiterate some natural law teaching as well as
reveal other important moral precepts that believers are constrained to accept. Just because
some moral truths may be known independently of Scripture doesn't mean that all moral
truth is knowable apart from Scripture. Thus, knowledge of moral truth can never fully
replace belief. For political purposes, however, the difference may be very important.
That which is knowable might be permissible territory for legislation while that which is
believed might be restricted to the believers. Drawing such lines is never easy but is not
necessarily impossible.
In conclusion, it seems that orthodox teachings regarding the imago Dei, the
sovereignty of God, common grace, creation, general revelation--all of which Henry
heartily endorses--lay the foundation for the natural law theory. Henry's view
impoverishes the richness of this tradition and pre-empts serious consideration of this vital
teaching. The political discourse of modem evangelicalism might be enriched and
strengthened to the extent that it reconsiders what seems to be a premature rejection of the
idea of natural law.
The possibility of natural law is recognized explicitly by widely known Wheaton
College evangelical philosopher Arthur Holmes. He says:
(1) Granted (a) that moral values and obligations derive ultimately from the will and
character of God, it does not follow (b) that they are known only by special
revelation. In ethics as elsewhere, general as well as special revelation pertains, for
Scripture speaks explicitly (Rom. 1-2) of moral knowledge that is accessible apart
from the specially revealed law of God. Whatever the difficulties in understanding
the moral implications of general revelation and whatever the obstacles that result
from man's perversity, moral knowledge is still sufficiently possible for man to be
held accountable. (2) Granted that the moral law is known by special revelation, it
does not follow (c) that biblical morality is wholly other than philosophical ethics.
Regardless of men's ethical disagreements, general and special revelation
themselves cannot contradict each other, for God cannot contradict himself. Truth
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is a coherent whole. 57
An immediate advantage of a renewed interest in the idea of natural law is that it
would help Henry maintain his treasured separation of church and state. The existence of a
universally intelligible basis for passing judgement on matters of justice and injustice in this
world makes it easier to maintain a distinction between church and state. It would also
make it easier for Christians to speak to the political world without violating this separation.
Recently, Henry wrote: "At least two things in a pluralistic society now remain for
evangelicals to clarify: how to encapsulate in legislation moral values that are not merely
sectarian, but also constitute the ethical foundation of a viable state; and to identify the
political rhetoric most appropriate to a republic in which civil government is the arbiter of
neither metaphysical nor theological concerns."58 I propose that evangelicals could
respond most effectively to these questions by reviving the natural law tradition.
The most important benefit of such a idea is its universality. Such a standard can be
profitably used by all people, in all times, in all places, in their quest for a more just social
order. The Christian inclination to relate natural law to divine general revelation and the act
of divine creation need not preclude acceptance of the idea by others. But a social ethic
derived solely from the Bible, or from Christ, will have little or no appeal to non-Christian
individuals, traditions, and societies. It seems, therefore, the universality of the message
of evangelicals would be aided greatly by the idea of natural law.
One might ask, why would the believer seek to know that which he already believes
to be true. If believers accept the moral law based upon the authority of Scripture, is
additional argumentation necessary? I would answer yes. Henry has said that Christians
have earthly responsibilities. They have the responsibility to try to shape the world in the
57 Arthur Holmes, Faith Seekin~ Uncierstandini (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), 85. Also, see Arthur Holmes, "The Concept of Natural
Law," Christian Scholars Review 2 (1972): 195-208.
58 Henry, Christian Counteonoyes in a Decadent Culture, 119.
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form of God's will. To do so, one must be able to convince believers and non-believers
alike to adhere to God's moral law. Since non-believers by definition do not believe, they
can only be convinced to adhere to the moral law via knowledge. If they know something
is right, they might accede to it. Thus, Christians have a great moral responsibility to
demonstrate to the world that a moral law exists and that it prescribes certain behaviors and
proscribes others. This knowledge may not lead to eternal salvation but it certainly makes
life on earth more tolerable. It is useful politically since it can be shared among fallen
creatures who have innate ideas that correspond with the teachings of this moral order.
Thus, as Henry says, "on the basis of the imago Dei that universally survives the Fall, even

if blurred, the Christian can declare even of the nonbeliever that concerning certain moral
emphases, 'in your heart you know it's right."'59
There are also disadvantages to be considered. In the hands of a zealot, a natural law
social ethic can become a tool of intolerance and authoritarianism. There is also a
significant ambiguity surrounding natural law. What principles are taught? The application
of general principles to specific situations is an act fraught with difficulty. Moreover,
which precepts of natural law fall under the category of sin and which are crimes?
Concerns of this type have perplexed natural law theorists for centuries. Immediate
answers are not readily available.
Regardless of the possible problems, the appeal of a natural law social ethic seems
apparent. The idea merits further study from the evangelical community. But as Strauss
has said, the desirability of the ideas of natural law/natural right is not in and of itself
sufficient justification for its resurrection. To the contrary, it only merits reconsideration if

59 Henry, Twili~ht of a Great Civilization, 33. This is not an evangelistic task
although one could argue that acceptance of a normative natural moral law might be helpful
to evangelism. It does create an atmosphere where evangelism is freely carried out and it
does induce non-believers to accept certain ideas that are compatible with the Christian
faith, thus removing obstacles to belief.
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it is true. 60 That is the issue to which evangelicals must tum their attention.
Apart from my criticism of Henry for his premature rejection of the natural law
tradition, he deserves to be defended against the charges of excessive rationalism and
individualism. Accusations of excessive individualism in Henry have been made by
several fellow evangelicals. In its crudest form these accusations assert that Henry is little
more than a modem-day Lockean individualist. The more sophisticated fonn of these
accusations are theological and sociological in nature. In this form, the charge is that
Henry incorrectly answers questions such as: Are social entities natural? Is the individual
or the community the foundational element in society? By what principles should they
operate? What does Scripture say in this regard?
A relatively crude attempt to identify Henry as Lockean was a component of a major
study of Christianity Today from 1956-1976. After a careful review of editorials published
during this period, many of them by Henry, Dennis Hollinger concludes that the "highly
individualistic social ethic" of evangelicals is drawn less from Scripture than it is from the
11

"doctrine of American individualism. 61 Specifically he argues that "contemporary
mainstream Evangelicalism has indeed reflected an individualistic social philosophy," and
this individualism "is rooted far more in sociological and historical factors than in Biblical
theology. "62 This thesis is common among more liberal critics within evangelicalism who
60 See Strauss' introduction to Natural Rieht and Histo:ry.
61 Dennis Hollinger, Individualism and Social Ethics: An Evaneelical Syncretism
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), 1. Hollinger focuses
exclusively on editorials during this period. Henry was, of course, editor-in-chief for
twelve of the twenty years in question. His opinions were pervasive on the editorial pages.
62 Ibid., 6. "In enunciating a philosophy of social change, mainstream Evangelicals
have focused on personal transformation as the means of changing complex structures and
social evils. In economic thought the movement has aligned itself with individualisticallyoriented laissez-faire capitalism and its concomitant approaches to economic problems such
as poverty and development In political thought Evangelicals have made freedom of the
individual the summum bonwn in both theory and policy issues, and often to the exclusion
or minimization of other values such as justice or community welfare." Ibid., 217-218.
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decry the tendency of evangelicals to be politically conservative. They argue, in effect, that
evangelicals have become a part of middle class America and have sold out to the values of
individualism. 63
It is inappropriate to characterize Henry as a proponent of the utilitarian or expressive
individualism described by Robert Bellah in Habits of the Hean. 64 His definitions of
utilitarian individualism with its emphasis on maximizing self-interest, or expressive
individualism with its preoccupation with self-expression, are notions that are completely
foreign to Henry. Neither is it accurate to correlate Henry with Locke. Hollinger notes the
emphasis that Henry and other editorialists give to the notions of rights, freedom, limited
government, and free-market economics and quickly assumes that these notions could have
no other basis than the philosophy of Locke. But, Henry does not espouse unfettered
freedom, his understanding of rights is preceded by the notion of duty, and his insistence
on limited government is not based upon a social contract or recognition of human rights, it
is derived from the priority and sovereignty of God. His understanding of government
itself is distinctly different from that of Locke. He does not espouse the position that man
began in a state of nature and in an act of self-interest contracted with one another to avoid
the worse aspects of individual existence. To the contrary, government came into existence

63 "Although Evangelicals have attempted to root their social perspectives in biblical
authority, they often have been oblivious to the fact that their thinking is sometimes rooted
more in American culture than in the Bible. They have accepted an individualistic
framework and then gone to the Bible in an attempt to support it. But the world view of the
Scriptures is far different than that of American individualism with its emphasis on the
private, autonomous, competitive, self-sufficient individual." Ibid., 237. He points
specifically to Locke as the source of American individualism. Arguments of this type have
been made by Indiana State University historian Richard Pierard in The Unequal Yoke:
Evangelical Christianity and Political Conservatism (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott,
Co., 1970), and Donald Dayton, "The Social and Political Conservatism of Modem
American Evangelicalism: A Preliminary Search for the Reasons," Union Seminacy
Quarterly Review 37 (Winter 1977): 71-80.
64 Robert N. Bellah et al. Habits of the Hean: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
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by the will of God who created man as a social being and gave the idea of government to
man as an act of grace to restrain man's worse tendencies. Thus, government is not a
conventional construct, it is a divine creation. The individualism of Henry is always
constrained by moral obligation. Duty and responsibility are stronger elements in Henry's
thinking than is unfettered freedom. The commitment to service and stewardship hardly
equates with rugged individualism.
A more sophisticated version of this argument also exists. Smedes crystallizes the
argument.

Dr. Henry, I am inclined to suppose, tends to think of the individual as the basic
component of society. He thinks of government and the individual as the two polar
existences in society. And this helps explain why many evangelicals are
apprehensive of governmental action in the sphere of economics and welfare. On
the other hand, ... [I] tend to see the individual--his rights and duties--in terms of
his social nature. Not the individual as such, but the various social spheres are
basic to society and the state. The difference in point of view at this level accounts
for the difference in perspective on social ethics. 65
Christ came to earth and died on the cross, according to Smedes, in order to redeem the
whole of creation, not merely individuals within it Therefore, Christians have an
obligation to reform social structures, a part of God's creation, in conformity to God's
will. By failing to see social structures as the basic component of society, Smedes claims,
Henry does not really provide a social ethic, merely a personal ethic. Smedes argues that
"there has to be a social ethic derived from Christian principles, an ethic which prescribes a
manner of life for society--the organic form of corporate human existence." Since "forms
are terribly important to any social ethics," he insists, "government has a positive calling to
see that the various segments of the organic society share properly in the social and
0

economic privileges and responsibilities of the common wealth. 66
Smedes does not deny that individual regeneration is both necessary and important,
65 Smedes, "Where Do We Differ?" 10.
66 Smedes, "The Evangelicals and the Social Question," 13.
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but the sole emphasis on regeneration leads one to overlook the corporate nature of human
existence. Structures are in need of change as well as individuals. Smedes wrote: "Unless
Christians recognize that structures can work iniquity as well as justice, they will wash·
their zeal in frustration as they try to reform American society by reforming individuals...
. The Christian must be aware that if he is to be effective, he too--in his own, constructive
but radical way--has to tend to the economic, political, and social structure. "67
Henry agrees that Christ died to redeem "creation in its totality," and that social
spheres have their own independent existence. 68 He, in fact, has argued for the
naturalness of social existence. Where he disagrees is the extent to which these social
structures can reflect perfect righteousness. "As to my own view, the depth dimension of
sin in history seems to me to weigh heavily against a Christian culture this side of Christ's
return, although because of the transforming power of the Spirit of regeneration I cherish
the hope of wide reaches of Christian culture."69
Those who argue to the contrary, Henry theorizes, are obscuring "the transcendent
character of the kingdom of God," correlating the modern state with the kingdom of God,
or expecting "Christianity to influence and transform the social order progressively along
the lines of a postrnillennial eschatology whereby Christians will predictably establish the
universal reign of justice on earth prior to Christ's visible return .....70 Henry is
convinced these positions are not biblically defensible. He believes Scripture does have
something to teach us about community, but we should not attempt to apply it
inappropriately to the temporal kingdom.
67 Lewis Smedes, "A Senator on Sin," The Reformed Journal 20 (July-August
1970): 4-5. Quoted in Johnston, Eyan~elicals at an Impasse, 88.
68 Henry, Faith at the Frontiers, 115.
69 Ibid., 116.
70 Ibid.
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In respect to corporate achievement, the emphasis of my social ethics falls most
prominently on the body of Christ, and only secondarily on the body of humanity.
While I insist that individual Christians ought indeed to be politically involved in
public affairs, I regard whatever pertains to the world as provisional. The church
faces the social task, first, of ordering its own life as a community of the faithful.in
distinction from the world of unbelief, and this it does under God for the sake of all
mankind. In this ordering of its own life the redeemed community ought to mirror
what is implied in a good society--not simply as compelled by law and grudgingly
approached, but as impressively achieved on the basis of agape. Only as the church
powerfully reflects in her own community life the direct authority of Jesus Christ
can she effectively witness to the world of the _perils of ignoring the lordship of the
invisible King whose claim the world spums.71
Hope for a better society, according to Henry, lies in the preaching of the gospel and

in the influence of the regenerate on fallen society. The influence of the regenerate will be
positive to the extent they derive their moral principles from divine revelation. To the
extent these two elements are realized, society can improve. To the extent these two things
are not realized, society suffers. Good people are essential for a good society.
It seems that Henry should be praised, not vilified, for his attempt to mediate between
the extremes of communitarianism and individualism. There are elements of both in his
writings. We find in Henry, as in modem individualist thinking, an emphasis on
individual rights, a free market, and limited government. But we also find in Henry an
emphasis on social structures, moral duty, and social responsibility. Henry's position is
neither strictly communitarian nor narrowly individualistic. His position seems to be
something like this. The only perfect community is that which exists in the kingdom of
God. Thus, the church, to the extent it reflects the kingdom of God, should reflect true
community. People, who are social and political by nature, also try to formulate a sense of
community in the temporal world. These efforts inevitably fail in some respect but they are
nonetheless important. They are important because the community one lives in
significantly shapes the lives of its citizens. However, people's lives are not merely
determined by their community. It is possible for an individual to help shape the
71 Ibid., 116-117.
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community in which he/she lives. Christians, in particular, because they have in some
sense stepped outside the temporal world and have become citiz.ens in the kingdom of God,
have the ability, to the extent they adhere to God's will, to critique the community in which
they live. They are cognizant of a higher standard by which to judge their own community.
The task is never easy given the fact that they are not solely citizens of the heavenly
kingdom, they are citizens in both. The question then becomes in what direction should
Christians steer their communities. Should they attempt to emulate the kingdom of God on
earth? Henry says no. Only God can bring about his kingdom with the perfect justice it
will manifest. We must be aware of our limitations and work for that which is achievable,
namely, a relatively just society. A society which protects the lives, property, and religious
freedom of its people is the best that the temporal world can produce.
Society may be based upon institutions, traditions, and practices but these so-called
social elements are the product of individual human decisions. One must acknowledge the
influence of social forces on individuals but Henry is not willing to concede that individuals
are immune from responsibility because of these outside forces. To argue otherwise, as
some seem to do, negates individual responsibility and assumes a posture of determinism.
People become pawns. Henry claims people are moral agents held responsible by God for
their every action. To study the significance of institutions, traditions, and practices and
their relative influence on individual decision-making is a valid enterprise and changing
these things may alleviate some problems and even encourage good behavior. But, in the
final analysis, fallen individuals will find ways to exploit all forms of social existence.
People must be changed.
There is certainly an individualistic strain in Henry but it is less a product of modem
enlightenment thinking than of classical Christian philosophy.72 It seems odd that Henry
72 There has been a long tradition of individualism within Christianity, especially
Protestant Christianity. If one defines individualism as the belief in the inherent dignity of
the individual, then Henry is indeed an individualist Moreover, the Reformation emphasis
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is assailed for being beholden to modern liberalism when his opponents turn around and
advocate that we become beholden to modern sociological theory. Sociologists such as
Emile Durkheim have told us that the principle units of society are institutions, processes,
and systems, not individuals. This emphasis on community has become the catchword for
modern liberal evangelicals. Henry does not deny the importance of community. Shared
practices and traditions are important Nonetheless, such practices and traditions are not
creations of themselves. They are the product of individual decisions. Christians cannot
be indifferent to these things. Individuals initiated the structures and practices of each
community and only individuals can change them. One could argue that social institutions
are as real as individuals but that their character is determined by those individuals most
influential in that society. Henry urges Christians to become those influential leaders.
The abuses of excessive communitarianism, as well as the abuses of excessive
individualism, must be avoided. Henry's critics insist they are concerned with larger
themes such as the ethical character and spiritual condition of the American people. They
claim Americans lack a sense of community and have become materialistic. But, if
community means an equitable distribution of economic benefits and burdens, which
Smedes and Hollinger essentially argue, then life is being defined in the terms of that very
materialism these critics despise. They insist the meaning of life cannot be reduced to
economics, then they proceed to tell us that the health of a society must be determined by
how it treats the poor. Thus, economics is, after all, the key to social justice. The
redistribution of economic wealth is the answer. Furthermore, they are not inclined to
on sola Scriptura, justification by faith, and the priesthood of the believers all worked
together to separate the individual from the church.
Duke University historian George Marsden comments on what he sees as a
paradoxical emphasis on both individualism and communitarianism within
fundamentalism/evangelicalism in "Preachers of Paradox: The Religious New Right in
Historical Perspective," Relif:ion and America: Spiritual Life in a Secular A~, eds. Mary
Douglas and Steven Tipton; introduction by Robert N. Bellah (Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1983), 150-168.
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discuss the illiberal aspects of a non-individualist philosophy. The resulting dogmatism,
intolerance, and authoritarianism raise a whole symphony of other problems. Perhaps
regeneration is the key.73
A second charge against Henry that seems patently unfair is the charge that he is a
rationalist This invective is reserved for those who stand accused of substituting human
reason for faith in religious matters. Henry's emphasis on the rationality of the Christian
faith has led his opponents to accuse him of claiming too much for human reason. In
particular, they believe he underestimates the fall of humanity, misconstrues the nature of
revelation, overlooks the role of the Holy Spirit in conveying knowledge of truth, obscures
the nature of the divine, and reverses that great tenet of Christianity: "I believe in order to
understand... 74
73 One observer notes that we cannot ignore the enonnous social consequences of
salvation. "Holding that the saved become one in Christ and that, in response to the gift of
salvation by grace, they are obliged to, first, be obedient to God's will and, second,
participate in an all-encompassing local church community. That community, in turn,
claims to ascertain God's will through its authoritative reading of His word and to enforce
it among members. Is such community building not social change in its own right? If, for
purposes of speculation, everyone in the United States were integrated into such local
church communities, would that not amount to a social transformation of staggering
proportions?" He goes on to conclude, "if this is so, we might well ask whether
conservative evangelical social ethics, rather than being a 'personal' ethic in 'social
clothing,' is not, instead, a social ethic clothed in the now unfashioned and, hence, to
many, strange dress of personal morality and individual salvation." James M. Ault Jr.,
review of Individualism and Social Ethics: An Evan~elical Syncretism, by Dennis
Hollinger, in Journal For the Scientific Study of RelifU,on 24 (June 1985): 223-224.
74 Among those accusing Henry of rationalism are Donald Bloesch, Essentials of
2 vols. (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1978), and McNeal,
"A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F. H. Henry."
There is another side to this debate. Henry and other presuppositionalists have been
accused of being fideists. R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, John Warwick Montgomery,
Arthur Lindsley and others adopt a more empirical approach to the Christian faith. Often
called "evidentialists," these men argue that the acceptance of axioms without supporting
evidence is an act of blind faith. Rationalist constructs to the contrary, anyone who begins
from axioms is simply a fideist. See Robert C. Sproul, John H. Gerstner, and Arthur
Lindsley, Classical Apoloeetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a CritiQ.,Ue
of Presuppositional Apolo~etics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing Co., 1984).
Henry says the "evidentialists" are "intellectually irresponsible." Evidence for the
Christian faith does little more than create "probability" which is not adequate ground for
belief. Furthermore, contrary to their claims, the evidentialists are guilty of starting from
Evan~elical Tbeolo~y.
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Although I cannot do full service to their arguments, I can briefly recount the essence
of their contentions. Prominent evangelical theologian Donald Bloesch calls Henry's
theology "evangelical rationalism."75 He contends that Henry underestimates the influence
of the fall on the human mind. Fallen humans cannot comprehend the truth of the Christian
faith. It must and does seem illogical to them. Bloesch also argues that Henry
misconstrues the nature of revelation. Henry's insistence on the propositional character of
revelation permits him to consider biblical truth "to be self-evident and accessible to
11

nonbelievers as well as to believers. 76 This, Bloesch argues, is simply incorrect. Faith
must precede understanding. Furthermore, he claims that Henry negates the importance of
the divine enlightenment of the human mind. If the human mind cannot understand the
truths of the faith, then divine enlightenment become necessary. In terms of religious
matters, reason becomes useful only after faith. "It can be argued that in his attempt to
defend the objectivity and rationality of revelation, Henry loses sight of the mystery of the
truth of faith and the decisive role of the Spirit in communicating the intent and purpose of
the scriptural message."77 By focusing upon the rationality of Christianity, Henry is
accused by Bloesch of obscuring much that is vital to the faith.

basic assumptions and therefore fall prey to their own arguments. True fideists, according
to Henry, are individuals such as Karl Barth and Soren Kierkegaard. Henry, Toward a
Recovery of Christian Belief, 38-40.
75 Donald Bloesch, review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry,
in Christian Centwy 97 (April 9, 1980): 414.
76 "He is adamant in his view that Scripture is basically a repository of divine truths
that can be directly apprehended by human reason. As he sees it, revelation in the Bible is
'essentially a mental conception,' 'rational and intelligible communications.' The Bible is
held to be 'a propositional revelation of the unchanging truth of God.' Because the biblical
propositions come directly from the hand of God, albeit through the instrumentality of
human authors, Henry argues for the 'propositional errorlessness' of Scripture. The
meaning of the biblical propositions is considered to be self-evident and accessible to
nonbelievers as well as to believers." Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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Thomas McNeal continues the attack by insisting that Henry has distorted the true
nature of the divine by demanding that the Godhead is rational. He contends that Henry's
insistence upon the rational character of God deprives God of much that is important.
Perhaps his most provocative contention is that Henry does not belong to the great
Augustinian tradition. "Although Henry claims to stand in the epistemological tradition of
Augustine, Anselm, and the Refonners who hold to credo ut intelligam, the priority of
reason over faith clearly demonstrates itself in Henry's system. •'78
The priority of reason over revelation is displayed in several ways. First, the
arrangement of biblical propositions in a logically consistent system of axioms and
theorems is viewed as enhancing the clarity of revelation. Secondly, reason itself is
said to be the instrument for differentiating authentic from inauthentic revelation.
Thirdly, it seems that in making the rational principle of noncontradiction the
measuring stick in determining the truth in revelation, Henry is forced to deny the
place of paradox in Christian faith .... Finally, Henry's insistence of the ability of
unaided reason to comprehend special revelation shows his radical departure from
the priority of faith maintained by the mainstream evangelical position through
Christian history.79
Is Henry guilty as charged? No. These men seem to have picked up on one key
element in Henry's writing, the importance of reason, and proceeded to assume that it
comprises the whole of what he has to say. Henry does not deny there is great mystery
about the nature of God, but at the same time he insists that God is rational, that God
created rational creatures and that God communicates to those creatures in a rational
manner. Those mysterious aspects of the divine nature need not imply the irrational. 80

78 McNeal, "A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F.
H. Henry," 108. "The problem in Henry's methodology is his ultimate reliance on reason
rather than faith in understanding revelation." This understanding might be in error. Does
one understand revelation by faith or does one accept revelation by faith and then
understand its content by reason? It seems the latter is likely to be within the Augustinian
tradition of believe in order to understand. While McNeal contends that "human reason can
serve and explicate revelation, but it cannot of itself make sense of revelation," I wonder if
he is mistaken to identify this position with that of Augustine. Ibid., 102-103.
79 Ibid., 108.
80 Nuclear physics might be a mystery to me but that doesn't mean it is irrational.
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Reason is important for Henry, but he hardly posits man's rational capacities in a
way to merit the label rationalist. Henry is not a rationalist in the sense that he derives his
first principles or presuppositions from reason; although, like most rationalists, he startS
with a first principle. His first principle is something he identifies as an assumption.
Admittedly this is begging the question, but Henry would argue that all philosophical
systems do the same. He is a rationalist in the sense that once one posits a first principle,
one can logically reason to conclusions and consequences. He is a rationalist in the sense
that he is systematic in his approach, he employs a deductive methodology, and he adheres
carefully to the laws of logic. He is best characterized by J. I. Packer who says:
It would be better to call Henry a Christian rationalist of the school of Augustine,
Calvin and Warfield. Like these giants, Henry holds that faith must precede
understanding at the deepest level, because of the darkness of the unregenerate
mind However (i) all humans have cognitive inklings of God (the religious a
priori), and (ii) it is possible to show anyone the unreasonableness of unbelief, and
(iii) showing this is important, both because the idea that God requires us to believe
unreasonable things detracts from his honour, and because under God the
demonstration may be a step on the unbeliever's road to faith. (This, of course, is
rationalism as opposed not to biblical fidelity, but to blind fideism.)81
Faith is not the antithesis of reason according to Henry. Rather faith seeks a rationale
and one's faith is strengthened to the extent that it can be shown to be reasonable.
Apologetics becomes a task of great importance. Explaining the reasonableness of the
Christian faith is, in effect, a form of evangelism. The rules of logic prevail among both
the regenerate and the unregenerate. One may show to an unbeliever that one's faith is
reasonable, coherent, consistent, and non-contradictory given one's presuppositions. One
may also show to a non-believer that he or she is not being coherent, consistent, or noncontradictory to his or her basic presuppositions. At this point, one can do little more to
convert another. Only the work of the Holy Spirit is capable of enabling one to appropriate
and accept the basic premises that are essential for the Christian world-view. Thus, Henry
81 J. I. Packer, review of Carl F. H. Herny, by Bob E. Patterson, in~ 20
(December 1984): 27-28.
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does not deny the mystery of divinity, the fallen nature of man, the importance of the holy
spirit, or the priority of faith. Charges to the contrary are ill-founded. 82
What are the implications for further study for evangelicals? Even Henry admits that
much remains to be done. A reconsideration of the natural law tradition along the lines
indicated in the previous section is needed. If God has revealed truth to humanity, and if
human reason is capable of discerning those truths, then one must at least consider the
possibility that general revelation as well as special revelation is capable of human
discernment There are three other specific areas where evangelicals should focus their
efforts. The first issue is the nature of special revelation. A second topic needing further
attention is Scripture itself, and the need for a renewed commitment to biblical exegesis.
Lastly, I suggest that evangelical scholars pursue the study of classical Christian thinkers
who have addressed political issues.
The first area needing further study involves Henry's view of the nature of biblical
revelation as propositional. This understanding of Scripture is not the predominant view in
theological circles today. Nonetheless, Henry's view does maintain internal logical
coherence and is presented in a compelling manner.
The political implications of this view of Scripture are obvious. If Scripture provides
us with propositional truth, some of which is political in nature, then divinely revealed
82 I do not want to imply that Henry's emphasis on reason does not raise questions.
For example: "Perhaps the greatest difficulty besetting Henry's notion of rational
revelation is the a priori character of his argument To establish the rationality of
revelation, Henry does not appeal to the contents of scripture to show that they are in fact
meaningful and true. Instead, he appeals to the concept of supernatural revelation and
deduces that its contents must be rational. The rationality of revelation, therefore, is
something Henry imputes to scripture, rather than a conclusion he reaches by examining
the data It is ironic that a theological proposal asserting the necessity and sufficiency of
special revelation as a basis for religious truth should proceed on a deductive basis, rather
than by appealing to the actual content of the purported revelation. Indeed, in the final
analysis, the position seems self-refuting. The argument that all religious truth must be
derived from the contents of revelation is not itself derived from the contents of revelation."
Ronald Rice, review of God. Revelation and Authority by Carl F. H. Henry, in Reli~ious
Studies Review 7 (April 1981): 112.
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political principles should guide us in practice. If, however, Scripture is not propositional
in nature then its value in regard to the world of politics is called into question. Any further
study of Henry's political thought must be preceded by an investigation into his doctrine of
revelation.
Critics such as Jesuit scholar A very Dulles admit there is some internal scriptural
evidence that suggests the validity of the propositional approach to Scripture. For example,
many biblical propositions are declared specifically to be the word of God and whenever
Scripture is referred to it is done so as an authority. There is also a fairly long tradition that
supports this understanding of Scripture. While Henry would argue that this theory of
Scripture can be traced back to the early church, the apostles, and even Christ himself,
critics acknowledge that it does go back at least as far as the reformation. In addition, the
propositional understanding of Scripture does have an internal logical consistency that is
both appealing as well as helpful in resolving doctrinal disputes. Disputes can be resolved
by simply turning to Scripture for the correct answer. While drawing conclusions from
difficult scriptural passages may not be easy it is certainly easier than arguing over the
source to which one must tum when resolving such disputes. Thus, there is a certain
utility to this view.83
Arguments against this approach include the following. Nowhere does Scripture
claim specifically to be propositional in nature. The closest thing to such a claim is 2
Timothy 3:16, "All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking,
correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly
equipped for every good purpose. "84 (NN) There is little evidence that the pre83 Dulles also argues that this view "encourages loyalty to the foundational
documents and traditions of the Church," gives members "a clear sense of identity," and a
"sense of solidarity." It also helps to undermine skepticism. See chapter three in Dulles,
Models of Revelation.
84 A significant scholarly debate has emerged regarding the meaning and authenticity
of this verse. For example, see William D. Mounce, Pastoral Epistles, Word Biblical
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reformation church adopted such a literal reading of Scripture. Perhaps the most intractable
challenge to the propositional view has been the rise of modem critical scholarship. Such
scholarship has called into question the authenticity as well as the accuracy of many
portions of Scripture. By drawing parallels between Scripture and other ancient forms of
literature, scholars have implied that Scripture has a human rather than a divine origin.
Some scholars purport to find distinct cultural influences in the text as well as historical and
scientific inaccuracies. Thus, they argue, Scripture is a mere cultural manifestation of the
time. When such matters are called into question, the reliability of the doctrinal teachings
of Scripture are also challenged implicitly. Other scholars claim that Scripture lacks internal
coherence evidenced by conflicting claims in Scripture itself. The implication being that a
perfect divine being would not be responsible for such an inconsistent and contradictory
revelation. Thus, again, Scripture is of human, not divine, origin. Critics also argue that
even if Scripture is propositional in nature, inadequate attention is given to how individual
experiences impact one's interpretation of these propositions. Does one's situation
influence how one interprets biblical statements? If not, why not? If so, how firmly can
we hold our interpretations and to what degree can we claim that our interpretation is of
God? Furthermore, if our interpretations can be culturally and historically shaped, may not
the same be said of the original documents. 85
Henry's response to these challenges are impressive. Few, if any, scholars have
responded in such detail and with such force. It appears, however, that his arguments are
falling on deaf ears. While he is praised in evangelical circles for his "decisive" repudiation
of contemporary "liberal" scholars he is widely ignored in broader theological circles.
Further study on this matter is imperative. My initial inquiry has convinced me that his

Commentary Series, (Waco, TX: Word Publishing, forthcoming).
85 See chapter three of Dulles, Models of Revelation.
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arguments are powerful, important, and worthy of consideration. In all fairness, however,
it is also imperative that further study be devoted to the arguments of his opponents.
One last observation on this issue. Several evangelical critics of Henry insist that his
view of Scripture is derived from the enlightenment 86 The argument deserves comment
here and further study elsewhere. The emphasis on the objective nature of propositions by
enlightenment thinkers led to a tendency at the time among theologians to interpret Scripture
as only propositional in nature. Henry, critics assert, is a product of this approach to
human knowledge. 87 Arthur Holmes argues that "revelation is not either personal or
86 Several serious studies of fundamentalism have pointed to a distinct influence
from one strand of enlightenment thinking, namely Scottish common-sense realism. Due
to the influence of Princeton University and its seminary during the early years of America,
Scottish common-sense realism emerged as a dominant philosophical influence in American
theological circles. In fact, it emerged as dominant in most intellectual circles as well. The
so-called Princeton School of thought attempted to integrate Scottish common-sense
philosophy and Calvinism. The prominent figures include Charles Hodge and Benjamin
Warfield of Princeton, and J. Gresham Machen and Cornelius Van Til of Westminister
Theological Seminary. One cannot deny the influence of these men on Henry. However,
at least one prominent historian on this topic has absolved Henry of being a direct product
of the enlightenment. Mark Noll argues that Henry's roots are more accurately traceable to
the classical Christian tradition that preceded the modern era. Further study on this topic
should begin with the following sources: S. Ahlstrom, "The Scottish Philosophy and
American Theology," Church Histoiy 24 (September 1955): 257-272; Mark Noll,
"Common Sense Tradition and American Evangelical Thought," American Quarterly 37
(Summer 1985): 216-238; The Princeton Theology. 1812-1921 (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1983); Princeton and the Republic. 1768-1822 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989); George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American
Culture: The Shaping ofTwentieth-Cennuy Evangelicalism (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1980); "Understanding Fundamentalist Views of Science," in Science
and Creationism, ed. Ashley Montagu (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1984),
95-116; and, "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia," in Faith and Rationality:
Reason and Belief in Goc:l eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame,
IN: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 219-263.
87 Several fellow evangelicals object to the use of the term propositional revelation.
For example see Bernard Ramm, Special Revelation and the Word of God (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1961), 155; Arthur Holmes, Faith Seeks
Understanding, 135; and, Bloesch, Essentials ofEyangelical Theology. Ironically some of
these same scholars accuse Henry of failing to come to grips with the Enlightenment.
Henry and others like him are accused of being "obscurant" in that they "ignore the
Enlightenment and gloss over the problems it raised." In other words, he has failed to
adequately address the challenges that modern historical and literary criticism have made of
Scripture. Bernard Ramm, After Fundamentalism (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row,
1983), 27. "The central problem the Enlightenment raised for Christianity is that of the
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propositional, but both." The exclusive emphasis on propositions is mistaken according to
Holmes. There is a personal and subjective side to revelation in that revelation is not
merely infonnative but is also redemptive and experiential. 88
This camp within evangelicalism often looks to Karl Barth for guidance. Henry's
views on Barth were touched upon in chapter three, but a brief account of Barth's position
is worthwhile. Barth, it is often suggested, managed to make peace with the historicalcritical approach to Scripture spawned by enlightenment critics of Scripture while
maintaining "the full theological integrity of Scripture. "89 He does this by claiming on the
one hand that "if the writers of Holy Scripture are truly children of their cultures, then they
express themselves in the terms, concepts, and vocabulary of their culture.... They wrote
as anybody would write in their times and in their cultures." Therefore, the Bible is a
product of culture that is susceptible to historical and literary criticism. He combines this
emphasis, which accepts one product of the enlightenment, with another emphasis that
denies the ultimacy of the enlightenment "Barth's positive thesis is that embedded in the
culturally conditioned Scripture is the witness to the Word of God, or to the divine
revelation. The Word of God exists 'in, with, and under' the culturally conditioned
text. ..90 He simply argued that "commonly recognized difficulties in a text [does not]
prevent the text from being an authentic witness to the Word of God... 91 Thus, a fallible
document becomes the Word of God. 92
authority in a scientific age of a book (the Bible) written in a prescientific age." Ibid., 39.
88 Holmes, All Truth is God's Truth, 74-77.
89 Ramm, After Fundamentalism, 46.
90 Ibid., 47.
91 Ibid., 46.
92 Bloesch is an example of an evangelical theologian influenced by Barth. He
contends that "the Bible contains a fallible element in the sense that it reflects the cultural
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This denial of propositional revelation and the emphasis on subjective, personal, and
existential experience is an anathema to Henry. Henry, of course, denies that one needs to
concede to the challenges of the enlightenment Furthennore, he rejects the subjective·
nature of knowledge that is explicit in the writings of Barth. The debate is an extremely
important one for the Christian faith and one that has political ramifications. Further study
is needed.
A second area where evangelicals must pursue further study involves Scripture itself.
The lack of biblical exegesis on the part of Henry is disappointing. On the one hand, this is
surprising given his emphasis on Scripture as God's word and as our only reliable source
of truth. On the other hand, it is not surprising given that Henry does not consider himself
a biblical exegete. He is a theologian concerned with broad themes and doctrines. He does
not spend his time doing word studies or close textual analysis. That task is left for others.
This leads to an area of study for other politically inclined evangelical scholars. Careful
exegetical studies could shed further light on the teaching of Scripture on various political
questions.93 If one expects biblically derived principles to be taken seriously, then those
principles must be solidly grounded in Scripture itself.
Henry's arguments could be strengthened or refuted, for example, by a detailed study
of justice in Scripture. Several theologians, including some fellow evangelicals, have taken
Henry to task for his clear distinction between love and justice.94 Admitting that many
limitations of the writers." Thus, "the truth in the Bible is enveloped in mystery and
therefore can only be dimly perceived." However, "the truth of the Bible can only be
known as the Spirit makes it known in the event of revelation." Bloesch, Essentials of
Evangelical Theolo~y. 1:68-69.
93 Henry is often accused of proof-texting. This word is usually used in a
pejorative sense and implies that one uses scripture out of context as evidence to support an
idea not derived from Scripture itself. No one can argue that he fails to provide scriptural
warrants for his positions. For example, over 7 ,000 scriptural references are in the six
volumes of God. Revelation and Authority. Nonetheless, his use of Scripture is
sufficiently ancillary to his arguments that it makes him susceptible to such charges.
94 Gabriel Fackre, Lewis Smedes, Robert Johnston and Nicholas Wolterstorff.
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liberal theologians are guilty of overemphasizing God's love at the expense of God's
justice, Gabriel Fackre accuses the Christian right of making the opposite error. He insists
that God's love is of equal ultimacy, and the resulting paradox is simply one which we
must learn to live with. One cannot supersede the other.95 Voicing a similar argument,
Robert Johnston contends that the distinction is wrong-headed.
The Biblical writers do not understand social ethics in terms of one or the other of
these human values, but in terms of the nature and activity of God who
demonstrated their interconnectedness and indissolubility. God's justice (his
righteousness) and his love (his mercy) are not clearly distinguished in Scripture
and never separable in fact. Although these qualities are not identical, they 'infect'
one another (cf. Isa. 11:5; Jer. 9:24; Hos. 2:19).96
To make a distinction, and then base the role of government upon that distinction, is a
"sub-Christian notion" that must be dismissed.97
In response to these challenges, one should ask: "Does God act justly to fulfill the
demands of love or does he act lovingly to fulfill the demands of justice?" Because
Scripture teaches the latter, it would appear that God's justice does supersede his love.
This seems plausible and in line with orthodox Christianity. A careful exegetical study on
Henry's part might have made the argument more convincing.
Along this same line, a careful exegetical study might more clearly define the nature
of justice. While some scholars are less inclined to dismiss the justice/love distinction, they
do object to Henry's understanding of justice. Lewis Smedes agrees with the distinction,
although he denies that Christian love is particular rather than universal, but differs
significantly in its application. He agrees one can find in Scripture the notion that

95 In his book he focuses primarily upon Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority. His
remarks in this regard, however, can apply to Henry. Gabriel Fackre, The Reli~ious Riwt
and Christian Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982), 98103.
96 Ibid., 103.
97 Johnston, Eyan~elicals

at an Impasse, 98.
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government is to enforce justice, not to act out of love. Where he differs from Henry is in
his definition of justice and in his understanding of human rights. "The difference must
exist in our respective ideas of what is embraced among the inalienable rights of men."
Smedes understands those rights as including economic rights. When he speaks of
economic rights he means much more than the basic right to property espoused by Henry.
He means a right to share in the common wealth of a society and the right to a minimal
standard of living.98 A thorough exegetical study of justice could determine the validity of
this often parroted suggestion that the Bible defines social justice as "to each according to
his or her needs ... 99
Yale University philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff also objects to Henry's limited
understanding of justice. He sees Henry as only wanting the state to protect "freedomrights." Meaning "the right to act without coercion in one area or another." Wolterstorff
believes that benefit-rights are also proper. These are rights that someone has to receive a
benefit As an example, he suggests the right of the disabled to receive an income.100
True justice, which he calls social justice, will include state protection of both freedom
rights and benefit rights. He is convinced, and probably rightly so, that when Henry calls
for the government to protect rights, "it is not social justice but regulative justice that he is
thinking of."101 He argues that "it is impossible to read the Old Testament prophets
98 See Smedes, "The Evangelicals and the Social Question," 9-13, and "Where Do
We Differ?" 8-10.
99 Johnston, Evan~licals at an Impasse, 98.
100 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Contemporary Christian Views of the State: Some
Major Issues," Christian Scholars Review 3 (June 1974): 320. "A freedom right is a claim
on everyone to respect that right. A benefit right is a claim on someone or other to satisfy
that right." Ibid.
101 "Henry's view is that the State's proper function is to regulate the activities of its
citizens by maintaining a system of laws based on regulative justice and good order. It is
not the State's proper function actively to promote social justice, i.e., actively to promote
the satisfaction of benefit-rights." Ibid.

315
without seeing that it was social justice they were calling for. It was the deprivation of
benefit-rights that evoked their denunciation. The Orristian cannot possibility regard
justice as confined to regulative justice." 102 He insists that "the deprivation of benefit~
rights is also a matter of wrongdoing, both individual and collective: a matter of perversity,
and of dereliction of duty." 103 And, therefore, "there is no escaping the conclusion that all
justice which falls within the common good--social as well as regulative--belongs within
the proper function of the State." 104
Perhaps the most interesting part of his argument relates to the traditional
interpretation of Romans 13. Henry and others have used this portion of Scripture to limit
the role of government. But, as Wolterstorff points out, the apostle Paul is not necessarily
providing a comprehensive statement regarding the role of civil authority.
It is clear that what is here uppermost in Paul's mind [is the fact] that the State is
called to deal with wrongdoing and that it is authorized to do so coercively. But as
to whether the State also has a positive side, Paul here says nothing one way or the
other. He is not here giving a general statement as to the nature of the State. He
does not say that the whole of the State's proper function consists of restraining by
constraining. This becomes especially clear if one considers the context; the only
side of the State which is relevant in the context is its negative side.105
Wolterstorffs argument is weakened to the extent that his attempt to find additional support

102 Ibid., 321.
103 Ibid., 322.
104 Ibid "What then is the sphere of the State's action? What is the domain of its
proper function? A two-fold one. The State's proper function is to regulate the activities of
the members of society--both individual and institutional--by a system of laws based on
good order and regulative justice. And secondly, the State's proper function is actively to
promote social justice."
"The phrase 'actively promote' is crucial here. When at all possible, the State is not
itself to provide the services and engage in the activities which will satisfy our benefitrights. Rather, its function is actively to promote a society containing institutions which
will and can satisfy those rights. For remember, in all its actions the State must respect the
autonomy, the sovereignty, of the other institutions in society." Ibid., 324.
105 Ibid., 326-327.
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for a more positive role for government requires him to go back to the Old Testament and
draw from examples from ancient Israel. He does not address the problems that this raises
such as the unique nature of the theocratic form of government in Old Testament times.
Even a superficial exegetical study of Scripture would help Henry's case. For
example Kittle and Friedrich have pointed out that the Greek word for justice, Dike, only
occurs three times in the New Testament and each time it refers to retributive justice. In
fact it is sometimes translated as punishment.106 My point is this, if Henry's political
principles are based in Scripture, then careful study of Scripture will illuminate this fact in
such a way that might help unify the evangelical community.
A final recommendation for further study among evangelicals involves a renewal of
interest in the classical Christian tradition. In the process of revitalizing evangelical interest
in politics, Henry has brought before his fellow believers many ideas that are worth
pursuing. Many of the ideas summarized by Henry have been addressed before in greater
depth and detail by thinkers prior to Henry. His lack of originality is not to be condemned,
rather he should be commended for resurrecting ideas that have pervaded orthodox
Christian thinking for centuries prior to the modem era. In fact, he does not pretend to be a
political philosopher, and it was his desire to revive political and social thinking among
orthodox Christians. A renewed study of the classical Christian tradition would add depth
106 Variant forms of the word appear numerous other times. dikaios [just,
righteous], dikaiosyne [justification, righteousness], dikaioo [to justify], dikaioma
[regulation], dikaiosis [justification], dikaiokrisia [righteous judgment]. It is also
necessary to go back and explore Old Testament usage of the Hebrew words sedeq and
saddiq. This study would have to deal with many problems. For example, "in rabbinic
Judaism righteousness was completely identified with conformity to the law" which would
tend to support Henry, but obedience to the law included "works of charity and works of
mercy" ... such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, giving drink to the thirsty, ...
mourning with mourners, comforting the broken-hearted and visiting those who were sick
or in prison." Colin Brown, general ed., The New International Dictionazy of New
Testament Theoloey, translated, with additions and revisions, from the German
Theolo~sches Be~j.ffslexikon Zurn Neuen Testament. edited by Lothar Coenen, Erich
Beyreuther and Hans Bietenhard, (Grand Rapids, MI: Regency Reference Library,
Zondervan Publishing House, 1986), 358-359.
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and breadth to evangelical political thought. Rather than accepting old cliches and
characterizations, a thorough examination of the works of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas,
John Calvin, Martin Luther, and Thomas Hooker would enrich evangelical political
discourse. Henry is calling evangelicals to be true to their heritage, and he wants them to
expound upon the implementation of that heritage today. Further study in this area would
aid the effort greatly.107
Further work in these four areas could help resolve tensions that exist within the
evangelical community itself, enabling it to speak with one voice and to present a more
viable alternative to the larger intellectual and political world.
In conclusion, Henry bemoans the plight of modernity. Modern naturalism has
defined the nature of reality and humanity in such a way that prevents us from discovering
real solutions to perennial problems. As a result, modern culture is headed down a slippery
slope. "A culture which has lost its unanimity concerning the validity and significance of
the spiritual and the moral is not a culture which is doomed to disintegration at some future
day; rather, it is culture in the very process of disintegration." 108 Humanity must
reinvestigate alternative understandings of reality. For Henry the alternatives are reduced to
two: biblical theology or naturalistic nihilism.109 Henry pleads for reconsideration of the

107 Another interesting study that would shed greater light on Henry himself would
involve a review of those who have had the greatest impact on his life. The starting point
would be to look at those thinkers and books that Henry himself has identified as most
important. These would include Gordon H. Clark, (1902-1986), one of Henry's
professors at Wheaton College and later the Chair of the Philosophy Department for many
years at Butler University in Indianapolis; W. Harry Jellema, (1893-1982) a one-time chair
of the philosophy department at Indiana University; and, Cornelius Van Til, (1895-1987),
long time theologian at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. He has also
identified the two most influential books in his life as The Christian View of God and the
World, (1893) by James Orr, a Scottish apologetics professor from the University of
Glasgow (1844-1913), and The Ori~n of Paul's Reli~ion by J. Gresham Machen.
108 Henry, The Drift of Western Thou~ht, 140.
109 Ibid., 160.
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former.
Henry's most important contribution to our quest for justice is twofold. He has
successfully reactivated a significant element of American society and has helped return
them to the political arena Regardless of their shortcomings and misdeeds in many
respects, this element, modem evangelicals, is deeply concerned about the quest for justice.
Henry's second contribution is a renewed emphasis upon divine revelation as a source of
truth to guide our quest for justice. In an age when the supernatural, the transcendent, and
the spiritual have been called in question, it is vital for someone to provide an intellectually
sophisticated case for divine revelation. Henry has not convinced the world that biblical
theology is the only answer, but he has fought the fight in an era of skepticism and has
inspired others to continue in his footsteps.

If evangelicals heed his call, Henry is optimistic about the good that Christians can do
in this world. He calls them to actively preach their message to a lost world. "Let us call
individuals and nations to a new vision of justice and righteousness. Let us invite a
vagabond race to share with us the joys of life redeemed and fit for eternity. For the crisis
of our times, the light that shines in darkness is still more than adequate." 110

110 Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society, 150.

BIBLIOORAPHY

Books by Henry

Henry, Carl F. H. Answers for the Now Generation. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1949.
____. ASPects of Christian Social Ethics. The Payton Lectures at Fuller Theological
Seminary. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964; reprint,
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1980.
____. Bender in the Cameroons: The Stoty of the World's Darkest Continent.
Grand Rapids, Ml: R. Williams Press, 1936-1940.
____. Christian Countennoves in a Decadent Culture. Portland, OR: Multnomah
Press, 1986.
____. The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society: Promotine Evaneelical Renewal
and National Riehteousness. Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986.
____ . Christian Personal Ethics. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1957.
____. Confessions of a Theoloeian: An Autobioeraphy. Waco, Texas: Word
Books, 1986.
____. Conversations with Carl Herny: Christianity For Today. Symposium Series,
vol. 18. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986.
_ _ _. The Drift of Western Thoueht. The W. B. Riley Memorial Lectures,
Northwestern Schools. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1951.
____. Evaneelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theolo~. Grand Rapids, Ml:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957.
_ _ _ . Evaneelicals at the Brink of Crisis: Sienificauce of the World Conm;ss on
Evaneelism. Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1967.
____. Evaneelicals In Search ofldentity. Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1976.
____. Faith At the frontiers. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1969.
_ _ _. Fifty Years of Protestant Theoloey. Boston, MA: W. A. Wilde Co., 1950.
____. frontiers of Modem Theoloey. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1966.
319

320
Giyin~

a Reason For Our Ho.pe. Boston, MA: W. A. Wilde Co., 1949.

Glimpses of a Sacred Land. Boston, MA: W. A. Wilde Co., 1953.
____. God. Revelation and Authority. 6 volumes. Waco, Texas: Word Books,
1976-1983.
New Stricies of Faith. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972.
Notes on the Doctrine of God. Boston, MA: W. A. Wilde Co., 1948.
____. The Pacific Garcien Mission. A Doorway to Heayen. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1942.
____. Personal Idealism and
1951.

Stmn~'s Theolo~.

Wheaton, IL: Van Kampen Press,

____. A Plea for Evan~elical Demonstration. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, 1971.
_ _ _. The Protestant Dilemma: An Analysis of the Current Impasse in Theo1o~.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1948.

_ _ _. Remakin~ the Modern Mind. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1946.
____. Successful Cburch Publicity. A Guidebook for Christian Publicists. Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1943.
____. Such As I Haye: The Stewardship of Talent. New York, NY: AbingdonCokesbury Press, 1945.
____. Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books,
1990.
____. Twili~ht of a Great Civilization: The Drift Toward Neo-Pa~anism.
Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1988.
____. The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundaroenta1ism. Grand Rapids, MI:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1947.
____. Who is My Brother's Keca>er?. Phoenix, AZ: National Committee of
Christian Laymen, 1962.
____,ed. Baker's Dictionazy of Christian Ethics. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, 1973.
____,ed. Basic Christian Doctrines. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1962.

321
____, consulting ed. Biblical EJWositer: The Livin& Iheme of the Great Book with
General and Introductory Essays and Exposition for each Book of the Bible.
Introduction by Billy Graham. Philadelphia, PA: A. J. Holman Co., 1960, 1973.
_ _ _, ed. Christian Faith and Modern Tbeolo~: Contemporary Evan~lical
Theolo&Y· New York, NY: Channel Press, 1964.
____ ,ed. Contemporary Evane;elical Thoue;ht Great Neck, NY: Channel Press,
1957.
_ _ _ ,and Rutherford L. Decker, compiled by. The Evaoe;elical Pulpit Vol. 1.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1948.
____, ed. Fundamentals of the Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing
House, 1969.
____, ed. Horizons of Science: Christian Scholars Speak Out. San Francisco, CA:
Harper and Row, 1978.
____ , ed. Jesus of Nazareth: Savior and Lord. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1966.
____ , and Stanley Mooneyham, eds. One Race. One Gosgel. One Task: World
Conim;ss on Evan~lism: Berlin 1966. Official Reference Volumes. Minneapolis,
MN: World Wide Publications, 1967.
____, ed. Pro.phecy in the Makine;: Messa~s Prepared for The Jerusa1em
Conference on Biblical Pro_phecy. Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, 1971.
Carl F. H. Henry and others. Quest for Reality: Christianity and the Counter-Culture.
Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1973.
____ , ed. Revelation and the Bible: Contemporary Evan~lical Thou&ht. Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1958.
Articles by Henry
"Agenda for Evangelical Advance." Christianity Today. 5 November 1976,
38.
"Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough." In Horizons of Science, ed. Carl F.
H. Henry, 87-116. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1978.
____. "America Faces Critical Decisions." Christianity Today. 20 January 1967, 2425.
____. "American Evangelicals and Theological Dialogue." Christianity Today, 15
January 1965, 27-29.

322
_ _ _. "American Evangelicals in a Turning Time: A Theology Perpetually on the
Make Will Not Do; How My Mind Has Changed." Christian Centwy 97 (November
5, 1980): 1058-62.
_ _ _. "America's Future: Can We Salvage the Republic?" Christianity Today, 3
March 1958, 3-7.
_ _ _. "Basic Issues in Modern Theology: Revelation as Truth." Christianity Today,
1January1965, 14-17.
_ _ _. "Basic Issues in Modern Theology: Revelation in History." Christianity
Today, 20 November 1964, 17-20 and 4 December 1964, 13-15.
_ _ _. "Between Barth and Bultmann." Christianity Today, 8 May 1961, 25-26.
_ _ _. "The Bible and Modern Science." The Holman Study Bible, 1184-1194.
Philadelphia, PA: A. J. Holman Company, 1962.
_ _ _. "The Bible and the Conscience of Our Age." Journal of the Evaneelical
Theoloejcal Society 25 (December 1982): 403-407.
_ _ _. "Bible Infallibility: Important or Essential?" Christianity Today, 21 January
1966, 44-45.
_ _ _. "Bible, Inspiration of." In Evaneelical Dictionazy of Theoloey, ed. Walter A.
Elwell, 145-149. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984.
- - - · "Biblical Authority and the Social Crisis. In Authority and Interpretation,
eds. Duane A. Garrett and Richard R. Melick, Jr., 203-220. Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1987.
II

_ _ _ . "Billy Graham's Impact on New York." Christianity Today, 16 September
1957, 3-5.
_ _ _ . "Brotherhood for a Week." Christianity Today, 2 February 1959, 20-22.
_ _ _ . "Central Evangelical Concerns." Christianity Today, 9 December 1966, 2627.
_ _ _. "Chaos in European Theology: The Deterioration of Barth's Defenses."
Christianity Today, 9 October 1964, 15-19.
"Charting a Course." Christianity Ioday, 31July1970, 28.
"Christ Against the Tyrants." Christianity Today, 2 August 1963, 24-25.
_ _ _. "Christ and the Atom Bomb." Christianity Today, 2 September 1957, 20-22.
_ _ _ . "The Christian Dynamic and the Cultural Decline." The Pulpit Dieest 37 (June
1957): 13-17.
"Christian Education and Culture." Christianity Ioday, 10 November 1958,
3-6.

323
_ _ _. "Christian Education and Our American Schools." United Evan&elical Action,
1 December 1955, 3f.
_ _ _. "Christian Education and the World of Culture." The Mennonite Ouanerly
Review 32 (October 1958): 307-313.
_ _ _. "Christian Ethics and Economic Debate." Christianity Today, 2 March 1959,
32-33.
_ _ _. "Christian-Marxist Dialogue." Christianity Today, 12 August 1977, 28-29.
_ _ _ ,. "Christian Perspective on Private Property." In God and the Gooci: Essays in
Memozy of Heruy Stob, eds. Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes, 93-104. Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1975.
_ _ _. "Christian--Pagan West." Christianity Today, 24 December 1956, 3-5.
_ _ _. "Christian Personal and Social Ethics in Relation to Racism, Poverty, War,
and Other Problems." In Let the Eartb Hear His Yoice. International Congress on
World Evangelization, Lausanne, Switzerland Official Reference Volume: Papers
and Responses, ed. J. D. Douglas, 1163-1180. Minneapolis, MN: Worldwide
Publishers, 1975.
_ _ _. "Christian Responsibility in Education." Christianity Today, 27 May 1957,
11-14.
_ _ _. "Christian Social Involvement: Its Basis and Method--A Reply Dengerink."
International Refonnecl Bulletin 26 (July 1966): 25-30.
_ _ _. "Christian Theology and Social Revolution (In." The Perkins School of
Theolo&Y Journal 21 (Winter-Spring 1967-68): 13-23.
_ _ _. "Christian Witness in Iran." Christianity Today, 7 November 1975, 36-38.
_ _ _. "Christianity at the Epistemological Divide." The Watcbman-Examiner, 3
February 1944, 108-109.
_ _ _. "Christianity and Communism." Christianity Today, 16 March 1962, 26-29.
_ _ _. "Christianity and Medical Frontiers."
Affiliation 30 (September 1978): 97-103.

Journal of the American Scientific

_ _ _. "Christianity and Our Freedoms." Christianity Ioday, 27 April 1959, 20.
_ _ _. "Christianity and Social Reform." Moravian Theolo~cal Seminary Bulletin
(1960): 17-33.
_ _ _. "Christianity and the American Heritage." United Evan&elical Action, 1 July
1954, 3-5.
_ _ _. "Christianity and the Economic Crisis." Yitai Speeches 21(May15, 1955):
1243-1248.

324
_ _ _. "Christianity and the Modern Emptiness." The Watchman-Examiner, July
1950, 725-726.
_ _ _. "Christianity in a Runaway World." Eternity 20 (May 1969): 11-12.
_ _ _. "Christianity in a Troubled World" Ministt;y (Reformed Theological Seminary,
Jackson, MS). Spring 1990, 2-5.
_ _ _. "Christological Neglect by a Mission-Minded Church." In Scripture.
Tradition. and Interpretation: Essays Presented to Everett F. Harrison by his Students
and Collea~ues in Honor of his 75th Birthday, eds. W. W. Gasque and Wm. S.
Lasor, 216-233. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1978.
_ _ _. "Christ's Resurrection and Human Destiny." Christianity Today, 27 April
1973, 8-11.
_ _ _. "Church and State: Why the Marriage Must be Saved." In Christian Thou~ht
and Action: The Christian as Citizen, 9-13. Carol Stream, IL: Christianity Today,
Inc., 1985.
"The Church and the Kremlin." Christianity Today, 2 March 1962, 24-25.
"The Church and the Race Problem." Christianity Today, 18 March 1957, 2023.
_ _ _. "The Clergy and the 'Word Business'." Moody Monthly, January 1939, 258.
"Committing Seminaries to the Word." Christianity Today, 13 February 1976,
6-9.
"Confessions of an Editor." Christianity Today, 1August1969, 3.
_ _ _. "Conflict over Biblical Inerrancy." Christianity Today, 7 May 1976, 23-25.
_ _ _. "Confronting Other Religions." Christianity Today, 1August1969, 31.
_ _ _. "Conservative or Liberal--What is the Difference?" United Evan~elical Action,
15 January 1949, 3-4.
"The Crisis in Education." Christianity Today, 12 May 1958, 20-28.
"The Crisis of Modern Learning." Imprimis 13 (February 1984): 1-6.
"The Crisis of Our Time." Alliance Witness, 6 February 1980, 4-6.
_ _ _. "Cross-Currents in Contemporary Theology." Jesus of Nazareth: Savior and
Lw:d. ed. Carl F. H. Henry, 1-22. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1966.

_ _ _. "Dare We Revive the Modernist-Fundamentalist Conflict?" Christianity
Today, 10 June 1957, 3f.

325
_ _ _. "Dare We Renew the Controversy? The Fundamentalist Reduction."
Christianity Today, 24 June 1957, 23-26.
_ _ _. "Dare We Renew the Controversy? The Contemporary Restoration."
Christianity Today, 8 July 1957, 15-18.
_ _ _. "Dare We Renew the Controversy? The Evangelical Responsibility."
Christianity Today, 22 July 1957, 23f.
_ _ _. "Decade of Gains and Losses." Christianity Today, 15 August 1954, 42-43.
_ _ _. "Demythologizing the Evangelicals." Christianity Today, 13 September 1968,
13-15.
_ _ _. "Desegregation and Regeneration." Christianity Today, 29 September 1958,
20-21.
"The Dignity of Work." Vital Speeches 20 (August 15, 1954): 665-671.
"The Dilemma Facing Karl Barth." Christianity Today, 4 January 1963, 2728.
_ _ _. "Distinction Between Conservative and Liberal Theology." The WatchmanExaminer, 2 December 1948, 1224-1226.
_ _ _. "Divine Revelation and the Bible." Inspiration and lnte[pretation, ed. John F.
Walvoord, 253-278. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957.
_ _ _. "Do We Need a Christian University?" Christianity Today, 9 May 1960, 3-5.
_ _ _. "Doctrinal Consensus and Conflict." Christianity Today, 25 November 1957,
20-24.
_ _ _. "Doing Your Own Thing."

Theolo~y

Today 32 (January 1976): 403-410.

_ _ _. "A Door Swings Open." Christianity Today, 18 June 1965, 24-26.
_ _ _. "Ecumenical Age: Problems and Promise." Bibliotheca Sacra 123 (JulySeptember 1966): 204-219.
_ _ _. "The Ecumenical Movement Today." Christianity Today, 29 January 1965, 3-

5.
_ _ _. "European Theology and the Lost Multitudes." Christianity Today, 6
November 1964, 29-30.
_ _ _. "European Theology Today." Faith and Thou~ht, 94 (Spring 1965): 9-91.
_ _ _. "The Evangel and Public Duty." Christian l&~al Society Quarterly 3 (SpringSummer 1982): 14-17, 64-76.
_ _ _. "An Evangelical Appraisal of Liberation Theology." This World, Fall 1986,
99-107.

326
_ _ _. "Evangelical Colleges as Faith-Affirming Institutions." Christianity Today, 10
September 1965, 25-26.
_ _ _ . "Evangelical Profits and Losses." Christian Centwy 95 (January 25, 1978):
69-70.
_ _ _. "Evangelical Social Concern." Cbristianizy Today, 1March1974, 99-100.
"Evangelical Summertime." Christianizy Today, 1April1977, 38-40.
"The Evangelical Task." Decision, October 1966, 3.
"Evangelicals and the Bible." Cbristianizy Today, 3 March 1972, 35-36.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and Biblical Authority." Journal of the Evan~elical Theolo&ical
Sociezy 23 (June 1980): 139-142.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and the Ecumenical Movement." Moody Monthly, May 1949,
629f.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and Ecumenism." Christianizy Today, 22 May 1966, 10-13.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and Fundamentals." Christianity Today, 16 September 1957,
20-21.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and the Social Scene: God's Plan For Salvation and Justice." In
The Ministty of DeyelQpment in Evan~elical Perspective: A Symposium on the Social
and Spiritual Mandate, ed. R. Hancock, 96-104. Pasadena, CA: William Carey
Library, 1979.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals Jump on the Political Bandwagon." Christianity Today, 24
October 1980, 20-25.
"Evangelicals and Social Action." United Evan~lical Action, 1March1951,
7-8.
_ _ _ . "Evangelicals in a Comer?" Cbristianizy Today, 27 May 1966, 28-30.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals in the Social Struggle." Cbristianizy Today, 8October1965, 311.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals: Out of the Closet but Going Nowhere?" Christianizy Today, 4
January 1980, 16-22.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals Shape Philosophy of Science." Christianizy Today, 6 July
1959, 20, 32.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals United for Action." United Eyan~elical Action, 1April1950,
6f.
_ _ _. "Evangelism and Social Action."

.Cr.uK 16 (September 1980): 24-29.

327
_ _ _. "Facing a New Day in Evangelism." In One Race. One GoSPCl. One Task:
World Conmss on Eyan~elism: Berlin 1966. Official Reference Yolumes, eds. Carl
F. H. Henry and Stanley Mooneyham, 11-18. Minneapolis, MN: World Wide
Publications, 1967.
_ _ _. "Facing the Tide of Obscenity." Christianity Today, 9 April 1965, 29-31.
_ _ _. "The Faith of the Nation." Moody Monthly, July 1955, 25f.
_ _ _. "The Final Triumph." In foundations of the Faith: Twelve Studies in the
Basic Christian Revelation, ed. David J. Fant, 172-189. Westwood, NJ: Fleming H.
Revell Co., 1951.
_ _ _. "A Finn Reliance on Providence." Christianity Today, 23 June 1958, 20-23.
_ _ _. "The Fortunes of Theology." Christianity Ioday, 14 April 1972, 35-36; 12
May 1972, 32-33; 9 June 1972, 30-31; 7 July 1972, 21; 11August1972, 30-31.
_ _ _. "Foundations: Tilt to the Left" Christianity Today, 28 April 1958, 20-24.
_ _ _. "The Fragility of Freedom in the West." Christianity Today, 15October1956,
8-11.
_ _ _. "The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Ricochet of Silver Bullets."
Christianity Today, 4 September 1981, 30-31.
_ _ _. "Further Thoughts About Women." Christiaoity Today, 6 June 1975, 36-37.
"God and the Modem Mind." The Watchman-Examiner, 29 March 1945, 300301.
_ _ _. "God as a Problem." Christiaoity Today, 13 February 1970, 32-33.
_ _ _. "The God of the Bible Versus Naturalism." In Christianity and World
Revolution, ed. Edwin Harold Rian, 225-237. New York, NY: Harper and Row,
1963.
_ _ _. "The God of the Bible and Moral Foundations." In The Christian Vision: Man
and Morality, ed. Thomas J. Burke. Foreword by George Roche, 1-23. Hillsdale,
MI: Hillsdale College Press, 1986.
_ _ _. "God's Word for This Century." Christianity Ioday, 28 March 1960, 20-21.
_ _ _. "God's Word to a Nation in Decision."
1983): 24-27.

Reli~ious Broadcastin~

15 (April

_ _ _. "Gospel and Society." Christianity Today, 13 September 1974, 66-67.
_ _ _. "The Great Issue." The Watchman-Examiner, 11 September 1952, 840-842.
_ _ _. "Has America Awakened At Last?" Christianity Today, 9 November 1962,
28-29.

328
_ _ _. "Has Democracy a Future?" Christianity Today. 5 July 1974, 26-27.
_ _ _. "Has Winter Come Again? Theological Transition in Europe." Christianity
Today, 21 November 1960, 3-5.
_ _ _. "Henry on Gallop: Faith and Social Concerns." Christianity Today, 10
October 1980, 38-43.
~--·

"The 'Heresy' of Fundamentalism." The Watchman-Examiner, 15 September
1949, 918-919.
"Heritage From the Past." Christianity Today, 13 February 1976, 32-34.
"Honoring the Bible as the Word of God." The Gicieon, August 1954, 302-

316.
"Human Engineering." Christianity Today, 12 September 1975, 48-53.
"Human Rights and Wrongs." Christianity Ioday, 8 July 1977, 25.
_ _ _. "Human Rights in an Age of Tyranny." Christianity Today, 4 February 1957,
20-23.
_ _ _. "Hunger of the Masses." Christianity Today, 16 March 1962, 24-25.
_ _ _. "Impress or Evangelize the World?" Christianity Today, 30 March 1962, 2425.
_ _ _. "The Interpretation of the Scriptures: Are We Doomed to Hermeneutical
Nihilism?" Review and Expositor 71(Spring1974): 197-215.
_ _ _. "Introduction to Theology." Christianity Today, 4 June 1971, 25-26.
_ _ _. "The Inverting Power of the Gospel." In The Evaneelical Pulpit, Vol. 1.
Compiled by Carl F. H. Henry and Rutherford L. Decker, 139-148. Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1948.
_ _ _. "Is Christianity Worth Trying?" Moody Monthly, March 1945, 378-379.
_ _ _. "Is Freedom Terminal?" United Evaneelical Action, Spring 1976, 12-13.
_ _ _. "Is God Really Omniscient--Comments." Reliejon in Life, Spring 1951, 186189.
_ _ _. "Is Modernity Worth Sparing?" Christianity Today, 7 January 1957, 20-23.
_ _ _. "Is the Supreme Court on Trial." Christianity Ioday, 1March1963, 28-29.
"Jesus and Political Justice." Christianity Today, 6 December 1974, 34-35.
"Jesus as the Ideal of Christian Ethics." Christianity Today, 4 February 1957,
12f.

329
_ _ _. "Jesus Christ and the Last Days." In Pro,phecy in the Makin~: Messa~s
Pr<(llared for The Jerusalem Conference on Biblical frqphecy, ed. Carl F. H. Henry,
169-186. Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, 1971.
"Johnson, King and Ho Chi Minh." Christianity Today, 26 April 1968, 2425.
_ _ _. "Jonathon Edwards' Still Angry God." Christianity Today, 6 January 1958,
20-21.
"Judgement of America." Christianity Today, 8 November 1974, 22-24.
"Judgment of the Theologians." Christianity Today, 25September1964, 3-4.
"Justification by Ignorance." Christianity Today, 2 January 1970, 10-15.
"Land of the Free." Christianity Today, 21June1963, 23-25.
"Lessons from the Slavery Crisis." Christianity Ioday, 5 January 1959, 2022.
"Let the Chips Fall." The Christian Statesman, March 1953, 6-7.
"Liberalism in Transition." Christianity Today, 20 December 1963, 10-11.
"Life, License and Permit of Status." Christianity Today, 22 June 1959, 2021.
"The Logic of Our Mission." Christianity Today, 5 June 1961, 20-22.
"The Lost Dimension of Depth." Christianity Today, 21July1958, 20-21.
"Lost Momentum." Christianity Today, 4 September 1987, 30-32.
_ _ _. "Low Tide in the West." Christianity Today, 24December1956, 20-24.
_ _ _. "Making Political Decisions: An Evangelical Perspective." In Piety and
Politics: Eyan~elicals and Fundamentalist Confront The World. eds. Richard John
Neuhaus and Michael Cromartie, 99-108. Washington, D. C.: Ethics and Public
Policy Center, 1987.
_ _ _. "Man--Machine or Miracle." The Christian Reader, June-August 1974, 40-42.
_ _ _. "Man's Dilemma: Sin." The Word for This Centwy, ed. Merrill Chapin
Tenney, 3-20. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1960.
"Man's Glorious Destiny." Christianity Today, 15 September 1958, 20-21.
"Marks of Christian Education." Christianity Today, 27 February 1961, 2628.
_ _ _. "Martyn-Lloyd-Jones: From Buckingham to Westminister: An Interview."
Christianity Today, 8 February 1980: 27-34.

330
_ _ _. "The Messianic Concept in Israel." Part 1. Christianity Today, 13 October
1961, 11-12.
_ _ _. "The Messianic Concept in Israel." Part 2. Christianity Today, 27 October
1961, 11-13.
_ _ _. "Metaphysics and Ethics." In Ba1cer's Dictionazy of Christian Ethics, ed. Carl
F. H. Henry, 419-421. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1973.
_ _ _. "The Mid-Twentieth Century Crossroads." The Philoso.phical Forum 6
(Spring 1948): 22-28.
"A Mind to Win." Christianity Today, 11April1969, 24-25.
"Ministering to the Jobless." Christianity Today, 19 July 1968, 24-25.
_ _ _. "The Ministry of All God's People." Christianity Today, 27September1963,
30-32.
_ _ _. "Mission in the Mountains." Christianity Ioday, 3 July 1964, 37-38.
_ _ _. "Modern Education and the Secularistic Tide." The Watchman-Examiner, 11
October 1951, 963-965.
_ _ _. "Modern Science and Values." The Asbwy Seminarian, Fall 1949, 91-98.
_ _ _. "Modern Theology at the End of Its Tether." Christianity Today, 16 July
1965, 20-23.
_ _ _. "Moral Values in Public Education." Eternity 5(September1954): 14f.
"Moving on Media Frontiers." Christianity Ioday, 10 September 1976, 4647.
"Moving on Public Frontiers." Christianity Today, 5 December 1975, 40-41.
_ _ _. "My Proposals for the Bicentennial." Eternity 25 (July 1974): 26-27f.
_ _ _. "The NCC and Economic Planning." Christianity Today, 13 February 1961,
36-37.
_ _ _. "NCC, God and the Schools." Christianity Ioday, 8 June 1959, 20-22.
"The Need for a Christian University." Christianity Ioday, 17 February 1967,
3-8.
"The New Coalitions." Christianity Ioday, 17 November 1989, 26-28.
"The 'New Consciousness'." Christianity Ioday, 8 October 1971, 28-29.
_ _ _. "The New Image of Man." In The Scientist and Ethical Decision, ed. Charles
Hatfield, 167-176. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1973.

331
_ _ _. "New Testament Ethics." In Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics, ed. Carl
F. H. Henry, 456-458. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1973.
_ _ _. "No Other Name." Moody Monthly. August 1948, 866.

_ _ _ . "Of Bicentennial Concern and Patriotic Symbols." Christianity Today, 2 July
1976, 14-19.
_ _ _. "The Ominous Drift from Christian Ideals." United Evan~elical Action, 1
February 1953, 17-18.
_ _ _. "On the Brink of a New Order." Christianity Today, 24 May 1963, 20-21.
_ _ _. "On the Edge of an Abyss." Converted Catbolic. May 1955, 18-23.
"The Paganizing of Love." Christianity Today, 3 February 1958, 20-21.
"Pale Ghost of Barth." Christianity Today, 12 February 1971, 40-43.
_ _ _. "The Peace Drive in the Churches." Christianity Today. 27 April 1959, 20-21.
_ _ _. "Peace in Our Time: What are the Pacifists Doing?" Part 1. Christianity
Today, 19 January 1959, 9-11.
_ _ _. "Peace in Our Time: What are the Pacifists Doing?" Part 2. Christianity
Today, 2 February 1959, 13-16.
_ _ _. "Perspective for Social Action." Part I. Christianity Today, 19 January 1959,
9-12.
_ _ _. "Perspective for Social Action." Part II. Christianity Today, 2 February
1959, 13-16.
"The Plight of the Church College." Christianity Today, 21May1965, 16-19.
"Plight of the Evangelicals." Christianity Today, 5 July 1968, 25-27.
_ _ _ . "Political Theology." In Baker's Dictionazy of Christian Ethics, ed. Carl F. H.
Henry, 513-514. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1973.
- - - · "A Postscript: Reply to Morris Ashcraft. II Review and Expositor 71 (Spring
1974): 225-227.
_ _ _. "The Power of Truth." Christianity Today, 13 September 1963, 24-26.
_ _ _ . "The Predicament of Modem Theology." Christianity Today, 16 January
1961, 20-21.
_ _ _. "The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article." Journal of Eyan~lical
Theolo~ical Society 27 (March 1984): 77-92.
_ _ _. "Private Sins, Public Office." Christianity Today, 4 March 1988, 28-29.

332
"Pull the Lever Knowing Why." Christianity Today, 24 October 1980, 22-23.
_ _ _. "Purpose of God." In The New Face of Eyan~elicalism: An International
Symposium on the Lausanne Coyenant, ed. by C. Rene Padilla, 17-32. Downers
Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1976.
_ _ _. "A Question ofldentity." Christianity Today, 6 August 1971, 30.
_ _ _. "Race Tensions and Social Change." Christianity Today, 19 January 1959,
20-23.
_ _ _. "Rationale for the Christian College." Christianity Today, 21 May 1971, 7-10.
_ _ _. "Reaction and Realignment." Christianity Today, 2 July 1976, 30-31.
_ _ _. "The Reality and Identity of God." Christianity Today, 14 March 1969, 3-6.
_ _ _. "The Reality and Identity of God." Christianity Today, 28 March 1969, 1216.
_ _ _. "Recasting the Ecumenical Posture." Christianity Ioday, 26 October 1962,
24-25.
_ _ _. "Reflections." In The Cbica~o Declaration, ed. Ronald J. Sider, 127-131.
Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, 1973.
_ _ _. "Reflections on American Theology." Christianity Today, 1January1965,
26-28.
_ _ _. "Reflections on a Nation in Transition." Interpretation 30 (January 1976): 5259.
_ _ _. "Reflections on Women's Lib." Christianity Today, 3 January 1975, 25-26.
_ _ _. "The Relation Between Conduct and Belief." Journal of the Transactions of
the Victoria Institute 78 (1946): 56-74.
_ _ _. "Religion and the Crisis in Education." The Watchman-Examiner, 6 March
1952, 228.
"Religion in a Free Society." Christianity Today, 26 May 1958, 30-31.
"Religion in the Public Schools." Christianity Today, 30 August 1963, 30-32.
_ _ _. "Religion in the Schools." Cbristianity Today, 14 September 1973, 38-39; 12
October 1973, 38-39; 9November1973, 46-48; 7 December 1973, 34-36; 4 January
1974, 36-37; 1 February 1974, 24-25.
_ _ _. "Reply to Morris Ashcraft." Review and E3Positor 71(Spring1974): 220226.
_ _ _. "Repressive Powers." Christianity Ioday, 21January1977, 30-31.

333
_ _ _ . "Restoring the Whole Word for the Whole Community." In The Reli~ous
Education We Nee<l: Toward the Renewal of Christian Education, ed. James Lee, 5574. Mishawaka, IN: Religious Education Press, 1977.
_ _ _ . "The Resurgence of Evangelical Christianity." Christianity Today, 30 March
1959, 3-6.
"Revelation and the Bible." Part I. Christianity Today, 9 June 1958, 5-7.
"Revelation and the Bible." Part II. Christianity Today, 23 June 1958, 5-7.
_ _ _ . "Revelation, Special." Eyan~lical Dictionazy ofTheolo~, ed. Walter A.
Elwell, 945-948. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1984.
_ _ _. Review of Between a Rock and a Hard Place, by Mark Hatfield. In
Christianity Today, 18 June 1976, 24-27.
"Revolt on Evangelical Frontiers." Christianity Today, 26 April 1974, 6.
"Revolution in Theology." Christianity Today, 9 October 1970, 36-37.
_ _ _. "The Road to Eternity: A Travel Guide for the 80s." Christianity Today, 17
July 1981, 30-33.
_ _ _. "Science and Faith." Faith and Thou~t 104 (Summer 1977): 53-56.
_ _ _ ,. "Science and God's Revelation in Nature." Bul1etin of the Evan~lical
Theolo~al Society 3 (Winter 1960): 25-44.
_ _ _. "Science and Religion." Contemporary Evane-elical Thoue-ht, ed. Carl F. H.
Henry, 247-282. Great Neck, NY: Channel Press, 1957.
_ _ _. "Science and the Bible." Christianity Today, 1September1958, 20-22.
_ _ _. "Science and the Need for Visible Value-Options in Policy Making." In
Modifyine- Man: Implications and Ethics, ed. Craig Ellison, 263-270. Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, 1977.
_ _ _ . "The Secularization of American Life." In An Intro<luctioo to Eyan~lical
Christian Education, ed. J. Edward Hakes, 13-24. Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1964.
_ _ _. "Sharper Focus on Watchman Nee." Christianity Today, 9 May 1975, 31-32.
_ _ _ . "Signs of a Bultmann-Tillich Merger." Christianity Today, 11 September
1964, 30-31.
"Signs of Evangelical Disunity." Christianity Today, 9 April 1976, 33-34.
"Soul Searching in Social Welfare." Christianity Today, 2 February 1959, 3133.
"South Africa's Race Dilemma." Christianity Ioday, 31January1964, 34-35.

334
_ _ _. "South Korea in the Balances." Christianity Today, 4 July 1975, 65-66.
_ _ _. "Special Revelation and the Problem of World Community." Part 1.
Calvin forum 18 (August-September 1952): 13-16.
_ _ _. "Special Revelation and the Problem of World Community." Part 2.
Calvin Forum 18 (October 1952): 31-33.

~

~

_ _ _. "The Spirit and the Written Word" Bibliotheca Sacra 111(October1954):
302-316.
_ _ _. "The Spirit of Foreign Policy." Christianity Ioday, 29 April 1957, 20-23.
"The Stalemate in Theology." Christianity Today, 18 January 1963, 24-25.
"The State in Welfare Work." Christianity Today, 18 January 1960, 20-23.
_ _ _. "Step Up the Evangelical Thrust." Cbristianiiy Toda,y, 13October1961, 3334.
_ _ _. "The Storm Over Academic Freedom." Christianity Today, 12 April 1963, 2830.
_ _ _. "Strife Over Social Concerns." Christianity Today, 4 June 1976, 32-33.
_ _ _. "Taxation and the Churches." Christianiiy Today, 4 January 1960, 20-22.
_ _ _. "The Tensions Between Evangelism and the Christian Demand for Social
Justice." Ficles Et Historia 4 (Spring 1972): 3-10.
_ _ _. "Theological Reflection on Bicentennial Concerns."
(May-June 1976): 288-303.

Reli~ous

Education 71

_ _ _. "Theological Situation in Europe: Decline of the Bultmann Era?" Part 1.
Christianity Today, 11 September 1964, 3-6.
_ _ _. "Theological Situation in Europe: Decline of the Bultmann Era?" Part 2.
Christianity Today, 25 September 1964, 12-14.
_ _ _. "Theology and Biblical Authority: A Review Article of The Uses Scripture in
Recent Theolo~y by D. H. Kelsey." Journal of Evan~elical Theolo~ical Socieiy, 19
(Fall 1976): 315-323.
_ _ _. "Theology and Evolution." In Evolution and Christian Thou~ht Ioday, ed.
Russell Lowell Mixter, 190-221. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1959.
_ _ _. "Theology for Evangelism." Christianity Today, 3 August 1959, 20-22.
_ _ _. "Theology of Mission and Changing Political Situations." In Theolo~y and
Mission, ed. David J. Hesselgrave, 275-291. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, 1978.

335
_ _ _. "Third World Know-How." Christianity Today, 3 January 1975, 32-33.
_ _ _. "Those Incomprehensible British Fundamentalists." Part 1. Christianity
Today, 2 June 1978, 22-26.
_ _ _. "Those Incomprehensible British Fundamentalists." Part 2. Christianity
Today, 23 June 1978, 22-26.
_ _ _. "Those Incomprehensible British Fundamentalists." Part 3. Christianity
Today, 21 July 1978, 29-32.
_ _ _. "Three Threats to Our American Way of Life." United Evan~elical Action, 1
January 1952, 3.
_ _ _. "Tillich's Voice is Stilled: A Molder of Modem Theology is Gone."
Christianity Today, 19 November 1965, 30-31.
"A Time for Moral Indignation." Christianity Today, 18 June 1965, 28-29.
"Toward An Asian Theology." Christianity Today, 1January1971, 36-37.
"Toward A Brighter Day." Christianity Today, 6 August 1976, 28-29.
_ _ _. "The Triumph of Christ's Gospel." Christianity Today, 15 February 1963,
28-29.
_ _ _ . "The Trumpet of the Lord." Christianity Ioday, 10 June 1957, 20-22.
_ _ _. "The Undoing of the Modem Mind" In Evan~lical Roots: A Tribute to
Wilbur Smith, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer, 101-120. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson,
Inc., 1978.
_ _ _ . "The Uneasy Conscience Revisited: Current Theological, Ethical and Social
Concerns." Theolo~. News and Notes, Fuller Theological Seminary (December
1987): 3-9.
- - - · "The Vigor of the New Evangelicalism. Part 1. Christian Life and Times 3
(January 1948): 30-32.
II

- - - · "The Vigor of the New Evangelicalism. Part 2. Christian Life and Times 3
(March 1948): 35-38, 85.
II

- - - · "The Vigor of the New Evangelicalism. Part 3. Christian Life and Times 3
(April 1948): 30f.
II

"Vision of a Uniting Task." Christianity Today, 8 October 1976, 40-41.
"Visit with Brunner." Christianity Ioday, 26 September 1960, 46-47.
_ _ _ . "The War of the Word." The New Review of Books and Reli~ion, 9
September 1976, 7.

336
_ _ _. "Wavering Evangelical Initiative." Christianity Today, 16 January 1976, 3233.
_ _ _. "WCC Approves a Trinitarian Basis." Christianity Today, 22December1961,
22-24.
_ _ _. "What Is Christianity?" BThliotbeca Sacra 123 (April-June 1966): 104-114.
_ _ _. "What Is Man on Earth For." In Ouest for Reality: Christianity and the
Counter-Culture, 155-161. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1973.
_ _ _. "What is this Fundamentalism?" United Eyan~lical Action, 15 July 1955, 3-

6.
_ _ _. "What Must We Do to Save the Day." Eternity, December 1970, 12-15.
_ _ _. "What Social Structures?" The Refouned Journal 16 (May-June 1966): 6-7.
_ _ _. "What Some Scientists Say About God and the Supernatural." Christianity
Today, 26 August 1965, 5-11.
_ _ _. "When Psychology and Theology Meet." Christianity Today, 2 July 1965,
24.
"Where Do We Go From Here?" Christianity Today, 12 November 1956, 1618.
"Where Is Modem Theology Going?" Christianity Today, 1 March 1968, 3-7.
_ _ _. "Where is America Going?" Christianity Today, 21June1968, 23-24.
_ _ _. "Where is Evangelical Initiative?" Christianity Today, 22 May 1961, 20-21.
_ _ _. "Where Were the Giants?" Christianity Today, 2 August 1963, 30-31.
_ _ _. "Which Way for Theology in the Near Future?" Christianity Today, 6
November 1964, 8-11.
_ _ _. "Who Is My Brother's Keeper?" Christian lierald 85 (January 1962): 14f.
_ _ _. "Why We Need Christian Think Tanks." Christianity Today, 15 March 1985,
14-15.
_ _ _. "A Wide and Deep Swath." In Philoso.pby of Gordon H. Clark: A
Festscbrift, ed. Ronald H. Nash, 9-21. Philadelphia, PA: The Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Co., 1968.
"Winds of Change--Puffs of Freedom." Christianity Today, 7 July 1967, 4-6.
"Winds of Promise." Christianity Today, 5 June 1970, 29-30.
_ _ _. "Wintertime in European Theology." Part I. Christianity Today, 21
November 1960, 3-5.

337
_ _ _. "Wintertime in European Theology." Part II. Christianity Today, 5 December
1960, 12-14.
- - - · "Wintertime in European Theology. Part m. Christianity Today, 2 January
1961, 10-12.
II

_ _ _. "Wintertime in European Theology." Part IV. Christianity Today, 16 January
1961, 10-12.
_ _ _. "The Word of God Will Not Be Bound." Christianity Today, 15 April 1957,
20-21.
"World Council On Socialism." Christiapity Today, 8 July 1966, 3-7.
"World Evangelism or World Revolution." Decision, November 1966, 1,14
"A World Short of Breath." Christianity Today, 6 November 1964, 28-29.
"X Marks the Mystery." Christianity Today, 4December1970, 31-32.
"Yea, Hath God Said .. ?" Christianity Ioday, 26 April 1963, 26f.
Additional Sources
Ahlstrom, S. "The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology." Church History 24
(September 1955): 257-272.
Ammerman, Nancy T. "North American Protestant Fundamentalism." In Fundamentalism
Observed. Vol. 1. (Forthcoming).
Anderson, Randall E. "The Symbolic Processing of Continuity and Change Using the
Case of Carl F. H. Henry." Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1983.
Aristotle. Nicoroachean Ethics. Translated with introduction and notes by Martin Ostwald.
Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962.
Aristotle. The Po1itics of Aristotle. Edited and translated by Ernest Barker. London:
Oxford University Press, 1958.
Arnold, Paul L. "Is Doctor Henry Right: Yes!" United Eyan~elical Action, 15 July 1947,
5f.
Ashcraft, Morris. "Response to Carl F. H. Henry, 'Are We Doomed to Hermeneutical
Nihilism."' Review and Expositor 71 (Spring 1974): 217-223.
Augustine, Saint. The City of God. Trans. Marcus Dods. New York, NY: Modem
Library, 1950.

338
Ault, James M., Jr. Review of lndiyidualism and Social Ethics: An Evan(Wlical
Syncretism, by Dennis Hollinger. In Journal For the Scientific Study of Reli&ion, 24
(June 1985): 223-224.
Baillie, J. The Idea of Revelation in Recent Ihou&}lt. New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1956.
Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M.
Tipton. Habits of the Hean: JndividuaHsm and Commitment in American Life.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.
Berg, John Leland "An Ethical Analysis of Selected Leaders and Issues of the New
Religious Right." Ph.D. diss., Baylor University, 1985.
Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Iheolo&f, 4th revised and enlarged edition. Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1941.
Berkouwer, Gerrit C. General Revelation. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1955.
Bloesch, Donald. Essentials of EvanfWlical Iheolo&Y· 2 vols. San Francisco, CA:
Harper and Row, 1978.

____. The Future of Evan&elical Christianity: A Call for Unity Amid Diversity.
Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1983.
____. Review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In Christian
Century, 97 (9 April 1980): 414.
Blumhofer, Edith L. and Joel A. Carpenter. Tweotieth-Cennuy Evan&elicalism: A Guide
to the Sources. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1990.
Boice, James Montgomery, ed. The Founclation of Biblical Authority. Grand Rapids, MI:
Z.Ondervan Publishing House, 1978.
Briggs, Kenneth. Review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In
New York Times Book Review. 3 April 1977, sec. 7, p. 32.
Bromley, David and Anson Shupe. New Christian Politics. Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1984.
Brown, Colin, general ed. The New International Dictionary of New Testament Tueolo&Y·
Translated, with additions and revisions, from the German Theolo&isches
BejUiffslexikQn Zurn Neuen Testament. edited by Lothar Coenen, Erich Beyreuther
and Hans Bietenhard Grand Rapids, MI: Regency Reference Library, Z.Ondervan
Publishing House, 1986.
Bruce, Steve. The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Ri&ht: Conservative Protestant
Politics in America. 1978-1988. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Carpenter, Joel, ed. Two Refonners of Fundamentalism: Harold John Ocken&a and Carl
F. H. Heru:y. Fundamentalism in American Religion, 1880-1950, vol. 45. New
York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988.

339
Cerillo, Augustus, Jr., and Murray W. Dempster. Salt and Li~ht: Eyan~ical Political
Ihou~ht in Modem America. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989.
Chandler, Russell. "Towering Theologian." Chap. in The Overcomers. Old Tappan, NJ:
Fleming H. Revell Co., 1978.
Cochrane, Arthur. "Natural Law in Calvin." In Church. State· Relations in Ecumenical
Perspectiye, ed. Elwyn Smith, 176-217. Pittsburgh, 1966.
"Conservatism Today."

~.

13 July 1962, 51.

Copleston, Frederick, S.J. A Histoty of Philosqpby. Vol. 2, Mediaeval Pbilqsqphy, Part
l, Au~ustine to Bqnaveoture. Garden City, NY: Image Books, A division of
Doubleday and Co., 1962.
Cranfield, C. E. B. The Epistle tQ the Romans. International Critical Commentary Series.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Limited, 1979.
D'Arcy, M. C. and others. Saint Au~stine. New York, NY: Meridian Books, The
World Publishing Company, 1957.
Dart, John. "Evangelical Impact on U.S. Society: Theologians Use Varying Yardsticks."
LQs An~eles Times. 7 November 1987. Part 2, p. 6.
Davies, E.T. The Political Ideas Qf Richard Hooker. London: S.P.C.K., 1948.
Davis, John Jefferson. IheqlQ~ical Primer: Resources for the Iheolo~ical Stucient
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981.
Dayton, Donald "The Social and Political Conservatism of Modem American
Evangelicalism: A Preliminary Search for the Reasons." Union Seminaty Ouanedy
Review 37 (Winter 1977): 71-80.
Dayton, Donald W. and Robert K. Johnston, eds. The Variety of American
Eyan~elicalism. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1991.
Deane, Herbert A. The Political and Social Ideas Qf St. Au~ustine. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1963.
Demarest, B. A. General Revelation: Historical Yiews and Contem,pcmuy Issues.
Foreword by Vernon C. Grounds. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1982.
Dempster, Murray Wayne. "The Role of Scripture in the Social Ethical Writings of Carl F.
H. Henry." M.A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1969.
Dengerink, Jan D. "The Christian in Modem Society." International Refonneci Bulletin,
April 1966, 42-52.
_ _ _. "The Power of the Reformation in Political Life." Intematiqnal Reformed
Bulletin, April 1962.

340

Dulles, Avery, S.J. Mo<lels of Revelation. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,
1983.
_ _ _. Review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In
Theoloeical Studies, 38 (December 1977): 773-775.
Ellingsen, Mark. The Evanulical Moyemem: Growth. Impact. Controversy. Dialo~.
Minneapolis, MN: Augsberg Publishing House, 1988.
Elwell, Walter A. ed. Eyan~lical Dictionazy ofiheolo~. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1984. S. v. "Bible, Inspiration," by Carl F. H. Henry; "Church and
State," by R. D. Linder; "Evangelicalism," by Richard V. Pierard; "Higher Criticism,"
by R. K. Harrison; "Millennium, Views of the," R. G. Oouse; "Natural Theology,"
by J. Van Engen; "Neo-Orthodoxy," by R. V. Schnucker; "Regeneration," J. I.
Packer; "Revelation, General," by B. A. Demarest; "Revelation, Special," by Carl F.
H. Henry.
Engeman, Thomas S. "Religion and Political Reform: Wesleyan Methodism in
Nineteenth-Century Britain." Journal of Cburch and State 24 (Spring 1982): 321336.
d'Entreves, Alexander Passerin. The Medieval Contribution to Political Thou~ht: Thomas
Aguinas. Marsilus of Padua. Richard llooker. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1939.
_ _ _. Natural Law. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1951.
Fackre, Gabriel. The Reliwus Ri~ht and the Christian Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982.
_ _ _. "Carl F. H. Henry." In A Handbook of Christian Theolo~ans. Enlarged
edition. Eds. Dean G. Peerman and Martin E. Marty. Nashville, TN: Abingdon
Press, 1984.
Faulkner, Robert K. Richard Hooker and the Politics of a Christian En~land. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1981.
Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rj~hts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Fowler, Paul B. Abortion: Toward an Eyan~lical Consensus. Portland, OR:
Multnomah Press, 1987.
Fowler, Robert Booth. A New En~~meot: Evan~elical Political Thou~t. 1966-1976.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1982.
Frank, Douglas. Less Than ConQYerors: How Eyan~elicals Entered the Twentieth
Centwy. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986.
Garrett, Duane A. and Richard R. Melick, Jr., eds. Authority and lnte{pretation: A Baptist
Per:wectiye. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987.

341
Gierke, Otto. Natural Law and the Theory of Society. 1500-1800. With a lecture on "The
Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity," by Ernst Troeltsch. Translated with an
introduction by Ernest Barker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Gilby, Thomas. The Political Thou&ht of Thomas AQuinas. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1958.
Gilson, Etienne. The Christian PhiloSQphy of Saint Au~stine. Trans. L. E. M. Lynch.
New York, NY: Random House, 1959.
_ _ _. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas AQuinas. Trans. L. K. Shook. New
York, NY: Random House, 1956.
_ _ _. Reason and Revelation in The Middle A&es. New York, NY: Scribner,
1938.
Hancock, Ralph. Calyin and the Foundations of Modem Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989.
Handy, Robert T. "Fundamentalism and Modernism in Perspective." Reli&ion in Life,
Summer 1955, 381-394.
Haney, D. P. "Carl F. H. Henry: A Critical Appraisal of Fundamentalism." M.A. thesis,
Earlham College, 1965.
Hick, John. "Revelation." In The Encyclopedia of PhiloSQphy, ed. Paul Edwards. New
York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press, 1967.
Hill, Samuel S. and Dennis E. Owen. The New Reli&i<>us Political Ri&ht in America.
Nashville, TN: Abington, 1982.
Hillerdal, Gunnar. Reason and Revelation in Richard liooker. Lunds Universitets
Arsskrift, n.s. 1, vol. 543, no. 7. Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962.
Hofstadter, Richard. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New York, NY: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1963.
Hollinger, Dennis. Individualism and Social Ethics: An Evan&elical Syncretism.
Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983.
Holmes, Arthur F. All Truth is God's Truth. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1977.
_ _ _. "The Concept of Natural Law." Christian Scholars Reyiew 2 (1972): 195208.
_ _ _. Faith Seekin& Understandin&. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1971.
Hopfl, Harro. The Christian Polity of John Calyin. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.

Hudson, Winthrop S.
1965.

Reli~on

342
in America. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,

Hunter, James. American Evan~licalism: Conseryatiye Reli~on and the Ouandary of
Modernity. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983.
____. The

Comin~

Generation of Eyan~elicals. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago,

1987.
____. "Religion and Political Civility: The Coming Generation of American
Evangelicals." Journal for the Scientific Study of Reli~on 23 (1984): 364-380.
Jaffa, Harry. Thomism and Aristotelianism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1952.
Jelen, Ted, ed. Reli~ion and Political Behavior in the United States. Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1989.
Johnson, Stephen D. and Joseph B. Tamney, eds. The Political Role of Reli~n in the
United States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
Johnston, Robert K. Eyan~elicals at an Impasse: Biblical Authority in Practice. Atlanta,
GA: John Knox Press, 1979.
____. The Use of the Bible in Theolo~:
Knox Press, 1985.

Eyan~lical

Qptions. Atlanta, GA: John

Kantzer, Kenneth S. Review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In
Christianity Today, 20 May 1983, 72.
Kelsey, David H. The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theolo~. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress
Press, 1975.
Kis, Miroslav M. "Revelation and Ethics: Dependence, Interdependence, Independence?
A Comparative Study of Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl F. H. Henry." Ph.D. diss.,
McGill University, Montreal, 1983.
Klempa, William. "John Calvin on Natural Law." Chap. in John Calvin and the Church:
A Prism of Refoon, ed. Timothy George. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1990.
Kopp, Darrell. "Currents in Contemporary American Evangelical Political Thought"
M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary, 1977.
Liebman, Robert C. and Robert Wunthrow, eds. The New Christian Ri~ht: Mobilization
and Le~timation. New York, NY: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983.
Lippy, Charles H. and Peter W. Williams, eds. Encyc}Qpedia of the American Reli~ous
Experience: Studies of Traditions and Movements. 3 vols. New York, NY: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1988. S. v. "Conservative and Charismatic Developments of the
Later Twentieth Century," by Richard Quebedeaux; "Fundamentalism," by George
Marsden; "Liberalism," by William McGuire King; "Neo-Orthodoxy," by Dennis N.
Voskuil; "Nineteenth-Century Evangelicalism," by Leonard Sweet; "Social

343
Christianity," by Charles H. Lippy; "Social Reform After the Civil War to the Great
Depression," by John A. Mayer; "Social Reform Since the Great Depression," by
Glenn R. Bucher and L. Gordon Tait.
Little, David "Calvin and the Prospects for a Christian Theory of Natural Law." In Nm:m.
and Context in Christian Ethics, eds. Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey, chapter 6. New
York, 1968.
McNeill, J. T. "Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers." Journal of Reli~ion 27
(1946): 168-182.
_ _ _. "Natural Law in the Thought of Luther." Church Histmy 10 (1941): 211227.
Magnuson, Norris. Salvation in the Slums: Evan~lical Social Work. 1865-1220. Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1990.
Maring, N. H. "Henry, Carl F. H." Encyclcwedic Dictionary of Reli~ion, eds. Paul
Kevin Meagher, Thomas C. O'Brien, Sister Consuelo Maria Aheme, SSJ.
Washington, D.C.: Corpus Publications, 1979.
Marsden, George. "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia." In Faith and
Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, 219-263. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
_ _ _. Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shapin~ of Twentieth Centwy
Eyan~elicalism. 1870-1925. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980.
_ _ _. "Fundamentalism as an American Phenomenon, A Comparison with English
Evangelicalism." Church Histmy 46 (June 1977): 215-232.
"The New Fundamentalism." The Refonned Journal 32 (February 1982): 7-

11.
_ _ _. "Preachers of Paradox: The Religious New Right in Historical Perspective."
In Reli~on and America: Spiritual Life in a Secular A~e. eds. Mary Douglas and
Steven Tipton; introduction by Robert N. Bellah, 150-168. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1983.
_ _ _. Refonnin~ Fundamentalism: Fuller Seminazy and the New Evan~licalism.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1987.
- - - · "Understanding Fundamentalist Views of Science. In Science and
Creationism, ed. Ashley Montagu, 95-116. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1984.
II

Marsden, George, ed Evan~licalism and Modern America. Grand Rapids, Ml: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984.
Marshall, John S. "Hooker's Theory of Church and State." An~lican Theolo~cal Review
27 (1945): 151-160.

Marty, Martin E. Modem American Reli~on. Vol. 1, The Irony of It All 1893-1919.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

344

Mathisen, Gerald Stephen. "Evangelical Social Concern: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of
Legitimization." Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 1982.
McDonald, H. D. Theories of Revelation: An Historical Study 1760-1960. Formerly
published under titles, Ideas of Revelation. An Historical Study. A.D. 1700 to A.D .
.l.8!2Q, 1959 and Theories of Revelation. An Historical Study. 1860-1960, 1963.
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1979.
McNeal, Thomas Reginald. "A Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of
Carl F. H. Henry." Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1986.
Miller, Ed. L., ed. Oassical Statements on Faith and Reason. New York, NY: Random
House, 1970.
Moberg, David 0. The Great Reversal:
PA: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1972.

Eyan~elism

Versus Social Concern. Philadelphia,

Mounce, William D. Pastoral Epistles. Word Biblical Commentary Series. Waco, TX:
Word Publishing, forthcoming.
"Mr. Inside." Newsweek, 15 January 1968, 71-72.

Mueller, William A. Cburch and State in Luther and Calvin: A Comparative Study.
Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1954.
Nash, Ronald H. Christian Faith and Historical Understandin~. With a response by
Harold W. Hoehner. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984.
_ _ _. The Conce.pt of God. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1983.
_ _ _. Evan~elicals In America:
Abingdon, 1987.

Who They Are. What J'My Believe. Nashville, TN:

_ _ _. Faith and Reason: Searchin~ for a Rational Faith. Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1988.
_ _ _. The Li~ht of the Mind: St. Au~ustioe's Theozy of Knowled~e. Louisville,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1969.
_ _ _. The New Eyan~licalism. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House,
1963.
_ _ _. Reviews of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In
Christianity Today, 1 April, 1977, 21; 22 February 1980, 38; and, 6 June 1980, 4042.
_ _ _. Social Justice and the Christian Church. Milford, MI: Mott Media, 1983.

345
_ _ _. The Word of God and the Mind of Man: The Crisis of Revealed Truth in
Contempoouy Theolo~. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1982.
Nash, Ronald, ed. The Philoso.phy of Gonion H. Clark: A Eestschrift. Philadelphia, PA:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1968.
New Catholic Encyclopedia. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967. S. v. "Natural Law:
Historical Development," by B. F. Brown; "Natural Law: Thomistic Analysis," by J.
C.H. Wu; "Natural Law: Contemporary Theology and Philosophy," by T. A.
Wassmer; "Natural Law and Jurisprudence," by W. J. Kenealy; "Natural Law and
Jurisprudence," by P. E. Sigmund.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. "Augustine's Political Realism." Chap. in Christian Realism and
Political Problems. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
Noll, Mark A. Between Faith and Criticism: Evan~elicals. Scholarship. and the Bible in
America. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1986.
_ _ _. "Common Sense Tradition and American Evangelical Thought." American
Ouarterly 37 (Summer 1985): 216-238.
- - - - - · Princeton and the Republic. 1768-1822. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989.
_ _ _. The Princeton Theolo~. 1812-1921. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House,
1983.
Obitts, Stanley. "A Philosophical Analysis of Certain Assumptions of the Doctrine of the
Inerrancy of the Bible." Journal of the Eyan~elical Theolo~al Society, 26 (June
1983): 129-136.
Oliver, John. "A Failure of Evangelical Conscience." Post-American, May 1975, 26-29.
Packer, J. I. Review of Carl F. H. Henzy, by Bob E. Patterson. In ~. December
1984, 27-28.
Patterson, Bob E. Carl F. H. Herny. Makers of the Modem Theological Mind. Waco,
Texas: Word Books, 1983.
_ _ _. "Carl F. H. Henry: Apologist of Evangelical Orthodoxy." The Journal of
Ministers Personal Library, 1and2 (1979, 1980).
Pierard, Richard V. "Bibliography on the New Christian Right." ISF Bulletin 5
(November-December 1981): 1-4
_ _ _. "The Christian Right." Foundations 25 (April-June 1982): 212-217.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals and the New Political Conservatism." Evane;elical Studies
Bulletin 5 (May 1984): 7-9.
_ _ _. "The New Religious Right: A Formidable Force in American Politics."
Choice 19 (March 1982): 863-879.

346

_ _ _. The Uneg,ual Yoke: Eyan~lical Christianity and Political Conservatism.
Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1970.
Porter, Daryl A. "Christianity Ioday: Its History and Development, 1956-1978." Th.M.
thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1978.
Purdy, Richard Allan. "Carl Henry and Contemporary Apologetics: An Assessment of the
Rational Apologetic Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of the Current
Impasse Between Refonned and Evangelical Apologetics." Ph.D. diss., New York
University, 1980.
Quebedeaux, Richard. The Worldly Evanielica1s. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row,
1980.
Ramm, Bernard. After Fundamentalism. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1983.
_ _ _. "Is Doctor Henry Right: No!" United Evan&elical Action, 15 July 1947, 5f.
_ _ _. Special Reyelarion and the Word of God. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1961.
Reichley, A. James. Reliiion in American Public Life. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institute, 1985.
Rice, Ronald. Review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl F. H. Henry. In
Reliiious Studies Review, 7 (April, 1981): 107-115.
Rifkin, Jeremy with Ted Howard The Emeriini Order: God in the A~ of Scarcity.
New York, NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1979.
Rodriguez, Richard. "A Continental Shift: Latin Americans Convert from Catholicism to a
More Private Protestant Belief." Los An~eles Times, 13 August 1989. Part V, p. 1.
Sandeen, Ernest R. "The Origins of Fundamentalism." In Reliiion in American Essays:
Intet:pretiye Essays, eds. John Mulder and John F. Wilson, 415-430. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.
_ _ _. The Roots of Fundamentalism. British and American Millenarianism: 180012.Jil. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Sharp, Larry Dean. "Carl Henry: Neo-Evangelical Theologian." D. Min. thesis,
Vanderbilt University Divinity School, 1972.
Shupe, Anson and William A. Stacey. Born Aiain Politics and the Moral Majority: Wbat
Social Surveys Really Show. New York, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1982.
Sider, Ronald J., ed. The Chicaw Declaration. Carol Stream, IL: Creation House, 1974.
Sigmund, Paul. Natural Law in Political Thouiht Washington, D.C.: University Press
of America, 1971.
Simon, Yves R. The Tradition of Natural Law. Foreword by John H. Hallowell. New
York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1965.

347
Smedes, Lewis B. "The Evangelicals and the Social Question." The Reformed Journal 16
(February 1966): 9-13.
_ _ _ ,. "A Senator on Sin." The Reformed Journal 20 (July-August 1970): 4-5.
_ _ _. "Where Do We Differ?" The Refonned Journal 16 (May-June 1966): 8-10.
Smidt, Corwin. "Evangelical Versus Fundamentalist: An Analysis of the Political
Characteristics and Importance of Two Major Religious Movements ... " Delivered at
the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting in Chicago, April 1983.
_ _ _. "Evangelicals Within Contemporary American Politics: Differentiating
Between Fundamentalist and Non-Fundamentalists Evangelicals." Western Political
Ouarterly 41 (1988): 601-620.
Smidt, Corwin ed. Contetnporacy Evan~cal Political Inyolyemem: An Analysis and
Assessment. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989.
Smith, Timothy. Revivalism and Social Refonn in Mid-Nineteenth Centwy America.
New York, NY: Abingdon Press, 1957.
Speer, James A. "The New Christian Right and Its Parent Company: A Study in Political
Contrasts." In New Christian Politics, eds. David G. Bromley and Anson Shupe, 1940. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984.
Sproul, Robert C., John H. Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley. Classical Apoloe;etics: A
Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of fresu12positiona1 Apoloeetics.
Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing Co., 198.
Strauss, Leo. Natural Rie;ht and History. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1953.
_ _ _. Studies in Platonic Political PhilosOJlhy. Introduction by Thomas L. Pangle.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Strauss, Leo and Joseph Cropsey, eds. History of Political PhiloSOJlhy, 4th ed. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Surlis, Paul. "Natural Law in Richard Hooker." Irish Church Ouarterly 35 (1968): 173185.
Sweet, Leonard I., ed. The Evaneelical Tradition in America. Macon GA: Mercer
University Press, 1984.
"Theology for the Tent Meeting."

~.

14 February 1977, 82.

Thompson, W. D. J. Cargill. The Political Thoueht of Martin Luther. Brighton, Sussex:
The Harvester Press Limited, 1984.
Troeltsch, Ernst. The Social Teachine; of the Christian Cburches. 2 vols. Translated by
Olive Wyon. With an introduction by H. Richard Niebuhr. New York, NY: Harper
and Row, 1960.

348
Verhey, Allen. "The Use of Scripture in Moral Discourse: A Case Study of Walter
Rauschenbusch." Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1975.
_ _ _. "The Use of Scripture in Ethics." Reli&i@s Studies Review 4 (January 1978):
28-35.
Wameck, Richard H. "The Theology of Carl F. H. Henry." S.T.M. thesis, Concordia
Seminary, 1968.
Weber, Timothy P. Livimi in the Shadow of the Second Comin~: American
Premilleooialism. 1875-1925. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Weinreb, Lloyd L. Natural Law and Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1987.
Wells, David F. and John D. Woodbridge, eds. The Evan~elicals: What They Belieye.
Who They Are. Wbere They Are Chan~n~. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1975.
Wiser, James L. Political Theory: A Thematic Inguizy. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, 1986.
Wolin, Sheldon. "Politics and Religion: Luther's Simplistic Imperative." American
Political Science Reyiew 50 (March 1956): 24-42.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. "Contemporary Christian Views of the State: Some Major
Issues." Christian Scholars Review 3 (June 1974): 311-332.

VITA

The author, David L. Weeks, is the son of Bob and Dorothy Weeks. He was born
June 25, 1958, in Terre Haute, Indiana.
In September, 1976, Mr. Weeks entered Marion College, receiving the degree of
Bachelor of Science in political science, religion/philosophy, and business in May 1980.
In June, 1980, Mr. Weeks was granted an assistantship at Indiana State University,
enabling him to complete the degree of Master of Arts in political science in August 1981.
His M.A. thesis, entitled "Colonial American Puritan Political Thought," was completed
under the direction of Professors Robert Puckett, Robert Clouse and James Johnson.
In September, 1981, Mr. Weeks was granted an assistantship and entered the Ph.D.
program in political science at Loyola University of Chicago.
In September, 1983, Mr. Weeks was named an assistant professor of political
science at Azusa Pacific University, where he teaches courses in political philosophy and
American government. In 1988, he was appointed chairperson of the History/Political
Science department.
He has published book reviews in the International Journal on World Peace and
Christianity Today. He co-authored, with Dr. Robert Puckett, "The Moral Majority and
American Foreign Policy," published in the Indiana Journal of Political Science. He has
served as co-director, with Dr. Christopher Flannery, for two summer institutes entitled
"The Principles of American Democracy." The institutes were supported by a grant from
the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution.

349

APPROVAL SliEET
The dissertation submitted by David L. Weeks has been read and approved by the
following committee:

Dr. James L. Wiser, Director
Senior Vice President and Dean of Faculties
Loyola University of Chicago
Dr. Thomas Engeman
Professor of Political Science
Loyola University of Chicago
Dr. Ronald Nash
Professor of Religion/Philosophy
Western Kentucky University
Dr. Raymond Tatalovich
Professor of Political Science
Loyola University of Chicago
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature
which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to
content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.
'i

\

~··

i',,

~/

/

\ pirector's Signature

\_

/

'

,-'

/ / //:/

